Skip to main content

Full text of "Illinois Appellate Court Unpublished Opinions: first series"

See other formats





o /^ 

General number 9330. y a ^ /^T'H /. ^ ■■ ^^®^^^ number 7 
i/the appellate GQB!^T 

0? ii.Liiij>rs 


MAY^-^^il^® A.D. 1942 



Plainti f f -A^iJellee , 


ViJEISIIAa^R, Executors of the 
Estate of Joseph V/eisiiaar, 

HAYSS, P. J. : 



316 I. 


A Clain was allowed in the County Court of Calhoun 
County in favor of appellee (hereinafter called plaintiff) 
against the estate of Joseph Weishaar, deceased. h£i appeal 
from this judgment was taken to the Circuit Court of Calhoun 
County where the claiia was allowed in the sum of two thousand 
five hundred and ninety-five dollars and thirty-six cents 
(12,595.36) and jud^aent entered thereon. 

The claim v?as based upon a promissory aote dated 
April 29, 1933, for thirty one hundred ($3100.00) dollars, 
due one year after date, payable to Louis Baltisberger , signed 
by Joseph '.Yeishaar in his lifetine, and four other signers as 
co-aakers. The signers of the note were all directors of the 
Bank of Brussels. It appears from the evidence tiiat the Bank 
was having difficulty in obtainiiig permission to open after 
the bank rioratoriu-ni of 1933; that in order to obtain cash 
with which to re-open five of the directors, including the 

decedent Joseph v.'eishaar, made and executed the note in question. 



to ^Tr 

•Y ■-, ;V ""r M ■ .- ;• ^•: 5)fiO at) b 


The cashier P, II. Zingrang, one of the co-makers, secured the 
signatures of the other four snd delivered the note to plaintiff 
in exonange for thirty one hundred dollars in Liberty 3ond.s. 
ihese "bonds were used to open the bank. Certain notes of the 
bank \riiieh had evidently been taken out of the assets of the 
bank v?ere place«.with I,!r. Zingrang as security for the benefit 
of the makers of the note and from the collection of these 
securities one thousand dollars v/as paid upon the note on 
April 18, 1938, end the interest was peid to April 29, 1938. 
Neither in the County Court nor until the close of evidence 
in the trial in the Circuit Goixrt vms there a denial of the 
execution of the note filed. At the conclusion of all the 
evidence in the Circuit Court, the defendants asked leave to 
file amended objections which denied that Joseph Weishaar, 
during his lifetime, executed said note for the consideration 
mentioned therein. 

The principal ground urged for reversal is that there 
is no competent evidence to establish the execution of the note, 
and that the v/itness ?. M, Zingrang who testified to the execution 
and delivery of the note was incompetent on account of being a 
joint maker, and interested, and that the statute prohibittii a 
person in interest frora testifying where the adverse party 
defends as adaiiiistrator. 

It appears fK>ra the record in this case that ilncrang, 
who was Cashier of the Brussels Bank, had taken the note in question 
to the various directors and liad had theia sign it. Under his 
testimony, which was not contradicted, the execution of the note 
was clearly established, leaving the only question of whether or 
not he was a cosipetent witness. Under section two of the Evidence 
Act, Chapter 51, tiie prohibition is against a party to the suit 

•sffbt Ttaiiitc 

i->fiC>;', VJ*i: 

.o'l e^aficfxie ill 

T eaiso I 


noliljssO esw cuQlW 





or a person directly interested in the event thereof. Singrang 

cannot be said to be directly interested in the outcome of this 
particular suit. His liability, by reason of being a signer on 
a note, is not changed in the slightest degree by tids particular 
suit. He does not testify on his own notion nor in his ovki 
behalf but rather to the valid execution of the note in question. 
It would be more favorable to hiia in relieving hiia of liability 
if it turned out that the note was not a genuine or a valid note. 
His testimony, in effect, is aj^ainst his ov^n interest aiii does 
not, in our j'jigr.ient, come v/ithin the prohibition set out in the 
statute , ... 

In the ease of Sconce v. Henderson, et al., 102 111. 
376, it was held that the principal of a pruraissory note is a 
competent witness in a suit brought on said note against the 
surety, for he is not a party to the suit and his interest, 
whatever it aight be, is equally balanced, no i.oatter in whose 
favor the suit slight terminate, as he is and would ultinately 
be liable for the i^ole sua aue on the note. 

The fact that the execution of the note was not 
denied in the Probate Court nor in the Circuit Court, until 
after the evidence was closed, — and then the ueuial uas not 
certain and definite but conditional — aiid no eviaence offei*ed 
by the defendant showed that the signature of Joseph Weishaar 
was not genuine, forces us to conclude that tiie testinony of 
Mr, Zingrang was the truth and the iK)te v.'as ■aade, executed 
and delivered in consideration of the thirty one hundred 
dollars v/orth of Liberty Bonds of the plaintiff, and tiiat the 
Circuit CoMrt properly allowed the clain. The defendant's 
suggestion, in their brief, that attorney's fees were included 
in the amount of the judgment is not warranted for a computation 

ail;:: JS&a%»^ i.B fQ 

HO laii . 

>J 3xii 


Digitized by tine Internet Arcinive 

in 2010 witii funding from 

CARLI: Consortium of Academic and Research Libraries in Illinois 6illij^^^^^ 



■;■■ ; 
of the unpaid principal with the Interest from the date of the 

last payment of interest to the date of Judgment shows clearly 

that no sum v/ae allovved for attorney's fees. 

For the reasons herein set out tiie allowance of the 
claim of the Circuit Court of Calhoun Oouaty v/as correct, also 
the judgiaent entered thei^on and the jud^ent is hereby affirned. 








General No. 9336. 




AdmlnlBtratrlx c^f the Estate ) 

of Everett E. jdtchell, ) 

Deceased, ,. ) 

pefendant Appellant. ) 

Term, A. D., 1942. 

Agenda N<k^. 

Plaintiff AppelJi^A, 

Appeal "^fo: 
Circuit Coiipt, 

■■ / / 

RiSSS, J. : 


The plaintiff appellee, Mllford Kellenberger, filed suit 
against tiie defendant appellant, Helen Hartman Elitchell, as Adralnis- 
tratrlx of the Estate of Everett E. Mitchell, deceased. In the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County to recover daaasee for personal 
injuries arising out of an automobile collision. The case was tried 
by a Jury which returned a veardict in the sum of two thousand dollars 
against the defendant, after ootions for a directed verdict for the 
defendant had been denied both at the close of plaintiff's evidence 
and all of the evidence. Motions for Judgiaent in favor of the 
defendant notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial were also 
made and denied, and jud^aent was rendered against the defendant on 
the verdict on August 18, 1941, ft»om which this appeal was perfected. 

The co^laint charged that the collision between the car of 
the plaintiff and that of defendant's intestate, li^verett E. Jfiltchell, 
ocouxT*9d at about 12:30 P. M. on October 4, 1940, at a point on State 
Route No. 48 about one mile east of U. 3. Route Wo, 66 in Montgomery 




fJI ^0 

.dS;C(^ .oV }LB.i&tk%0 









^iiJ8 i)dli^ 4"ia&'xa<fist»lX»X MotXli^ .sallaqciA tlUrci/^lq aril 

9*iHllGh iatiisdiJodJ' owd" ^o fiiwe 9ii^ aJt loif>as>v « I)«craiiJro'i Hold*/ \iiii R xd 

BOfiaLfiv';* %'11tJWnlfjXti to saoXo si? jiii^Jb ri^dd Ljsii J'AaJbfu>l9fi 

©£fd- 1g 'xo'tri!! Hi d^flSiTMaijfct, i*^ «4Btt»itlv ^adlv© sd.^ ^o XXs JbAA 

o«Xjr 9T:3w Xjili^ ^t>« lot f'r^a ^oi^*i?7 yaJ ijiiJUifUi^a^J'lwJofi J'fiiai)n0^ei> 

.&e.*09tidQ a»w X««Qcr« aiitf riaiiiw i3<Mrt ^1^' no ioiJt««r silJ 


County, Illinois. The con^lalnt furtbier charges and It appeared ftrom 
the evidence that the deceased, li^verett E. Mitchell, was the ovner of 
and was driving a Sulcic automobile in an easterly direction along State 
Route No. 48; that he undertook to pass around a truck which was pro- 
ceeding eastwardly ahead of him, and at a point near the rear of the 
truck, x*an into and collided with the car of the plaintiff, t^ho was 
proceeding westwardly in a Mash automobile, and thereby seriously 
injured the plaintiff. 

Numerous allegations of negligence on the part of the 
defendant are set forth, including failure to keep a lookout for 
west bound traffic; failure to aiaintaln sufficient brakes; to sound 
his horn or give warning signal that he was about to turn his vehicle 
from a direct course, contrary to statute cited; in driving at a 
speed greater than was reasonaJale and proper, having regard for the 
traffic and use of the way; in falling to turn to the rig^t of the 
center of such highway so as to pass without interference; In driving 
to the left of the center of the road on and against plaintiff's car, 
while the same was proceeding on the right or proper side of the 
highway; in negligently attempting to overtake and pass another 
vehicle proceeding ahead of the Mitchell oar in violation of the 
statute, from which alleged negligence the collision and injury to 
plaintiff proximately resulted while the plaintiff was in the exercise 
of due care and caution for his own safety. Defendant denied due care 
on the part of the plaintiff and of any negligence on the part of the 

Defendant assigns error in the refusal of the Court to gz»ant 
motions for directed verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of 
plaintiff's evidence and of all the evidence; in denying defendant's 
motions for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial and 
in entering Judgment on the verdict, and contended that there was no 
evidence tending to prove the exercise of due oare and caution or lack 


sliR^e aAoX« 0oWo«alli Y-£'t«'?»^" dotto^uii 5f»x.i;e « sniTlifc SAW barn 

-(yxq SAW i£oliiw SLbixat <j bnuirca esaci o.t j{ool'X9&ittf %A is^iLt ^8^ .oM sJ'juvff 

sricr tot 5*!ot3»l siJiv/us ^rn&qo'sq htm 9Xo^noB«<5*i 8«%" osriJ^ •x»J'AS*xfi £«*q« 

^••r•«;i.t,". v J..-^c-3vlXs»J5 fli ;T&«inE{gld 
. ..; .__ .... ^/.JLf>»»oo'S€j eXoJLrieT 

i: 'Id lol x!oi•i^i.-i^:: one y'x«c «i2& t» 
sitJ "5.0 .t'u . .::,^__.^. "^^ini: ' -o i^^&^_ 9&S no 

8'J^n*^G*i. ..-,.. ..^ jsonaiJl. ... .„. : .. htta •s>«ax>it^«s rj'HiJ'niAXq 

l2a« X»i'i ' •' r 30"* fc«fi ^oXJbisx'' ■ -5 :«f!Xftnfll8xi#iwJofl J^mtmait; , ^ftei^oa 

Ofi r*r. ...J Ifijci^ JE>9£tfIs4nCi:' -.. , JSXf)''"'"'' ■^'■^'•' <"<'■ .?rf i.ns^.i)jr'f snXl«Jn« CX 



■ - 

.. _ "tAfiOTfT *.. 

- ---...- 

<^ i ;■' -t ,• y. 

a3£.c, .;■ 



f^^XoXv ... 

.. ._. 

OS ^^i; 



98X013X9 ^lU. .... 

• -•■ -- 

--_-. _.- - 

«^ao fiub fte-Jn;^: 

■ ifti.:fvit-<^r*r 


of contributory negXlgenc© by the plaintiff. Aside from tlie refusal 
to give instruotions directing verdict for the defendant, no error is 
assigned In the giving or refusal of any of the instructions. The 
case is argued by the defendant upon the theory that there is no proof 
in the record tending to show that the plaintiff was in the (sxerciae 
of due care and caution for his own safety. 

Briefly recited, the evidence of one of plaintiff's witnesses, 
Helen Oross, was that she was driving in her own car at a speed of 
between thirty five and forty miles per hour alosig the highway approx- 
imately one fourth to one half mile to the rear of the Mitchell car at 
the tlrae of the oollieion; that the oar driven by !litchell^ passed her 
at a speed of about ten to fifteen miles faster than she was driving 
and continued westward ahead of her car in the right traffic lane until 
It reached the rear of a truck going in the same direction, when the 
Mitchell car diHJve to the left without hesitating, to go around the 
truck; that the Kellenbei^er car was approaching from the opposite 
direction along the north side of the slab, which she first saw when 
the Mitchell car collided with It at a point near the rear end of tlxe 
truck, the collision being on the side of the highway from whi<^ the 
Kellenberger oar was approaching; that after the collision, the 
Kellenberger oar was headed half way around and at an angle, being 
partly on and partly off of the iilghway and the Mitchell car was 
entirely off of the highway; that there was a light rain at the time 
of the collision. Photographs of the point of collision and condition 
of the cars were admitted in evidence. 

It is undisputed that in this collision, plaintiff was 
severely injured and Mitchell was killed and the defendant appointed 
Administratrix of his estate. The evidence further showed that as a 
result of the collision, the plaintiff sustained a fractiire of the 
skull, an injury to the sensory nerve from a cut above his eye, cuts 
on his arms and lege, torn ligaments of his leg and injuries to his 


.I5.?8^.na iiwc siA lol floiJTi;*© &«« d'ijip «iai It© 
to Jb»&as B Sa obo n«fo inrl ni siiivi«x& saw diis v^A^>iv^ ajiv ,A&e'x-0 a»JLi^)r 


; ..-^liiOaorf;c;Qi"i a*''- ^a'yfMi'rtfiX«:i 

Xf^Xt; «noX«tX£Xaf» e4^ oX 4£s^ i>4»ui;QaX^*iUf si .fX 

rrfc; ■il!.lisiXxiLq, 9sM ,noX«XXXoo efj. - =- 

^X«»uUJ; Uit> h^l bJUI io sJuttiafigiX iwdJ^ ,«g»i. Jioa ajruB «Xxl ac 

anlde and other Injuries for whi<di he was treated; first In the 
hoaplttil aod then at hla home for six weeks and^wns obliged to go 
on crutches for a tliae thereafter. He waa unable to work for more 

than two laonths and became liable to paj coiisiderable sums for hos- 

. , , . sus.talned 
pital and physicians' bills and X-rays andAoaa of wages while 

undergoing treataaeat for his injuries. 

Froa a careful reading of the briefs, abstracts ivnA an 
examination of the record herein, it appears to this Court that both 
the question of due care and want of contributory negHgenoe on the 
part of the plaintiff and that of negligence on tJne part of the 
deceased beoaiae questions of fact peculiarly within the province of 
the Jury to pass upon under the facts and clrcusaatances in evidenoo 
and legitimate inferences therefroa. 

It Is a settled nU.e of lav of this State that upon a notion 
for a directed verdict, a question of law Is first presented as to 
whether, shen all of the evidence is considered together with all 
reasonable inferences therefroa la its aspect moat favorable to the 
partry against whoa the motion Is directed, there Is a total failure 
to prove one or more of the necessary element© of the ease. Foreaan- 
3t&te Trust & Savings Bank v. Deiaeter, 547 111. 73, 179 IJ. S. 466. 
The Trial Court Is not permitted to direct a verdict where there is 
any evidence fairly tending to prove the allegations of plaintiff's 
ooB¥»laint, and this rule spiles in passing upon the question of 
whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care and catitlon 
for his ogm safety at and inuaediately before the injury. Blumb v. 
Oetz, 366 111. 273, 8 H.E. <2d) 620; Reidel v. Can^, 311 lU. App. 
656, 37 M. S. {8d) 579; I'^edig v. Ki^oger arocery & Baking Co., 882 
111. App. 370; Selaan v. llldwest Haulers, 309 111. App. 164, 33 H.E.CSd) 

In the case of Zlraldo v. Lynch Co., 365 111. 197, 6 tJ.E. (2d) 
125, it is said: "Whether a plaintiff was guilty of oontrlbutoxv 

-«>ro.n life sxnifB ^Xfifjp.riab.' iJJtl .^H^eEa^^ b*iM MiL^stam. ovS tt»di 

a©i;*«« »!»«[« l^«itJ^«*^A^ iilit# to WAX ^9 3Sju% b9liS&» a 9i #1 

,qv .:X5 t^.- : S® {M . . 'J ,5T^ .XXI ©dC ,s^»<^^' 

^f.:' i-^.WiiP. A'"?^g»d0^fi •!«02j0'x:i .V ^, .. o-.'d iliiS) .a .11 V6 ,d«8 

US).'- . ax- ??0£ ^Q.'-s&Zis.'.n crBS.^J:/li' ./ .;-■ -li^C ;0V8 ,mt^ .XXI 

. 'I'-?' X 
(i: ,vei .Xir ???!n ..of- i!»nt4 . 'Sis t» sapo *i.oi:t r.i 

negligence 1b ordinarily a question of fact for the Jury to decide 
under proper Instructions. It becoraee a question of law only when 
the evidence Is so clearly insufficient to eetcbllsh due care that 
all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion tiint there t?as con- 
tributory negligence. (Thomos v. Buchanan, o57 HI. f570; Mueller tr. 
Phelps, 253 Id. 630; O'Rourk© v. Sproul, S41 Id. 576.) A notion to 
direct a. verdict for the defendant preserves for review only a question 
of law whether from the evidence In favor of the plaintiff, standing 
alone and when ooneldered to be time, together with the inferences 
irhlch laay legltlaately be drnwi therefrom, the juzy might reasonpibly 
have found for tlie plulntlff. (Brophy v. Illinois Steel Co., 242 111. 
65; City of Chicago v. Jarvle, 226 id. 614. ) '7e csinnot weigh the 
evidence to deteraine, as r fitter of fact, whether the plaintiff waa 
guilty of contributory negligence, (Dukeraan v. Glevelanft, Cincinnati, 
Chloaso and St. Louis Railway Co., S37 111. 104,) and we cannot reject 
testlaoiiy as Inprpbable unlesj? it is contrary to aorae natural law. 
2etsche v. Chicago, Peoria and ^t. Louis Plailway Co., 238 111. 240." 

As a general rule, both negligence and contributoi^r negligence 
are quefftlcna of fact for the Jury, and when there Is any evidence 
before the Court tending to prove such Issues and the deteralnrttion 
of the question Involves the weighing and coneideratlon of evidence, 
the question is subaltted ae a question of fact to the Jury, 

The only eye witness «ho testified was Helen Crross. Neither 
the driver of tiie truck nor the plaintiff were occurrence witnesses, 
and no other person was present at or liaaedlately before the time of 
the collision. At the time of plalntii'f's injuries, it appears that 
he was driving his ear la a westerly direction on the north side of 
the ^lt5h',5'ay to the right of the center line, t?here the law required 
him to be. Mitchell, froa the evidence, was driving at a rate of 
speed ten to fifteen miles faster than the witness, Heiwi C-ross, 
whose ear Tsras proceeding at a speed of thirty five to forty zailes 

flftfir %lft© /»«! t© noMa0«p ^ «<?f^a>e*<i . .loliout^^ni tQcmtq, TtAiMr 

-lico ajwr 9T:«iti^ J»£fcf iiois«io«oa ^^ «feK»©'4 i^Xuow acnlw 8X<L)itiie>»Ji!rx XXa 

^,ef«fK*»#!"i*t. ^.ciaJ^«,5C^*/t ©^ ^aoTftiii®^. «-Vi«iEl> art ■'«If»i*«a2^Jta'9X- X«a . ^i** 
.XXI s*': , *»^55 aiojtiiii .y xs<i«'i^-) .ttiiuiMist ^nS 'toA Jmm% ^umA 

issl^'f fc^ftf^ ; -.-CI "^§^ t*c^ •'a^llaH ^tiitKl ,iB biOi <igliitaff> 

: sonar- i-v ct-»iiJ .sfefjr Ijsa.- ,^tfi. «il^^l** ■#«<** ^© 8fir>iJ'ji»i;p »•!« 

«x?M!i . -:<n-i> I5K*X«H RiBir l^tit^i^a©^ ©xlp l*»*i^iw »^'b xX«o StfiT 

to f^X« li^'xon i»4ut no iioX/««'iiJ5 t^^wjj*©* s «1 riAO olJfi aiiJtvX*ib «-!>9 iM 

l>®'iij - i»£&^ s*)t^iiw ,©i5XX i^-^riao sfiit tc ifi^ii »^ o,J V-^'feJE^ ♦^ 

If) »J^/»r! i< ;rr 3nJ:vi«xJb mav ^son^bl^if orfJ' JSoTt ,XX«iJto4XK .•«( <^ siK 

»««ic'^4. n«x9K ,tsa9nJrxw od^ fiaiil 'X9,»,^ifl *<*X*bi a«»<}*lit oJT n«.t i>««^ 


per hour, and It appenred to continue at tJila rate until it advanced 
to a point at the rear of the truck, when it oming out aorose the line 
in an apparent effort to also pass the ti-Mck, and struck the plaintiff's 
car head-on near the rear of the truck ajid in the lane of traffic frcMB 
which plaintiff ICellenberger was approaching. 

Under tlxese clrcumstanceg, there was evidence tending to prove 
that the plaintiff was in tlie exercise of due care R.nd caution for his 
own safety and was driving within his traffic lane in a lawful Banner 
and thiit the deceased negligently turned acroBS froa the rear of the 
truck where he could not be seen by the plaintiff until Iiis ej?x had 
ooae out on to the slab and etruck the plaintiff e oar in a head-on 
collision on the left side and across the black line of the slab in 
the direction that the Mitchell car rfB.3 ti'avelling. Ih't&i^r these clr- 
cuHietances, we hold that the facts and clrcuiaetances were Buch as to 
make it a question of fact whether or not the plaintiff was in the 
exercise of due care and whether or not Mitchell was guilty cf negligenoe 
which proxliiiately caused the collision and resultant injuries and 
daaagee as charged in the complaint. 

The Court was amply juetlfied under the evidence wid reason- 
able inferences therefrom viewed in the light aoet favorable to the 
plaintiff in denying defendant's laotion for a directed verdict, '% 
further find that the verdict was not contrary to tlie maiiifest weight 
of the evidence on either the issue of negligence by the defendant or 
want of due care by the plaintiff. In denying defendant's action for 
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion to set aside the 
verdict and grant t. new trial, the Trial Coiu^t coiaia3,tted no error. Ho 
point is iaade nor could the contention be euccewsfully taade that the 
amount of the verdict is exceeelve in view cf the grave injtu'les sus- 
tained by the plaintiff. 

Finding no reversible error in the record, the Juc'.gaier.t of 
the Circuit Cour-t of Kontgoaery^is -if firmed. 


•nil ^d& Bsono J to ♦t«tart siii J^e ^nio<j a «i 

<iX«f •riit BSoiEo^ Iwitt o&jts jl»i osirf no ft(»I«XX£QO 

■ ' i-.riii£jna^!*jj fiUiXEsr it.;; 'il-ii?»iAX<| 

Gen. Ko. 9789. 


316I.A. 113 

Agenda ITo. 13. 





MAY TSRK, A. D. 1942. 

DONALD M. EATON, ^l^esident, II. R. STAIJ- 
TOH, Secretary, WIELTAM LIAPSS, J. E. 
I!Ai:, THOMAS SCRAP, coniti tilting the 
Board of Education of Stdtxkton High 
School District llo. 50, Jo^^Q^viesa / 
County, Illinois. - , / 

P eti tioner s-Appellajp?l5'^. 



CHARLES T. LAI<iB, President',' AilTIIUR R. 
PFIST321ER, Secretary, .-Constituting 
the Board of Sducat^xin of the Ilon- 
Iligh School Distr^"'t of Stephenson ' 
Coxinty, Illlnola^ 

/■-'^ Respondents-Appellees. 



Appeal frcm 
Circuit Court, 
Stephenson County. 







WOLPE,— J. ' ■ .' ■ 

The members of the Board of Education of Stockton 
High School District No. 50, in Jo Daviess County, Illinois, filed 
a petition in the Circuit Court of Stephenson Coxonty for a writ 

€^ jL A. '^ A. Ci 

♦ SI .oil at-negA 

.GGVG tOVl »n6. 

.u.^:?.r .IKKS-T YAM 


.T. — ^a'ijo?.' 

.1^ f^ 

;■ +f4i- 

of mandamus against the individual manibers and Board of Education 
of Non-High School District of Stephenson County, Illinois. The 
petition alleged that ten pupils from the Hon-IIigh School District 
of Stephenson County attended the High School of Petitioners in Jo 
Daviess Coionty; that there was due fron the respondents to the 
petitioners as tuition for said stiidents, the suin of 4^1,192,20; that 
the respondents paid the petitioners the suin of $1,016.14, leaving a 
balance due of $175,80; that the respondents i^ofused to pay the 
petitioners the same; that the petitioners asked the Court for a writ 
of raandamus to enforce said payment. To the original petition, the 
respondents filed a motion to dismiss, which was sustained in part and 
overruled in part. The petitioners then filed an amended petition, and 
a motion to disjniss was likewise sustained in part anu overruled in 
part. The petitioners were again given leave to ariend their petition 
and supplemental petition, and a aotion to dismiss v/as likewise filed 
by the respondents. The Court sustained the rjotion and dismissed the 
petition. The petitioners elected to stand by their second amended 
petition. It is frora this order and judgment that the appeal is 

In the case of The People ex rel, Ethel Shippe^T- Rude, 
Adnx, , Appellant, vs. The County of LaSalle et al. Appellees, 378 111,, 
Page 570, Our Supreme Court discussed the rule relative to raandaiaus 

3ifr .alpnllll ^-^.JrufoO aoaxted^j^J^S 1o cfoliislG Xoorioa xIalH-noM lo 

;. aisdyallj;. lopdoe xisiEfCO*^ &iSi . ;j basoXIij noliitlleq 

a^exsoXil^tdl lo loodc \ odi j3j&an»jdB vcfru;oO noanarfq^^a Ic 

3x1* o4 eitnel>noqa«i »£(? ^o'^i *"^ *•»* ©'xoif^ JjBxfi {tj^iujoO eaolviiG 

. i .jiiebaoq««*x ©rij ^£.1ac 

;i belix 8;tn6£>no<jaart 
w>iiii eiioijici^eq mH: ,4*Uiq at oelimevo 

lijsuisjja eclve'slll aaw salmalb o;t nolJofii m 

L.. juawea-i: . iioiiorfv. '-ictrsen-aeilQqflnB. J>f£* 

Olio' o©a.aJ:fiiSJ.i>- A^jEt^, aoJW.Oui ,©£i4" lJexiJl»it»A.'a ^r-iiio-O exlT ,*«<<ii«iinoqe ; ■ Tjd 

ai. iBeqqB' exf* ^ad^ inQ^n^bul baa lebio ald^ rrx .riolilieq 


^ebuH Y®^'W-^^^'2 ISArfiS ,Iot xe ©Iqoe'l oxfT lo eeao ^xid' nl 
j.IXI SVC ^aseXIsqqA tAlX^qcA » .xotbA 

ai/irtefiaaiar «:f QviinLei ©Xli fifiJ ij©ae;/i&8iij o'xt/oO eiae-iiQwe inO .8V5 ©j;.- 


suits. In this case the facts were stipulated that if the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover, that there v/as due fran the County of LaSalle 
to the petitioner the a^xr^. of ^821.25, and if the action sxorvived the 
death of the pensioner, then the vj-rit of mandamus should issue. In 
discussing the case the Court used this language: "The appellants 
claim that the parties have stipulated that mandamus is the proper 
procedure in this case and the appellees, by their briefs, fail to 
dispute the propriety of the nandanus proceedings. Certain fundamental 
rights cannot be so easily vu-aived and stipulated away. We would be 
giving tacit approval to the practice pursued here, if we did not point 
out that this is not a proper case for an action by mandamus. 

"Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a statutory 
duty only when the right to it is clear and Indispxitable. One seeking 
a writ of maftdamus must establish a clear legal right to the writ. 
(People V. Cetzendaner, 137 111. 234.) Mandamus will not lie for 
the collection of debts, but is proper to enforce payment of a claim 
ascertained to be due. This ascertainment is usually by a judgment, 
(People vs. Reddick, 131 111. 334.) Mandamus is not proper where the 
right of the petitioner must first be established or the duty of the 
officers sought to be coerced must first be determined. Hooper v. 
Snow, 325 111. 53; People v. Dixon, 346 id. 454." 

In the present case it is disputed whether the respondents 


llld'nljBlq: erfd- ll &s:rki be^Mluql^e 9^^W e^ctat od^ 9Bbo nidi al .a^tiiil 

ellsC',- iiwoO &di aD«xl ©j/b saw a^axlit d^srf* ^'xavooet oct f)eX;fI;tn» b&« 

9rlcf ijowivitra nolJ-os »i# "5it Iotb tSS*X2SC' ^o rue aiW TienojtiJtdoq »rfv* od 

■a;g±' iilt/orfa sx/iaabxiaBi lo H*tw edi aQd& ^teno te^ftsq ed^ io ritaeb 

Jarli fte^taXsrqX^a evfld aelitisq ad? ^adi attjilo 

ioellaiqqa dd^ l»nja »s«9 alxf^ nx 0'ii;/f>eooaq 

Ij3ci-j.ieiaBi>ruj I axaiisU .aanJLbaeoo^q 8ijma£)X5«a 9d>J lo "^oeliqoiq ojii Siti/qelb 

dtf £>Xx;c . jBwa £>&i«Xx/ql*« fiO« iJevX^w tjXIbbo oa dd ;toriaBO atd^li 

.y^i '11 ^9'^&d besJBim &QlStsan< Isivotqciz iXosi sat vis 

,TixmBbnArd Yd nolctoij n« lol esao leqoiq a :roxi ai eXdit isd:? ^uo 

^od'xj'cts^a s lo •oa«tnncol^T»q 9d* X*^aoo od aell tu/uisbrj^" 

3ni::::fd8a onO «eXdscttrqBlbnl fons laaXo ai J± oct clxfgii ©dc? nadw x^^° X^^'^ 

.iliw ©d^ ocf cfxlsii Ifl3©I ^laeXo a cfaildjectB© ctawia sx/icabftisi:-' lo il«iw b 

lol ion IXlw sMKiBJbnsM ( ,-J^5S .XXI VCX ^idiiaJboesisO .v ©Xqoe<5[) 

mlsl : jnom^aq ed'solae od- leqotq el ^fltf ^sicfeb lo xxoiJoeXIoo ^rii 

.cfnomjBDirt e Tf ^T YXlBtnaw a I iaeatnifliie.oa.e .ei/b ©d oJ bsnXisiieosa 

3rii 9i9dw •leqoiq ion al ^usmbnefA ( .i-SS .XII X©X ^lioXblieH .av sXqoo'i) 

&di lo x^^^ ®rf^ "^o X>edslXo'Bi39 ed iaill iaism lanoiilisq ©di lo idgli 

.V loqooii .bft^iim'TOiei) .'•.icf iaiii iairjn bso'isoo ®d oi idQiJoa Bieolllo 

"•*d* .i)X d*>C ,rtoxiC :a<i :55 •XXI eSS ,iirona 

aifl©i>ttoqBOi adi ledjedw JDeiircaiJb si i.t aesD ouseeiq ©dif nl 

owe the petitioners anything, so there is no judgment or ascertained 
claim that is diae. Until there is a jmgsient, or a definite ascertain- 
ed undisputed claiia, the action of mandamus will not lie. 

The Judgment of the Trial Court is herelsy aifirraed. 


tbeani'Via ■^deiari aJ: i^'XtroO XaJtiT erfd- I0 inengiJi/L 9j.iT 
.Jbonrj, -. - 



Gen. No. 979 



3 1 S IsA® 113 

Agenda llo. 19. 


IN THE ^^'* 

MAY Tm^ A. Pi 1942. 


(Plaintiff) Appellee, yv 



./' ( De f e ndant ) Ap p e 1 1 an t . 


Appeal froTH 
.5^ Circuit Court, 
V Da Page County. 



WOLFE,/- J. 

On October 23, 1941, the appellee, Mary E. ScLultz, 
filed her suit for a divorce in the Circuit Court of Du Page County, 
against Reuben Schultz, the appellant, Reuben Schultz filed an 
answer to the divorce proceedings. By stipulation the case was 
heard as of default, and the defendant did not put in any evidence 
at the trial, except as to the amount of alimony that he was able 
to pay to his v;lfe. The Couj?t found the issues in favor of the 
plaintiff, and that she was entitled to a decree of divorce and 

^^ ~. . a =i»- ^ ^ ^s JaxniBd/. 


I' ^•- f. 1 ^^ r o 

.QI .oil jsijnasA " - -'''^ -'^-»^ 


sonol. eve -^jfixs ni ctjjg oO« blA ^xr^iJjfiel^i) Qjcfcr Janja ^J-I.trx': 

•'.fiw erf d-flrfcf' Y^dHillB lo J^njJOtfJB srfi ocf slb c^cqoxs ^Isii^t exfcf ctB 


permanent alimony, also attorney's fees and expenses incurred by 
her in the prosec^ltion of her suit. The Court entered a decree of 
divorce and ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the suit, which 
amounted to .^^29. 00, and fifty dollars to plaintiff for her attorney's 
fees and ^42. 50 per month as permanent alimony. 

The decree was entered Deceraber 29, 1941. January IG, 
1942, a notice was served upon the defendant to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt of Court for failure to pay alimony 
etc., as pro /ided in the decree of the Court entered December 29, 
1941. Reuben Schultz filed an answer and a motion to set aside 
and vacate that part of the decree in which he was ordered to pay 
the costs of the suit and permanent alimony. Evidence v/as heard, 
and the Court overnaled his motion to set aside, or vacate that part 
of the decree. It is from this order that the appeal is prosecuted. 

It is contended by the appellant that the decree order- 
ing him to pay the costs of the suit and ;ij)42.50 per month for the 
support of his former wife is unreasonable and oppressive, and that 
he cannot comply with the order. He does not contend that his wife 
was not entitled to the divorce, but merely questions the amount 
the Court ordered hiii to pay. Considering the annual income of the 
defendant, SI'S, 200. C,: (plus) as shown by the record, it seems to us 
that the Court's order for the defendant to pasr ^42.50 per month, 
as alimony to his former wife, is not unreasonable. ' • 

. ^ .s. 

, ^^B 6rfd- jJ-Bild' le^io kldi smnt &1 : 

'i-Lto ;vs'-'; ." Tf« iarfct .irtBlIeqqs etfct ^cf £)©Jbne:fn:oo ei il 

Qi!'^ , 'r©q Og,a^$ fcas iltra eili lo Bvtaoo ©rid- -^Bg oj- ;.:M -^nl 

id- £>£i9t^i3£00 do/t 8 3ol> sH .^aMo edcf rfcfiw ^Iqaroo dcnnao erf 


It is claimed by appellant that the Court erred In 
refusing to adrait in evidence ani ccsnslder xho agi'oement entered 
into between Reuben Schults and L'ary S. Schultz relative to the 
settlement of their proj)erty, atid the axaount per laonth that Reuben 
Schultz should pay Mary S. Schultz for- her support and maintenance. 
The second paragraph of this agreement recites that Reuben Schultz 
has refused to live and cohabit v/ith Mary S. Schultz, his v/lfe. 
The agreement designates the personal property L'Irs. Schultz shall 
take and that Reuben Schultz shall pay her the sujn of |j30.00 per 
month. The limit of this agreement is one year, and v/as dated 
September 6, 1940, The suit for a divorce was started on October 
28, 1941, We thiric the Court properly held that this agreement was 
not admissible in evidence and it was immaterial, and in no ?;ay 
binding upon the Court in fixing the alimony for Hrs. Schultz. 

The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. 


ijil/i-lOo JJBq fine 388 9£iT 

:tneB!Q9'rs« oxfT 

I©' lecfiMftctqeS 

qxr '^tbciid 

,'jL>r:'vJ. : i.3 Y<^©isrf el moil belB&qqz laJb'xo o-lJ 



GEN. Np^. 9785 


316 I.A. 114' 


MAY TERM^. A. D. 1942. 







) '^Xv 




l-IUPPIklAN, P. J. 

Tliis Is a petition for writ of certiorari, brought by 
appellees in the circuit court of Peoria county, to bring 
before said court the record of the Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners of said city pertaining to certain alleged 
charges against appellees, the hearing thereon, and its 
order of their discharge as members of the fire department. 
Writ issued pursuant to the petition. The respondent 
appellants filed motion to quash the ^/vrit, and to dismiss 
the petition. Appellee petitioners filed their motion to 
quash the record. The court granted the motion of appellee 
petitioners, and entered judgment quashing the proceedings 
of appellant board, ordering that the record be held for 
naught. Appellants have prosecuted this appeal from such 
order and judgment of the circuit court. 


. ;,. :.. ......,^. ^, ^^eisd-fM -. tw. -.3noI;fIctsiq 

Appellees were members of the fire department of said 
city. It appears that during a mayoralty campaign, certain 
trade unions endorsed one of the candidates. One of such 
trade unions was designated as. Fire Fighters Union Wo, 544, 
to which appellees belonged. Thereafter, appellees received 
notice by letter that ttiey were dropped as members of the 
Peoria Fire Department, and advising them that charges had 
been preferred against them for political activity. 

The record discloses that the Peoria Trades and Labor 
Assembly, by newspaper articles and advertising, endorsed 
a candidate for mayor of said city; and that Local No. 544 
was affiliated with the general organization designated as 
the Peoria Trades and Labor Assembly. However, nothing appears 
to show that appellees held any office in the Trades and Labor 
Assembly, or had anything to do with such newspaper advertis- 
ing, or took any active part in the mayoralty campaign. 

The miles and regulations of the Board of Fire and 
Police Commissioners governing removal of members of the 
force, relative to charges made against said members, pro- 
vides that the same shall be in writing and sworn to by the 
person or persons making such charges, together with the 
names of witnesses and other Information to be used in the 
prosecution, Tfifiiich shall accompany the statement setting 
forth the charges. It is further provided that when any 
such charges are filed, the accused party shall be notified 
by the board, advised of the time and place of his hearing, 
and that he shall have not less than ten days for the prepara- 
tion of his defense, wo charges appear to have been filed 
against appellees in the maiiner provided by the rules and 
regulations. They received a letter from the board advising 


be vis 09^ 80oX XsqqB ,'iei'ifl€>T:erri . . -jallsqqs rfolxlw o;i 

5Bri a©gisrfo. ;*ail* mesa ^Hlaivjaj* wu* ^aiMiaiic'iBqea eiJ:-^ siioe-I 

' -sotfsil tea Be^jsti' aI*io9"? sxfct cfjail;^ e^Boloalb tnoo&i ecil! 

b9em>i>it& ^^a£&l!i%&vta jb««; eeloictie leqjscLewen xo, «\'X,cia!oeBA 

aiBsqqfl Sfiii£fctGri t^ev^iroH •■^XdtneaeA lodis*! fen« aaJoBir Blaoo-i ©ctr 
•Tioo'o oX©£[ eoeXXetgq* djpiciS woog o? 

-aio^o i i.iw&fi riOi^a ..iid-Iiw oJj o^ anXri^'^xiB ban tiaeasA 

.tedrTjent lo XBVOitnd'i ai-iixiievos ansrxoXeBiraoioO eolloH. 
'iiidtsimi bt&B ctaxiiBgB ebBm jaegtBcUi od 0jrljf#X»^ ^aoiol 
';i nicifWE. .&fis jv '^3 drfit ^Bfl:i 

f o^ iioiifar - -icJc ^j.'-j.j saeeoxT^flw lo eacifin 

IXBiie ifolfftr ^ctoWiroseoiq 

' ' ' ^foeXil ©IB B831Ad!0 ££0tfB 

■ I iQ oojun rj-A/i ■^ 'v&B ,l)^cBoef : " '' 

JbeXX'J nee'' ' ' : .o&a&'iJsb zld lo aol;t 

gniBlvJbB biaod ed* moil loct^feX b bavieoei -^edT .enoXd-BXi/i^erc 

them they had been dropped as members of the fire department, 
and further advising them that charges had been preferred 
against them for political activity. ATien they appeared 
before the board to request a copy of the written charges 
filed against them, they were advised that such charges 
would be preferred. It appears the board at this time 
proceeded to take evidence and make the record. Appellees 
were thereafter advised by letter that pursuant to such 
evidence, they had been foimd guilty of the charges preferred 
against them, and that the original order of discharge was 

The trial court had the record of the proceedings of 
the board before it, and found that the return of the res- 
pondent appellants was insufficient in law to sustain a 
defense against the petition; that no charges in writing 
vfere made to show any dereliction or neglect of duty, or 
incapacity of appellees to perform their duties as members 
of the fire department, or any delinquency affecting their 
general character and fitness for the i^ositlons they held. 
The court properly quashed the proceedings of the board. 

The order and judgment of the trial court is affirraed. 
Order and Judgment affirmed. 


j to sftts^te'^ e.a cfjaiid- Jbrujol bfxs ^.ti eiolocf feTijsod exi* 

ioileieli ^lai worie oi ebBm eiev 
;v.-; i'XOi=i«ci /laqqa lo ijil»«qBoni 

•ffsefl^bij-t baa -sieBao firfl 









/ \ 

/ X o 1 a 

tJ A '<-''■ J^-!'^^^ J^'--. -i- "^ 

Plaintiff filed hie com|rl.aint in chancery to foreclose 
the lien o/ a trust deed, executed Noveiflfeer 29, 1952, by 
Christopher L, Anton, to secure payment of $6,000. The case 
was referred to a Master in Chancery, who heard the evidence, 
reoommended a decree ae prayed for. The recommendation was sus- 
tained by the Chancellor and a decree entered June IS, 1941, 
September 11, 1941, defendant Ida Russell Mack, filed her notice 
of appeal from the decree of June IS, 1941, 

llie record is much confused. Numerous papers were filed, 
notices given, orders entered, and a receiver appointed from 
which latter order an Interlocutory appeal was prosecuted to this 
court, #41090, We affirmed the order appointing a receiver and 
in sustaining the appointment we said: "The undenied facts which 
were made to appear upon the hearing of the motion show an abundant 
Justification for the appointment of the receiver". The record 
discloses that the complaint and petition filed by the plaintiff 
for the appointment of a receiver showed "abundant Justification" 
for the appointment of the receiver, and that matter should have 
been disposed of in a very few minutes but there were numerous 
Botione, notices of motions, and other dilatory tactics pursued 
by the defendant, 

Aa near as we can ascertain defendant's position is that 
since there was no replication filed to her answer, which she 
claims set up an affirmative defense, the averments of the answer 


,u\i ^mfm, *J i!KH^OTBI/;HD 

\m AGi 

93S0 9££T *000,as^ "io d-flflflnjflq 9aiJ03a o"J" »«o*flii ,j toriqoJTai'^triO 

^olSon iQri ^©lil ,4osM XXoaex/H jadbl ^a.^a&lidb tXi-t/X ^If igcffflgiqaS 

,Li=''eX ^SX sci/L lo 99*100.5 9£[J laoil X^aqqa ^o 

fflcil J&»^ai<^qqs -xavlsoei a ^xmb tfeeieSffla s-saJb^co ^agivi^ bbqI^or 

alsa oi iiQiiiS996&%ii BAM Xa0qq« ^od'H^oX'Xft^fll aa isfiio i93^3"aX dolsfyt 

■fiB tsvlaosi u afli;»^isJtoqq« i©i>'iO 9/1* l&eiiiiJt'il:* 9Vv ,oe0X=^% jjiuoo 

iioiffw BjJ'Ofil l>9ina^ni; 9£iT" t&i>ffia aw tfxiofi!;tnioqq/» 9ilJ snlnlB^ajja al 

'10091 sriT ."lavlrjo©*! sMJa^ lo ^nam^flXoqqii ad* lot woiJsoltltatft 

llint&Iq 9ri3" itcf J&9Xlt «oi*i?9q i)fts tnl-slqaoo sif* *sjl* ssnoXoaU!) 

*^iiol:taot\liatil ^jKABflirtfa" fisTfofla isvlmoai s lO ^nsraJnloqqja 9x1* lot 

©VjSiL SXuoriB lecrtfsHi *iixi:' .^^^v^Jt Joea f^r'* lo Jnao'J^nlGqqja ©ri* lot 

suoi9iiciun a'xevr snexi* Jud ae-^uniia uret v^QV b ni to 69Fioqal/> nf»«cf 

i)9«9*iwq 80l*oa* vxo*.'3XJL5 "xmiJo btiB ,ano2*ofli to SflOiJon ,8ncX*oB 

,*rtrt.P)«ot9ii 9ii* Ytf 
*afl* ai noi*leoq n • JjijaLnftai) nls^'ioonja n.iO gv bh tuBa aA 

oxfs xlolxiw ^lawans lexl o* ballt noXJtBOlXqsi on qa*; engii* aonXs 

must be taken ae true« 

The complaint contained the usual allegations found in 
a suit brought to foreclose the lien of a trust deed. Defendant 
in her answer set up that Christopher L, Anton, the maker of 
the note and trust deed "did not execute a legal trust deed" and, 
therefore there was no legal conveyance of the property by Anton 
"to any person other than to hep [defendant Ida aissell Mack] 
who is the true owner of said property, with rights superior to 
any other person excepting Oook county, Illinois to whom a small 
amount of taxes are now due, " These allegations are wholly in- 
sufficient to constitute any defense. They are but mere conclusions 
4 of the pleader. She alleged that she is the true owner of the 
property but how or when she became such owner is not stated. 
Obviously no replication was required. 

Defendant filed a number of cross-bills and orders were 
entered striking each of them but no appeals were taken so the 
correctness of the orders are not now open. But in any event 
they were properly stricken. By the oross-bills defendant sought 
to obtain a set-off of #1500, vrhich she alleged she had paid to 
Salzman, Stern and Blum upon representation "that they were the 
owners of a good mortgage" on the property, vjhile the order 
striking the last cross-bill was not appealed from and therefore 
is not before us, yet we think we ought to say it was properly 
\i stricken. The allegations were wholly insufficient to show that 
f\ plaintiff, Keller, was not the owner of the notes and trust deed 
I in suit, 

A further point is made that at the time the trust deed 
in question was acknowledged by Anton on November 29, 1932, before 
Mamie C, Merrick, a notary public, she had not filed a memorandum 
of her appointment in the office of the County Clerk as required 
by §5, chap, 99, 111. State Bar Stats., 1941, There is no merit 
in "ttiis contention. The record discloses that Mamie C, Merrick 

,on^ "i^esi) d'eti/iJ iBgei s ©Jwoaxe i^on fiiJb" l>«9li tBui^ .^hb s^oc wt* 

IX^MS K fifOi*- ■■* -t-..»TT ^^JJf{|;flr, 3(oot) ^l*q»ox9 ixoa'ieq «xoi{*o vie 

-0:1 v;IXofiv =)-i..-:. ¥ir..>x.;j:;>;-s Xj3 ^aariT ♦•«?>»& won 9tii BftXJR^ to JeifOiwa 

fHi^ to ionv70 owid" ©riJ- aX aifa tfioSW fisgaXXs a^ ,if»i)««lQ sri* to 
*^?Hde D'-on i isfiwo rfowB offUsoecT s/fs flsifw 10 woxi Jwer t#*t^c«q 

^"^•sxypsn iiisw noi^fBeMtj©*! on TjX??«oJhrcro 

erfJ 08 floated" aiew al^aqqc oh ^wc( mon* to rio*«> sJ^i'Sfi-x^a b9ne^n» 

rfnftve -^ns nl d-uS .ra^qo wen *on s^.a 8^«»Ino sdJ to saonJosiioo 

d-ii^ijofi JasJ&fistQS aXXW-aeo'io ^riJ ^g .fnnini'iJa ^i»<-iO'];q wi*v ^orCJ 

o;t bi/5CT .5.«iil miB l)9^*rXXfi »ri8 lioidw ,003Xl to tto-!r»« a Hisifcro oJ 

©d3- ')i9vr Y9^X* S^firi*" nojtjrjs*fl»8siq»i noqw mum Bn« ni9*r ^ffiaflislBe 

'seXno ©i» 9l±£iv .Y,*isqon:q sriif no "g^^tioia fioo?^ s to aienvo 

9t^\?yim!t f>ns moit J59X«9qq»;. Sou s/^w XXlcf-aeoTO ^«6X »ri* ^iilits 

^Xioqonq sfiw ;fi ^«8 oi Itsi'^tso ©w jTnldJ ew ^^x »a« o^otfscT *oii «i 

rexlJ xfcria o;r tfl©le?ttw««l -^XXoxfw 9^9W ajjoli-ja^sIXii wCf ,rte3iol«xJ8 

6e©ft tBiJti bfiB es^on sfld" to t.-^bwo «>rid' ton esw ^-seXXeX ttti:tflXfiXq 

,-t/H« ml 

Be©* Jaui? sflJ 9Ki.t 9ri* *« JaxfJ 9£>Ji0 sX ^fnloq tftdd-'it't A 

©lOt^cT ,?:&eX t^S i9ifffl9voH «c «o?jT*i \>:J l>osM&®Xwoflici'j5 i«w noifasup nt 

muLtt&tom^m » baXit *on h&d erfa ^olXcfuq YiaJon ii taf^lii^iM ,0 •iaeM 

?)9^fup»i 85 ;C*foXD v;*nwoO «fx*;t t© f>oitt0 »/{# ni rf^itefa^fl^oqqjB •xtil to 

rM-if^ta on aX rierfT .X-f^ftX' , .s^jj^S iaS eiTaJP .r" ,'">€ .qsrio ,3§ t^ 


was regularly appointed a notary public, and the fact that she 
had not complied with §5 did not render the trust deed Ineffective 
or Invalid, MoCormick v» Higgine. et al «. 190 111. App, 241, 
In that case Mr, Justice Dibell in delivering the opinion of the 
court said: (p, 260) ^The affidavit of nonreeidence wae sworn 
to before H, M, Kelly, a notary public. Section 5 of chapter 
99 of the Revised Statutes (J. & K §7841) requires a notary 
public, before entering upon the duties of his office, to have 
a memorandum of his appointment and of the time vhen hie office 
will expire entered in the office of the county cl« rk of his 
county, l»ihen this affidavit was sworn to, Kelly had been a 
notary public for a considerable time, but had not then caused 
such an entry to be made. It is contended that this invalidates 
the entire proceeding. The statute does not say that his acts 
shall be void if he fails to comply with the regulation. The 
public, executing papers before a notary public, are not requiired 
to investigate the records in the county clerk's office to find 
whether such an entry has been made, and it would be monstrous 
to hold that every act performed by or before a notary public 
who has failed to obey this statute is void, and thus invalidate 
legal proceedings and titles many years after the acts performed, " 

Counsel for defendant in his reply brief says that the 
cases cited by plaintiff were "decided before the Notary Public 
Act was amended", no reference is made to any amendment nor to 
any section of the act and ve have been unable to find that section 
5 has been amended. Moreover, Merrick was a notary de facto at 

\/ the time the trust deed was executed. People v, Severinghaue , 

f\ 313 111. 456, 469, 

A further point is made that "the trial court erred in 

approving the receiver's reports without giving a full hearing 

thereupon". The record discloses the receiver filed a number 

Desw^^o flsiCtf ion ^.li ^if(J .,a#i:;t eid&iai)i8«oo ;3 not oilcfiKi ijMt^ftn 

■v -v .. 


iSV f 



r?< /^ 


r.' ^ /^ 

, ;. .,. 

, ,•• -f r, . 



Uii yj 

a ^ij.... i.j 

:,-.' ..''.l. 

\ As- 

9T;:- - 

\ '■ 

1 ' >'i-,-^ 

■■ :'' 

'V , ■ 

9ori i.) 

^^ Aii i 1 

'. . )Ji-!-i ■ 


r>io»9't sfi* 9itasi**®v*«^ c^ 

joiJosa i-ariiJ r-r -ii as^) i>nja ;fo& ai# to acl^soa xo* 

*§8-^ ^da^ ,XII 5X5 
fiX .Ddiis tfijuoo IaXi" ■ iii* alDfiiu oX ;t-nXcq ns»£i;r^ij/t A 

of report B and orders were entered approving them, and no appeal 
was taken from any of such orders. There Is nothing In the record 
that would Justify the statement that defendant was not permitted 
a hearing on the reports. 

On the hearing the notes and trust deed were produced 
by counsel on behalf of plaintiff, !Phis made a prima facie case 
of ownership as we said in our opinion filed in the receivership 
proceedings, above referred to, #41090. The defendant offered 
no evidence before the master or at any other time. If she had 
any defense to the foreclosure suit an examination of the record 
fails to disclose it. 

What we said in our opinion in the receivership matter 
is applicable here» We there said: "The objections of the 
defendants are purely technical and without any merit whatsoever," 

The decree of the Circuit court of Gook county is affirmed. 

Matehett, P, J,, and MoSurely, J., concur. 

, tJarioS-isM 

42132 -^^ 


ex rel., JOHN S. RUSCH, /■" ) / 

%ReXlet>" ) APPEAL PROM I 


>«. 1 ,-•» — 

/ '■--.„ I COUNTY COlJRl/, ^^ 







/ A petition was filed In the County court of Cook county 
ftgalnst the Judges and olerkg of election of the 61st precinct 
of the 24th ward, charging them with misconduct, arising out of 
the primary election held April 12, 1938, 

The case was heard by Judge Jareokl, and after hearing 
judgment was entered discharging the two clerks and finding the 
thz>ee Judges guilty as charged. Two of them were sentenced to 
confinement in the County Jail, the other was fined #500, On 
appeal to this court the Judgment was reversed and the cause 
remanded^ 308 111, App, 517 (ahet, ), 

Afterward the ease was reinstated in the County court 
and a trial had befor« another Judge, No evidence was introduced 
but by agreement of counsel the abstract of record filed on the 
former appeal was considered by the court, as containing all of 
the evidence and upon consideration the court found that defend- 
ants "did knowingly, fraudulently and unlawfully permit or ac- 
quiesce in permitting official ballots to be changed, altered 
and erased by persons other than the voter", that defendants 
while serving as Judges of election "did knowingly, fraudulently 
and unlawfully make false canvass, tally, proclamation, and return 
of votes cast". During the hearing counsel for the people stated 
he would recommend that two of the Judges, viz, Solomon and 

Jennings, be fined ^60 each and that the other Judge, Orloff, be 
sentenced to Jail for 60 days* Mien this suggestion was made 
counsel for defendant replied "we have no objection to the $50 


Qtti galbnlX baa aaiiel© o . :^al'^^iM£io&I.b h9i@Sn^ saw 3"K««86i/t 

.(.^racTfi) VI5 ,qqA ,1X1 80S ^9j&n«ffl«i 

to lis -gataljii^aoo bb ^t'xuoo 9di Ajtf bs^&tlQRoo a^w Xii9q(js I'^arao'i 
-oa no itsnoq xXXx/twJsXiw &IIJS ^X^nsiXjii&J^'xt ,x;XB£(lwonj( j&I^" 8;t'iiB 

ll^n^lBiiu&^il ^xS.'gntvon^ blSt** «oi*09Xa lo adgSut a^ gnlvisa sXldw 
niJJitii^'X ina jaoiJ-sDiflXoO'iq ^X-^Xiid' ^aaxjV-Cf.o ssl.'.l 'js- n ij;XXtflw«Xnu l>njB 

ptia RomoloB ,sXv ,«'ji*;'.uf, fiild' 1v> o^,i jhi'J lHr:)rr:o5^«T &Ii*ow 9xi 


flne as to the two respondents, I think counsel is correct as to 
the two respondents, I don't think, however, after your Honor 
reads the record that there should be that sharp differentiation 
Bade "by the Court as to these three respondents, I don't think 
that after the Court reads that record that any one of these 
respondents is any more culpahle than any of the others. If the 
Court feels that there should be any slight treatment given to 
any of these respondents, in that case your Honor should give 
Orloff a more substantial fine, I don't think that this case 
warrants the imposition of any such sentence as sixty days in the 
County Jail, " 

The case w&e then adjourned and two days thereafter the 
court announced his decision. He followed the recoHusiendations 
of counsel for the people, fining two of the judges #50 each, 
which fine was paid and sentencing the other Judge, Orloff, to 
be confined in Jail for 60 days, Orloff prosecutes this appeal. 

In our opinion on the former appeal we discussed the 
evidence introduced somewhat In detail so that we feel it is 
unnecessary to again refer to it here. We held that since Judge 
Jareckl was a candidate at the primary election involved he should 
not have tried the case* We also said: "We are not satisfied 
with the findings of the court nor the penalties imposed. As 
we said in People ex rel, Ruee h v, Lidovsky , supra , 'It is just 
as important that persons accused but innocent should be exon- 
erated as that those guilty should be punished' " and we reversed 
the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, 

fhe evidence that was before us on the former appeal is 
the same evidence in the record no^v before us. We are in as good 
a position to determine the truth of the matters shown by the 
evidence as was the trial judge. He had but the printed abstract, 
no witnesses testified before him. We have again considered the 


9vj:<> rijiivirfe. *ioaoH luo-v: »aiisO :?B,ff;t nl ^'s^ti&bno^m^'i ouMfcf ^o ■^oc 

".I.r.T, ytntJoO 

'■■ /^■•.•' •■. ^.i.'-.r:f Mv-r- ''f'-^n^ia&ii baa &l&q B^Tif sail: riaJriw 

,^ , , ..,^b1) OS 10^ ilMi Rt &&nltno9 fsd 

■''"• ^ 't no nolnlqo iwo nl 

' JU \f ^J 'J J 

' 'It" 

Lw *, 

'.rj-.ia^sxnwo f-tu ..jj.ij'. 


evldence in the record and adhere to what we eald in our former 
opinion. But since counsel for two of the defendants, Solomon 
and Jennings, on the hearing agreed to the suggestion made by 
counsel for the people that these two Judges be fined #50 each, 
and which suggestion and recommendation counsel for defendants 
concurred, we are of opinion that Orloff should receive the same 
punishment and he fined ^50, We are unable to see any substantial 
difference in the conduct of any of the three Judges, We think 
it appears that the learned trial Judge imposed a heavier sentence 
against Orloff because the court wag of opinion that Orloff had 
acted as Judge of election before, Which is not the fact because 
the evidence discloses he acted as clerk at but one prior election. 

For the reasons stated the Judgment is reversed and the 
cause remanded to the trial court with a suggestion that Judgment 
be entered against Orloff, imposing a fine of 3i>50, 

Matchett, P, J,, and McSurely, J,, concur. 

4o;a«» Or- ?;oi )?jl>iJt owd" sRSfiJ}" ti-'idt ©Xqoeq oriif 10*1 Xeeeijoo 

b^x It ix^ iBpif?iqo to »xn* tfijwa »£[;? ©siisoed ItoXiO isaJU^i/i^ 

^tiefflia&fe'i, .■l:ta9VH«a « il$j|w ti:,i;oo Xi?.i*x5Jf swi* ot i»«J&it9«»'x 9RW30 

efilt A milBoasil ,'1'ioltC tnal&:^M btyi^^ne wi 

U¥iA iWifmrM 


GEN. NO. 9792 





Q X O XeH.» X 


May Te3?m, 1942 



ANNA KAZNOV/SKI, an .Infant, 
next friend, / 




City of LaSalle, a municipal 






DOVE, J.: 

This is a personal injury suit by a minor, suing by her father 
as next friend, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her from 
a fall through tripping in a hole in a public sidewalk in the City of 
LaSalle, whereby her right arm was broken. There was a trifl by jury 
in the circuit court of LaSaile County, a verdict of iii400.00 for the 
plaintiff. Judgment on the verdict, and the city has appealed. 

Out of twelve grounds assigned for reversal, the only ones argued 
ate that the court erred in denying appellant's motion for s directed 

^X- ,Q^ ^4a€A 

si?e .Q'A .ijao 





tfjtjs II sqqA 

1c x^iO 3 flit nl 2[I&w9JiJt8 oilduq ?> al ©Ipif \l — ^;..iqql«i;t dai/oncCd- Ilal b 

.i)sIs9qqB sBxl Y^-fo sri:t Ms ,*ol£inev ^ri* no fa^ss^ul ,"ilI?nlBlq 
I->9jj3'iB asflo >^Ino ario .InBiovei -xbl: J5srt§jteaB aiifluong aviewd' lo iuO 

verdict, and^lts motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
on the theory that the defects in the sidewalk were so slight that 
the city was not negligent as e matter of law; and that its motion 
for a new trial should have been grajited because the verdict is 

A motion to direct a verdict is in the nature of a demurrer to 
the evidence. In considering such a motion the evidence must be 
taken In its aspect most favorable to the adverse party, and the only 
question is whether there is any evidence tending to prove the allega- 
tions of the complaint. (Ryan v. Deneen, 375 111. 452; Shutan v. 
Bloomenthal, 371 id. 244.) Under such a motion, the plaintiff is 
entitled to the benefit of all the facts that the evidence tends to 
prove and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and the evidence 
most favorable to her must be taken as true. (Pollard v. Broadway Cen- 
tral Hotel Corporation, 353 111. 312.) If there is any evideneey^t hid- 
ing to support a cause of action, the case is one for the jury, and 
It is error for the court in such a case to instruct the jury to find 
for the defendant. (Missouri Malleable Iron Co., v. Dillon, 206 111. 
145;^^Unfon Traction Co. v. LuncWy^Si^ 215 id. 289.) ^he question of 
negligence does not become a question of law unless the evidence is 
such that ell reasonable minds would agree the defendant %vas not 
negligent in his acts or that the injury was the result of plaintiff's 
own negligence. (Petro v. Mines, 299 111. 236.) Amotion for judg- 
ment notwithstanding the verdict is governed by the same rules. (111. 
Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 110, par. 259.22; iiussell v. Richardson, 202 

The record shows th: t the accident occurred on the afternoon of 
June 10, 1939. It was a bright day. Appellee was one v/eek less than 
eight years old. She and her sister were walking west, ahead of her 


^iolbiBV edi 'g^lbnp.iadilwion :}asm-gbul lol nol'Joui ^il^biv. .Jolfcxav 

J»rijr JiigllaoB slew jfl.Rwefiis Q'xi^ ni. a^osleB arf* ?Bxi;J Vxoaii;? *xl3 ao 

aoLiois. Bit i&dt ba- jc© 'ie^S' - iTnealiasn Jon aair t^is ailJ 

al lolDisv 8xid" saweosd .fteJiiBig ns^d svbxI i)Iycde iBiiJ wsn b "SOl 

od^ istiwiHSX) s to s'ssjie.:- rfosii±& oJ flOiJdai h 

sd '*»iflB''8brt6£)lve siitf flolJoffi is litoi/e :^[il'x&blB:i .etfasMvs .•rl;r 

•^^Ino'efi;? .bos '^vi^sq saisvfiB edS c3- sldaxovsi Jacci asieqas a?l rineis* 

, . . :ijltf svcxq oit 3nil)nad- sonsSlv© T^ns ai aisfi? -xaritfsrf^ir el noiJaaup 

.V nsJmlS jsa:^ ,1X1 eVS ,ii39n9G ,v ns^) .d-nlalqinoo $xl:r to enolJ 

i.i; Hl^rtitel^ dri* iflcld-oin fi rioua isJbnO Li>i-S .bi I?£ .Xsft^rneciooia 

cJ Bfinej son©l)lvft «i^J JjBid;f a^rc^t ar(«!r' fX*- lo i it mad Bdi xi JbaXJiJns 

naO- ^'^ti..t-Jh:BlXo'ii ■.■««** as aa^ni? ©cJ .teuai lari -o^T •Manr-y.*il l-aofc 

■-l^i^p&bfv^ vnp' '^f e^rii it tV§x8' i^lll §es ,ttoitiS%6<|t«fO Ieir6H X^i 

JDH-^; ,'V;'^rr'^ -.'jbo 9Xld" ^aoliOB Ic aeimo ?. ;tioqqA/8 oJ gal 

I)ni'- #8jso'.s ii«i/'8 nl t'iuoo .1 ioT:ie al #1 

.ill 9d2 ,a<»Xl . :c'il sXcfeeXXsM liwoealM) . :rnjsl>n9^«f5 94;r lot 

lo dotiaeui ;.ess .M 5X2 ^jglyi&njjJ .v .cO noid-OBiT noLiJ,,^;5i>I 

sJ sone^lvQ ^£i;t 88 9Xn«'#BX Id ii6i;ta©«|> b emoosd Jon eeo-^ eonaslXasrt 

JasMelelj sjSiJ ©s^g^- IjXwoW aXmlfii aldsnoaaST: X^b iTafW doua 

' Txi:^«l£Xq 1:0 d^Xwa^i 9ji» aiiw -yriiJL^l s^J ^^i -xo a#6B alM al .tnajjlX^an 

-S^fcwt '^ol nois^oDi ii (.6. . onaalXasix nwo 

.111) .'-.3L:i sasa erfi? -^d fi9ni9Vo§ -el tfolfii snxiJXxaJariJlwJon ta&n 

SO'" .noBbisriolJi .v XXoaauii ;S2.eSS .'Xflq ,OXX .q^flo ,XI>ex .JbJc ,vaa 

j»^igatjfei^wft»»t^^»sia? iU i» irf)>wi .i ( j« ■ ft Wi i § i iM^ jm.9'*m .iJumm itm dr^ ^*^r^^ • .5&d .qqA .iH 

lo iioon'xoJ'ir. ©do no be^nuooo iadbloo& ©rij ^ 5io09i aciT 

riBri;f e^oX jloe'' ano anv eaXXsqqA . ' I , f^f.OX ^OX BCiuJt 

19x1 to &i?. Siia i^aew gnllXew en:»vr^i«;lBi£a noxf fine atcte .Mo aT?i9X tri§l9 

mother and her grandmother, along the concrete sidiewalk on the 
south side of First Street in the mrxin part of the business 

district in the City of LaSille. Appellee was on the north side 
of her sister. There was a hole, irregular in shape, in ihe side- 
walk, extending south from the curb about five feet toward the 
building line, '^he portion next the curb was xvhere a pole had 
been removed. The surface of the sidewalk hsd become broken Fnd ■ 
the concrete was out, leaving a hole of varying widths, being about 
two feet wide in some places, and narrower in others. It was from 
one 'nd one half to two Inches deep. According to the testimony of 
the city engineer it was one and seven-tenths feet wide .?nd seven- 
eighths inches deep with an average depth of one and three fourth 
inches. Plaintiff trl, ped in the hole ajid feJl, breaking her arm. 
The Injury consisted of a fracture and dislocation of the head of the 
radius. The next day an X-ray disclosed the fracture, which was 
reduced the following day at a hospital. The ann was immobilized in 
a cast and bji aluminum splint for about six weeks, and appellee carried 
it in a sling for two or three weeks longer. At the time of the trial in 
November, 1941, there was an apparent complete recovery. The arm pplned 
her considerably until It was placed in the cast. 3he was unacle to be 
out and play with other children during the six weeks period. The 
doctor bill was ii^bO.OO and the hospital bill was about !i?11.00. 

The owner of the adjacent buildlne- testified the hole in the side- 
walk had existed in the same condition eight or ten years, and that 
she had seen city policemen and the chief of police wrlk along the 
sidewalk in front of her building; that she had sprained her ankle in 
the hole and a lot of other people had tripped in it; and that two or 
three years prior to the accident she had notified the city engineer 
of the condition of the sidewalk. The city engineer testified he did 


: ^iveal »d'i/© saw 6?e'ifin©o aaJ 
ol a4^fla3"*»n«ve8 Itfia ©xio ebw 41 •zeswisne xilo sfy 


.Jjsiflqaofl fi c 

'!^iitaeir lasnignQ y,ilo sxiT 

::offlso/X<ia v-itio as ?riB 

'loiiiq 9'x:«»| fMr^^ 

not remember the witness or anyone else reporting the condition 
of the sidewalk to him; that if she had talked to him about it 
he would have notified the owners, but he did not deny that she 
had reported its condition to him. 

Appellant cites oases in this State and from other jurisdic- 
tions where adjoining sections of sidewalk were constructed at 
different levels. It is apparent that an incline in a street 
grade or other conditions may require such construction, and it 
has been held that a municipality is not guilty of negligence in 
such cases. No such condition obtains here. The photographs In 
evidence snow an approximately level street and sidewalk with the 
irregularly shaped hole above described. Constructing a sidewalk 
on different levels where the pedestrian will usually anticipate 
the chan£:e of grade by the surroundings, such as a slant in the 
grade or a step down from a curb is a wholly different matter from 
constructing a sidewalk on a level and allowing a hole to exist 
therein which the pedestrisn has no cause to antioipate. Gases of 
the first class have no application here. 

While a municipality is not an insurer against accidents, and 
is only bound to use reasonable care to keep its aidewslks reason- 
ably safe for |he amount end kind of travel which mpy be fairly 
expected upon them, (Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 111. 638; Boender 
V. City of Harvey, 251 id. 228), a pedestrian on a sidewalk may ordin- 
arily assume that it is in a reasonably safe condition for travel. 
To hold that a person is absolutely bound to keep his eyes fixed upon 
a sidewalk in searcn of defects and dangerous places X'^jould be to 
establish a manifestly unreasonable and Impraoti^te rule. (&rs-ham v. 
City of Chicag9, supra; City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 111. 358.) 


— :^-iii ;.-ir.-. V. '-"'J' i) Sill Jon 9 vBil liltfOw erl 

-•Oi.rex''K iX/X}^:. •-■- '^ J.X .' ii.l C;^3^;-0 .;ir, ;..!,., >^li .,.J,■::^.i■;-- 

-' '^'O.tsaiXsin tc -^f^f— Jofl ai ^^IXeqXolmiffl jb j-^'.+ ^-r.,,-/ rtoaVi ggri 

.ij. r..iqf?130ioxiq &i.^ ... ^il anistfcft aol^lhBOO dot; .;.,;.. ^OlJB 

•i ,- ;». -..-TT----, , ,, ;,T r«, -,».».. p«.-r, J^sfwr -,< ■ST*-- - '-r; 

p, -,^.^ r=-<+-t'^" -^rrr-. ,^^ ,^..^w.... s ax dii/o B ffiOTtl awol) «j)83"8 ,^ -xo aJ&M3 

.siexl fioi^saxiqqa en avflxl aeslo iarf* '^-"'*- 

-livci 7. 8J{X.«w9f?ia 3d"l qseat o3" e'SBO aidsftoaBei eau o3 bmiod \laD al 

XIiIbI ecf -^taffl xlQlrfw levjsi:?' '^'^ '--'^-'' «^-- ■s-r.-.e'— ■r?'£^ -"^ '"'^•^a -^Xtfe 

i9i)neoe ;-85d .XXI ^^'^ .-.-..w.^^D ^^ ^^^_^, ^^ ^ ....-it./ ,,ur^-^ ....£•.. i:*r'Joeqxa 

oS s-i I-Ilc / <ioc 5Xq' ajjOTEegfi^ ^Joalsii' lo iiatc ..... ilBwa^feXa a 

,v tLzdsi'tQ) . alii-i i<l^ 3" 0^.1(^1 Jixx.. „^ - ..lOBsarii&f ^iXd'aaliflaa s daiXcfs^aa 

(.855 .1X1 5^1 ,jfOGOC£e ,V (■:) n^K" 'rr. v:t?" ; ^TC/rg ,;..-:r.l-G "to v ?Jt6 


A Child between the ages of seven and fourteen years Is not required 
to exercise as hlai a degree of . care, as a, person of^mature age and ^ 
experlenoex (Mueth v. Jaeka, 302 111. App. "^89; Owens v. Guerney, 
j^i^Jr>Wv>1lr9W>» ) , and on this appeal it is not cleimed that appellee was 
guilty of contributory negligence. 

The mere happening of an accident r^^ises no presumption that it 
was oe.used by the defendant's negligence, (Huff v. Illinois Central 
Railroad Co., 362 111. 95; Spring Valley Goal Co., v. Buzis, 213 id. 
341), but in this case the uncontradicted evidence shows tnat one 
person sprained her ankle in the hole, several others tripped In it, 
including appellee, who suffered a broken arm. This conclueively 
shows the hole wss d'^ngerous to pedestrians. It had existed in the 
same condition for eight or ten years and tiie city h=?d actual notice 
of it. Even if there had been no actual notice, its existence for 
so long -:.': time charged the city with knowledge thereof. (Graham v. 
Oity of O.oicago, supra.) Under such evidence end the applicable laxir, 
it cannot be said that the defect was so slight that tne city was not 
guilty of ne^igence as a matter of law. Ihe tibial court did not err 
in refusing to direct a verdict for appellant or in refusing to render 
Judgment for it notwithstanding the verdict. Furthermore, if the 
assignment that the court erred in denying appeli'^nt's motion for a 
new trial had been argued on this phase of the controversy, ve should 
be obliged to hold that the verdict is not against the manifest v/eight 
of the evidence, but the assignment, not being argued, is considered 
as abandoned. Decisions where judgment for the plaintiff were affirmed 
on negligence of the defendant comparable or analagous to the facts in 
this case are found in & v. City of Chicago, supra; White v. City 
of Belleville, 290 111. ^^pp. 616; Temple v. City of Chicago, 303 id. 


5JDW e9ll3.:iT'" J -ild" i>3aEleIo Joa a^ .I ao Ijri.;^ , i t^^'^-^^^M^v-iiisf^ 

.£ii Sis ,sii5Jo- .. ,,.- x3oO :^sXXsV a,Bi • ;• '' ^i^oiIlsH 

^al ai b.^Qltt s^esijc .r^T.rr'-ra .sXorJ Brit ~i slijlnr .■lioiqe aoa'xtq 

Xlsviu.!..: ^niiv-jlonjt 

x><38i9i)l.aaoo ai ^ajj^ia §ni9c. . fssamalaas en;J , ^aei)ivQ sriJ to 

Siomil'tli'. eis-n 'ilWalelq adi^ ^o'i JasH!jgi)W{, si^riw anoleloeG .l>«aoJI>iiacf« as 

. . ;::3ii©liiS I0 ^d-iO .T STB d«iS nl isfiwol ©-xb ee^o aMJ 

.£)i SOG ,cs6 0jtrf0 Ifi; VXO ,Y slqfiteT ;£., . .Ill oeg ,eIIiv«XIcS lo 


VJe do not agree with the clr'lm th-rt the verdict is excesclve. 
i'he amount of daniaj;ies to be av/arded Is ordinarily a question for 
the Jury, and p verdict v/ill not be disturbed unless It is clenrly 
excessive or inadequate, indicating passion or prejudice on the 
part of the jury. (Mueth v. Jaska, . ^Wisisew; Owens v. G-uerney,y. *?saB«f. ) 
In this case appellee's mother testified to her nervous condition 
after the accident. There was no testimony as to a casual connec- 
tion, and on appellant's motion the testimony was stricken and the 
jury were instructed they must not regard it. Considering the neture 
and extent of the injury, the expenses incurred thereby and the time 
appellee was incapacitated, the ajnount was very reasonable, and a.oe s 
not indicate tne jury were influenced oy the stricken testimony. 
The court did not err in denying the motion for a nev trial. 

Appellee's motion in this coux-t to assess damages of ten per 
cent of the sjaount of the judgment under section 23 of the Oosts act 
(111. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 33, par. 23) on the ground th^t the appeal 
v/as prosecuted for delay, is denied, '..'hile the evidence is overwhelm- 
ingly in favor of appellee, there is nothing in the record 'jhich indi- 
cates the appeal vas for delay and not in good f^ith. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 


9iiD' no •dOlbulQ'ici -no noiso::- >4i,.i..; .v.<.:j;i. ,»^ -v.iaj-fii.'. .i'.; - ^tasBdxs 

noi;Tli>noo BUO'srxBr: ■■■-'' -■,■ •■-■::' ' ■ -u....::?.,^.^^ va^nj alrl? nl 

-oennoo Iswas-o - . (^u^ i.iijbvi.- . tns£>i;oos eri? latffe 

-^ '^-.•^'-^ i---. ^b^■j'•floel59^• 'ioeT SAW tiiMfe»iBBB add" ^.bsifiJBSfiOBq^'''" ^. '^--f ©sIIeqqB 
-1-^. ... ...:x0.a 9£(* no (^2 .leq ,>" . ^x^ei .*s;te .V8/i .III) 




' '^'■"■--„^ Appellee, .J-'""""" f'RO& 





This Is an appeal from an interlocutory N'der aopolnting 
a receiver in/ohancery suit brourrht by plaintiff seeking an 

accoiintlng of funds olaimed to be due him from the defendant 

arising out of a contract for the dipeolution of their 


Although the cause was referred to a master no evidence 
has been taken and the Issues qxi this appeal are presented 
slolely by the pleadings- the complaint and plaintiff •g 
petition for the appointment of a receiver, and defendant's 
ans ers and plaintiff's replies. 

The parties were law partners praeticing under the name 
of Seyfarth and Leonard, and by written agreement dissolved 
the partnership in 1935 and divided between them certain pending 
oases, several of which were bank stoofeholdep liabilty suits 
in which the law firm represented the plaintiffs and were 
specifically named in a schedule attached to plaintiff's 
petition as Sxhibltri "B^' By the agreement each of th-^- parties 
respectively was charged with responsibility for the completion 
of the work required in the prosecution of the cases assigned 
to him; each was to eolleot the fees in such oases and retain 
one-half and pay the other half of the fees to the other p.rty. 

Plaintiff's petition alleged that defendant had collected 


I 99££BqqA 


tHTHMxaa.a j«a-i 


^tlr[>ih<uiw!ibi*di 3^ 

iHUOO 'am -'x 

•VUaa XJL^HI^tg 301TB UX.k^i 

o9#noes^q 9'XB Xesqqja sMiJ no aewasi srf* 5xi?, h»;/sJ aoetf saxI 

a^ijja itu lidBi X,,n8MoriElo©*a Ixisq siqw xfolxfo lo XsiOTsa «s^so 

B^llitffiiiiXq oJ 6arios.t;rs sXi/fesrfoe b nl Siefma ^XXjs4>Xlio9q8 

as-id-i^q ^}iii lo rio^ia Jnstne f^i^^s art? x^ 'i^" ^!*"Xcfiax5j sjs noXJXJpq 

:>ol3QLqsioo eil.t lol Y^XIicflBnoqsa^ ii^iv^ 6ss^^o uam ^XaviJceqasT 

J&en^X88« asaao sdi 1o noi^uosaotq eiicf nX fePiiupaT iiow ©riJ ^o 

cXArf-?»T: baB aea.'jo rfovs nX asel acfcT tDsXXoa o;f ejiw doas \a:M ot 

.X*iaq tsiiJo erl;J ot as?*! 8rf:r lo tiail nsd&o <?tLi %aq ban lXj£ff-g»no 


fees in certain cases but refused to pay to plaintiff one-half 
of such fees as required by the dissolution agreement. Defendant's 
answer asserts that he wae entitled to retain a portion or all of 
the |jal/ claimed by plaintiff by reason of numerous and substan- 
tial defaults and br-aohee of the contract by plaintiff. The 
answer set out in detail these alleged defaults. Plaintiff's 
reply denies such defaults. We cannot now examine the merits of 
this controversy for there is no evidence before us and the 
deference to the master is still pending. 

Plaintiff filed a motion asking for the appointment of a 
receiver to collect and hold the entire amoxmt of the fees 
collected by defendant^ including not only the amount of fees 
claimed by plaintiff but also those admittedly belonging to the 
flefendant, which motion wag allowed and a receiver appointed. 

Defendant contends that plaintiff's cause of action is a 
simple contract claim for money said to be due or to become due 
from defendant and that this issue is not properly witliin the 
Jurisdiction of a chancery court. Defendant's argtxment seems to 
be based upon the proposition that the agreement of July 1,1935 
terminated the partnership between the parties and therefore there 
was no question of liquidation presented but only whether there 
was a breach of contract. We are of the opinion that the proceed- 
ings were properly brought in a cbancery court. The agreement of 
July 1, 1935 did not terminate the partnership but dissolved it. 
The dissolution of a partnership does not necessarily terminate 
it or the fiduciary relationship of the partn re. Ill, Rev. Stats, 
oh, 106 J./2, sec. 30, It has been held that after dissolution the 
partnership continues until the partnership business has be-n 
completed. Thanoe v. Thanog , 313 111. 499, 506; '/itkowsky v. 
Affeld ,263 111. 557; Andrews "» inson . 254 111. Ill, 123, 



■to aQat^-Cff :« nlG-d-ei o:t JbeX^Kiso asw eri Jari^ a^frissa* iswan* 

!=ii:iT ."iTjlJixlAlq X^ iQSninoo esii to aedojaid fifta 8*Iw«t9.6 l£lcf 

e'ltl;rnlBl^ .s^fluatafi 1)9^6113 eaeri:? li.^id-dJb nl iuo tee rrsvafl* 

to-Q*li9ffl sxl^ ^atmaxB won toflfi*© sW .s^tluBtea d&ua 99la9.b xLq9n 

.gnlfusaq IXld'a al 'i«;fai=ffi &di oi 9on«>f9t«T 
cfa^ffiJJaloqcfA afid^ lot ■j^ni'^-'^ aolicm b iM»I2t tti^nieXI 

aeet tQ j'jw^urb sjeI;*^ TtXnP ;ton gcil>i;IOiii ^i'osMsteb ^d .6fi3^o«IIoo 

,5eJflloqq.s -ifvieoei is bciH J3«woir« as* n'^-iJoiH d^oldv ^itmba^t*^ 

9«fi Qffioostil <^ -moni lot shIaIo J'o^iJnoo ©Xc^a 

■^SXTsqoT ,bnet9b mcit 

dStsItl ^XmTj to Jnom©eTSJ2 9u:f itjaci;? nol^iaaqoiq sfi? noqir b99s^ acf 

ots'ioilj Mjs a^I?"- nsewjfet,' n*'x,sq 0ti& l>©^aiiiiHi9j 

f^ieit;^ istfl?9dw ^Xco tfud sed^iseas^q noUsiJlupil to n.lis^uc 0/5 saw 

-£)9tiooiq 3di ^^^ aolalc .::oAtiaoo to doijsid a saw 

to ^ft9m99'v:sB edT •J'lwoo "^tneofl^c ^ Jilswcxcf xl'^ieqotq anew asai 

.rii bPvX08al& iud qliiaientrraq^ 94j ©jBnlmn.t cfoc bib 3S?^I ^X ^XwT, 

©*Jj>l^lfl?^•»d■ x-C-f'Si"' ^ofl a©of> qiilai9ajl'?i>q « to aoi^uXcaslf) sxfT 

, ;■; .t .va . , .ioi^ftit sui;t to il 

ad;f flold-i/XoeaiD -^^jt j. .Osmose ,S\X 80X .ri© 

n 9cf ajil aaenlaud qiria-xsn^^Tisq aa* Xijro; a^unl^faoo qixleiemfiBq 

,v v.i5W0,^tti:'/ ;f?0(5 466*^ «XXI 5X5 » BOi\&d'l ,v a^t ^gft'T ..&©;t9Xqai©o 

,.CSi , .rXI i'SS .ngafli:^'-' aifc-i^nA jfrlO »III SSSt J&X^ttA 


In scheoule "Dw of the agreement was a list of cases in 
which the partners were jointly interested and were responsible 
for the completion of the work required. There was a Joint duty 
with respect to these, although their individual appearances 
may have been filed in such cases. The interest of one partner 
was retained in all cases handled by the other. There was only 
a division of labor* There is a provision for legal services by 
both partners in certain oases; the substitution of both partners 
In lieu of the appearance of the firm; also, each partner had the 
right to examine files in any of these oases, and there was a 
provision for monthly statements of each to the other, Vfe hold 
that the controversy was properly in the chancery court, 

A more serious question presents itself with reference to 
the appointment of a redeiver to collect and retain all of the 
fees collected by defendant, including one-half of the fees to 
which admittedly he la entitled. We do not find in the record any 
leeue raised with reference to defendant's fees* The only issue 
presented is with reference to the other half of the fees, which 
plaintiff claims and which defendant is withholding for the 
alleged breaches of the contract stated in defendant's answer. 

We find no cases supporting the proposition that a receiver 
may be appointed of assets abottt which there is no issue 
presented, Cochrane v. Potts Son & Co. . 47 F, (2d) 1026, involved 
the validity of certain bonds,and a receiver was appointed to 
take charge of all of the six Issues of the same. On app- al it 
was held that the District court did not have Jurisdiction over 
five of such Issues because the pleadings limited plaintiff's 
claim to one issue, although he asked for a receiver of all of 
the issues. The court said: "Examining the Jurisdiction of the 
court ov^^r the securities in controvert y **'**lt is perfectly plain 
that as to none of the bond issues or the collatf^ral securing 

sldlsfioqesi anew bxwx b»*B&^scfH2 •^Wnlot entew aisixJ'rJjq wf^ dolxiw 
'^wf) J-flJtot » aiaw 9*i9fl[T .ftsiitrpsi liow SilJ to noJtitf'Iqnico »ri" lol 

Xd BQolmoB li^^aL tct fiolsivoiq s al eioriT ^locfsl lo nolaivl-b a 

Siicf 5sd "rafltiaq rfoee ,08ls jonil »rf* to sonjBiaeqqiB acfiJ to wslX «1 

a Ba«r ansriJ 6i^■^^ tae?,A« ea^xi^" to x^b ni. esllt »«l»«x© ot itrfgli 

Mo^ ©■' ,t9Slto f^rii ojf .doiifl to nia'sm^^B^B \Ldfisosi lot noi«lvciq 

.^itfoo y^ison&d^ 9x13 ai X-Cisqoiq a-sw xsT^voi^no© 9di ijadt 

03- ©ofl'^i'Stsi titlw tl«3*i ad-jBse&^q noidiewp ai/cli^ff pioa A 

SjlS- to XIb alt.ii9% bti& *o*IIoo 03^ isTis© ' fa9m^nioqqM «tii 

c Yi.*ii-eao sfjlJbuIonl iinBbnetob X'^ f>6to»CIoo 3?»9t 

'jnjs bi.oo9z 9£l6' ai bait ton ob eW ,fe®X;fi:r*^9 aJt sri x-C&9*Jii£6B rfoiriw 

eweai x£«o sriT .sset a' Jnafenetefi o* sonaistST: da'lw bBalai aweal 

ijoixiw tRset srfJ to tlJBif i^dio 9ri* oj^ ©onsisteT riJX« ai 69;ffl98sn:q 

^xfJ lot :s«lJfeIoria^iw »1 *n,sixiet9.fe rieixfw bn& effil^'.Io ttl^nlalq 

.i«W8njB 3';JKfi6n«td6 nl .beitsd'a *OJB^Jfioo 9d;t to aario.^eicT fiegsXIa 

TsvXsoQi i£ *«il;* noid-laoqciq mi -^nltioqquB esa^o on Joclt «»W 

swasi oil el ®«i»fi^ rf«i/lar ^ootfa ai'sssjs to feaJiiXoaqs iKf x-^s 

bGvXov/iitdSOX (fta),*? 'P-^ . >oO dfe fioa aii^oH. ,v enBixfoop .bsiJasae^q 

o* b9$aioq,qa sbv i»vieo«i s 6««<8Biic>cf Jtlsd'ieo to x-^-^fc-tXAT ftiltf 

^.f li^'^qqB nO .smea «ri;;f to 8©yasl xXs edit to XX« to 9f^i£dt 9iAi 

jliDtimttisl Bviisi tea bib iisjoo tfottislG 9d.i *«xf;f bled h&w 

8 • ttl^nlBlsf; J&e*lttiX »SfliBaoXq eci^ 98!W*o«tf 8<*«ani rCoi/e to avit 

to Xltt to tsviso©*! a TOt £)9;^©a exf rigwrnfilXs t©w«ftJt ©no c:f BisXiD 

9di to noXiJoilJel'Xift »ri* s^Jt^-^^-sxcT" '.blRs -iTUCo adT ♦eewgai sri^- 

al&£q xl^o^Vzoq »! ti**"* x •^^▼o'^i^«oo jRJt aeiJliwa©* <Jri* i' vo *t:koo 

aclTtfoee Xs-r :rftXX©o wl4t to aewaaX bns>4 f^dt to sncc od" 3A t«il;J- 

same, excepting Iseue E, did the plaintiffs' pleadings put their 
oubjeot matter at lesue.or bring them within the ambit of the 
court 'g Jurisdiction; for while there were general allegations 
of fraud and confusion in the matter of the affAlrs of the two 
companies the plaintiffs' pleadings llralted their claim to the 
bond Issue £ and nothing was alleged to set up any claim asralnst 
or charge upon the other eeourlties," And In Scot£ v. Farmert^ ' 
Loan & Trust Co»^ 69 .^ed, 17, the court said; »***^ the Juris- 
diction pospeseed by a court of chancery to for«^cl08e a mortgage 
and to ap.oolnt a receiver for th» mortgaged property pending 
the foreclosure gives It no Jurisdiction or power to seize or 
take into its custody or control, throiigh a receiver or otherwise , 
property of the debtor which la not covered by the mortgage,** 
See also Leaoh & Gp^ v, Orant . 27 F, (2d) 201. It would seem too 
ol-ar for argument that the court would have no Jurisdiction to 
appoint & receiver of property about which there la no issue 
presented for determination* 

A gene al allegation of insolvency of the defendant was 
contained in pls^intiff 's petition, which wag denied. In argument 
plaintiff seemed to admit that he could not auetain the allegation 
of insolvency but claims he ig entitled to a receiver "without a 
showing of Insolvency or impending p-^rll to the partnership fund. * 
It is a rule that where essential allegations of a complaint for 
the appointment of a receiver ar<^! denied in a sworn answer, a 
receiver cannot be appointed unless these denials are overcome by 
proof, Klase v. Yavltoh . 30£ Ill.App, gg9; Sherman Park St.-te §»I|i^ 
V, ]^09P Off j^pe, Bj.^a, Gqi^», 238 Ill.App.460; Sohack v. ...c^iej 
100 Ill.App. 294, 

We hold that the receiver should not have been aut^ orlzed 

to collect the entire amount of fees held by the defendant, but to 

collect only^half claimed by plaintiff, 

We cannot In -.his case order disposition of the fees held 

:y^.ttcsi 'acit net tfiViftOtrt k :fn'ioc<|A o* fi>ft» 
joi:i.^8itsft ots tt 9iWFt% eiimolo^tot •£[? 

,i»fel»%ifiws«*»fe -lot f>f»:ffl©eMrq 

2ijIBa ^;fg.;tfi itg^ 0.^1 - : . . - 30S ^tBliSjBl •V lUil •loctq 

>^iJ «q<|A,iU 001 



under court order by any receiver In any othf?r case* 

The order appointing a receiver Is reversed In part ; nd 
the proceedings are remanded with directions to limit the 
authority of the receiver to th collection of the portion of the 
fees claimed "by the plaintiff, except as to t ose fees now In the 
hands of tisx other receivers whOj the record shows, will hold 
such fees until this cause Is terminated. Costs of this appeal to 
be divided equally between the parties. See section 78 of the 
Practice act (111, Rev, Stats, oh,110) for the authority of 
this court so to order, 



Matchett, P.J., and O'Connor, J* concur. 

^p.pftjj lesrlto ^ifi ill %»vt»&f^i isna ^cf T^feio tftwoo tftfenw 

9ri* al Hon ee; tqeoxe ^ItJEd-niAlq ftrf;J ijd fcsmlfiXo 8-»T: 

o* iasq'TB ain^ ^o s-taoO tfes^fifliflra©:? aX oawao gl/iS- Xiitm/ 8" fit rioira 

J^l-soj^^tfia 9d^ tot (OlX^rio ♦»*jajf8 ♦vaH ^lllX tOA #oi*dB*t''I 




LOUIS J. HUGH, Individually and as j 
trustee under the Last Will and ) 
Te&tament of George E.Huoh, deceased, ) 






COMPANY, an Illinoia oorporati*^, 
G. WHITTIER BALE, as trustee if 
the estate of Itdwin Vincent Gale, 
deceased, and ALFRED JAGOSSHAG-EN, 
(int-rvenor) and CKAELl^' E.BYRNE, 
^"^ ssor-Trustee, / 



JOSJ^PHIWS HUGH, J;ndi>i4lially and ) 

as beneficiary jinder the"^i,^st Will ) 
and Testament 4^f GEORGE S, 
deceased and ^,#LORENCE ELlZABfi 
WICKERSH1':IM/ contingent benef iciary^O 
under said/^ill, 

GounlTer Claimants—Appellees , 


suph:rior court, 

cook county. 





p>4 6I.A. 155 

LOUI^^J.HUGH, individually and as 
trual^ee under the Last Will and 
Testament of George E. Hueh, 

Counter Defendant-Appellant, 

Counter Defendant-Appellee. 


Louis J.Huoh, hereafter called plaintiff, individually and 
as trustee under the will of his father, George E.Huch, filed hie 
complaint in equity asking the advice and directions of the court 
as to the execution of the trust; his mother, Jo ephine Huch, and hii 
sister, Florence Vllizabeth Wiokersheim, answered and filed 
counterclaims asserting improper conduct on the part of plaintiff 
in administering the trust and asked for his removal; the matter 
was referred to a master in chancery who took evidence and reported, 
sustairting defendants' claims; the chancellor approved this .^nd 
entered a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity and 
held that 125 shares of stock of the Huch Le ther Company, which 
plaintiff claimed to own as an individual, were held hy him as 


10 ia.ii'£,i^iQ%1 

C r '1. 

( , , oJb 




' till i^hciu 



.Tflijoo ■:■);.' ^c hoxmiio ufHT aaasivijaa Yji-iHuaoM soitsui.hja 

fittta iXXfiiffeXvimi ,111-" rX Xo .&oXXb© i"J^«ei9ri ^dotxH.i:, siuoJ 

.-tiwoo »p ■: tilsjp® nl ;t£iij»Xgffloo 

iri fifi.G tCfoiiH sfilii t :iid'K,£i six:. ;iaii-xJ" &xiJ ii. rfoi*i/oexa sui* ©(t ya 

baXii im-. bv^iowaxia tJj?X9rl9i82ioIv rfJscfasiX.i sonartoX"? ^led'aXa 

m^fiXrl 't^q Bd^ no ;^o«J!>nco •leqcsqai 5\ni3-rrea»fl 8«iAXo'iB,tmroo 

•iavt#affl s-iv ;Iavo(at3i aid lol i)a:4ej3 Bee Jsjuii* arf* sniistfglfiiafya ni 

,B©i"*ioqirt AxjB •one'bXv© Hoci odw ^i^Gn^i t oaTislsi saw 

fcci^ i?. yjn lit ;fff«w tot ialAlqmozi mu ^iil...£.J.^o±b ©siosjb & b»^9^ae 

tif>t:iv nX:a&amoO larftf-s&J douH edS Ic ^i}ot^ lo nen^dn 3SX JfBd:r BlsiJ 

a A aid. x;c3 iJXsrl «*ia* ,X»oMvil>nl a» aa uwo o^ 69ffiii3Xo IlitnlAlq 


trustee; also, three judgments vmre entered against plaintiff 
y aggregating $7,910,50, and he was removed as trustee and a successor 
f trustee appointed In ills stead. Plaintiff a peals froa this decree 
and argues that tlae findings are unsupported by the evidence and 
contrary to law, 

Qeor^ E.Huoh was president of the Huoh Leather Company, whleh Is 
engaged In the business of tanning and preparing horse hide® for use 
by other manufacturers In making various kinds of leather products. 
He died on August 7, 1934, leaving surviving his widow Josephine, a 
eon (the plaintiff) and hie daughter Florence "iekersheim. His 
property was left to plaintiff as trustee, the net Income to be paid 
to the widow, JoFephlne, so long ag she lived, and upon her death 
the trust estate to be divided one-half to the daughter, Florence, 
and one-half to the plaintiff, with certain gifts which are not in 
/ issue here. Plaintiff trustee was uthorized to continue the bueiness, 
to handle the securities of the trust property as ne might deem best 
and not to be responsible for any error in judgment but only for the 
exercise of hon sty and good faith. 

For the seven years preceding the death of George Much the 
business was operated at a loss of over S£15,000, Upon his death 
plaintiff became president of the company and took steps to create 
a fund to pay the debts of his father and to provide a fund for his 
mother. An account on the books of the leather company was opened 
under the name of the F.state of George E.Kuch and there was credited 
to this accoxmt $100 a week, which was later reduced to t60, A. total 
of oret 19000 was credited to this account and out of this was paid 
the funeral and estate expenses and otx^-er miscellaneoug items. The 
bulk of this fund was used to pay plaintiff's mother at the rate of 
$50 a week, which from August 14, 1934 to February 16, 1937 a gre- 
gated S6,600. Before his a-^ath George Huoh allced Josephine *50 
a week, paid by tne company, and after his death plaintiff paid 
his mothf^r' approximately the s&me amount. 



ifi r:ifo no-:Jtw atli 

©SIC '"'"'^ ' •:-•»- ^ (.^ ^j^ ii»tiiXof?qA f^9imtnt 

...^ «... - -i^Jtjju^J =-•- -« ^ r_. 

■SfliV;-VS ^ ' ^'^ "RiTgl/A fl© bttlb sH 

.;1i^; ia^e^ iSnflii ^te ^'^eil 5e «8ltn:9jc« 
ijlh.q e.-'H aid* " ■■ *} ft/iA #|suc,i?»*; ^'i.. rif^^'X© ajs» 000e| «l»TO lo 



The matter about which plaintiff in his complaint sought 
advice and directions froa the court wat in connection with the 
purchase of stock of the leather company by his father from the 
eat&te of Edwin V,Gale, deceased, Q&le had owned one-half of the stock. 
The capital stock at that time was 1300,000, 

In 1928 G-eorge Huoh purehs.8ed this half, or 1500 shares, for 
#75,000, paying |60,000 in cash and giving hie note for the balance, 
Thla stock was reissued on the books of the leather oon5>any- 750 
shares in the name of George Huoh and 749 in the of Louis Huoh, 
By March, 1933> this indebtedness had been reduced to $10,000, and \ 
©eorge Huch executed a new note to the Gale trustee for $10,000, in 
the meantime the fapital stock of the leather company had been reduced 
from $300,000 to 150,000 and new oertificateg were issued to George 
and Louis Huch, There was deposited with the Gale trustee as 
eollateral to secure the payment of the |10,000 note, certificate 
No, 20 for 126 shares of the capital stock beloaging to George, and 
certificate No» 23 for 125 shares issued to Louis Huch, 

The entire principal sum of |10,000, with interalit, was unpaid 

at the time of the death of George, and shortly thereafter plaintiff 

communicated with the Gale trustee holding the note, requesting him 

not to sell the stock he ^eld as collateral, saying that some 

arremgement would be made to pay this note* It was tlnereafter 

arranged that the leather company would pay the note at the rate of 

#1,000 a year, and payments were thus made, and on April 1, 1940 the 

impaid balance on the note was $S,333.52» Plaintiff's plan was that 

when the entire note was paid and the collateral released, 100 of the 

125 shares issued in the name of George woiold go to the leather 

company to reimburse it for the pajrment of the #10,000 note. These 

shares would be canceled and not reissued, and the remaining 25 

shares would/ga the property of the trust. This arrangement was set 

forth in plaintiff *8 complaint and he asked, as trustee, for 

directions and advice of the court with reference to t; is plan. 



Jxlgirc^: rhti^^/'jfr^cf! ^M ml fil^nlBlci tLolsbk Svodn te^iim ©rif 
<5ri:j t: 'irf* me^lt tiGQltO'Txib ban BolvbM 

■ -^-^ 

,00 < . :ooiti Xfl*iq«o »riT 

,39'£.crf2 00'-.: ^ u»rf aMd' b9aiirio*f«?c i!oi/H •sjinooC) 8aSX nl 

.©ofijsi^tf a T 6«a i^ 000,0^^ T?'"!?^: tOoo,av| 

*ir;;:!' pi": - oS-xfidli 

jlttii^Q wsa M.ii 000,081 o* 000,005^' aoil 

aiii ssiJairx? slefi siif tiilv *?'>*f:»cq9f) sa?.' 9^941 .ilouH elwoj fina 

s^solllii^o fcStfOfi 000 jOX . ttfOSB c* J>i9*bXXoo 

t-a'sc**© Gt snX^coXi'cf ?>e?c X.p.*iT?o ffff T:o »ei;'il!^ e^:*/ tol OS .oM 

^..iO^ .- .. / . -J AOltXJiQO 

Sleqfiii a^w t*i»if?:rnJ: il^lw ,000^0X1 to wrBr^ lAqloaliq «nl;tne aa'T 

cffice ^4c£;f gfsi . '. - . '-i^f -^A i^^ct-^ fff? rXd« ©if" #'eii 

.i:xii^- .-■• .^^ asXq a ♦ 'l:lX;;iiXis.X'-£ ,S3,Sf.e,?.^- ??sv, onAlsc^i hlBqnu 

i^i \0 OOX ^bm.mifi'X XS1©J^«XX0«5 -fJTfS 9X1? B©dW 

Gii |}fliflijst!«"i tiljr fens t.6»«e ?.?'•' .:/sX©ofi^o »cr £Xt/ow •ertjsxia 


All of the books and reports of the company were produced 
before the master for examination and inspection, and It wag shown 
that xmder the arrangement proposed by plaintiff the trust estate 
would own free and clear over |18,000. The master found, and the 
chancellor approved, that the plan proposed by plaintiff as trustee 
was inequitable and unjust to Josephine Huch and Florence 
Wlckershelm, and the complaint was dismissed for want of equity, No 
reasons appear in the master's report or in the decree showing the 
basis for this conclusion. 

It would seem proper for the trustee, for tne purpose of 
arolding a sale by the Gale trustee of the collateral stock deposited 
to the $10,000 indebtedness of iieorge Huch, to make some arrangement 
whereby this debt should be paid and the trust relieved of this 
burden without loss* We h:ld that the plan to pay this debt in 
Installments by the leather company (as the only available source \ , 
ot cash were the funds of this company) tiius substantially reducing /\ 
the indebtedness, was fair and Just to all the interested parties. 

Moreover, the record shows that on October 8, 1-"41, all 
parties being present and assenting, the court entered an order 
authorizing the leather company to purchase the George Huch note from 
the Oale estate. When the leather company has paid the amount of 
George Huch' s debt to the G-ale estate, arrangements must be made to 
reimburse out of dividends the leather company for its funds so 
expended In the preservation of the trust estate. 

The plan seems fair and equitable and authorized by t e terms 
of the will under tne provision that plaintif -trustee had power 
to settle, compound and compromise all claims against the estate of , 
George Huch, with as full power and authority as the testator himself 
might have had if living. 

It is the duty of a trustee to seek the aid of a court of equity 


Cfs^IiC'O'iq •.•i-:-'vr t-"-'' "^'-'^ •" " ^'- ^i""!-'-- . '. i'fift B^Sood 9XiJ to IIA 

eiJfi^sa *8W-.;r s/lJ tti^rnlBlq ijd fteaoqoiq */:9K«8fi«TriB mi^ isbau tAcLt 

ftH* Bm ,f>nifct t^^asn ^ .r>. ,,^;5H -r,.^.. -rasis M* ©sit flwo BXwow 

.3*QU- "11*KiiiIq ^ci ^=.»..H--i i— ^* t&»voiqq« •jollsoxiado 

.i oiftMlonoo «l£{* lot eiaMf 

1o oacu-iw.. rj. .. -jui «:b« w-.; r^^i.- i./i ■xgqoiq assa blwow il 

.8;sj.ay..:9i> :rf.oo*R Ijsis^sXIc^ ?>&* to se^syti sXaD sri:^ x^ ^^^^ * ;8fl2WoT« 

i-ii«i«?^n«^nB ©Kos 9:i&m ot ,£[oifH 9^io»*> to a8»flf>fi*<i96cX 000,OX?> eiW^ o* 

aiii? to h^rioIlBt Jaiiid' 9fl4- Bab blMq »d JbXworis *Q9i» ajLriit X^^Msriw 

Ui *cj06 aM? T«<3[ «■? flusXg oilJ Jerlit fiX^ «W *880l Juofi^iw nsMtttf 

ssTjjoe sXcffiXiJsvB -^Xxso- ©tf* aa) tfi*C[ffloo iQdS&9l ea* -^d a^'neoXXAtsnl 

'^xilmfJ&«*s ■^li.fild'c&d-Bcrwa euri;^ (\fiSqBioo alrf:^ to afiiu/t sri* ^i^w xfe«o to 

XIb tXJ^X ,8 TocfotoC lie tBdi awerie fwoosT ««i? »i^voenoift 

to Jfrti/offis SiiJ l»lA{f ftJsA t^BtjEfOO ia«£*.3s9X sfi* nasi? ,»*B?as sXeD »ri^ 

.-.-» .■.'■-•-•.•, c^ itsijBi e#ii»ffisacetis 49;}-*'-'«a .-Ar^x- r^, •,■■>■ ,•.+ ,+ff.r,n gicfeirH «8no9{) 

v; ; 5.5rttf'^ ""*■* "rot ij;a»q8roo t'^^-^ "" .,»^ ., ..i. ...../ J. ..v.. Juo SBiifdMisn 

«o^s#a» i^axf... ,>-. lo rr6iJ.B'rr'--a9iq eii* fll &9l>fleqxe 

t«ir©q ?>jart 9e3'a«'.t;f- ti^fcXdlq tarit noie...> . , .. .; 'xs£)fl« XXJtw adi to 
to e^sta* 9d«f ^enia^a ajsi^to XXa seifflotqiRoo 6rt« Sfiwoqinoo t9l;t:f&8 oi' 


in the administration of a trust, feitman v. Fisher , 74 111. y 
147; Warner v. Settler , 260 111.416. The chancellor in 
dismissing the complaint deprived olaintiff of the right to have 
the advice and consideration <si^ the court as to this plan end left 
all the parties in interest in no better position than they were 
prior tothe filing of the complaint* »»Courts of equity will as ist 
trustees and protect them in the due perfoiTaance of the trust 

whenever they seelc the aid and direction of the court ag to the ' ^ 
establishment, the management or the execution of it," (g etory's '^q, 
Jur. (13th ed, ) sec, 961» ) It was error to dismiss the complaint. 

The master* approved by the chancellor, f und that Louis J. 
Huch did not own, individually, certificate Mo« E3 for 125 shares 
of stock of the leather company, but foxind that he owned the same 
as trustee. This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The 
stock book of the company shows that plaintiff owned a substantial 
number of shares in December 1923, and that the certificated 
evidencing this were in his name for tea years, when they were 
canceled pursuant to the resolution of thy company reducing the 
stock, and a new certificate. No, 22 for 125 shares, was issued 
in plaintiff's name. Apparently there is no dispute as to this. The 
stock book further shows that in March, 1928, plaintiff individually 
became theowner of additional shares, which were standing in his 
name for five years when the capital stock was reduced and his 
certificate was exchanged for certificate Mo, 23 for 1S5 shares. 
It is this certificate which wa« held not to belong to him 

Plaintiff testified th£.t these shares were gifts from his 
father and there is no evidence in denial. Moreover, the stock 
record of the leather company shows that from iiiarch, 1929, G-eorge 
Huch executed an Income tax retuiin, under oath, stating that 

♦ 3 

e ^.•' "': b^r^lt^Qh iaJmlo^o »ilt galaaiaoJ* 

a-v?)*- Y--- iicioia* /: iu ;Jat'£prf"fti al a«i?'iJ«| arid II* 

^.:ii ■•liVcn o*i* lo gi.oliQ^ ba^ hi& ^dit i9s« i;a£f^ rr^vaaai^ 

d: » ,. ! . aoI;J«-09X» «is[;t to in^mwj^smfim. adJ f^^aeaoislld'sdse 

,:}T,\f :• r:;;.":(..-o "rfo ■:r..;inKi': oa iciis e^w ;fl ( *XS€{ «©a« < ,fe« riJfSI) .imX, 

.. _ .. ^ i'-ilistotisMs add' ^cf bsvo^aqje ,i«*»aa arfT 

esT&fle 3S; ... ,oVl ^i&nVtXiisti »tIL»uJQlvl&fli tawc- Jon &ii) xisirH 

. onsi>IVf ,! 6o3^'>:oqq<fa .ton ai fioiaiflsnco elilf .©•^a«i^ 8« 

Ijplj-asitadws & osflwo l^l^tfiiaiq *sfi^ awcxia x;ii^ao« 9iii \q iCocif Xoo^t 

^zi&^-% tii^t, lol Qsum aid nl 9itv» t^ixLi ynioaaMvA 

sriu sulOiVbr^'^i ■'SiEi&<:rmoo .'ii^ to j£joi;fwloe9^ ^i &t tsimn'ntsiii b^JL^otiAo 

bay-si ( njads 3? I ic-^ SS ♦©» t««fi3©lllJi90 vsa « !«£ ,7i©oJ8 

■J IT .slci.v wqaib or. .'£iii xlttiQiJiqqt^ »9fsi&a b * VtJittil»Iq al 

XLL&isb tribal lIltTiildq ^SSOI txioncsii xxi tad^i auouti© laudJowt ioocf Jiootf^a 

Bid ni snl&xrB*'- .ioldw «a9fi-a£ia L&aoitlbbii to isiwoaii? 9a«&«tf 

airi brf, b'?o:!bf)t bbw :Soo^e Xs^i-qii© nd^ a»tiw ates-^ avil lol 9KJUi 

,B9i&im . '^^:tii,ol'il*i€)© not &«^«j|iiJsxs asw ©;y»oJ:^i*i9« 

jEBiit o* scol:- a i>I»fl »aw iisidw BiM^itXtieo bM3 ai ?I 

aixf aont ai^li^ ©'.fs- ?>fit?vria m^i i^^:^ j&si!tiita©;r itl^fslslv 

93T0i^ ,es€X jilotBAi /soil ^Mcii Bfforfa TjJtafnuGO tc9£(J^js?»X 9d;f lo f^ooai 

plaintiff was the owner of 14c 9 shares, which was the number of 
shares plaintiff claimed to oim before the stock reduction. This 
is only one share lees than one-half of all the shajres. Thie 
statement was repeated by George Huch under oath in 1931 and 1932* 
la January, 1933, again &eorge Huch signed new certificates, Mos, 
22 and 23 to plaintiff for 249 shares, and this was repeated under 
oath in March, 1933, In the note for $10,000 of George Huch to 
Gale it ws.s recited that certificate No. 23 for 125 shares of stjck 
issued to plaintiff and by him endorsed, was deposited with the Gale 
trustee as part of the collateral secured for the payment of this 
note» Plaintiff testified that he gave this certificate for 125 
shares to pledge with Gale because hie father requested it; that he 
and his father "worked hand in hand * «^ « i just handed it over to 
him without any question whatsoef-er* " The decree erred in finding 
that this certificate of stock was not owned by Louis Huch individually. 

The decree entered Judgment agiiinst plaintiff individually 
in favor of Josephine Huch for 12,600 as damages for his alleged 
failure to have a widow's award allowed in the Probate court in Mie 
©state of George Huch, of which plaintiff was executor. Section 178 
of the Probate Act (ch, 3, par, 330) provides that appraisers 
appointed by the court shall determine the aaount of the widow's award! 
This duty is not upon an executor. Moreover, the evidence shows that ■ 
for over six years Mrs, Huch accepted without complaint the :;j50 per 
week which her son arranged to be paid to her. A widow's award may to^ 
waived. Howe v, BrowH i 287 111. 532, 541, and her receipt of these / \ 
payments mifrht ell have been considered to T^e a waiver by her. Also, 
the record shows that her widow's award hag been allowed by the 
Probate court to the amount of f2,600, which was fou.nd by the report 
of the appt^isers to be a prober amount of the widow's award. 

It is also pertinent to this item to note that inteinrenor, 
Alfred Jacobshagen, who acquired all of the interest in the trust 
estate of the daughter, Florence v/ickersheim, claims tl».t the amount 
paid by plaintiff to his mother, Josephine Huch, was in excess of the 


^o i-'CfiEWfi »di noixlw ,B9i:3ia ic lomo siid saw lli^tnlBlq 

axnT •acitiOixf)©'! ifooJ- otsd ist .-iUnialc aeisxiB 

«S5GI J&n-s XSSI al xidTso 'tebmr rfouH ^SjIO&Q ^d fjsJs&ers'i a^sw tn^taBtmi^ 
,aoK tQ«^>ailX*i®^ ■ "^^ »S**o"-^ iilaga ,&6SI tiiAifoAi nl 

or: 000^0 v:^ III .S2",ei e^oiisM ni ilJao 

s.i;,> iw fiaJlaor 4&saio.&ne sfixl xa ba& tlliatslq otf fesweal 

SSI I'ol f?J«.ol1x*i90 airia- ©wag atf *bj1* isilUaa* m^nijal*! ,fi*on 

•galbr.: , .rieoB^ailw floli'apiyp x^"» tuoslSlm ntd 

XLl£iii!blYlbal ttiiaJ.&lq tfafllAsA *nsfflsi3*/l ^©is-Jn® esicsS ariT 
fiajieli i9g>oja3d bjs 008 ^a|: «xcl jatouH ©flJlriqaaoL Ic novAl ni 

eiM fii (tti/oo s;^6cfoi ' jb9W<^XX» IJOJawB a'wol>lw a avari oi^ ani/Xlal 

SVX acJiiOH<i .lo^iroe: tti^nX^feXq fioifiw *c ^iiowK ©sioeO lo attaJa© 

^iincjBWB »«wo£>Iw 9ii;j to :J'nifOEi>c> ©ri;^ onXisnca^al) Xlisilr oxl;t \cd bstfnioqq* 

~mi^ awwda soxj^Mve « ^ " .«xo;ti/o9xf^ iia noqw i^ou aX x**''^ alxlT 

19<5 03i Quit JcI-^ilQinoo tfJUG^5^i« l)s;fqaso-» £[ou.v\ : X xi -rot 

aaoxi;? Ig d-qisoa-^: 'i.aii £>n^ »X-^<3 ,SS3 •XII V3S t ^-'Cia ,v »^isoK ,,l)svl«w 

^ , .oa ^d nevXjBw b atf oj f)ei9f>l«no» n«©cf svcri XXo tiiUm ataomx£i<l 

9di -yjcf iiewoXlja as cf 8«£i J&iawa 8'wo|)iw loii iadd awoila Moast ©ii* 

^toq^n Biii x^l buijot aaw doirfw t006iS| lo ^nwofflja ©xi* oi/ Jiwco eJ^iscfon*! 

..IHfifirii s'wol)!*' fuel:/ Ic iJauojae 'xe^oiq ><$ aci o'Jf ais»aiiJ«Qq« 9tii lo 

t'xon»vT:6;l'cX ^J3£l;f ©don o;!" ms^i aiai^ ou JusnX^fieq osXb ai ^I 

iBiuni ©xi? ci iJasiadTii ©ti:^ ^o lie b^rtluppu onw ^negiWlaclooAX. btmtlA 

iauoBA ©riJ Jad^' amiriXo «iBi3iiai82ioX'A' ©ofisrtoll ,ito?i'IatfajQ axi* lo •*«;ti© 

9di lo aaaox© ni a^w ^iloi/H onitiqsBoL ti:©fl[;J©iB aid o* lllJnlaXq x^ JE>XAq 


amount to which she Is entitled under the terms of the will 
creating the trust, and that ehe Is Indebted to the leather eompacny, 
and he aske for an accounting In this respect. 

George Huch borrowed from hla wife Si, 000, giving hei- two 
notes of $500 each; she filed n6 claim In the Probate court on these 
notes but had a conversation with plaintiff with refei^anee to them. 
Several witnesses testified to this, but agreed In substance that 
plaintiff said he had no money In the estate at that time and could 
not pay them, and there Is undisputed evidence that at the time of 
this conversation, which took place about two months after the death 
of (Jeor,ge Huch, there was no money in the estate. Based upon this 
evidence it was error to find that plaintiff falsely represented to 
Josephine Huch that there were no assets in the estate with which to 
pay these claims. There were assets but no cash at the time when 
Josephine Huch asked for payment, and there is; no evidence that sh^v / 
was persiaaded through any false statements not to file any claim in 1 
the Probate court against the estate* In Smith v. ^mith , £06 111* ' \ 
App, 239, the court held that even If a claimant w&s misled by wrong 
advi ce of counsel this did not excuse the failure to file a claim 
within a year. 

There was no sufficient reason presented for the removal of 
Louie J, Huch as trustee. Plaintiff had been employed by the leather 
company from the time he was approximately 17 years of age, or the 
year 1915; he had worked in all phases of the business during the 
time hie father owned only 0ne-half and the Gale interests the other 
half of the bueiners, and also after his father had acquired all the 
stock; he was elected vice-president in 1920 and also acted as 
president while his father, who was a cripple for nearly 30 years, 
was away. In 1952 plaintiff was an equal stockholder wltn his father 
and drawing the same s; lary. The corporatiod at that time carried 
$50,000 of life insurance on the life of plaintiff, and in 1927 

IIlw ^di 1o sn::9;t exJ* lebmj beXil-^rx^ ai ©rfa doldv oi inisoaui 

©aarf^ «io iTiifoo s^fBcfo'il ©lio' fil miAlo An beXil aria jrioa© OOet Ic a»;fon 

hluoo bciii 9(0.1:} t&d^ t& siTfeiJae 9ri.t at ^e«0JH oa bzd acf btj&» lliJnlaXq 

to 9&li d'js ;rmlJ aonsftivs £)«9;ttfqa2J&nitf el 9*iSii;J fcna ^medi x^q :ioa 

di»9b 9d;f -isJlje adiacm onui iuods ©o«Xq afecJT rioJtuf* ^aoi^BSioyiioo alxf* 

sM^ noqu hse&Q. ^^t&imib flaCt ai ^enoai qn sbw ©^9fi;t ^ilouH a-ioiaO to 

«t fie^^nsas'sqei -v^Xselal tti^txiAXa tms bnt\ o? -rciia s^w it oonoblrt 

at doXdvi ri;fiw siT-a^tss »a« fti afeaaa on sisw »^9lli? itsilit risjiH eniilqgaoX. 

n&d^ Buli (3di *^ iiaBO os ^ud Bi^MSM ^tsfs sierfT •aaiaXo (9e9fl;t ^Aq 

«d» tsri* ©ofiQMvft ©« si e^ed^t Sua ,tfi£i«"^j5C[ lOt J&siaB xloi/H onldqoaoL 

ni iHi-tifo ^a.6 'jilt oJ iton Q.tn6!»«*,0;r8 prXbI \;n* xlguoixi^f Bftfeisuat^q saw 

.XXI d^ 4 d^^mP, »v dj-lnio i-^- .%;t»i^9 BdS Jsniasd iHiroo sJatfcil 6d* 

j^rto^w '^cf bBlBl : -;.SflTisX0 :5 ti nmrs tndi bind ftv o Bdt ,eS3 .qqA 

ULtBXo ^ V ;i..*^ «iii »9i3-oxs JoH bl!> nidi Lbbciuco tci 90iivba 

,ia<?X a nldii^ 

"io XAVoarsrr 9di toI ftetfflsaoiq noa*an ^nsioilltfe on aaw sieirfT 

T9il..«eX ©fi* )c4 SdYoXqms asscf feM ^1:i^rii>3l^T ,i9©*8kiJ sjj riouH.t* aiuoj 

««(* 10 ,9^J8 t© 81JBSTJ fl )[X»;JaffiixGT:qqs sbw ed ssiii^ axi;r aont ^nskjaioo 

axis gniiifJb aaofliaifcf sd* to 3®B;eaD[q XI« ni l>©3[rtow 6aii eri ;3XeX la^t 

'xodio 9dS a^eoTsitfli ©Xa© 0£fd^ baA tXad-ocd ^Xno feaor© leritfal did 9ali 

eai Xto 6<riiw»©jB fc«fi taflUfBt sM lod'tjs oeXJs boB tS ©niewcf «irf;J to tXiwf 

BA beto» oalM beiA 0s6X xii ^nsMa-iq-solv J&a^o^Xa asi? isri ;:tfoo*a 

^eise^t 06 X-tia ^n 'tct »Xqqiio rs ^jbw ofiw ti9ri#st aiil ??Xidw d'fl8l>ia-5^q 

r-Mi^Jjsl aid a&lv 'i^blodAoois Xawpo fla «.«% 'tti^niaXq SG<2X nl .t-<^« 8«» 

fisiiiiiO 9isi;J uiifia Ja ^oi.iu'iiuq'iott ejff vX'^^i- a Wir^t «W^ Sfliwai* £Aa 

Vj&X Hi t'/e* ,t1:i*nl.BXq to 9tiX 9di no ftSiXfiiwani stiX to 000,08$ 



when George Huoh drew hie will he gave plaintiff complete pov7-rs 
with reference to management, sales and settlement of claims, and 
after plaintiff "became president he reversed the business from a 
loss to a profit. This is more or leee a family disagreement, largely- 
growing out of plaintiff's dislike of hie sister's husband. Such 
quarrels are not sufficient ground for the removal of a trustee* 
Wylie V. Busbnell . 87? 111. 484, 505; Lorenz v. Weller . 267 I11.23j?C 

The court should not have removed plaintiff as trustee, taut it 
was also error to appoint Oharles E.Byrne as successor trustee* The 
will creating the trust ordered that upon the failure of Louie Hueh 
to perform the duties of trustee the National Sank of the Republic 
®f Chicago or its successors should be aipolnted trustee. In the 
brief for the defenda its It is stated that the Rational Bank of the 
Republic is out of eicistenoe. There is nothing in the record to 
show this, but even if true the will provided that its successor 
should "be appointed trustee. The brief filed on behalf of plaintiff 
disclaims any criticism ©f Mr, Byrne, 

We now consider the brief filed 6n behalf of the intervener, 
Alfred Jacobshagen, By leave of court he v;as pe mitted to file his 
intervening petition in which he asserted (and it is not contradicted) 
that on or about February 13; 1941|he became the holder by purchase 
of all of the right, title and interest of Florence Wickersheim in 
and to the trust created by the will of George Much, deceased. In 
his brief counsel for the intervener, with one exception, supports 
the conduct of the plaintiff in the administration of hie trust. He 
argues, as does plaintiff's counsel, that Louis Huch acted in good 
faith as president of the leather company and that no ground exists 
for his r iffloval as trustee. He asserts, however, contrary to the \^ 
claim of counsel for Mrs, Huch, that the trustee has overpaid her 
and that she is therefore indebted to the co3?poration. He asks that 
the decree be reversed in part and the cause be remanded with 
directions to take an accounting as o the amount received by Mr?, 
Huch. To this plaintiff makes the sufficient reply that all of fne 

Xl^rs'fi^I ,;t'n9Ksf?i^.sei6 -yiXim^t s «8«X -xe ??io» aX »MT ^tl'iQiq a o* asoX 
.Snscf'BifTf^ <»»»r<%*^Xn slri 1:o ^^j^lIeXfe a * tti^crlsXq to ttio goiweTS 

•QSS.XXl^l'as «'I:'?IM^ -^ siia'y.aJ 550S t,*€^ ,XXI '*fifS ^ IXgfglai/a .t elXyW 

.Bf^lfsutt lo-'seooiis QB ©jti-xiS^a 8»Xi&rfO S'flloqqa c3- ic.«rse osXjb sav 

ilosiH aiiroJ to e<»3t|;iS'A'3! «utfd- G©<yH 3'Aildf .b»Tr©l>TO ;f«i/id od;f gaXtfBirro XXiw 

©XXcftrq^H »fS* to affisS X*fl©X^al ari* *9;t«int to 8»Xtufe ©rfJ ano^Taq o^ 

©3' IrtEeiiei ari* aX gc±rf*o« al fe^&ifl' ♦©onstalxo lo «tKO aX ©XXdyqei: 

'i08e^^r)*/» efi l^j&riif &©fei:Toi<^ X£Jw MS 9U*tS IX xt«v9 *tf€f tsXrid" woria 

ttXtfiX»I ifif8cl f!C l>»Xlt t^XTbT BilT ,e»^st'«i* I)«>^eXo«f':fl stf bluoAB 

»ais^^av*TM to HKil©X#X«i« ^laa MtXeXofiXi) 
t«rt>r*#9^'^frl «fiS- "ro IXexied a* fee^Xlt t^-i-^«f ®^!t t^feXstios won s^ 

.l>-«?:t?rXfP"f*a S^w ®£i t*iir /.ftsX ifS ^us^Ariscfoost, £»»fttXA 

, V .i. X..:. ,1..; i cfx fcfis) l»©?fi9B8s sti d.ot£t& al noX?X#®^ %nXH»vTr:»;JnX 

'■^i mf^i^/.nioiit'l*: &sri^'t0:£%-'t6''-l^m:^ttil: t — ■3i"« «ef-^ to XXiS Ic 

. :'a^i»«o«B ^iieit# >?si'r<>s^ %^ fl/^ ^H;^ >^cr Jb^etMsio ttv^tt i^rfJ ©^ fens 

n^f-Gfrmm-^ ^x{i!^Xffi«>p.-- . .. . ^ ■ vrftf «s©"!t X»8-fijtfos tfeitd sXri 

. oi*^^**^XffX9rfei* ««id' /tX itX^trrXaift 9«^ t« toifiaifo® iwltf 

boo® fil 59Cfo&$ ll©i»i? fi-i ^ l«=tr!i/oo s'lti'tfliiX* ««o6 ft« tiiias;^iA 

ftdiif oiJ' t^jatSisco ^Tovw/©*! t3*^«a8S , '*asMt BM XiSTOffif T aXif rroTc 

led J&i^q^evo s/sri 9i>#su'. ^ .3>sM fot Xsaaflfeo?* to ai^Xo 

J«il? «<a« »R *noXi?KT:(Mt*5ec' b©3^d9fe«X diolr^isd-? aX «>^s *a«* Jbn* 

fioXw &«fcfs4»«(9«s &c .X 6deiE»v««i scJ 89»r&efN edit 

,?i!;'. Tjcf b0vX''o«"t ^'isucaiB 8«i;t . nl*ri»;o©oi< «£ aij** o:? a^oXJ^©e'tXfe 

©nJ to XXa Sosif xi^qe^ ^T/igXoXl'iir -s«at ttX^nXaXq Bltii oT ^o«H 


funds paid Mrs.Huch were pursuant to resolutions of the direotord 

of the leather company In August, 19,;4, and In January and May, 

1935,, Jacobshagen did not acquire any interest in the trust estate 

until February 1941, and therefore he was not affected by anything 

that happened before he acquired his interest. See Baboo ck v, Farwell , 

146 111, App, 307, 355, where it was held that one cannot complain 

of corporate acts done prior to his becoming a stockholder, ag he ir 

presumed to have become a stockholder with knowledge of conditions 

existing at the time of his purchase. 

A further sufficient point is that the intervener hag not filed 
any cross-appeal from the decree and therefore cannot seek a reversstl/ 
Forest preserve District v. Ghilvers, 344 111, 87S; uark,/ v, pope , 
289 111, App, 558, 574, 

To note all the many points made in the defendants' brief would 
unduly extend this opinion, W« have indicated only the affirmative 
reasons for our conclusion. 

For the reasons indicated the decree is reversed and the cause 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with what we have said, 


Matohett, P,J«, and O'Connor, J, concur. 

&to^of"\i\- c^riJ TO Bnul'iulosiv,' . 'ol.^q about 

n.l»LqMC<. </^0S .qqA *in d*X 

,8«3 .cj«iA ,1X1 682 

Slycvs* lalrca *sifjij»&:ff»l.&js- si^tf isl (^ojaat »tuXo., ;.a oT 

,XiOl«tfXSflOO 1UQ lot fiilOSA^a 

5*f*iwi& eaftf lust® .feSR^xsven j:1 ■-■■sios.fe sdii' ^^^asimi axiesiftST: »fi"J 



GEORGE C.L-' G»;RSTR0M, Administrator ) 

of -4Uaf Estate of George A.Lageretrom, ) 
Deceasedty--..^ \ 

Appellant J 


EDWIN JACK) and MRS.O. JAG0^/'"' -^^_^ 







Plaintiff as administrator brought suit for damagesj 
/Alleging that the defcth of hie Intestate was oeused by the negligence 
of defendant Edwin Jago while driving an automobile in which ilre, 
Jago> the owner, was also an occupant. At the close of the evidence 
for the plaintiff the oourt instructed t-ie jury to return a verdict 
for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. 

At the time of the accident the deceased, G-eorge A.Lagerstrom, 
was a child six years of age; he was struck by the automobile as it 
was going west on Addison street, at or near the crosp-valk of 
Rutherford street, which runs into Addison from the south; 
Rutherford does not at this point run lorth of Ac ison; there are 
sidewalks on both the north and south sides of Addison, 

The sole reason stated by the t^^ial court for instructing for 
the defendants was that he did not believe there was any evidence 
"showing that degree of care that a child of the age of six should 
use crossing the street, even at the cross-walk, » This was 
erroneous, for it has been repeatedly held that "up to the age of 
seven years 'a child is incapable of such conduct as will constitute 
contributory negligence,..' ** Chicago City Ry. Co, v. Tuohy , 196 
111, 410, 427j, Central R.Co . v, J rnigan . 198 111.297; 
Richardson v. ivielson , £21 111,264; M ^^kaliunaa v, C.'.-.l.H. Co . 318 
111, 142« The trial court said that he wag following the decision 
in Roberts v. City of Rookford . £96 111. App.469, In that case 
there was uncontradicted evidence that the child ran directly in 




-i_v? to 


• 8T 


.^^^Tv^; 6n« GOAL Miwa? 


::;ht aajsCTiosa xaafioeoM aoitauL.'Sti. 

t8©8«iaac •xol iJiwa rMguoicf lo^Aivfa iaiMfeA »« HI^cIbI'I 
onsMv© 9rio to oaolo &dt d'^.i ,d'nfiqwnoo ns oalB bjsv ^ne/iwo ari;^ iOS,aT» 

;xi3"jjOi sri^f fflotl ao3io«.A Qinl Brjst rioidw »d'!=«?>td"a JbnoliodJiiH 

ui tJnIoq aifl^ ^j3 ;fon asob tnotiBiiiuii 
,iiQBlQbA lii aatie diuoa £>n3 diioti 9x1^ difccf no a]LLam9blfi 
lot sni;fojuntajRl lot tiwoo .£-?i:;r SilcT ^d" i)9;ffi*B HenBet e-Ioa •ilT 

«one£>iv9 ViJ3 BBW ftiarij ©veiled i^on bif) ari ;fsriJ sbv. a;J«ADfiet96 ad^ 

Blwcxln xie to 6S« 9n^ to bllAo s jftii? si«r> to '^eT3Sf) ^fld;f ^nivods" 

aisw ei:iT " ,2ll« - exi^J J-^ nevo , Joe-id's sdi anXaeoto enu 

to B§B 9iiJ o.t qy" a^sriJ^ IiX&a TeXLaJjaeqat nascf sari it 'xot^awosnoTis 

©itud-ld-snco XXXw ba ^oubaoo rfowa to sXdsqjsonX ai feXldo £i' aiBs^x nevso 

sex tl^Siii ♦▼ #oO »'^H yiJJ.0 o-Aiiold'O " • , . .ooxis^lXaen x;'ic;t«<fiT:tnoo 

iVes.XXI aex tSssiilS..- - . oD.H Im-ij aeO ai..xxiXXI if^*- tOX*" .XXI 

8-fS . op .H.I.i\.Q ,T . a.gniji£j?.iiBaH ;^-Ss*XXI XSc;; t coa I tv^ .v goaljTiJBdoXfl 

noXaXool) ariJ sniwcXiot 8*'.w ad iMxi;i btaa i^tuoo 0^J^i3 od .SI^X ,XXI 

eaao *i)d;r nl .Cft^.qgA .XXi 8G5! ♦ fcio'-btooH to yj-XQ ,v a;tiqdofl ni 

«X XX;to9iXJ3 nan. J&Xido ad* ij^d^f soaooXvo betfOlb&iiKoetuf saw a^sd^ 


front of the oncoming truck, and moreover, that was not & cas6 
involving a direction to the Jury, for the trial WI|b before the 
court without a Jury* 

The defendant argues that there was no evidence that the 
automobile was hegligently and carelessly driven without a proper 
lo kout ahead or at a dangerous rate of speed, or that defendants 
negligently failed to yield the rV^t-of-way to plaintiff's / 
intestate as he wae crossing at the street inter sectioni as was 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint* 

The accident happened about 6 p,m. on SeptemDer 2, 1929, when 
it was still light; the pavement was dry; there is a painted /Wlalta 
line down the center of Addison street, which runs east and west; 
the mother of the child saw him in front of his nearby home about 
five minutes before the accident; he was then carrying a little 
kitten; she testified that he had always been instructed never to 
go into the street. He was se=n by another witness on the sidewalk 
on the south side of Addison and going e«Qt» This witness testified 
that he heard no hom sounded in warning but neard the sound of tires 
skidding on the street and saw the west bound car standing on the 
north side of the cent r line of Addison and some 15 to 20 feet 
beyond the west cross-walk of Rutherford, and the child lyinc-^ 
unoonseious on the parkway; there were blood epc ts »t the cross-walk 
and also in front of the automobile; also some glaf|S near the ooosr:- 
walk; there were skid marks on Addison about 50 to 60 feet long, start- 
ing east of the east oross-v/alk of Rutherford, 

A police officer testified he had exaaiined the skid oiarks on 
Addison, which were 57 feet in length; that the front headlight of 
the automobile was broken and there was a blood stain on the pavement 
north of the ce iter line of Addison and about even with the west 
cross-walk. This witness testified that in ills Judgmnt, based on the 
skid marks, the automobile was going about 30 miles an hour.Another 

.Xii-l * ^uorfJiw ;f'xx;oo 

•xsc ifoxl^iw fl9v±^ t-^sasXaiJBo S).^.b xLta^f^tl'^^ti saw allcfomoi'i/a 

8;tn«l>n©1d^ i»di 10 ,ft©8qs Ic 9*£'i suoiesnaJb a *a to ^siiB tuol oX 

B <.aoi,to9a'-i--.}fil ~. r,a Sf?lB8©f£0 aim 9d a« »JA^as*flI 

,^fii»Xq«o6 6^\'itini.&L([ al fctgeXX* 

neri^R tes(>^I 4S lESdasJqeg no S 3'irocfs 6»n»aq&d *af»!>X»e« «dT 

»tlll|rw6©;JflXj»q s bX »i<5d;f j-ywrfe qjsw ;inot«v&q «d;t i^d^iX IXi^» sew ti 

jj-eew fefijs *8A9 aoflf^ rioXriw »d''^s«x*B nosX5£>A ^© ie*fl»o 9d& mroft ©niX 

d'tfddA sfflcrl iceFTc^sn el^ 1:o ^RoTtl a I aM wan J&XJrf» Bil9 ^0 •t«d;fo« «xf* 

> , ^evsfl bcifourrd'isnX ncstf 8^«wXja feed sri *BXl;f 6«Xllt3»» 9dB ;n9tfJli 

riXBffebIa •rf:?' xio a««i!v'J^ ti^Mitcfi^ tcf *■•{? s^w 9H ♦J^'erti's ad? ©;fftl 03 

53i'ilJa*J ggftffJIw sXiiT *iJ"5»e 'gfiios JbKB n©Bi;:;JbA to 96Xa dtuoa Mt* no 

gHil;t to bmros adtt Maafi ^i/d §jfiin'saw al bebnuof^ ntod on fi^jasif m( ^Ac(;r 

9il* no s*^X.5nJB;fa ti&o feiruocf *emy ©xiit w«a has *&wt#a »Xi^ flo guXJbJBiis 

i9st 02 o* 9X smos hna ao^±i> ■■<tJt inituso ©li* to ©IjXb xitnoH 

^iiXtX fiXiifo &£t9 bae tBnot^idMt^ te iSXB^-seoio Jsew tutit bno%»^ 

'(Xaw-ftso'io acirf' i' booXef siaw sisrid" ;Y*w^'^«cf 9ii^ a© Buolsenooau 

- 8 0«o ^^rii 1^ ■:■ eaaXg aioa osX^ ; QXicfouo^uja edi to *ffoTit ni oaXa JboA 

■iiAi'3 tgnol J-^st 06 oJ oe tirocfa aoaXSfiA no aifijaaf JbiiLe 9i«w s*i«cl^ {jiXaw 

.fe'rotiedd'uH to :SXav -oeoio Jsis© 9£[;r to sTbas Bfii 

no aJCtaiD Mia axiJ BenXiisaxs fijari ad 6eitl;ts€>;t tooitto solXoq A 

to tii-gilbBoti iactt ©ftiT j^acIJ ;ii^§noI nX *sst "P5 ©new xioldw ^noalbbk 

iaamtivi&q &ti^ no al^Je SooXcT >isrf;r Iwi^ nsaioitf ai*-^ •IXtfoaio?jjA enJ 

^s«i» «ri;J ri*Xw ««v© a^ucicTfi i»rt» nosii £»A to eicili ivi^n^o aiW ^o itl'ioix 

•dt no I>eBBcf,Jn m^fiyt eXd ni sfisd* fesXtXcfae* lasistriw sXd'I ^jLLsm-aeoto 

ic-tifoaJ><,tisod nB anflci Oe ivod& gnio^ aaw ©XXcfoao^tfA ariJ ^jsifjm itlJiu 

police officer testified as to tJat pre«enc« of the blood and gl&SB 
and the akid marks. He tested the torakea on the »utomobll8 and 
testified that at 2* alles an J^ur he could stop it in 20 feet* 
fhere w-e other testisiony to the saxe gen*? al effect. 

Trom these facts it is argued that the child was croeaing from 
the south to the north eld- of Mdieon in the segt cross-walk of 
Kutherford and was over half way across the street when te was struck 
by the automobile « which had skidded some 57 feet« carrying or 
knocking him to a point 20 feet u»st of the west cross- ..alk of 
, Rutherford where the sseeond blood spot was found, fhese facts 
/ tended to support the charges of i^gli^nee ma4e In plaintiff's 
complaint and should hare been submitted to the Jury for their 
Gon side ration. . 

Defendant© argue that plaintiff's case calls for an iafsrenee \ / 

based upon another inference, and that the law will not permit this. 
This statement may have at one time received some support, but as 
^iplot's in his work on Svldenee (aad ed, ) see.41, says: ^'S'here is 
no such rule; nor can be. ** This author completely demolis ;es this 
myth, and ntm«=*rous i^ell considered opinions are to the same effects 
notable |uyE g ▼• Prudantial Ins. Co.. £85 111. 4pp. 442; iMm^ v. 
Qoldblatt Bros. Inc. . 298 111.4pp. 3£6; yiodalen v, SeKool . 314 
111. App. 40, 

Plaintiff asks this court to pass upon what is said to be 
improper conduct in the trl 1 on the part of counsel for de endants. 
This counael apparently did go farther than w >s proper in his attempt 
to bring before the Jury a written s atement said to have been made f' 
by defendant Sdwln Jago. such a statement was self-serving and 
inadmlsslblej» and th* inquiry into its contents was an indirect method 
t© bring it to the attention of the Jury, such conduct has been held 
to be reversible error in |;iishop v. Chicago ui unetion xiy.Co.. 280 
111. 63. 

££ua 'C4IXU4 .e^it&B Uldm 9i%t I^m 

adoy-.l fevj'^rff •.feivtfot ^*j-v^ ;ro-t« McX«f &JKi#«« «i* 9<![«sfw »*iot7»d*tfJ' 

»i «*»»Ji . ♦ «Miii«»iira ao- itow •Irf ni •'^•ilU^ 

sMJ ««»- :»lIofli^'^-^> v.rPht-^i ap«© "stt^rftifs srjtKfT ** •»«f ileo tore ;«Xir« rfo*f» Wi 

, . : . . . -^ •*££L-ti... Mkis^ 

.01^ .tjcrA .xn 

.Rjn.«1^ft« #l& t ^t«(| 9Kt» JI6 I itt mit at f9isbaot> r ^qo m csml 

iqafiiist isJUi Ai t»qo*t< dt ^i>>dttB\ OS fe**" tX:f«*ta«]fK?» X»«iun>« »lrfP^ 

aAfiff it«»d »vArf ©» Mm tit<m«tB's aniit^^ a- t^tff. 9tit snotucf ^airrd o;? 

E?f.;3 "gr,Xvt»R-^Xs^i'. mv ;{'o'58S «*.«*« a diotffi .o^jsl' ixX«t»3 tiui&«r«'i»A ■V' 

6cx(;t9m to^ti^ni ttM »js^ ^:^fi«itslOO afl otat t**X»j>fli $>£iJ^ &nJk «»X«fi«!tiiAMii 

.58. XXI 

It was also error for counsel for defendants to attempt to 
Inject Into the record, as authority, the contents of the United 
StatefS Bureau of Standards, a hearsay statement as to what is the 
proper stopping distance of an automohlle at various speeds, / 

For the error in peremptorily instructing the Jury to find 
for the defendants, the Judgment is reversed and the cause is 
remanded for a new trial- 

Matchett, P»J», and O'Connor, J, concur. 


RUTH U MAGABBS, a minor, by 0. A. 
father and mother and next friends; 

and C.A.i'jklCABEE, 





1I0HARD MILL^^^ trading as HIGHAM^" ) 

MiLLSH AMUs.^Mr<:N'r^■'myIces; cham:es j 

MII-LER, trading ae iHUw.R >i!U8' Mf !«T ) 

EST^ HPRISES; and CH;\RLI#itlI|.LiSR and ) 

RICflARD MILLER^ oopa^tneri, tJ^kdlng ) 

ae RICHARD MILLKR ^U8 ■ .iaKNT Dv:Vim;§ ) 

and/or MILL1::R ipiifSmmT mTKliPRtr:S^^'%, ' 
/ Defendants, 

316I.A. 15? 

. A#1U. FROM 

RI0HARI>4llLL^^R ftnd GH.<mLKS MIU.ER, 
/ Appellants, 




Ruth L.Mac&toe'*, a minor, hereafter called plaintiff, by her 

next friends, brought euit against defendant© seeking cfama^g 

for Injuries said to h&ve heen received iriille she was riding 

on one of defendants* aiBus»r>aient devices beoauBe of its negligent 

operation; the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants not 

guilty; the trial court allowed plaintiff's motion for a new trial; 

defendants eou«7ht and obtained leave of this court granting 

permisBlon to appeal from this order and the que ft Ion before us 

la the propriety of the trial court's order, 

August 5, 1938, a street carnival was held in Hig^lunt Park, 

Illinois, An amueefflent device Imown as Loop-0-Plane rated 

by defendant Charles Miller, The loop-o-plane consists of an upright 

coluaafx at the top of which is a horizontal axle/which is attached 

a rod or pole 16 feet long, which, whentthe device is at rest, is 

parallel to the colw^i; at the lower end of this rod is & cab 

containing t»© seats back to back, each seat holding two people, or 

four per? one in all; the cab and pole act as a pendulum and can 

be «»ung around the horizontal arle in a complete circle, Af t^r 

passengers wer-: in the cab an ope at or would push tne cab and start 


:c V n. 

no i:;.^yuw i^ 



'gn:bli ejBW Slip fllljiw) fesvleofn naf^tf 9V3rf c.1 blAs t»litr(.fli tot 
*fl®SlXi»n aii "io pr^i/.-off^/ ataiv^b ^Tflso^sMi^ *WiSciBhn9\9b lo ©no jxo 

:^nl}n£.t:^ 3''-woe ^lii>: sat&itio bptm ;^^»ea 9iitsAha9lt*b 

s,i( ; v.'lt*d iK^I^'aii jjiift %B£-/ti) slim tacTt L&9<iq>i ct aol^Blan^q 

,i9tbnc s'?isroo Xjatii^ afl^ lo x**2*iqctq ad^ al 
»HT.v. 6i?^£d8lH at Marf 9At« Xsvi/rsso ^ssTrifa & ,8SGX ,3 ^iQtqaiU'^ 

Jxlgl^q0 na Ic aJftisnco ec«X<3f-©-cfC©I ©ri'I ,i»fXi« saltBdO Jna^jnstftft x;tf 
fari3A>-tJ^ Bi ^Xxa Xja^nosi^oi:! « el iioi£hr to qot ed* ^a mutIoo 

<lfio i^ ei fict sJUi* "iG firj» t«w«X axiJ ;f-a ;i«w»Xc.o 9ti^ ct XwXX^M^ 

iOt»X€(0©q cw* yt^fiihlasl -tAss xlojae ^alojasT cJ 3[oi<tcf»^ja«« oa^ yjXnia;roo« 

fSAo SiXB inaXtfbnf^q e rm J^sa »Xo<i feft» d&o 9di jXXa ai aflc T«>r> itrol 

•Xf^r^Vi jSXoiio ©*»Xrr«o© & ftl ©Xx^B X>^«c«JttQC{ fjrfJ bauoiJt sn«w« Mf 

^tRi^R bnt cfAo ». * riswq fclwow lojfB cf/eo «flj «i ?«t»w atiJ^ataAq 


it swinging backward and forward; there is a 3 horsepower motor 

attached to the top of the /right column which is geared to the 

pole attached to the cab; the motor was incapable of swinging 

the e&b from its stationary position below to a vertical position 

above, as it could move the cab only a distance of two or three 

feet. When passengers got in the cab they were secured in tneir seats 

by a belt running from one side of the cab to the other, across . 

their laps and hips; after the passengers were in the cab and strapped 

in the operator would push the cab and tui»n on the motor so as to 

swing the cab in the direction it had been pushed, for a distance 

of two or three feet, and as gravity would reverse the movement 

of the cab, swinging it in the other direction, the operator would 

reverse the motor thereby swinging the cab in the opposite 

direction; this would be repeated *» the momentum and force of the 

motor continually swinging the cab fu' ther, first in one direction 

and then another like the pendulum of a clock, until finally the 

cab would swing up in a position vertically above the axle, at which 

time the passengers would be upside down, kept from falling out 

by the straps; when the cab was in this position the operator 

would apply a hand brake which would hold the cab in that inverte 

position for a moment or two and then it would be released and 

the cab permitted to Si ing down and back and forth gradually until 

It stopped. 

Plaintiff sought to show negligence in the operation of this 

device by testimony of certain witnesses, including plaintiff, that 

when the cab was up in a vertical position and had started to s:ing 

downward and had gone about three feet, it was suddenly stopped 

and moved backward in the opposite direction, passing through the 

vertical position and then oaclllating gradually to the bottom; 

that the "wholf? thing" and the braces were tilted over and the 

neJttiaocr InTiti"^ woI«>d tfoid^laoq t'^JWiol^sSa eifJt moil fi-^o Bdi 

'??'sr{? Ic OQimi^Blb a %lao cfao »£lrf^ evors bLvoo $1 8« ^erocfa 

t nsctoii <ȣ9rid"o 9tii^ Q-i tfso 9iii:^ 1o s&is 9xxo moil ifninmn ;tX?Kf & \;cf 

6e< A^as cfso aid;? al sisur a-i98n«38S«j ari^ teJlfs IBQi^ 6n» scfi.X liari* 

oi SB 08 lotfoffl 9rfJ fio nttr^f Bha efst:' sxf;)' x£6wq J&Xi/ote loJfitsqo arf* ol 

*n3JH«voiii arid' osTeve'i filwow y,;tiTSfES as JMta ,t*»*t eintit 10 ow# to 
&I«ow *to;fisi®qo '',ti^ taoii&ettb isd^o Bdi nl il snlgnXwa ,tf«o •«{* to 

•tit ,i»iflC;tTjbrt CffiO ariJ? ^nlsnlwg -^IlAiMTlS^nos toiyofli 

edS xllsntt Itlfna tJsoIo s to muli/feasq ^liiJ" ©all isriSonA andi baa 

doMv ts ,a>XxA off* fsvod« '^il««i^'^fsv noi^laoq « rd qu snlwo M«ow cTao 

Sifo gjslllet ffiott *q«af ,mroJb ©fiXaqw 9<f feXwow ets^gfl^asjaq a«cf^ Mill 

ic^fitf9ffo t3is;f noitlaoq siriit ttl sbw jIbo eifJ usiftr ;a0fiY#a tiid' t«f 

sjj-i^vjpri (fan* ai tfeo erftf JbXori 6X0OW dolrlw taL»itl b§uui £ ^Xqqa *Xuow 

bns. feeaasXei «d &Xt/'..«. it n^dt bttA ©w^t 10 taim&a « lot nci^laoq 

Xid'ft0 x-f-^J^^J&'^S ififi^st Bns ioBtf feflJB fwofe 3^1*: 8 o:f ftQJJXaisq «Ja© sd? 

•fcvqqe^B ti 

al/tf- "io R©ilfti«qo ^fitf xiX ftorts^iX^on T^rris et $stj^uc6 1LttfaI»l^ 

J^:f ,tti*friaXq gnlio^Ioiti ta©as9fi*iv> x-tii&^'^^^g to Tjflculla*? x* »«iT»A 

giii^a o* 6»**t;il'8 bad bsm nXiltJnst^q Lsioti^t^v :i nl qu saw ^tt> «w'l;f nstfw 

j&<!CfqECF:J8 xJjn«^*w« a-^^ *-^ i#fi#t netsit tycda aao^ 6iaxf tns btMnOKOb 

etii if^i^oifl* srrl'-mBq ^floiSo««rXS ®tH»oqqo eri* ni bisw^isiMr 6«vo« bnm 

tJROif^ctf 9xi3^ c? xCX^wfcsrtig 8fiiitj3lXi©&o n«xi^ fir .e- ^eij^iaoq X«olt<x«r 


platforw upon which th« deyleft rfiettd vae ral«ed from the i^pround 
about 3 or 4 inoh«i, Pl&lntlf r olalass that when the oab stopped ther« 
WAR a eudden Jerk that injured her spine, aad for this danag«e 
ware sought* 

Defendants introduced teetimony tending to show that the 
devioe operated in the ueual manner and that there w&® no sudden 
stoppage or J«rk as desoribed by plaintiff; «ls«,o medical teetimony 
tending to show that plaintiff bad a oompresrion of the 4th lumbar 
vertebra r^^aulting froa a turoor which had been present probably 
sot les@ than a year befoz^ the instant occurrence « 

Plaintiff was at t; is time an active girl 14 ysar^ of age, 
above the average in intelligence j she, with a girl friend and two 
young men, went to the carnival togetheri they rode upon a device 
called a Til t-a-?/hirl and tiien went to the loop-o-plane and watched 
It operate for some time; plaintiff and her girl friend becaae 
passengers, entering the cab; two young men (not the escorts of 
plaintiff and her friend )oooupied the other two seats of the eab; 
these yoimg roen were not witnesses at the trial, 'he boys who had 
accompanied the girls to the carnival did not take the ride but 
stooA/ watching it operate. 

Plaintiff and her girl friend and the y ung wen escorting 
then testified that the cab sudoenly Jerked back in the opposite 
direction Just as it had left the vertical position and had aoved 
about three feet. However, the testisony of one of the young sen 
and the girl friend of the plaintiff was weakened by t » 
introduction of etatements they had made shortly &ft*='r the accident, 
signed by then, in ic||S8)i which they said that the device operated 
normal r and no mention was made of any Jerking* 

p operator of the device testified that there was no 
Jerk I la the operation of the device and that it worked normally 
«ai (he usual manner. There was testimony of others, including 
%> Ml eatpert electrical engineer, th?:t it was a physical 
I klity for the device to Jerk in the manner decribed 




^-jg-jw ' i» ,=»•»» T» 

Xt^^^^o-- -' 



M-..,/ -"TvTtB^tf t«»t s ."'ajS* »««I too 

■' ' ■•£.'■":• c( fin*) J-:"- • ' '^ftta TiWB^»X«| 

■■■ '■■■u^, ^Y-'; ^aS tSStf B«ltl7V-- -"ii? 
" feinilfl Ptt$ igltt ham 

ikW -t ^-r ' ■ IBmrf^ A «. 4 W 

by plaintiff and her witnesses* The expert explained in considerahle 

detail, giving measurements and weight in support of his opinion 

that, if the cah was stopped two or three feet after it had left 

the vertical position, the motor was not sufficiently strong to 

pull it hack into the reverse motion. Whether the Tmspso^^^xxa^ operated 

in the normal/ii«jcxx , without any Jerk or unusual movement, was a 

question of fact for the consideration of the Jury, which indicated 

by their verdict thst in their opinion the operation of the device 

at the time and place in question was normal and as usual. 

The trial court gave as his reasons for granting a new trial, 

first, that he was of the opinion that an instruction given at the 

request of the defendants was reversible error. This instruction 

is as follows: 

"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
before the plaintiff, Ruth Macabee, entered the loop-o-plane in 
question she had senn it operate and thereby became familiar with 
the manner in which it was so operated, and if y.iu further find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that as a result of the 
plaintiff having seen said loop-o-plane operate she knew^ or in 
the exercise of reasonable care foroone of her age and intelligence, 
should have known of all natural risks arising out of a ride in 
said loop^>e-planf ,then upon entering said loop-o-plane under such 
circumstances, she assumed all normal risks arising out of the 
usual oDeratlon thereof, and if you further find that &t the time 
the plaintiff was in the loop-o-plane it operated in the usual 
manner and as she had previously observed, then you should find the 
defendants not guilty, " 

^The court was of the opinion that the assumption of risk doctrine 
applied only where there was a contractual relation or relationship 
of master and servant, and that this was not present In the instant 
case,. And plaintiff asserts in her brief that the doctrine of 
assumption of risk never aoplles except where there is the relation- 
ship of master and servant. This view is erroneous, There was a 
contractual relation here when plaintiff paid the fee for permission 
to ride on the loop-o-plan§. '.'hat we said in Murphy v. White City 
Amusement Co ^.24g 111. App. 56, is in point, where we held that while 
the relation there between plaintiff and defendant may have been 
that of passenger and carrier, yet the relative duties of the parties 

...^Isilqo qM to d'^Ofowa oi ^iigiaw Me a3-a9iB^*T[tf«Aefflt gnivJtji t'tl«^»6 
^teX S«ii ^fi te^ta *»©! f^s^tfi'J 10 ©wtf i)«|q€>|e a«» €a0 mii "ti «;^*cl;t 

.^ ...w titfl^^vom X£jy8«c0 to aC'tsJ, ^a» Jwojc^sTi* « xxiWi\Ia«n;on aifit ill 
oetf^sifefli Hjolsiv tV^iil 9iii to ffelif-iJfSfc^aR&o s/:J«f tot tQ&t lo noiJeej^p 

^.. ,: . . ^ gnJtJiSJa^a tot BfioajBoi Jslxl sa 9va^ *«juioo XaI^J sdT 

JewoXXol BJ3 ft! 

nrJiv •■-._.:„..., . „,. v: . _ JJ-Kfee bj-iu ...- ----; : ../p 

^ - - ia'nisXq 

t -^^ :. j._ ... . ... , -i^Kfi «^f^- 

■ ten lis ^C ";-:GnA Fvijr; bi: 

rvr-f^'- - ..:.,... :. ., .. .... , • ' m 

« vJIiurs toe ntoAhaelBb 

eijf'-r'ir.n .trrrvj:rR5j„ .. , . , noifflqo Slid' to saw iivoo SifT 

qiiir.. : ... T M.taufc«$flOo a esw arrssri^ 9n?Mtir tjXco bsIlqcB 

H 8«-w ©no^ . .l'.js»/5O':e'3:0 ei wsly alffi. ^^t/usvTt'-a fma i$#8j3b; to qixle 

noiffiaiwrftq not net ^tii t>ls>q tticfixiaXij Sfldw g'l^^ff n<?iJ«X'^i X^«*'-'is^*flCO 

-Jill-S-i^J^ *>^ Y.jrfa? ffM til tlsB f<w tfBffP . 9n«IqrO~qooX srftf ao *61t ©J 

lArfw ;fBii:; Mofli ew ©rc&iif^ ^Jfiloq nl ei ^da ♦qqA ♦XX^ S*^«>lSt£22ESSaB4i 


depend upon the kind of carriage contracted for. In 01 sen v, Rlvervlew 
Park Co.. 262 Ill,i^p. (abet) 638, which Inrolved an accident while 
plaintiff was riding on a circular railway, the court said: "When 
persona contract for a ride on these devices, such ae are 
oommonly In our amusement parks, they do so with the knowledge 
that there Is more or less danger In the eji^erlence. That Is 
onw of the sources of attraction." In Stlokel v* Rlvervlew 
Sharp shoo t'^r 8 Park Co . > 159 Ill.App, 110,116, a case Involving 
injuries Incurred on an amusement device, it was held that the 
question of aseumptlon of risk was for the jury to determine, .any 
other cases support this proposition, 

Th© instruction under consideration told the Jury, among otlwr 
things, that plaintiff •assumed all normal risks arising out of 
/ the usual operation thereof, and If you further find that at the 
time the plaintiff was in the loop-o- lane it operated in the usual 
manner and as she had previously observed, then you should find 
the defendants not gulltji, * Cases said to be to the contrary can be 
readily distinguished from those above cited. We are of the opinion 
that the instruotl n stated the law ahd was properly given to the 

The court also gave as a reason for granting a new trial the 
refusal to admit in evidence an answer first filed by Richard 
Mlller,a defendant. His original answer, not sworn to, admitted 
the ownership and operation of the loop-o-plane device; subsequently 
Richard Miller moved to be permitted to file an amended answer In 
which he denied operation or ownership of the device; this motion 
was supported by an affidavit of the attorney who drew the 
original answer to the effect that the admission of the allegations 
of ownership and operation by Richard Miller was made in error, with- 
out the knowlefige or authorijjy of Richard Miller, and was contrary 
to the facts* The motion was allowed and the amended answer was 

nexiW" }feijB3 .tii^oo ariJ ,X-®*XiJd''^ i-elHsnio » a© gfiifei-s ««w l^l*niBlq 
©1,9 P.J3 fiot/R ,9*oxva6 ©aad? no fli)X'i & to^ io&i^aoo ano^'iaq 

iii c^6riT ,i9o/ir«si'f''qxs' ©xi^" al ifign^fe aB«X Tto «t[©h «1 e^Bdi iAdi[cvrl f?5^£.o b ,@XX,0XX. ^qqA.XXX SSX ^«,ft,Q ,^-y$^ alt^fftJMlKJi. 

jiri psw ;tl 4©©Xys^ ta^ffisaya's na no fi^'inironi a^iit/tni 

^i:si3>'i i^Bttluneisb o9 v^^-rf, »rfJ lol s&n :ABtt to ncli-qffisraa* lo nolJaewp 

iQXlifo Sncififi t^':ii''t ^^^^ ^^'^^ aolt»'tf^hlBU9o iBbau tiel^^uniQcUL 9tCi 

^o iuo snx8it.o aiisii'.ton IXa f6fiV8it«* «id-nlaXq *ari* ,asnlri* 

&cii *3 JAiliT I>ii21 tsxt^iifl uov; 11 ba& ^to'ftedJ noXJBT^qo letUBU oii* 

X':;/3U 0(^t ni B'^zTsioq© tl •a»X -c-qooX 8*fJ ci aaw TtlXlfni^Xq 9d? e»X* 

i/c--^ aotiS ^csvtsa^G ^Xftwoiv^^'itq bAd erit e« Ana «x8nn«a 

ecj njao Y.icTtfnco ©rfrf oS' s-o ojf bl&9i «t>aisC " ,Jt;fXi*n3 iifoa sisu^as'i^b e^3 

f:-oIni- iA' .lus^is svoeTfi esort;r meit fewsKi«nSf«-**8i:c> t-f-£ft*''i 

5a? ocf nevir^ ■^EX't'^qontq saw bB& v; b®,i.!33:a £i'-i;f9«i3"a£ii ©riJ izdi 

Snmom X^ b^llt i&'ilt •xswaoB a& soii^j&lv© si d^iabB oJ iBaulsT: 

b9t^ijsb» ^oi ni'QVua ;foit ^^ew»JaJS Xanigiio bIA ,iaAbaBt9b BtiaXXlid 

XX*ca0p»sc(ji;8 jaoiveJb »nBXq~o-qocX ari* ^o neJ:<rBieqo Jwie qlriaieiwo eri* 

ni inw»xiu» fi9l3nsaTjf3 a» 9X11 e* J&8,-t:tijn^q ?^ci Qi b»rom tsllM SrtRdolB 

noiiom eXrirf jaoiveo «ul;t to qXriat^nwo io flcld«rf«cTO belnaJb »il £(oX£lw 

&dt wma o^w ^»ftio.j-c>-ja €>il* 10 ^ilv^bittsi as ^cf B«ifTtoqqua *5««f 

aisoiiABSIXfi 9ri? "io noXeeiJii^ ^sii ^Adci ^OBfi-^ mi ©* i^wacs XAnijlio 

-iiJlw t'TO'xto al -3f)«« ««w laXXXM msiioXfl ijd aoitffi'Sf^otG jwie qiila-i^nfro lo 

Xtai^ceo 3«w X>aa t'5f»XXil4 MadcliJ to ^ti'^'ist^tf* io s^SisXwocjf «iitf *jtfO 

as&v levieaa J^sAfiteiae add' jbnjs .^^^^'©XIjs asw aoltfoa 'hIu «a^9st f>ti^ oi 


filed* The court i^roperly excluded the origin 1 answer of Richard 

Miller, InriBgnnett v, Auditoriiam Bldg> Oorp. ^ 299 Ill.App. 139, 
we held that an allegation in one of the counts of an original 
complaint should hare he n admitted in eTidence as this count 
was never suprlanted in any way nor contradicted in any manner, 
and we properly assumed that plaintiff advised her attorneys 
of the facts when this original coiuat wa« filed. See also 
Niederle v, Ohioago R. T. Co .. 264 Ill.Apo, 547, and Linn v. Clark. . 
29§ 111* 22, The facts in the instant case are quite different.v/here 
it appears that a pleading is filed which misstates f&cts« a.nd 
new pleadings are substituted, the assumption that the first 
pleading was authorised vanishes* In V^enegar v, Bollenbac^ . 180 111. 
222, is an extended discussion of v^thls question and the opinion 
concludes that where such pleading Is not swora to by the party 
and It Is prepared by his attorney under a misapprehension of the 
facts, as shown by evidence, •such original tmswom pleading ought 
not to be admitted In evidence against the pleader,* Other oases 
AT^ to the same effect. But in any event when the Jury found that 
Charles Miller, admittedly the owner and operator of the device, 
was not guilty. It would follow as a matter of course that Richard 
Miller was also not guilty. 

Defendants argue that the court committed reversible error 
In excluding two letters by certain Insurance brokers, who are 
not parties to the suit or agents of the defendants, or witnesses. 
The defendsjits offered them upon the theory that they threw 
some light on the alleged ownership of Richard Miller, but this wae 
Immaterial In view of the verdict of the jury, 
/ v?e cannot approve of the brief filed on behalf of the 
defendahti, where approximately 160 cases ar?; cited In support of 
•ubstantlally one proposition. Such a barrage Is unneoe n&rjm 

«9SI .quA.III -^^ ,-.tL *. „jJBPWHH^Bki«.»^9XXlM 

.tK»o© wiii:? «« wnefeivf* nt fts>^ - ;. a-? fiilalepoo 

,ta.«i!E«M t*s* «Jt &«t6i&«Ki*s©a t«ii t«« V< «i Ai«»Ja«lncr»i nsvta tiam 

osX*,<?»S .,&**rM -. •* :f«i«e« XisuX^i*?:-^ airi* fl»rfw «9oAt »ilJ^ to 

* III 0»I » 4&j&€ffigIIcig ,v •;.g^.»ggW Hi «3«Ei>ifr«ir Asaitc^^j&A 8«v 9«iJb««l4 

Xtta^at «^* t<J ®^^ firrois/8 ton si 3|flXJbAsXq it9tf« <wr«iftr teaii a96uXoaoo 

3ai' to jBoX»tt9rffv'S<!jq«»X« « "f?»J&ai? tso^o^^* alii njd Beieqswq »i ti fics 

J«f»i/o ^cl63js»X<!f *rtow*ttJi XiSfii^iio riows" ««»»ft»i^iT« 'itf mroOa b« t'^^^^ 

a ©as© «j®f5i;"; " ,ti»S:Bf»Xe[ »sld #8«ia:^ •aff»fciv« fti h%ittab& ©d e;r foe 

*«iril M»oi „; . I?;* «r«rffr *ft#r» x^ia at faS ,to5>1;t* «««» «d;f 6t «••!* 

.b'i.arfni- 1.0 7?= '■•*■. t>,>'r« ,s 35? wcrroT- 5XUOW *i tV;fXit/j| ^11 SAV 

»r^XiJtfa #ofl oaXa ««w iftXXiM 

:^i» orlw ^aTf'i^fo'xtf ^-Sfi^niitfisai alBSt^® x^ ^'S9$$f<l ow? naiJ^Xsx^ ni 

.afteBSfluiw 10 ,acfv<s^K»t?'IS> ftd? t© 8^3-5135 •*© flat «d[^ of asitTAq toa 

ws^jDfd' t*<^tt issiS x^o^dt «>rf^ «o<?r »«/i* l!>«»i alto »^fliBftil«t9fi «riT 

aaw ei;^« tm! »«sXXXhl 5*ta«i'diB tc gMt^-siwo ^9«|»XI« sirf^ i5c fff^iX mios 

♦>t^Ki t^a^ to #©ilrrfl'V ©itj to v^ir nl LattniBmal 
'iiiz- to tXjMiMf «<5 ^»Xlt tditsf 55/f* to fiPTo^q<ja #Of^ruR« eW 
to ;t*tocqi/g nX fesS-io lia b«>b»o ©dX tXt^^ABixnqij* fl»Tf«ffi» ,«trf«&js«t*r 

/ We cannot say that the verdict of the Jury was contrary 
to the weight of the evidence. We find n© reversible errors 
upon the trial. The order of the trial court granting a new trial 
is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to 
enter a Judgment upon the verdict returned, 

Matchett, P#J.> and O'Connor, J, concur. 


^swenoo ,L<ioi;iioO*0 &nA ^^ » j^JsrioJiaM 


L. Js. BERC, et al., 

JAMES KARBAM & COMPAmt|, a.,-©6r- 
poratlon, -^^ 












ii:T*iAL FROM yf 





L, J, Berc filed his complaint in tJae nature of a creditor^ a 
bill against Karollna Krzystoff, Frank Kraystoff , her husband, 
and Frank Nedeepiel, the son of Karollna by a former marriage, by 
which he sought to subject 6 parcels of real estate to the payment 
of a Judgment he had obtained against Karollna iirzystoff and 
Pjaank Krasyetoff, which real estate he alleged had been fraudulently 
conveyed, without consideration, to defendant, Frank Nedeepiel* 
The prayer was thet the conveyance be adjudged void as against 
plaintiffs Afterward a petition wag filed by other judgment 
creditore and they were made co-plaintiffs* Some time afterward^ 
by leave of court ^ plaintiff amended hie complaint by alleging 
/ he was informed and believed that James Karban & Company^ a corpora- 
tion, has or cl Ims to have, some interest in the premises which le 
subordinate to the lien of the judgment. 

Defendants Karollna Krzystoff and Frank, her husband, filed 
their answer denying that the conveyance by them to defendant, 
Prank Mede spiel, was made with the intention of defrauding com- 
plainant and other creditors but alleged it was made in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration^ They also averred that two trust 






! :. 


-T c ;■ 


, S-I2S ♦L .J 




aHT oaflavioaa jsowmod'o 

^fitsw'^fsJ'i * , ti3'fl:li4lq~oo abaic stsw tj®^^ ^Jti'^ aiotfifc^io 

-jaioqtc- ^ usqmoO A nsdijsl a»fflsl» d'arid' fcevsil^d dis£ J&sarttoliil bbw ori 

JbsXi'i tSHBcTeuri 'isn tAruTrt 1ms« "lloJetsil arILo's^ a^in&bae'isiG. 

^i£mb£i»t9b oi fflsxl* x^i ooa^YQvnoo oxi* tcdf %nlxa&b Ttswan* lisri* 
-flio© gni5uBil9^ 1o noi^TroJni <m3'3- rf*lw 9£t£«B esw »X«iq8©6©J5 jQi»x1 

deeds which purported to convey tae property claimed to be owned by 
defendant, James Karban & Co., were executed by them without any 
consideration; that one of the trust deeds and the note for $2000 
were executed by them in consideration of which Ke.rban & Co. agreed 
to loan them |2000 but they had never received any part of the loan; 

,^ that the othe* trus.t deed which purported to secure an indebtedneee 

©f |7,500 was represented by Karban & Co. to be an agreement 
.^extending the time of payment of an existing encumbrance of |7,500 on 
the property, and that the trust deeds should be removed as clouds* 
At the same time, defendant Frank Nede spiel, filed Ms ansv;er 
and a counterclaim. In the answer he denied that the conveyances of 
the 5 pieces of property to him were mere shams intended to defraud 
the creditors of defendants, Karolina and Franfc Krzystoff; and 
averred that the conveyances were made for & good and valuable 
consideration. In his counterclaim he alleged that defendant, James 
Karban 4 Co, had procured defendants, Karolina and Frank Kraystoff , 
to execute two trust deeds conveying the real estate in question, one 
of which purported to secure their indebtedness of #2,000, and the 

/ other 07,500, and alleged that the execution of the notes and trust 
deeds was without consideration, and prayed that they be decreed to 
be null and void, and removed as clouds from his title, 

James Karban & Co, filed its answer to the complaint as amended 
alleging it had a lien on the real estate which was prior and superior 
to the lien of plaintiff, and denied that plaintiff was entitled to 
i any relief. It filed its motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Frank 

^ Nede spiel. After this motion waB filed, Frank Mede spiel amended his 
counterclaim inwhioh he sets up more in detail the execution of the 
two trust deeds claimed to be owned by James Karban & Co. 

Karban & Co.'s motion to strike was filed to the amended 
counterclaim and after a number of continuances, it was overruled. 
It filed its answer to the counterclaim in which it alleged that 
ffidfii was not in possession of the premises and that they were 


0003^ 'jol 9*00 9£{o bn& aiJeafi ^Bimit ©rftf ^o eao jf*£[J ;itoitf«i«J61anoo 

;ascl '^^'i-v :\' ^' j;.i>! ',;.('i3 i>avieo«»*i 'Xf^ivexs bad x^di iu^ 000S# aefl* frscl o* 

no 009 ^Ti to 9ofiBicfmi;ofiw -griitslxe a& lo tfnsjKt'^ "io 9®!* »rf? gnXbns^xe 
*a.5i/oX3 8B Bovofflst 9cf Jbljjoxla »l»6©ft tewiit ©ril d'iid;t 6f<fi t^itieqciq QSii 

to eeonBxevnoo arid" 3'iiirid" bsinel? ed iswa/ijs ȣiJ nl tttlaloiBtauoo m bnm 

tuBilBb o;t bBbaeial 8asri?j sis® ©'isw eiil oi xiti^qoiq to a»o»iq 3 ©ri* 

fiaa itlo;ra-l«'xi ifxAii &a* Aeilcia/ ta3'asi>fi9t9fi to aioS'lijeio srii' 

Ql^ssssLs^ff bn£, fecos --i lot Bhmiv. s^ew a 9ofi«'v;«fVflo© 8xl;t JjaxiJ Beiieva 

8smal» t#jEfA&i!dt9.b iti^il^ f>e^dXl£ eti mls^loi^isiuoo «ld nl «aoi:t&is£>ianoo 

^ttod^a-itaiJt as{n»it>l him MtilLo'^gU f,Bia»ba&t9b b^rtuooiq, bAd ,oO ab nsdijaa 

sno ^nott^&up al 9:iAt»9 1»qi &£ii 3njtTj»vftoo abaeb (fayxJ oif:t sJi/oaxs od" 

jna ,000 «8 .isii»s#Q'Q&ai nl»di siuo^a o^ fisJ-xoqiwq ilolifw to 

ifiu%^ ^$iA estTofi «»£ia to aoliuoexQ sd^i Hb^S b»'%QlLsi ban ^OOS^Tl; iifdio 

od" &??S'io©D cxi Y®^^ 5tsdd' l)6Y,aiq inj? ^aol^&i^bl&noo iucditv saw ef>eel> 

,9l3^ii? bM ffioit 8£«/oXo SB £>evoffi8i bae. »&iov fina Xij/ii ©cf 

bebuBem a.B d-niii^XOT-oo QdS^ cd" •tsweris sctl J&sXX'l .oO s& asidt&4. 3 9ffi.s5l. 

olTsqua 6x13 nolrtq ^^m dolm Q^uieQ Xaai aui;t ac aeXX ^ B^ d"! j^igeXXd 

oJ l)»X:fIcfn© 3JMr ttlJaJtiaXq t&di bela^b bsiA ,ttX;tfiJUXq to fl»IX ari:r oi 

iniS'Xi to mXmlG'T.&inuoo 9di bbIm!.- aoliom bH beXit *I •tslXsi %a& 

Bid beba^fm X9lq8»£>©M. alfiftrr'^ »X>aii'i ^^w noXJoai alrf;^ i3;ftA •Isiqa9l>9lf 

«1(^ to nojt^oosxs 9j!ij xiaJefo Ki ?ncm q« a^©a sd dolawni alalonsiauoo 

nsofiaiS 3j>m»C> ^d ^ditwc da o;^ b^ml^Io a.&9e& ^airxit ow^ 

£>®^i*»fiU4 !rfi.i.: >£w eicHX'jJs o* fiol."' ' kcD i natfiaJS 

,6eXut*x©vo aiiw i(i ,ttJ*yniiXi«i^r»oo to i9<imua a -xsJt^ ftxio joiiaXoioJniJOC 

iad3 b&^^lla il doiifw kX axjoXoie^nwoo 9ri;J oJ newajaa a*X JbaXit il 

tnfi^ Xed:t ^Bdi^ 5n,e sOaXatsnq «»n* lo nolRasaaoq nX d"Ojfl i^w gju^f 



not vacant and unoccupied, but were improved; thgt it was the 
holder of the notes secured hy the two troist deeds; that they 
/ were executed for a valuable consideration; and averred that the 
subject matter of the count rclaim was not germane to the original 

Some months afterward, Karban & Co. filed an amended answer 
to the counterclaim setting up substantially the same matters as 
those in its original answrr, except la more detail, but also 
averred that it had paid Frank and Kal?olina Krzystoff |1|125 on 
account of the #2,000 note secured by the trust deed, and that the trust 
deed was a prior lien on part of the real estate; th^tt it was the 
legal owner and holder of the trust deed and "entitled to its 
reasonable solicitors' fees for obtaining counsel to represent it in 

/ this proceeding, " 

The case was tried before the court and July 82, 1941, the 
court entered two decrees, one on the complaint as amended and the 
other on the counterclaim. In the first it was decreed that the 
purported conveyance of the properties hf liarolina and Frank lirzystoff 
I to Fr^ank Nede spiel wera null and void and the record of the» be vacated 

^ and eaqpunged* It was further decided that plaintiffs were entitled 

to a lien on the premises and that unless the amount due Berc on 

his Judgment, viz,, ^1,287,48, and the amount due the co-plaintiffs 

on their Judgment t5,404»03 were paid within 5 days, the property 

be sold by a master in chancery. The other decree entered on the 

counterclaim found and decreed that one of the trust deeds given to 

secure the $7,500 was/ by James Karban & Co. a corporation, without 

consideration; and therefore was null and void and of no force. And 

it was decreed that the notes and the other timet deed, purporting 
J to have been given to secure an indebtedness of #2,000, which 

Karban & Co. had agreed to loan to Karolina and Frank Krzystoff 
li, { but which loan . -s never made) be cancelled and held for naught 

Sand removed as a cloud. The court then went on to find that betwefp 


X^i *-^rf^ jrj.b-'5& i . -t wit xcf b'O^uo^Q asJon 9dt \q •t9bloil 

arid" oinr:-.- ; ^Ja'SsMbhoo aldjBt/Iafy »^ fol boiuomxe ©lew 

X*ni^i'j:o Oitrf o:!^ bub^'^i-vx, ^ton ^'iw mi/slo-^^ itawoD ftfi'J" to teJ^ain i"oaJ,di/a 

oaXi- ^ ri-5;t©fi OTom fil iq90X9 ii Maa& LAal-gtic sJi til 9aodt 

no 3^1 ( i.-ilctoX t^.HB 3fnBi'? .51«g bail *1 J<4fl[* b9ntBrM 

::^.^ o" r,' r . laiiLod ba^ ftemo I«s«i 

sn.l t ^as i:lisl> bn2 &rcuco ^ri^^ sTCotsd b@i.i:f 90*9 »bmo ariT 

i:lo;ts'«a*iii ' ro sonj^j^evnco fieitioqni/q 

l)9;rA0:^.v d Of. :oosn exi. .'iov Sfifl LLua sisw IsiqasfieM jCoi^ft^ oU 

no oif^a 9JJ.6 *i: 1 eealaiertq arijf no n6il £ 0* 

o* aovi.-^ ?B''^5 :t3i;'Tt -^rir' •■■^'-^ot'f) ftr;- miaXoi^^fntroo 

*0O£{*1t I .6 iSfiCrifiX B ^jj?^ ari^ ©11/0 ea 

bnA ,9sno'i blQV bn^c llvn s«w ©noteierij has laoliMiobittaoo 

ItoJfs'^'Xil ixijatl isK« j»flIXs*s i * ; ■■j^n-sJ* bad •oO A lUKf'xsi 

^d-gUAn lot fiXarf ftnn b9XX«on.uo so (8£>aia laTen a .a nacl doMm *wd ) 

^f9w;tstf J'.adcf bni'i a. .:r!.:>tv nsxi^ 3'«r.i)Oo Qui ,&troio ^ a& f)*vt>ES3i bnA 


the date of the execution of the #2,000 note and trust deed, September 
24, 1931, and December 19, 1931, Karban & Co, advanced to Karolina 
and Frank Kriyetoff, #300 and that in equity and good conscience, 
Karban & Co, var. entitled to a lien on the real estate for 1300, 
It Is from this last decree that Karban Jb Co, appeals and the issue 
raised by this trust deed Is the only one before us since counsel say: 
"the trust deed and note for $7,500 « * * were cancelled by Karban 
it Co. who procured a release deed executed by the Chicago Title & Tf»U8t 
Co,, and the documents turned over to the Krzystoffs, immediately 
after the hearing of the case," 

No briefs have been filed by any other party. 
We have stated enough to show that the record is very much 
confused. The etidenoe Is undisputed that Karban & Go, gave #300 to 
Karolina and Fi.anlt Krzystoff on account of the i5i2»000 note executed 
by them, but counsel for Karban & Co, contend that Karban & Co. paid 
out on account of this proposed loan |1,125, and, as we understand 
eounsels* argument^ they contend Karban St Co, is entitled to this sum 
and to its solicitors' feesi 

Upon a consideration of all the evidence, we are unable to say 
that the chancellor did not arrive at a rough sort of conclusion as 
to what Karban & Co, was entitled to. In acGabe v, Ohicago •& 
Northweatem R, R. Co.. 215 111* App, 99, we quote with approval 
what the Lord Chancellor said In Kie Mediana . L. R. [1900] App.Cas, 
113, in which it was held that the Board of Trustees of Mersey Docks 
and Harbors was entitled to substantial damages for the los^ of the 
damaged lightship, and not merely nominal damages. We there quote what i< 
the Lord Chancellor said: "Of course the who}.e region of inquiry 
into damages is one of extreme dlfiioulty* You very often cannot even 
lay down any principle upon which you can give damap;es; nevertheless 
It Is remitted to the Jury, or those who stand in the place of the 
Jury, to consider what compensati- n in money shall be given for 
what is a vsrrongful act, " He then considered a hypothetical case and 


■■.;.l :; , , • 

, - . qA [OOcr ' 

ton OOO^a*"^ •i'u.l 1o iioJL*wo>3>jr.9 sxiiJ to stfs/j -^rf* 

, ._.r--.., *..^,^ 991096 *aJ8l alrf^f aoit nl tt 
oa^T^ lol a^ofi &na l>©9J5> *«ffT* ad** 

fvvfioo »oO & n««fn:a/i let laanwoo ;ti/tf tuadi^ xd 

^ ass ,3SX»li aaoX ^^oqfonq alil? to ttu/oooje no tuo 

': , " riBdisil SfisJflcc teriS' ,^n9fflB32^a 'aXsem/oo 

, "" ' ^cJicXXca B&l o;t fcaa 

, • '/ "tjCd xii: is'i^olanco ft noqU 

H ris^c V ?5i?lii. ,5 CO 6JL6 loXXftOfi-arf© ori* ;fari* 

v,.„ '- ^^eM S(C' .. blA9 -roIXaoxuaiiD J&rtoJ M;f Jflriw 
"V^irxx :io inBOix ?»ad ^nd^ Jblaa sm/ il dolshf nl t5IX 

y;iiupfli to rciyf.'i Q^odv ^S &&tuot> tC" tJbXjes ioXX»oiSj8rfC &^oJ add" 
J"cniiijo nsd'to y'^^v ,-t '•-•■^' ^IB afljeittx? to one si 8»8JBfliflfi oJrti 

'lu eofiXq AriJ «i fif-Aa-B orfw ©seiiS^ ic t-^ii/t ail* cJ bstilmon al ti 


said: "and in that way they oome to a rough sort of conclusion as to 

what damages ought to be paid," So, in the liietan* case, while 

#300 was awarded Karban & Co. by the second decree, the two decrees, 

in substance and effect, were but one and the matter should have 

been disposed of in one decree, and we shall treat It as what, in 

reality/ ls» but one decree. 

The deeree of the Circuit court of Cook county is affirmed* 

Matchett, P.Ja» and McSurely, J., concur. 

'jiiiA ^eio tud ai^w »*o.»i't» btm 9t>smi»<Sua al 
,;. ; J. . IJ[j3£ta aw fixta tssioafe enc al to 69eoq8ll> neetf 




I 31GI.A. 158 

) APppia^-rfibM 

^^ MirNlClPAi,^/COt|lT^,X 

Gorporatlon,CHARLB:s a. COM" 
and GARIUE G. COEY , d . trig bue- 
Inese as DrNELL SpMNG ?^ATER 





For many years defendant, Dynell Spring Water Company, a 
Corporation, was engaged in the business of selling water from a 
well located at 95th street In Palos foonshlp,Cook county, 

Illinols»and March 31^1938, entered into a written con ract with 

plaintiff whereby plaintiff was to buy 14,495,000 gallons of^ water, 

covering a period of about 15 years, at certain specified prices# 

January 3, 1939, plaintiff, contending defendants had breached the 

contract, brought suit in the Municipal court to recover ?j;810.45. 

Defendants denied breaching the contract and took the position it 

was breached by plaintiff ♦ Afterward, April 14,1939, while this 

suit was pending, plaintiff brought another suit in the iaunicipal 

court against defendants claiming other damages of $P22«30 on 

account of the claimed breach of the same contract»Defendants 

filed their defense denying liability, and January 2£, 1940, plaintiff 

filed an amended and supplemental statement of claim in that suit 

seeking to recover $1,546,01. Defendants again denied liability. 

The oases wei^e consolidated and tried before the court without a 

Jury, and July 9,1941, the court found in favor of plaintiff in 

both 4uits,and in the first asseseed plaintiff's damages at 

^541.34 and in the second, |l,471.20. Judgments were entered on the 

finding and defendants appeal. 

^ r 


1 . ^:. c 

0013 ^ 

( ^9o£l9qqk 

( V ,, . ...00 

( .acfiiijIIeqqA 




st'^iiJyoG JtooO^qlilBxiv oT aoI?/i «i *©9i;ra d^QQ i& bsiBOol Hew 

9X1 J 

^ t-d-,0'.'^ lo snoIIiSB 000t8Qe>t*"I ^ud off a»w ttl^aJUlq xdw^^sim t^i<rai»lq 

,8i^,0It'"' '^■--^'■•f 0S1 oiJ d^iuoo I.3qi{>lfltfi>ii sxitf til Una id-gucid xtQ&ttaoo 

alxl*r 9X14W ^eseiiM XliqA tlnswis^lA ♦ItlJiSlBlq t<^ fcadoAsicr a«w 

Xjaqiol/iwA'. '''•r* •"^■' + ^VB lerid'OfiB (Jxlswoid" l:ii:tfiialcj,gfiif>n9q sjs« Hub 

no 0£ „,..,_ .<. ..;..,;^smjiil> i&d;fo 'gaiml&lo aiaBbnelsb iBnt&^& Jiuoo 

&ia&bne\9Q.,it>Btiaoo emus sdi to doBBtdi Bemljslo edt to totfoooA 

Iti^ni^IqtOi^GIiSa -^^unali bn&iXiliM^ilI gnXxixioii eaaeteb liad;^ b9ilt 

Hub ^&iii cit mljulo "io d'nsniecJs*© X.i-.tnefn9Xqq«s Ji>n« £>»i)n3mj3 oa fislit 

:, :}jjoild'/.w. ^ijjoo efi\t ®«xol0Cf MltS baa Jbsd'BcXXoanco ei»w aaa^o edT 

'..f lliJfllsXq Io "tovAl al bnuol i-iuoo sd^^l^Q1^9 xXwI- SiiB tX^^^l 

*B B9§^.iffij5b 8'l:!tl*ni.^iXq Ss^sq-bb isilt sdi nl ba<3,^9iiub «[^ocf 

a3 no £i9^9;tne ensw s^tnsmjijJ&jjl. .OS.XVJ^^XI tbnoooa axirf ni i»iX8 *>C.X*5;} 

♦ XBoqoii ed'fi.sJE)nel9£> i>iij>i Miii.fjnil 

The record discloses that defendant, Dynell Spring Water 
Company, a corporation, had been engaped In the mineral /ater 
huslness In Palos Township for about 18 years. Ivan P.Florsheim, 
president of plaintiff company, testified he was & drug specialist, 
March 31,1938, plaintiff and Dynell Spring Water Company, entered 
Into a written contract which recited that the Dynell Company had 
exclusive control of water from tne well located at 95th Street, 
in Palos Tovmship; that the Floreheim Company was desirous of 
securing the sole agency for tiie distribution and sale of the 
water in the United States, exclusive of Chicago and certain of its 
suburbs, The water was to be bottled and crated by the Dynell Company 
&n one and five gallon bottles for certain specific prices. The 
contract provided that plaintiff would take 60,000 gallons of 
water by April 1,1939; from April IjlSSO^^^to September 30,1939, 
100,000 gallons, and thereafter, approximately every 6 months, the 
quantity was greatly increased until it was provided that from 
October 1,1952 to March 31,1953, plaintiff would take 813,000 
gallons and as stated above the total number of gallons was 
14,495,000, The contract contained many other orovlslons not 
necessary to mention here. 

At the time of the execution of the contract defendants, 
Charles A,Coey and Carrie G-,Coey, executed another document 
addres-ed to plaintiff. The Florsheim Gomps.ny,in which they 
represented they were the sole owners of the land upon which the 
well was located; that the Dynell Company had the exclusive right 
to the disposal and marketing of the water tak n from the well 
and that while the contract was in force they would do nothing to 
prevent The Floreheim Company from taking the water ^,8 

specified in its contract with the Dynell Company. And further. 

isj-fiw iBiftisia sjptff al bB^iS^RS need oarftflol^a'soqioo «,TcriuqEoO 

&a-T9*n<9i:t'^lifiqafoO isJjsW s^t't'^I^ IlefiAC^i f)nd ItltatAlq tSSGXtiS iljrrail 

t3'9 3a*2 -0^5G *^ l)©tBooI Il9w ad* ractt is^bw ^o loi^'flco sriauXoxe 

to auojX.l80|) Sfiv? ■^naqmoO aiisrfaio£-i edi t)id^ ;qid8/»voT (ioI«^ al 

Bdi lo 9l^ i>iid noid-ydii^aifi 9d^ lol ^on9.5<ii •loa ati:^ -gniiuo^B 

o-gBtitdO to 9vl*jjjIox9,B8d'x;cre fc^JlfiU &di al i&iem 

3aA..8«s»iiq sl'iiosqa flistrtso ict asXrfvtod noIXjss evil fiiia enc ndl 

Ljs^ 000 106 82lsjt blvov \1±falklq iAdt ostlvoiq ^OBitnoo 

f,Qo%i^<j iscffflSiJ fiSGI,.C i:«TqA fflott ;e5ex,X XiiqA xd i©*flw 

9ri:ftsa*noffl 8 x't^ve xlBiimlxonqq& ^t9'Jt&9n9di AfiBtenoXXsg OOOtOOX 

- 0cit *i3riS' f)9&lv<yxq aBW *X XXJm/ b«ai39isni yX^jbot^ aaw xtlHti&up 

000,SX8 iJ-filBXq ,SaGX«X£ rloisM oJ aeeX,X t«do*oO 

3cii2jL;'n iBioi 9di svotfA fc»ifa*8 SA fina anoXXAg 

;ton axioxa.; 'Xi:^o Ajmun roanijsttnoa JojsrtJnoo ailT ,000,8e^«*X 

♦ 9T:Aa aoltnois of \t»6R9o9a 
^Qirizbaele to noi^twosx© afi;J' to ©si?- sriiT lA 

'■.irf;? rlolrfvv nX,)fi!i5qfitot5 fiUttrfaior? *lrr .tti:;rrtidi<^ o* frao^ba 

siii dciiixs r " ' '. : ?iIob Bdt »n©» t^^i^ 6«tffl«eetqsrt 

td-glt '^yrlBuiox-^ euj i)«n -^xi/^Qsou ixsiiija sricT ^.sxfd^ ;Aii#jK>oX saw XXew 

ri9w eiri^ EC' ■ r "i9»f«w wft to sx:l3-e.Si.ast Iiiu6 X««OQaXfc •ri* o* 

c>f grLirf^T- -" . ^ 9oiot f^.' '.o^-x^noo siW" eXlffw ^isd* .bna 

fiToO mt'tdst.ori ariT 3-nevwtq 
,ieri*iwt l>isA .Y^^iaoO IXsmcu aay aJiw *ojsi;?noo sJi nx 6»^*l«»«in» 


" This statement ia made for the purpose of inducing the Florehelm 
Corporation this day to execute and enter Into an agreement with the 
Dynell Spring Water Company, " 

In September, 1938, plaintiff, The Florshelm Company, Kold 
to Albert D»Hueslng,who was In business in RocIj: Island, Illinois, 
about 200 cases of the water which had been bottled by the Dynell 
Company for The Florshelm Company in accordance with the terms of 
the contract. Hue sing testified by deposition that he used some 
of the water but claimed there was dirt and foreign aubajance in it 
so that it could not be used ,that he bad complaints from some of 
the persons to whom he had sold water but could not remember their 
names; and that in November of 1938,he returned 190 cases of the 
water to plaintiff. 

Plaintiff's position is that the Dynell Corapany,.ln 
bottling the water, did not do so properly and as a result there was 
dirt in it; that the bottles were not made clean, and therefore the 
water was not saleable; that when it took this matter up with 
the Dynell Company and the Dynell Company denied there was any 
dirt in the water or that it had not been properly bottled 
that in a telephone conversation between representatives of the 
parties defendant refused to carry out the contraction the other 
side, the Dynell Company's position is that the bottles were 
thoroughly cleaned before filling; that there was no dirt in the 
water, and denied its representative had stated over the telephone 
that it was agreeable to the Dynell Compsjiy that the Contract 
be terminated. Their counsel contend that * a careful examination 
of the circumstances surrounding the filing of these suits 
indicates an effort to create a smoke screen of evidence to cover 
plaintiff's attempt to get from under the terms of ?ald contract." 

" .-^nsqinoO i9;f«W 8«liq8 XltM^Q 

&!©'; a-nBqfflGO BrlsriBrfGl'ii 9xfr,m?cliaXq4 8CRX »i9rfB»;fq»8 nl 

t5iwfiiIXI,fe/iBlaX looH nl BRsnisifd xtl saw "oifWtaiiisewH^Q .Jt^tfXA oJ 

XXect^ edi ycf ftfiXt^od asecf bMti doldvn t^issw 9tti lo aae-so OOS ;tuoda 

lo Bfli' J:j1^ sojncaMooofi ill t^BqaoO aXerfaioX'H sdT «iol ^ftJBq«BoO 

9fi?os .B©. lit floitiaoqelJ "^d fialllJas* sfliBsuH ,*o«i*noo erii^ 

to 9soa sao'i'i a^x^^sXcaico SjeuI ed ;{j» JbstBU »cf Jon JbXiAOo Jl issii oa 

^tiaxiJ isrffl?sj29'i ?on fiXwoo d-ucf -xsldw fiXoa ban «ii ffloiiw o;f tnoaisq eri* 

9dt lo a©i330 Ot;^X B9fn:i;:f©i arl^SSSX lo 'ladsievol'I nl itsriJ fifus(Beat£n 

.tll^al&Lq oJ is^AW 
fTl.#tf^BqffloO XXsnf' nolrTlsoq a*^ll*fll«X1 

ti^*r©qc ■ i5,t9»fiiw eriJ aalX^^ocT 

9i.(* eiola^orid' ^«Btfl»«X© 9*^ J' ^ffif tf.erf:?;*^ nl ittb 

m alift jfoo*^ d"! ilr®ilw *3ilJ isXcTseXjaa ;t©fl a»w ^e*«w 

'in? -911;^ Bel '^ fiii« ijnjBcfffloO XX«»n'!tQ «d* 

f)9Xtf:foc) ^Xneqo'xq T:»;:f«w 9£l? al Jil£> 

©li-t to 3©vl;t.Q;tn98 9iq©^ usewtanJ iiol3"jafi»i«»vaoo snoiiqsXs" b al tsui:t 

leitto ©rid- nG.iTjjAi.rfic.o srid- tf'tfs t'^t'^Jso 0* besntei iaAttiBfb aali'iaq 

eiew ael J'od ^di Jjari.; 'x;fi«qffloO XXsn^G anJt^fcla 

■.u i r-i rrfj fiMl?;3|itlXXit 9'ioled bsnseXo X-CriS^otoil* 

snori'.7Sli»;j '^j.-.Jb fiud evl:}"atfn««8'fq»'r a;fl AvlHSJb fins, las' aw 

sXdises'xsja saw ;^1 ^m(^ 
noxjfanlJB*^-. tBdi Jbneonoo Isenwoo ils/lT ,fe»:fBiJlflf^^9;t ©d 

.r ^1 6fli/oiitfa a©oiiA;^Qitaioiio «ri;f to 

•2s>700 od" »on c ' .JA.->ihnt 

" .d'OAicinofi blsp jc sffiia? 9si;r tabmj ntcit ^J^o^ oi^ ^qm^isA a'ttlitnifiXq 


Plaintiff's statement of claim filed in the first suit 

allege a that September 22, 1938, defendant a sold and delivered to 

plaintiff 200 cases of ^ water at 72 cents a case, or 0144 and 

that plaintiff eold it to Hueeing for Ie,80 per case, or a total 

of 1560, At what price Huesing sold it to hi^ customers does 

not appear* The testimony of Charles E.Coey and his wife describes 

the manner in which the water was bottled, which tends to show 

that the bottles were thoroughly cleansed before they were filled 

and that no foreign substance was in the water, Evidence offered 

by plaintiff, including the testimony of Huesing, %-as that there 

w&s dirt in the water and some of the bottles were not properly 

eleansed»Two of the bottle e whi»h were sent by plaintiff to Huesing 

In Hook Island^ were introduced in evidence as a part of Huesing* s 

deposition and they are before us, #b have estamined these bottles, 

one of which the evidence shows, had not been opened since it was 

filled by the Dynell Company, so that we are in as go jd a 

position to determine the question as to the condition of these Irwo 

bottles and the water in them, as sag the trial judge, .e are unable 

to say what his finding on this point was but we are clear that 

there is no dirt in the water nor are the bottles in such a condition 

that it could be said they were so xinclean as to prevent their 


Considerable is said in the briefs and argument as to 

whether there was an implied warranty that the water would be fit for 

the purpose for which it was sold but we think that question is 

not involved for the reason that the only complaint made by plaintiff 

is that the water and bottles were dirty. This being the fact, 

we think the anaiysis made, by a witness for defendant, which was 

excluded, was not admissible except that part where the doctor, 

-0 cfnaaiQtBiJ'a a * l^ijjcl&l'i 


woii ' Idv ^,bf^£:}:}o^ aaw la^Aw ©ri;f xiolriw nl tunnssa erf* 

fesf ■'" ' ■' b9»si&&lo TElrisuoiori^ e^ew «©I;r*o<:f edi tid^ 

jDO'ir ikC 9o/iSOi.y.-i .'les'ai^A 9rl;f ni a^sw ©ofi^^acfya agioiol on ^sdi fica 

" t^niaewH "io xnossl^B9t ad* s«-^**^-CofiJ^«'3tT:Jt*ni«Xq ^cf 

^w aoJ--'*ocJ axi* "3:0 acaos J&na is^jsw «rf* nl *ijtJ& saw 

:' r^8 ®iew xf»iriw a«X**od ©dt ^o owT.fisenaeXo 

o ;'i q a ^,;.; r^onsbivQ fii l)©ot;J&oiJni sisw^fiuBlal jLooH al 

'"' befs.imBX9 ©vad »W .aw sioletf stjs ^^di baa noiJisoqefc 

ir DQiioqc fiescf *on l)a££t8worie ooiiafelva silJ doln.v lo 3flo 

'"■ /g as nl ai^ aw lisuiii" os <iEix^eioO Ilt^tvCl ®ri* xcf JbeXIil 

•' noiisstsp 9rf* ©niffliajsf) o* nolJXaoq 

..... _j. o|;g-j.^^ ^j jjju^ asX^JocT 



*sii* 'X 

a(„. jlbnoo B ilcua 

'r >••■■-■•>• •>■--,- 

en n©*Bw ar** nX ttlb oa si ©rrari* 
3idw Y*«'* i>iJM scf JbXi/oo *i i&di 


l'.^J."iO fJiii iJj: .L.'.Lir;K (I. 


111.*"-' , r.r vrf •rir>j.;.r! .i p" f ; r.-vfjTf,<\ xr r„, 

©ew iloif{v;,r^i.H n©!©/) lol aaan**. 

.iw cfi doldv iv't seogiyq sri* 
- 9'i Sri* ':fo"i l>©vXovai *oix 

-Cf Dfiii T[9*«W sriJ *a£f* ©1 


nria- *"crir; *>..ffr!- j-aen- n ^ rcfj .-s /t is ,tojn sm ^b9bu£ox9 

who made the analysis, testified that he ex&ralned the water from 

ten bottles &ad found It olean^fhat part of hie t etlmony should have 

been admitted, The analycls which he made sfas wholly unimportant 

and properly excluded* 
We are further ^opinion that the oourt was in error in 

excluding soffie of the testimony of d®fea<3ant Charles A.Goey and 

hlg wife. Charles A,Goey testified that for 18 yeara he had b©«»n 

engaged in fhe mineral water buslnegg In Faloe P&r*t; timt he 

and his wife had owned the property for 30 yeareithat he wag 

president of the Dynell Cofflp&ny^ln bottling asd gelling the water 

which ooaee fi^m 300 feet below the earth*® surface, the last SO 
feet of th« «ater coming through solid rock; that he had personal 
•taarg:e af the bottling and shipping of the water to Hueslng.Ke 
described In detail the method folloitedj that he inspected every one 
of the bottles, i'hls last part of his testimony was erroneously 
strleken.The isltne '•-?■• further testified tmt after the bottles 
were returned by Hueelng he examined eaeh bottle and found 
"eiwry o^ie of them clear, pure and clean,* That after the bot'.les 
were returned by Hue sing he talked with Mr^Florshelm over the tele- 
phone and told him the water had been received from Hock Island, 
that he examined the botrles and *'th®y were Just &r clean a^ when 
they left our bottling plant," that ^r.Florahelm ©aid he hiid & 
bottle that had some sand and gravel In it nd X asked hla to let 
ae see It; that Mr, llorshela said he would, but never did, 
although he sade several requests, 

Mrs.Coey te stifled, a«ong other things, that jn July 28, 
19S8 [ which was about 3 1/8 months after the contract was made] 
Mp.FlorshelB called at the bottling plant and handed two 
documents t© her requesting that she and her husband sign them. 

«i»«bif Xd3t« xJ:ii«9«it^ tea? 

t'n)st*!:»fj 8*xftf^^ri «d,t »oX<Mf *»«1; 00ft «o*il »«ioo ftoliiv 

•file ' '')ft;t&.»qa ''' elicit 6&di^i«r «£f XlA^^ii ol £i«€ri«tS8Bl^ 

^I«*|-o«i3c'"': "ifiOi.Uir^.i..j ^tei tt> tts^ t9»£ WtM'i •8?!'I*#««f iuU \9 

:w^ii &Ad ^(f-^m ^fij mid ftJc* fcfl^ «ii<auE(q 
iK bmi -. , , ' -ocf itfo ;tt«X t*rf* 


Th« documents were then offered in evidence but on object! >n by counse] 

for plaintiff, on the ground that they tended to vary the terms 

of the written contract of March 31,1938, they were excluded, This 

was error, While we have not the documents before us, counsel for 

defendants having failed to copy them into the record, we have his 

statement th^tt the two documents modified the contract of liiarch, 

1938, This offered evidence would tend to sustain defendants' 
contention that plaintiff was endeavoring to modify, and later get 
jprem under the contract^ 

There is argument as to whether what purports to be a 
printed analysis of the water from the well, made laj the Ohioago 
Laboratory, was a part of the contract of March 31, 1938, and whether 
it was offered and received in evidence, These questions may be 
cleared up on a retrial of the case. 

Counsel for defendants further contend that the court erred 
in denying their motion to file a counter claim setting up their 
claimed damages for failure of plaintiff to carry out the terms 
Of the contract. 

The Statement of elaim in one cage was filed January 3, 

1939, and in the other,April 14,1939, to which defendants filed 
their affidavit of merits and defendants did not move to file a 
counter claim until October 18, 1940, when the case was set for 
trial. We think the matter was within the discretion of the courts. 
Since we have reached the conclusion that there must be a retrial 

of the case as against the Dynell Bpring Water Company, a corporatio$i, 
the court might well permit such defendant, if it so do sires, to file 
a ooxmter claim because when the case is redooke ted, this can be 
done before the time of the trial is fixed, 

A further contention is made that the court erred in 
entering Judgment against Charles A,Coey and Carrie G.Goey because 
the contract involved, for the purchase and sale of the 15 million 

9Bauco y,cr w Ittntldo no rtws' *t>n©i.>lT« nl 6ei©"ilo ii9jz{;f «*nw ■tnamiroofi «)riT 

airiT.fie&jifioxe stew %m:f ,9^X,X5 risijaM lo Joa-x^hoo Si9titrv ed* to 

ejtd svari »w<Sigo91 ariS^ od^nl merf? TQOO o^ f>*X±sl gisiv^ e^aiafinelef) 

jj^o-xs-.: lo ioBTitsioo Qdi belt-tbom e Jawfutr oofi owj 9d;f *.an;f S'nsadcr.s^fa 

*8^jaef>fle'isl) nis^sifB oJ £n©3^ blwow 9«>n<5.5iT«> fi»^9tto alxfT ,8S6I 

d'dg 1©?&X baB^x'ii■^om ojT ^niiovse&ixs ajsw t1:i;^«iBlq tMdt nclinetnoo 

.ea&9 dd:^ to Ip-IiS^i « 00 qu AfiiAelo 
^©•ns Siiroo aii^t 3'=:rf* beL9inoo Tsii^hsi/t sdrts^nstefi tot lannifoO 

il9£ii q« sfilJ.tea misX© TeJaBOo r* slit o^- nol^GiB •5lsd;f ^ltc»A nl 
afflisd^ ©riJ ^wo t^i^o ocT ttJt^JfllisXq to snirXlAt i©t aiOgMm&& b^mlBlo 

^,t»»XttROO wii to 

,o ■^•£&tfn.'^',L fisXit ?isw 9e«3o ©ir© iii oijeXo tc ttja^eieiBtH adT 

i>9XXt 8Jn*s£in»t9J& cfoliiw o'J tesex<>X IliqA,i^:ro ©d* «i baa »e58X 

ii 9lit oJ 9vom ;Jofi 61^ «;?a,«£n9t©& ^na s^IieiH to JiTJSOittje liad^f 

rcct Jss afivf 98S0 sriJJ nsrl^tO^feX^SX "X^cfocfgO XiJiw alulo isdrtuoo 

^^ii/oo etii tc nolj-snosli aritf oM^iw bavi teii&m &di inJUit 9<v »Xjiitd- 

X^li?©i J6 90' *Bi/iB ©rf€>ri;f ;f3ritf noisi/Xofioo ©ri* J&adoasi 97sui aw #snX8 

t^oiitoioo'ioc! .a,^ni3qaoO le^sW gniiqe Xisxti^Q ad? tsxxiASa aa esAs ari^ to 

aXXt oJtadiiaftft oa :?i tJI^^TiABristsI* rioi/R tlwieq XX«w ^J^rigia tiwoo 9xf* 

«cf fiAo slfiJ^ie^J-s^LooJ-jQi aJt ©sso miS aadw aeu^oe^ mlAXo na^m/oo a 

»&exit ci Xeii^ ad^ to »ali Bdi a^otsd afiol) 
-J: .o.a^.T'^ Jiu:.'j an,.' J^d" ©riaar eX i7cX;tn©*itoo lariifitrt A 
9F:i;iosd x©o0.0 6l^•T.'30 fin-T ^9oO^ aaXiiidC (Tanla^^ :tneiC8i)i;i, gniiaifua 
noiXIlm 3X 9nit to eXse Jbaa 9aJSdotuc 9rlt lottJbavXovnX 3'os'xJnoo aricT 


gallons of water, was made between the plaintiff ,Flor8helm 

corporation and the Dynell ^^prlng Water Company, a corporation, 

to which neither Charles A.Coey nor his wife was a party, In 

reply to this contention counsel for plaintiff say that the Judgment 

against the individuals was properly entered because at the time 

of the making of the contract, Aiareh 31,1938, the two Individuals 

executed, simultaneously with the execution and delivery 

of the contract, another doetament "wherein they represented that 

they were the sole owners of the land on which the Dynell 

Spring is located and that the Dynell Spring Vater Company had 

the water 
the exclusive right to dispose and market from the spring. " 

7/e have above referred to this document but vm thiak it 

Inauffioient to warrant Judgment entered against the two individuals. 

The document simply recited that the land in which the well was 

located belonged to the individuals; thst they > ould not hinder 

the Dynell Company in carrying out the written contract for the sale 

of 15 ,iillion gallons of water. There is no contention that 

they made any objection to the Dynell Company cariT^ing out the 

contract. The Judgment against the individuals must be reversed. 

'^e are also of opinion that the findi/ig and Judgment in plaintiff's 

ikfoi' against the defendant, Dynell Spring Water Company, a 

corporation, is against the manifest weight of the evidence and 

for that reason and the further reason that the court improperly 

excluded some evidence offered by defendants, the Judgment as 

to the Dynell Company is reversed and the cause remanded. 

The Judgment of the iiunicipal court of Chicago 

against Charles A.Coey and Carrie C.Coey is rev-rsed. The judgment 

against the Dynell Spring Water Company, a corporation, is reversed 

and the cause remanded as to that defendant. 


Matchett, P.J., and Mc Surely, J., concur. 

^«.-, f;t.:rTr,r;»r,-.n ^ ^-r r .:\n(ucZ: 'TriJ-nV/ •;iP.K<j' XISflXG acli" i)nJ8 HOl^B'XOq'IOO 

sfflXo .^i/so«d £>©T;©ii.- „_ - - - , jaw alJMiAJtvl£>fii ©dJ d'enlAgA 

- _. . i)®io.ta© ^tfieffi^yt itui'^ne.^ oi iti9lol \U9k1 

.:■•-■ ".? Tins r ^di^ jflii^ r>©*Xoen xJ-<?''5J-3 *n»JBiJ00f) »4T 

•isfM i'- „ ^ , . ;.. ,>jtvlftni •«!;? ot Bo^^oXstf 693"3»oI 

a"il/.jJ ■ :t«ii? aolnlqo to o«Xs frr* t^w 

^ ■,,:.....,...,.- „,.-...,- -;.....^.-i.i tv.jaJ&iT©t®J& ©ii;^ ;t 5 flifiga i|^^jg| 

V r-v ,nT:qjHi. ... -.dtitft ^i S»t2 aoe«.-Tc ?ad;J lot 

asffi^^uf. ... ^ .„; .iSX? id fie^sllo ©ojfiefcJtvs saoa befewXoxe 

,r,o,-,r!r,!,,p.t r,?-tr^-:.o ^.r^? on;> &8aTk9T9M sX V^q«O0 XXSflX''-^ ^^ Ot 

;t«->iagfii;t, sriT ,f>Bs*toY . _ , » f>I'si.>>0 bn& x®oO»A asXiadO ;f8rtifiaB 
£>esigvoT: al^sicttsi,•zoa1QO /:«YfiaqiBoO i©3'«W galiqa XXstncQ ^tti iaalM^ 



""^-.^ Appe llant , 

MART A. WRIGHT, et al^f, 

^^, Appellee §. 

316I.A. 159^ 




October 16, 1939, plaintiff filed her com laint in 
equity to set aside the will and codicil of her biro t her; , 
Edward J.Olakin. « It was executed January 16,1939,e.nd the 
codicil February 10,1939. The testator died June 15, 1939, and the 
will and codicil were admitted to probate by the Probate 
Court of Cook County September 7,1939« Forty-eight parties 
were named as defendants. Upon the filing of the bill summons 
issued,and upon plaintiff's direction to the sheriff but eight 
of the defendants were served, the dates of such service 
being October 16, 19, 20, 30 and Movember 6,1939. December 1, 
1939, the eight defendants, part of them represented by one 
attorney and the others by another, filed two separate motions 
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of claimed 
InBufficienciee in the allegations of the complaint. So far 
as the record discloses, nothing has been done to dispose of 
either of these mot ions .February 28, 1941, which is more than 
a year and four mon the after the suit was commenced, g special 
appearance, by leave of court, and its verified motion to 
dismiss the complsint, were filed by the Holy Family Church, 
located _t 1018 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago, one of the 
legatees under the will and a defendant to the suit. It was 
further ordered that the hearing on the motion and such 
answers as might be filed to it, be set for April 9, 1941, at 

'ifi X */i 








t^HU'to 7IU0HID 




J i9riJcn:cf to I4© Maj liXw sd;} sMsb iJoa oJ ttij/p» 

i^ 6rtfit9«C-iX,3I OfTcrL |>s.t£, io;Ja*a©* aclT .95SX«0X X'T:»Ji'icf9'ii Xiolfioo 
e-i. dc-i J ®d^*cfoici o^ &9;^«■iJttJbA ©^ow XXoidoo .bn* XXiw 

©divxe ;_o a»0"s , oisw »^aj»fefl9l»J& »ri:r lo 

4 ofmeo'jO »9s;GX«3 isdcisvoM f^ns OS »0S ^QX t.6X isdotfoO grlsd 

anoi'. x ttsff^t ' a;? Atia xefi'xotfjfi 

^©iBisXo to .bni/ci, i.t-iIq«ico ©rf:t aaXflwlf) o* 

X«i5SCT8 i,5ao09RTnu ; lod'^B ed^tftom mjjoI baa, laa^ ^ 

tffo'SifllO ^XXiDB'? y.XoH erfij tccT fiaXXl siaw t*«-t5XcifltoQ ecirf aeXaelf) 

sil^ lo ©no^osiaolilOt&saS ^XsreaooH d-asV 8X01 j ,, beer aooX 

3 3W *I .Jlua 9fij' c;? JnjaJ^ne^ei) iS fenfc, XXiw »CL.t T:ef>nif a98(f«8«X 

.lJiv-C^'^-^It& IX'iq^i lot , od- .5®XX1 ©<f Jiislia b,s siswa/ia 

11 A«M,* without further notice. 

It was alleged, among other things, in the motion 
which is in the nature of a petition, that plaintif f , f usan E. 
Hei8e,was a sister of the deceased and that Sliaabeth Hitter, 
who was one of the heirs and a necessary party, had not been 
pade a party to the suit, It then set up that but 8 of the 
48 defendants were served in accordance with plaintiff's 
directions and no attempt had been made to serve the other 
defendants although the addres es of most of them were in 
Chicago and well known to plaintiff, A number of other orders 
were entered continuing the motion to dismiss the suit, and 
October 14, 1941, an order was entered sustaining the motion 
and dismissing the suit at plaintiff's costs« Plaintiff appealg , 

There is no dispute as to the facts as above stated. 
Counsel for plaintiff in their brief say, "It is our contention, 
and has been the practice in these Gourte for many y:^ars,thfct 
in the cause when reached for trial the lalntiff **^'** could 
dismiss all defendants who were not served with summons, and 
proceed witti the other served defendants* 

"This entire procedure was a matter which was not 
properly before the Circuit Court of Oook Cotinty on October 
14,1941, and this plaintiff , Susan S,Heise, should have been given 
an opportunity of impleading such new defendant or defendants 
and serving the same, or, in the alternative, that the Court 
might have dismissed the proceedings against such unserved 
defendants and permit this plaintiff to proceed to a hearing 
with such defendants which she deemed necessary and proper, 
and who, as the records disclose, were served and properly 
before the Court. 

n The question of unreasonable delay originally against 

.&oiion tediiut ^ucsiilti '*>M»A il 

tT[®;t^lH d*»cfjasixa; JsfiCvf boM fi«sdeo»J& sxlJ to is^fals m 8Air«t8i9H 
asotf *os l>.Qil,Xi^'iJ^ •^laas'ao^&a « bixa aiXtd «fit* to &flo ajaw odw 

twi^o ed:i ftviea od" 9i>B(H neecf bad *q««*Jis on fefl« anol^ooiJtB 

Bie&fo isd^o lo 'iscfraufT a .Itld'fiiAXq o* nwotU IL9W btia o^aoldO 

AoitoflreifiiJ Snlnija^aue fesieiJne^asw isfeno njii,XJ^QI<,M necfc^oC 

,b9^Aia svocfjs 3A ad'ooil aiif ©J 8i» 9;fMqaXJb on ei ©isriT 
tnoiifn?^d-noo tuo aX i'i" ,"^«e toitcf ^isdJ ni lti*niiiXa let XsafiwoO 

SXjif( • 'tLtnialr, ari;f X^iiJ^ i«^ 6«iic*i!n aids bbum^o 9iii nl 

£iflfi,ajciOK:irijtf8 lictl?? bsvisa ^on ©'Jdw oxfw a;fitia£>C8to5 XXa astmalb 

•fiixjii.&n9tsJb feevies isrld'o %ri:t nilm l)«»ocrrq 

;for '^xriw *f»J"tejR :-stjjfesoo'iq a^i^n© alxfl" 

i9cfc \:iaiiO\) a[©oO lo v^iwoO *X«oilO Bdi etotocf ^Xieqonq 

r.avi-: u.afjtsaiaa*^' GS8tfiE,l:ll;ffiij8Xq ald^f -&rrj&,X^GX,*X 

B^fijabnstQ )n»t96 ?.»n liswa gnlbfisXqisl to x^-t^i^^'soqqo hb 

i'isjoZ Qrii cf ,n3-,evi#£.m[9;rx^, axf* ni ^'^o^9m&B 9di SiOivxeB 5flj3 

fisvisanu rious d-^nlB^sjjs esniissociq srf* j&$;^ >> lais ix) svari i"iisiia 

giijhj^sff £ o^ b99ootq oJ- t'^id-niBXq 3lx-:^ ^Iffi^aq btiA aJnaSnsteJb 

»isqoiq J&fl& Tjiaaaaosfi fcemssfe sda rioiriw 8;>'n»ojn«t9Jb riowa ri^iw 

■^Xioqoiq ^fia JbDvtsa ©lew ,9eoXoai& eMooei 9x15*^ 8BtO£iw fcnis 

• :fiiuoO s£i;^ s^otscf 
^eniM^B X-^X-sniaiio -^Aleb sidjsnosseinw tc nolJasifp sxlT » 


the plaintiff in bringing the case to issue is one chargeable 
not alone to this plaintiff but likewise to the appearing 
defendants, " One difficulty with this contention is that so 
far as the record discloees, plaintiff never asked for an 
opportunity to dismiss any defendants nor to serve those 
that had not been served and she does not ask this in the 
briefs filed in this court, Evidently she is content to have 
the suit stand without being disoosed of. 

The question for decision is, did the court err in 
dismissing the suit for want of diligence by plaintiff in 
prosecuting her suit* We think this must be answer^ed in the 
negative. Par, 2, Rule 5, Supreme Court of Illinois; Sanitary 
Dist.of Chicago v. Chapin . 226 111,499; Daly v. City of 
Chl^go, 296 Ill,g76; Svela v. Blooh ,294 Ill,App.515; 
Bnvde r v, Whitney 310 Ill.App,297, 

Par»2jOf Rule 5, of Our Supreme Court provides; "vJhere 
the plaintiff fails to show reasonable diligence to obtain 
service through the issuance of alias writs, the action may be 
dismis ed on the ap lication of any defencant or on the court's 
own motion*" In Sanitary Dist.of Chicago v, Chapin 226 111, 
499; it was held that a court has power, independently of any 
statute, to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute it with 
due diligence, where no excuse for its delay is presented. In 
the instant case there is no excuse of any kind offered why the 
suit was not prosecuted, The record discloses that although 8 
defendants were served as plaintiff requested, :nd they filed 
their motions to dismiss, no attempt was made to serve the other 
40 defendant t.More than a year and four months thereafter** the 
Holy Family Church, one of the legatees named in the will, filed 
Its motion to dismiss and although this motion Wc-s pending 


Id? aiȣj ?Oii 43 J&c-s &*TiS8 ns^ jQfi f)iad iati^ 

Ti;oo ea;r Bl&tal rfoisi©®l tol r-oi^fsewp 9/11: 
Ud-nifiXq %i^ 99a9r^XllIi to Jfasw -xo* ttus axl? gftXeaXaaXfi 

nJi»^Ais,j^ ;8XoiiiIII to ^'WioQ WB«T[qi;S,§ eXj/H ,S,"iASi ,8TXtfaS9n 

lo.,l^.iO .>/ xi:^ ;etJ^»XXX ass tii^iiMii .V oa^oXiiO^XQ 

.^es.gqA.III OXS t2jS2i£fS. .▼ l a^YflS 

nXc4cff fX^^«aoa;3ei woaa oi allat lllJnlsXq adJ 

o'cT-xwoc iioXvt.aoiX qis sxiJ co fia .aioaXfi 

I vci tissop A 3-^? j&Xeii saw il ;Se> 

.oaa-aaa-^ »ju-35l9 oa f»»i9rfw^«ion9slXXi> awb 

9ilJ^ ^iw feoist': asi/oxa oa at stadi egjeo i^ns^ajoi 9di 

Q iSgi/oiisfXB ()Aiii ao8oX«^xi> inooet sril ,fea^B®»«©«iq Joa sbw d'Xws 

i t®dl? Sa/,»J&»J^aej;/p»i tliJuJUXq a« Jleviea eiaw a^aatcatai) 

9iii* ,^©Jt»g(*t9rfJ ?iicr «ofir i«ot J&ii^ 1A«^ « iMfcdiif 0iciii«8Jnfi£fl8l:9i> 0* 

foaXittXXii! oiis cil boffi^ft ses:f^s9X edj lo anOtiioiyxlO -^Xlas'S ^XoH 

Bfli^a^ aj;« floiffom al^ff ^jtfo<i;fIi8 bsi» §8Xoai& oi aotiosc nil 


for about 7 months, no attempt was made by plaintiff to serve 
anybody, nor to make any additional defendant, nor to any 
move, and in this court nothing is pointed out th&t she 
expected to do in the future in cage the dismissal was set 

The order of the Circuit court of Cook county 
dismissing the suit Is atcirmed, 

Matohett ,P,J«, and MoSurely,J«, concur. 


^^"■"MiaiJilB FUR GOMPAivy^a Corporation, 



ireot: goaibossy, 



o 1 o I •A* 



March ',^0i 1939, plaintiff caused Jud'3:ment to tife entered 
by confession against defendant for #334,11, being the balance 
claimed to be due on defendant's promissory note, f 277, 25 
principal, $6,86 interest and #50 attorney's fees. An 
execution was issued on the Judgment and April 11, 1939, demand 
for payment made^ April 20, defendant filed her verified petition 
to vacate the Judgment and for leave to defend, and on the 
same date, by agreement of parties, an order was entered giving 
defendant leave to appear and defend, the Judgment to stand 
as security. The case was not tried until September 24,1941, 
when there was a hearing befoire the court without a jury, and 
a finding and Judgment against plaintiff. Judgment entered on 
the finding, and plaintiff appeals. 

The record disclosie that October 31, 1933, plaintiff 
sold defendant a Japanese mink fur coat for §489,25, plus 
insurance of 118, On that date defendant paid llOO on accoxxnt 
and executed her note, with monthly payments to be made of 
$40,73, »ith interest at 6^ per annum. The coat was not delivered 
to defendant until about December 1, 1938. The first monthly 
payment was to be made December 6,1938, and every month there- 
after. December 6, defendant paid |46, January 6, 1939, t^45, 
anfi February 6, 1939, ^?40, but made no payments thereafter. 




:.;VT. ;'.:;■; i-.r, i;'>« ' in-iTfU ;■(,.???; 

iiA .ss®! a*t9«wo:f:r« 03$ joas ^aenaS^ni 68.64 tjC-^^I-tonl'xq 

j&naaeJb tSCGI ^IL lltqA ba& ^fisaj^fewt, »ri;t no b9U9*l saw noi;?j/o?»x9 

nci^Wsq Ijsninsv loti b9llt Jl a&bstaleb *0S liiqA ^9bJm in9m%Aq lol 

aiid^ fio JbfijB ^bnelsl) o* svasI lot feos ^aansJ&trt ad* 9**oj»v o;f 

gnlTi^ b&tstRS saw i(9f)io ajb ^8©i*iag ^o JneffiSfirt^ Xtf««*«JE) saaa 

bn&3B oi in9m:^aul sai ihnetob baa tUQqqa oi ©vfisi itu^}a*l9b 

,IJ^9Xt^S i9cfBi©;tq9c; Ilcfxiw ijsii* ^on aaw ea«o »rfT c'^itiiiioea •« 

no ijsisitn© :tn9m^,£>i/[, tlttini&Ii:!! iaatss^a ia^a^sdl btui •gatbnl^ a 

fil^iai&lq ,8S€X ,X£ ledo^fsO $Mdt ifaoXoRll) &nco€rc ©dT 

BtfXq t3S»68*S lol *j8oo iw'i jJnlci aesasqat « S'GJB&nslei! bXot 

*ni;oooB no OOX^ btaq ici&ba^lBb 9i&b i&riS nO »8X? lo eooBii/anX 

tc ©6-Sflt scf o;/ aiJ'nsfaxjsq Y,Xii^nom d;tiw ,«#on isrf fe-^wosxs ba& 

b€)^t&7ll&b ion Qm tfAoo sri'i ««Hruji5 isq ^6 d-® i&tneini d$im ,5?,0*| 

lEXrid'Eoffl *8'ii^ 9ilT ,8£ex tX necfissegd ^Ti/otfa Xidriw ^naftnetef) ocf 

-Qisrirf^ rfJnoia yi^vo fina tSfiftXtS isdasojli s£i«b ©d otf am taea^Aq 

idi-- tpSfeX 16 Y'^jjifttBl, »d*^ Jblaq in&bnslBb ,3 lecfjasoaa ,is^l:s 


Defendant's position was that the coat was not durable 
and well made as represented; that after she had worn the 
eoat for about 3 weeks it ripped in various places and was 
returned to plaintiff for repairs which were made. Inmiediately 
after it wag returned to d>fen«ant it started to rip again, 
was again returned to plaintiff and the rips repaired. About 10 
days thereafter, it again began to rip in divert places and the 
ooat was then again taken back to plaintiff and again repaired. 
Shortly afterward defendant again returned the coat to 
plaintiff stating the coat was not as represented, th&t it was 
not durable and that in addition to this ripping it did not fit 
her; thatt she then offered to return the coat, demanded a new 
one, which was refused, and that afterward she was unable to 
wear the coat because of ripa, tears and general unfitness that 
March 9, 1939, she offered to - return the coat. On cross- 
examination defendant corrected thi? by stating it wag March 
1940, She testified that " I am willing to return the coat and 
/ you giye me a release, a release for my ooat, and a release of 


the judgment," and that she was willing to sacrifice the $230 
she had paid - - let defendant keep that and take back its coat. 
That this offer was refused. 

Witnesses for plaintiff testified admitting that the 
/ coat had been returned by defendant a number of times for 
/ repairs, which were made substantially as testified by t 

Wlllard Bellinger, called by plaintiff, testified he had 
worked for the plaintiff fur company for 18 years, that he saw 
the coat when it was brought to the stor- in 1939. " I did the 
repair work and sewing on it, I do not remember whether it was 
torn in the same place where it is torn now, but I do remember 
it was in the sleeve in the places where it gets the most wear. 

ojT ,tAoo ©rid" 5efstii#©i niag^ ^ft»s>a©l»fe gi. '.itJlp. x^^'i^'^ 

;tXl itofi Mjb il ^tttciqJti i>iliii oi Rcltlfiba ai ^&dt baa eMjariub tti 
wr,n s 6©MsiF»l> td-3c.«5 S'jcivt RT«*«i o* l>9T»t^o e»ri;f Ada UMlt i»Ml 

£io*££iss ?;sw ■Si '^aM&^B %ti 3 Mi h9t&9^rtov) iaahii9^^& aol*«fll«JW» 

bciA *Bo» SiECt «t«ii ^jGilliv? flits ^i *«11tl*a^4- adfi ,©*-ei 

lo ss!ja.- «^io$ xro '^cl ^sjaol®*! js^aeaalsi -« sa ©vi^ wot 

Q52?s »rid- ©si1:ii©®e est 'g&llll^ ksw sris ;J^.Brf* &n» " ^tRSK^lMil «rf* 

•^430© s^i r-ioBd" «>■ Jsdd" qsaM d'flfiljfisls.fe *siX « - i>jtfiq &asf Mfe 

,i)»QRr1:9'y. ?»sw *i®llo alii* i&Af 
-■.Kf^di^ TSittlttlmbB k&11lt»t^ T:'iiiffll*X«[ i©! a#e«Sfl*lW 
Id aeislcf lo 'lesfj;: iijnelefc i;«f l)en'SifJ»i n-^sd bad tBOo 

fjsfl ari l>ai!t2*S'?tt;^'ii*i5±BXq ^ef &eXXa» ,"X©ifilXX»M MaXXIW 
afs^ «jtf >ta4i*,a'x«©t 81 'xo^ Y««cpao© lal ttXifisiBXq daj Tot fiaiiow 
9ii? J&ift I « .ee : d-Ji^woTid 8;3w ;ti «®rfw ^boo a^^ 

'iscffflSiyp*? o/> I *ycf ,woc nicJ al ?i srrarfw aoisXq 9ft»8 ad^" ni enai 
.lAsw d'eoa «*rf* eiteg ti (nnskim ss^o-nsXcf »fl^ nX sresXa airfit nX a^w *1 


The pelt Isn't torn, it is in the seais. ''''* It Ib made of hundreds 

and hundreds of pieces and that is how you get the effect of a 

drop-skin only 21 inches long," That he was the only employe 

of plaintiff who worked on that kind of fur. ** There is a tendency 

for the ekine to become dry under the arm pits, " 

When the evidence was all in, counsel for defendant said: 
*• If the Court please, we are willing to return the coat now. We have 
no use of it from n&yGit of 1939, It is only a stdJ^fep service 
charge. Since that time she purchased a new fur coat. Of course, 
now It is In storage because of the weather." The court then found 
for defendant and this appeal followed. 

The coat wag introduced in evidence and is before us on 

this appeal. There are many rips, some large and gome small 

and it is in a bad state of repair* Defendant has filed no brief 

in this court. Counsel for plaintiff In his brief says : "The 

defendant, except for returning the coat^W iatervals of a few 

hours for repairing rips in seams, kept the coat in her 

possession and still retains the coat in her possession, and has, 

at no time, attempted to rescind the sale by returning the coat 

and demLfinding reooveiy of the money paidp Even at the trial of 

this case no tender of the coat was made, nor was "here any 

set-off or counter-claim filed to recover the amount paid, The 

only attempt made by the defendant to return the coat was about 

two years after the sale, after judgment had been oonfes ed 

oh her note and when this case was about to be reached for trial. 

She then offered to return the coat for a release of the Judgment 

and forfeit her claim to the S230 paid on account. At no time was 

there any attempt to reseiid the contract of purchase, The only 

defense made is that the coat did not fit properly and ripped a few 

times, although each time It was promptly repaired by the 

plaintiff. " 


Bb^ihPMJu to SDBjn ■ .;M*a ^si,t ul ex vi ^nioj ^* aal ^l^q ailT 

£ to icit . ; 3jj wo^ won si i^i bas. asoeiq lo B£>8'zJtou{l ba& 

d\ol<imB ^iosv M? aew act ^afliT " ^jgnol serioxil ia X-^cc aLAa~qoib 

Xon&bR. - 10 J!ifil:tf imit ao .beof'xow oriw lll^^nlBlq \o 

• .aiiig !T*\« sfl^ lebmj xtb sttooecf o;t anijlB etii rrot 

tjoijie ^txiaiiaelsi) lot laam/oo »ni IXa 3£w eioaafclva 9sii aeiCii 

eoivisa «§j§^dra v;-I«o si Jl .GCer i n'^^aM «^C'-7* :M to saw on 

tSaii/o-o to ,^4Joo lij-t Wfsii « BaaacLoiiiq eaa aailj Tisn? «oni8 ,»siario 

SflXfOt usxirr ilTMiijq,. aaiT ^ .1 eric's aw ©d;? ' . i«9cf s^jwoi^a nl ai i"! woa 

,i>«wQXiot iH^^qq» alAi bcA ^n&bn^lBb lot 

LSJmn sfflOB ftas «31aI ©ooe »aqli xn-«« e^a ©^sriT .Issqc.o axn;r 
tsiicf Of; ' ' z'od ia&bn»J^Q ^'ilAasn to «:J'j»*a f>scf is ni si *1 boA 

' . ^ '^ot IsfSiiuoO ttt'xuoo Bldi nl 

1© aIsv'!:i.'Jr.;i. ?*A;^.;ct> sci" gnimvJs's lot tq»ox^ t^iits-flotsA 

isii ax " ,, ' aqli ^iiJt^qs'i lot eiwoff 

tBs4 flfl^ tn'oi3««>fJ."c 'iiwi anx.-i^ert IXld"8 bn« aoisasesoq 

J«©o exi^ gnijat- " onlOBSi od- l)S^qm9;?;tB ^9sX;f on *£ 

to I •--;■■- ^ .j^^ ^&noffi 9di to t'rDvoosi gnlJbiijsasJ!) JbnB 


T(,n. ...7? it.n ^c:).5aflI "" "^ • 

^e.aotfloo , 

.X^i-Tc:; 'lot &srios.^i ^^u o>; .^uuo.i -..-w ^>?> ;.o aia.- n-^ 
(JaoffiQJbwt sxid" tc Bfi£>.- '' - -:" '--- ■■- 

i iri..iio~':ia.'::iJuc 10 tto-;t9a 
~ ^ ' sbfifit JqB(»;*Ja xXixo 

? " "" ;:t»»X OW? 

Bin..- n-rtw Diiii 9;J^0H l^rC no 

.:!• ^©natto nad^ Mi8 

tistnot htm 

'300 9i4? ifadd^ gi sfyjaa aanstefi 

:^i 9fliXj rfoas xJguorfifU (Saal^ 

« .tti^alBXq 

Ae above stated, defendant testified that she Offered 
to return the coat and permit plaintiff to retain $230 upon 
release of the Judgment against her. ^fhere ig no dispute that the 
ooat was not dur&ble and alt ough it wae a new coat, it w&e necessar; 
to repair it frequently on account of ripping &jid it saa also 
torn in places* In these circumstances we think, upon a considera-ri 
tioa of the entirf record, that we cannot say the Judgiaent 
of the court was not warranted. 

The coat will he returned by the clerls: of this court to 
plaintiff upon calling for it, and the Judgment of the municipal 
court of Chicago is affirmed, 


Matehett, P.J,, and wcSurely, J., coneur. 

coqu J'eTt o* ^IXd^aiJBiq ?i:orr©q Jhrtft t«©o 9Sit trtutai oi 

^b&^nxTXMw den shw ttvoi3 wit lo 
- J a.^_ :;? t«f B^wrtu?*'?: ad iliw d'«o9 tifT 

»&9mnt\t» •! o^AeltfO to ^ijuoe 



\ Appellants 

0HRISPEM3 TRUCK^bi|iES,INC,,a ^-'■ 
Corporation^ DAVE CJaiSPpir^ 
Individually and doiiig^lSwslnesB 

and FRED BaR&A|iirf , X^^ 

,^,^-'*" Appellee«» 


316I.A. 160 



ayi*ei?l6R 'COURT;! 


Plaintiff Ruth Rioh Shcnnan, brought an action to recover 
damages for personal injuries and plaintiff Joseph E.Rlch, her 
brother, sought to recover damages for the wreckage of his auto- 
mobile which resulted from a collision of the automobile with a 
tractor owned and operated by defendant, Ghrispens Truck Lines, 
There was a Jury trial, a verdict and Judgment in defendants* 
favor and plaintlffa appeal* 

Dustin Grannis brought an action against Ghrispens Truck Lines 
to recover for personal injuries sustained by him as a result of 
the same collision, he having been in the automobile which was 
being driven at the time by plaintiff, Ruth Shennan, The two cases 
were tried together and during the trial Grannis tjL^k a voluntary 

The record discloses that about 7 o'clock on the evening of 
November 20,1938, plaintiff Ruth Rioh Shennan (at the time of the 
ac' ident, Ruth Rioh) was returning from Wabash, Indiana, driving 
a Buiok automobile belonging to plaintiff, her brother, Joseph K, 
Rioh, Gran is was ith her in the carj,While roimding a curve on 
United states Highway 50, there was a collision with defendants' 
tractor being driven in the opposite direction. The tractor, which 
was without a trailer at the time, and the automobile, were 
greatly damaged, if not destroyed^ U.S, Highway 30 is a two-lane, 






-■ •▼ 


:^.r"i,":?/d:.f:20onT p^~-inifrHO 


n - 

\) ' 

.THOOO 2H_ ,. - . yiuEG HOIH^IOO'O SOITeUL.Hii 

v^ ■' . . .r; .. lliiJfii&Iq £>£is eelttrtnl lACcaiGcj lot aaSAittAfi 

B jiJiw sXldosBO^Wfi 9x1? to aolailXoo b ao'rl festXuasT rioixtw slidoa 
• eaniJ JtojJil ansqaiidO t^fj«f>«el8Jb x<f B9*is*7sqo Safe bBtmt loio&ii 

.^rjeqqjj atAl*nl*Xq baa loval 
aeriiJ, .'fouTl afleqaitriC Jsnliigja noiS'oii fua ^xlgiiortcf sl'ftai*) alinuQ. 

'tc ;flu89i is as laixi Tj;cf Xjsniacfatxs asiiKt"-^ lAniia'TQq lol lavoean o* 

axsw floirfw B II (Scn'O^ a /L ado ni nr.scf aclvjBii ah ^nolaliXoo eB«a wW 

jBO ow;f 9fi . ^ li;;]^!! :,Xq xd ©bX* aa3^ t« n«TXrt£) s^^Xatf 

„'X«3'nuXov B . . : ni*tJD'6 jjcu: t -uid-njict fjsi-tj ATt^w 

to s^nXfiov© edit no ^ooXo'o V cTjjoa'is li'axl? a©«?oXoaXl5 Liooei etHI 

sxicf tc . .liX^ 9xi^ .ts) nafinajcte rlolH xi^ifA ItXJci^Xq tS5eX,oS isansroH 

gnXvli:.; (SnsX£>nI ,d8MfiV; lacxt gr.Xi-^-trj.tot a-sv. (liolrl dJwH ,;tn8iJ3i o* 

*^I liaaaoX. tisriJoicf lari ,ttjt.:rr:;l . I ^ ignoXsd sXitfocio^fir* afolwa & 

no eviijo B snibnwc't sXli , ^aJ ni isn £iii bsv al abi-O •dolS 

•siffiBoneteb rf*iw noisiXIoo ;i aew 9iari;t ^OS "^taari^XH a»*a^8 bdJInU 

doldw^id- 9jcii" .floi;J-o©il6 eJX«oqqo ezi? aX nevXil: gnXstf to^foaiif 

sis'w ,f>X/cfcrtrc*fwfi «£to bfia tsalJ 9di t.a TsXXAid- a .twoxl*lw a«w 


ooncrete high ay about 20 feet wide. As a result of the impact, 

the automobile was smashed and turned onOQcr so that when it came 

t© rest it was facing practically east ^n the north aide of the 

pavement. The tractor turned over two or three times and stopped 

on the shoulder to the south of the pavement about 75 feet eaa* 

of the automobile. 

Plaintiffs* theory is that the driver of the tractor, in 
rounding the curve, negligently classed the center line of the 
pavement into the lane in which plaintiff was driving in the 
opposite direction, as a result of which the collision occurred. 
On the other side, defendants* position is that the tractor did 
not cross the center line of the pavement but that as the tractor 
was passing on the curve, a number; of automobiles were coming 
west) driving in the north or westbound lane, when suddenly the 
automobile driven by Ruth Rich, which was the third or fourth in 
the line, sud enly shot out into the e&stboumd land and collidea 
with the tractor* Ruth was severely and pelrmanently injured. 
Grannis was sligntly injured. The driver of the tractor and his 
helper were also injured and the four ersons were taken to a 
hospital in Lal'Porte, Indiana, which was about 24 miles from the 
gtsetd^ of the accident. 

Counsel for plaintifTs iay that » Plaintiff Shennan and 
Dust in Granriis, both suf ering from retrograde amnesia, were unable 
to recall anything of the accident or the events that transpi ed 
Immediately thereto," so that they were unable to throw any light 
on how it happened. Grannie, however, who at and before the trial 
was a soldier at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, where hie deposition 
was taken April 11,1941, testified that immediately after the 
accident he saw Ruth ^crumpled up" in an unconscious condition and 
helped carry her into the lunch room^ called the Curve Inn, 
located on the north side of the curve. The case went to trial 


siio io sflii is;tfl9o exit StasiOflto X-t*«»8iX8®n ,9Vi«o 9d& ^nlbRUot 

ad;? nl ^iiivii itnlBlq Hoist* at bo&I eili otnt ;tneE€rv«q 

.55"? ■ oirfw to tiimei s ba iaoliosnlb eJlaooqo 

bib i&S'o.^iiw sn;*" J^id ;ii aoiJlaoq *8^ix&£)n«*tsi> tsJbla Tail;fo sxlJ' nO 

.grilscii a'iOv; B©Xiefofflc;Jw6 tO'T5dffii/c & tsmi/o ari-t no gxiipOBq aAW 

' : "; 10 fiiiri* B£i^ as,ia rioldvsr ^rfoiH ^^uH XJ^ avvlib ©XlcfoatcS"!.* 
8.oiii.oo una j&hbX ijfitrctftJ'gBe srin ottfil *uc Soda '^Xas ftoa t»niX sriJ 

•^e'ju/tni; 'ijXS'flafiaflKiSQ £>ns ^Xeisvsa 8«w ii;J-H;: ,ttto&'ii 9cii rfJlw 
aid J&Hs to:^sjsid' oritf ic if^vXt© ©dT .feeriifta-^ ^Xiti siXa bb« alanAiO 

ijS'Ei/ oaXa 9^«w leqXciii 

fens nsnnexio I'Sio-nlal^i « d-^vH? v; -y =^ lilxilfiXq io1 XsaixycC 

eiOAitjif eiaw fSXeaflflLs efia•xgo^#8^ aioii sni-xa ,lwa il;to«f taXnnsn© nlJejja 

5«rlqansit fMi nin^ ':n&bJt.t)9e, &Hi to ^nM3-^n« XXjsaei o^ 

•?- i^OTcxi? o;J ftlcfsr.i,- •. ??' -^sii* itarfif oa " t03-ei«irii- tJC9^^6»i^'«-t 

9fl;J •,'^: ttyvsworf cBliin^i-e ♦i>9n9<:;-^jwl .ti wori no 

;.i*i3or.9.o 9xn f.-^er;"' ^i-n';.!?^. x.voJ ^noitRgniirlJ qaiBO :fB isifeXca A a«« 

:; .itl&fieo gxrofoBHOdfiw a.h ni "qu fesXqraino* riJi/fi wxie sxi JneBJtooa 
,nfll aTiwi:) mat Sallys ^fiiooi rionwX e£tjr o*nX lori Y'JCiJao fesqXsii 

r f,,-; , -. 4....,, ,.. -...r.r, ^"™ ,- — / o. ., gfj^jg dJiofl sdi no Jbs^fiooX 


May 20, 1941« He testified that he had no recollection as to 

how the accident happened* "The first thing that I can recollect 

after the accident was seeing how bad the oar was damaged up and 

seeing Be^ty Rich [Ruth], who was driving it, all crumpled up, 

I was unconscious after ttaas accident*" He then described the 

condition of the automobile and continuing saidJ "Immediately 

after the accident I got Betty Hioh out of the ear* Somebody 

helped me carry her into the little stand, hot dog stand or some 

kind of a place that was next to the road« * * * I had cuts on 

my face and then I was Jittery and banged up* There were cute 

on my forehead and on the side of my f ace« " That he made telephone 

calls at the Curre Inn, calling the Mdingtons, whom they had 

been visiting} that afterward they were taken to the hospital 

at La Porte, Indiana* 

Counsel for plaintiffs contend the evidence shows part of 

the tractor was over the center line of the pavement, as a result 

of which the collision occurred; that this fact appears from the 

/ /evidence of gouge marks in the pavement which were from 1 to 4 

/ ftet south of the center line and were caused by the right front 

fender of the tractor as it was knocked over on the right side 

, by the impact between the two vehicles. That the width of the 

/ tractor would put the left side wheels north of the center line, 

/ In the westbound lane. That there were similar marks and gouges 
' extending from the point of the collision in a southeasterly 

direction to where the tractor finally landed on the shoulder 

south of the pavement about. 75 feet east of the automobile 

when they both came to rest. 

The driver of the tractor, Fred Borgardt, and his assistant, 

Frank Hund, who '-rae riding with him at the time, testified that 

the tractor did not cross the center line at any time but, as 


c.t 8» af>l3o^S£oo^n. on B&ii &A SadJi ^•llUae? 9k\ .I^til ^0-2 \zif 

d"oeIicoai Hit© I tMdt ^isif d^ti"^ ewST" ^h'int>cq&^ rta&bi09& tdt worl 

5n& qss bBjjBmab »«w iao aii:? &a€f veil ^jt9»a a*'*' taebitooii •!!* tb^^a 

.qj;; fe9Xqiaitin.D iXs ^tl ;gaiv4^Jb saw «rii? ,Cii#»^j tkaJtfi .%t$wi^ 3«i9«a 

lledrsXijeffimX" iiaiea aaiwiSi^raofi fens 9lidcffio:ttf« ©fliJ lo aolJlfinoo 

ixsfi asv *ailJ eo«Iq jt lo baiJ. 
«Kcfiq&X©;J ©£;«fi! sfl ^sj . "o s.6i« «il* flo bam ftjeeiistol t^ no 

♦jRfiaJf'nl ,»;fio*I «J ;fB 

siiit wGi't ai.^egcfis aoa' -Ai j.f>ei*txf©o«) nolalXXeo ©riJ riolriv to 

B^^^'ivc; |)it« ajttftes *iAXJEflfie .snBX .itiJOdJasv 9ri;f at 

aXlcfoffio:' -oc© arferesvaq eri^r lo riJwoa 

,?8St o? amsp if3'od t^^* fieriw 
jitnAJai- , ^ tevlntft eriT 

^^u(i tmlt xnis its sniX rio Jon fiJtfe noJo*^* 9Ai 


above stated, the automobile driven by Ruth, suddenly turned out 
of the vreetbound line of cars, crossed the center line, and the 
collision occurred* 

No witness was produced who aaw the collision except the 
four persons, two in the tractor and two in the automobile, but 
almost immediately after the accident, police officers and other 
persons gathered, and assisted the injured persons who were all 
taken to the hospital* They gave testimony as to the condition 
of the two vehicles, their location, skid marks, gouges, etc* 

Plaintiffs contend the court erred in excluding certain 
evidence offered by them, in admitting, evidence on behalf of 
defendants and in instructing the Jury, 

0. J, Beman, a salesman who lived in Wlnnetka, Illinois, 
called by plaintiffs, testified that he was coming from Ohio to 
Chicago, driving his automobile; that he arrived at the scene of 
the accident within a few minutes after it occurred; that the 
night was dark and clear, the pavement dry; that the tractor was 
off the south side of the pavement and the automobile near the 
north side; that the passengers were still in both vehicles when 
he got there. He described the curve in the roadway and the 
location of the Curve Inn; identified plaintiffs' Exhibit 4, 
taken November 28, eight days after the accident, as a correct 
representation of the roadway and the marks or scratches he saw 
in the pavement at the place in question; that the tractor was 
about 75 feet further east than the Buiek automobile; that it 
was upside down when he first saw it and a man was still in the 
cab, and Ruth Rich still in the ^hiick; that he helped carry her 
from the car to the Curve Inn and then went over to the tractor; 
that "there was a lot of spilled gasoline around there» The 
truck was smashed and the Gasoline tanks had burst»" That he 



9di btLB ,enlX»o sriJ beeatrco ^aiBO lo nail bauo6t&9yr 9dt to 

,&9iiysoo ftolallloo 
9d;f ;fqeoxe noXailloo @xi;:f v&b od>r b^oubotq exw eo8fl;fiw oK 
?MCf ^sIlcf Officios efi^^ ;fls toSGBtt 9cit ai cw:f ^anoeieq tuot 

IX& ilw enoBiRa fceii/tfi '■((tslasjR iin* ,B9i»xi;fBa anoeieq 

lo IXar: ofT95iv® §niJ*im6s at ^9Ai xti Jb©i«lto eone£ivo 

^■sjniif ©fijf gnlJotn^ani nl fins atttRbtftsb 

,8iofi/XII ^^jS^ffsmi oAv aaffiselaa £ ^/isfflea ,L .0 

oJ olri' av 9fi ::fsil3^ bsl^ioae* ,attlJnlj5lq xd JieXlAO 

to snsoe fmi Js lier^t's?'. ©fl iJ^ijiiJ jeXJtcfoEoJi/s aiil SJ^ivlife ,oa*oiriO 

exi.t iacis •of'TT? ■ssJt.s 8©;fifniffi v«t a fliricMv JnsBlooie erf* 

»«?^' Tctosi.. ri^' {\i5 Jk«»©vbc ©ilJ ,T9eXo bn& Jitssb 8«w ^iisXa 

■ •sfl 9XldoEiO*itf.e ®il:f Jans Jfismeveq sriJ to »£>i8 iiJwoB ©d* tto 

nsifw aaXolrigv riitotf «! XXi*s oiaw aisgneessq «ri? ^J-aildf {ebla diion 

erfcf fjKB YBwl>BCi QiW 111 ©vxifo 9fl:f fisdiiosali ©E *©t»iii' ^03 exl 

4> ^^Idtrb-'- *'?AJl:fnin^y bsmfn^hi jnrtl ©v^wO ericT to noiJBOoX 

^ois-T'T' ^ : i« ,8?? na^cfffisvoH neaiB^t 

•"•<?,' 'D?3ioa '^0 sjli:,Ea fc.< nol^fB^nesaiqen 

; ' JdoffioJue -'olyR nrf-r n^^rtt JEjse T>ri*itft 3"©«t 67 JuodB 

arid' fix . r:©w jRBff rt 9ii neilv nwof) eljlaqw aew 

'idil Atiiflo fcscleii sri Jjg.riO' iXolu U3 rioJl>"i xijrwB. Sna ,cfso 

jnoJ-Ofii/ 943" oJ 'levo Jnsw iisxl? I)«3 «nl ©VTtJwO ©/!;»• ot njao qA^ ffloxt 

9f'T .o'jsxld' fcntfoi« sfliXoBs l>eXXlqa to ?©X s a«w artexiJ''' JbiI* 

Oil i&AT " ♦Ja'swcf fifiri sins t ©nJlXoas', «ii* f»ns Jbarisama bbw l&tni 

motioned everyone away who had cigarettes; that In walking between 
the two wrecJced vehiolee he noticed some scratches that were 
about 3 feet south of the center of the pavement and ran southeast 
r^' towards the tractor; that all the scratches vrere in the south or 
eastbound lane. 

Plaintiffs then called 1, G, Hiokey, who testified that he 
went to the scene of the accident with three other oersons, 
November, 82, 2 days after it occurred and that the photographs shown 
correctly represented the Inn, the poadway and the place in question* 
That he did not see the wreckage of any vehicle but saw a part 
of one; that there was an oil spot on the grass, off the south 
aide of the pavement. Objection was then made by defendants' 
counsel and tipon inquiry of the court, coimsel for plaintiffs 
stated he expected to show by the witness the position of the marks 
in the pavement and the oil spot. The court sustained objection 
on the ground that "It is too remote" - two days after the accidento 
The witness then testified that he examined the pavement and found 
//iiarka to the right or south of the center of the roadway; there 
- were scratches 8, 3 or 4 feet long, some of them were l/4 of an 
inch to 3/8 inches in deptb* This was excluded on objection* He 
then testified the color of the marks was white, as the concrete 
would be| that the marks were pointing southeast from the center 
line. Counsel for plaintiffs then asked, "State whether or not 
these marks pointed in a direction off the highway or not". 
Objection to this was sustained^ Afterward the witness stated, 
"They pointed out toward the outer edge of the highway"* This 
was objected to and the objection sustained. 

Plaintiff Josenh Hioh, called in his own behalf, testified 
he was a brother of plaintiff j Mrs, Shennan; that on November 22, 
two days after the accident, he went to the hospital in La Porte 

«0A8X bmuod^BAB 

d^'ij; .. Tr,, •..,', . ,.,., -. 9i^,axs8tv 9x1* a«e J'ofl fiib bA JaxIT 

3l:^J3"ni; ' ■■'" loanuc ^ - -^^ " "^o ^ilupnl noqi; fciua leeiufoo 

nciJ09tC!c r.'Of!lj3osi?2 o't.l-oo ©ri? «*c- ' ' rvd^- -J&n/s ^nsujsvjsc 9di at 
^iu^' '■ • :'■' • ;v.e£i owct - "' ■^vmet oo-; ^ " " :I? Snuoi:^ »rf* no 

s^d' Bani.ii.'O'D tui cf.sriJ r-c-'/Jsiif neri;t sasnJiv ariT 

''o 'isJn^ • - '0 riJooB '7.0 *jf%Xn »ri;f o;^ SiltsB 

^ i.'oi 3'»e'" ' " , ^ asrtoJs'Joa anew 

•Giijuiov friT ♦vi.^v- : ■'/. a^rloni 8\5 oi doal 

' " riJwos giiJlJnlocf e~6': 3a'i3£. sxiJ 'j ;:IJ Jed fcltfov 

3u£3'vr' ^fisile.^ nerli? eltld-nislc; lol l9Sfii;oO .anil 

ilSiri «i!:r "ito aoid'oeni '. heinloq aaltaB •aeiliT 

elxiT ,"^3Wfisl£i arid; Itc sg^o -ii-'i/ijc erief 6i^wo.' i-uo iD9;faloq ^oriT" 

'le^neo arid- 

to Bee his sister, Huth; that he vent with Elmer %oh and Mr. Hlckey 
and his wife. He then identified the exhibits, being the photographs 
taken of the scene of the accident; that he examined the roadway 
and surroundings where the accident occurred; "I sair gouges in 
the pavement, " that they were at the curve on the south side or 
eastbound lane about 2 to 2^ feet south of the dividing line; that 
the marks were white and olear and were from l/4 to 3/8 of an 
inch deep* fhat "They were white and new looking"* This latter 
testimony was objected to, the objection sustained and the answer 

,, stricken. That the gouges pointed toward the southeast in the 
eastbound lane, away from the center. The witness was then asked 
if he sav anything on the shoulder on the sogth side of the 
pavement. This was objected to because it was two days after the 
accident, and the objection was sustained* 

We think the iniling of the court vas erroneous and the 
evidence should have been admitted. The witness Beman, who was 
coming from Ohio to Chicago, and arrived at the scene of the accident 
immediately after it occurred, identified the photograph of the 
roadway taken November 28th, by Ralph Poole, This was the same 
photograph testified to by Hicjtey and Hioh, and ^^eman testified 
that it represented the situation as he saw it at the time of the 
accident. His testimony and the testimony of Poole (who took 
Exhibit 4, on November 28, and who testified that the exhibit 
correctly represented the situation) together with that of Hlckey 
and Rich, was sufficient to have the jury pass on the question, 

1 The evidence that the gouges were from 1 to 4 feet south of the 
center line running somewhat in a southeasterly direction, was 

\ some evidence tending to. show that the north side of the tractor 
was over the center line* 

XfiJioiH .iM fens riol^^ iftfisX^' Atlv <^a«w 9x1 •j»rf* \sij$isB ,i9?2la aiil ssa oJ 

Xawjbfio'x Gii^ b^nlmAX^ eii ;tsil^ jitaefiloOB 9£Uiv'lo sneos »tii to nels^ 

Hjt ae^iiO'S VAa ^" (6e*inii&06 ^ae^isoa 9di sisdv 8snJL&fij3o^i0a bus 

•xo eblB riJ'uos sri? no ©\n0o ©riJ cfjs ©*S0W Y»ri* Jsrii^ " ,*fl»flt«vaQ siiJ 

nB ^6 8\S o? •t'Nl ffioit rx»>r i>n« iJseXo Jbna eJlrtw anew aartBB ©li* 
laHtAl aifiT ."snijiocf wen f?a,f; 9SMv ©i©w lEwlT" JarlT «q»al) riofli 

^tii nl *3a9riJtfo8 aii* Jfe-SBWO? BsJnJtoo segtfo^ ©ricf tad- ,«»afolT*8 

Jbt^jia,? flsricJ- a-sw 85«H*iw «ilT ^tntn9o 9iii nonl X;j5w« ,snsl bmtodiaiun 

-: '^0 s^ia !!*#©« 9iiS CO lei^Ivoiie «ri:r no snld;f-^a« ifae •il ^i 

©ri;}" r?t J i.£ >i^.^c owJ sew d^i sstrsoed od" JBsJoet^o asw aixfT t^ceaaTAq 

SiBv Qiiv ^iiBSiaH seBfltiw ed? vi^a^^it^j^ floecf evad l>Xin»£ie a:«a£)lva 

jiiSiblooB &M to en99.a ©dJ Jjs b»vliiA ba& ^o^aoiLciD oJ oMO ttoni sfilooo 

©n* lo dcf«i5t3o;foiSq aricT J&siTfiJ.n»&i ,6»'S'xifooc Ji ia«ri:« xl»i&lb»mml 

eaiss efi;f aaw sldT ,eloo<5 riqljs^s x^ ^Ai&^ 'iecFaevoV! amiAi xuytbsvi 

©£i<r "ic ©ffl.U e.'i • 'A'-u^ 3j^i aj& noliautlB sjEiJ 6a;^n9s«rrqe'i Ji r^rtt 

iooif oii'^O yXo&'i lo iEacffii?ss;J 9dS fens ^eniJaa* eJtH «}n»lJl9l»A 
Jicfirlxe aria^ JaxiJ fesillJeed^ erivr ba& ^&^l i^sevoW no ,* ildltbtS. 

«floi;tasi/i5 Sff^t no sasq Y'^u^t sri:^ svjarf oJ rfcuiXellljya asv ^riolH i^m 

sild- ^o ri^ryoa Joe't i* o:f I fsortt siav aa^Ji^OB ari:r ;^silJ ©anefilvs ©rfT 

aaw <noi*o©Tift -^clieifa/seilrfijoa e ni *jMJsr*Bioa gnlitnwi onil leJnso 

loJosT* axiJ to 9i>le riJicn ©il3^ a^eriJ voiia oJ .^nifina? aonsJblvs aajoa 


Beekley and Corboy, called by plaintiffs, testified they 
made an exaoainatlon of the tractor which ^ras in e garage at 
Hanna, Indiana, November 28, 8 days after the accident, but upon 
objection, the court refused to permit them to testify that they 
found a pocket of powdered, white-colored cement at the juncture 
of the right fender and right running board of the tractor, on 
the ground there was not sufficient preliminary proof that the 
condition of the tractor, at that time, was the same as immediately 
after the accident* We think this evidence should have been 
admitted. The tractor was not in the possession of plaintiffs or 
any one connected with them. There is other evidence touching 
this question but since we have reached the conclusion that there 
must be a new trial, we do not discuss it further* 

Complaint is also made that the court permitted Alice Shoemake, 
lidio conducted the lunch room called the Curve Inn, at the place 
of the accident, to testify over olBjection that just before the 
accident she saw an automobile coming very fast westward in the 
north lane, east of the Inn; that just before it reached the curve 
and she "heard the sound of the oar", she knew that that automobile 
was the one involved in the accident*. And further, that after the 
accident Dustin Grannis, ^o was with Huth in the car, told the 
witness that "down the highway * * ^ I looked and we were going 
85 miles an hour"« This last statement as to what Grannis told 
the witness was ruled put except as to Qrannis whose case was being 
tried at the same time. We think there was no error in. the ruling. 
The weight to be given to the evidence was for the Jury* 

A further point is made by counsel for plaintiffs that the 
court erroneously refused to permit the witness, McPharon, called 
in rebuttal to testify as an expert on the question of driving 

^»iB!r;sor;.v &'^ .oaffJjtfftec tis/o^i ©ri-:r *sJiJ ft^a o«ls ei ^Bl&lqmoQ 

eri* ni J&Tsw;f89^r cf-asl -^ifiir saJtroo eLX4omcivfi Ra w.^e aria tfnefelaos 
eirwr® d^ ;6^9xiO' ' ' ■ ■^^t tflal »fl3' Ic 3-s>^9 ^snal li^icn 

©XMcjpo^-tts JBff." lirii. sii' oriir to ^ffires sxi? fcisaxl" «rla bUA 

®xi:r i»*'2:j8 ^/^jI;? ii^ai'^i^.: ,^5ris£iooB ©cS* fix i)«vIoTfli »no ©ri* bbw 

,gnili;i ©£i* njt toi": - niriiJ ©W .airi? »«!??. wit iA b%tnt 

^ivl'tb to nol&neap axid" flo d-'ieqx© cib «« ^tli^ai?;? o* lAi'^iKSei at 


tract ore with and without trailers attached. On this question 

plaintiffs sought to show by the witness that a tractor without 

a trailer would have a tendency to "wander", resulting in a harder 

pull upon the operation of the front wheels and consequently greater 

difficulty in steering. We think the ruling was proper. It was 

too speculative and there was no evidence that the tractor "wandered", 

Plaintiffs also sought to show by this witness that skid 
marks, which it was contended were made by the tractor at the time 

, of the collision, would tend to indicate that the tractor was 


f being driven at 60 miles per hour but on objection this was excluded, 

\ We think the ruling was erroneous and this, too, although the 
allegation of the complaint as to speed had been stricken at the 
close of [plaintiffs' case on defendants' motion, for the reason 
that afterward defendants called Fred Borgardt, the driver of the 
tractor, who testified there was a governor on the tractor set at 
38 miles an hour. He gave further testimony to the effect that just 
before the accident he was driving from 25 to 35 miles an hour. 
Defendants having Intiroduced evidence as to the speed at which 
the tractor was traveling Just before the accident, plaintiffs had 
the right In rebuttal to Introduce evidence that tended to show 
that the tractor was going at a greater rate of speed* 

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court gave too many in- 
structions tendered by defendants concluding with the words, "Then 
you must find the defendants not guilty", Beven of such instructions 
were given. The court gave 32 instructions, 17 requested by 
plaintiffs and 15 tendered by defendants. The controlling issue 
was simple and we think the Jury was not misled* 


♦ "Aeisfensw" icd^oja'53' ©ri:f i^BiiJ^ eonsJbiv© on »&Mf e'xtAi tae •vi*«X«©»qa ooJ 

sjHi:3' sxiJ J® noJor^Tt ®fft x<^ ft&sffl »i9w jbsJ&naitcioo a&vf it fiolriw ^siiAa 

SBW toios.' .r:-,4* s;l'a«iJbnx o? f;««J Mi/ow ^iJoiaiXIoo »il^ to 

,i)9jbwIox« 3BW Bi.x{;f iiciiJoetdc no tfiid luoA isq a«Ila 06 Ja nBrlib :^l9(S 

edf £iguodiL& ,oo* talrii" i&oa aco^noTi© e«w joilm ©ill ialdi aW 

floas9i Bdi met ^^Ql;^om ^ ^^£i^bB<dlL»b ao 98av 'tlUti-nlaXt to •aoXc 

:f;3 ^53 io;fOj8^;t 9x1? itc if9«T:©v©9 a agnf ^nttdi i>BltU99i cdv ,io;ro«Tt? 
t^al i&dlf Joelt© sxlJ oi Xdoaxl^ta^t ledliriwl svftS sH ,*zBod oa »©Xlai 85 

.ixjqrl if.y. rslini 5S c.t l'? irott ijfljtvitfe Riiw sd ^Tneoloo* sd3 ©nolecf 

ii.fisil altXitni/iXq ^Jnafiioos 9di e^wj'Secf *exj!t gfiXXsva-s^ saw loioBti ^At 

«i3X Xa&i. ...:... ..,., .,„..., ___. ..,.. j,idif baeSaeo QJtiial&l^ 
nsffT" ,a.5'tow 9x1:? xfiTlw ;gRlJ5xfX©ii®9 a*fl«l>0»l95 ^d bffi9bR9t anoX^foime 
,:ncl;Jot/'xjeni: rioi/e to ;if:t?=- , ."-^j^Xiira Jon slnAfcae^siJ 9s:ii J&nil ;ts£f(s Jtrox 

St;,..-. ,j.\:. :''^"-+r<,-.' ^ .. .,.iaJr/fi9l».b ^cf J&9T9.&ii©? eX bns BttXtdl&lq 

*..;.:...;:, "^'< ^'- ■ ■<■'-"•■■ «-^-*' jIniriS' 9vf £)ii8 ©Xaitla aaw 


A further complaint is mad© to Instruction No^ 4, given 
at defendants* request. By it the Jury were told that before 
Mrs* Shennaoi could recover she must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence (1) tha.t she was in the exercise of due care, (2) 
that defendants were guilty of negligence in operating the tractor; 
and (3) that such negligence of the defendants, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the damages complained of by Mrs, 3hennan« 
The objection to this instruction as stated by counsel is that, 
"As a matter of law, contributory negligence sufficient to bar 
a recovery is that negligence of plaintiff which contributes 
proximately to the injury". We think the objection is hypercritical. 
The instruction is a stock instruction given in many cases of 
a character similar to the case at baTf We think the instruction 
was proper* 

For the ruling on the admission and exclusion of evidence, 
as above mentioned, the judgment of the Superior court of 
Cook county is reversed and the cause remanded^^ 

Matohett, P,J», and McSurely, J», concur* 

••xot*d t»M.:i ^lod" 9i«w xtvl 9sii Jl x^ ♦^faeupsT ♦a:fnBf>n«l«b iA 

ssajfeieficoqeiq ^5 ^cf avoiq 3" sum sds leToocn BIuoo nsnnerfS ,anM 

(S) ^ jaX©ies:» 9M Ml saw ©rie Jjaxl aefbiv* tcLi to 

sAi BA^ ^xti ^ ■ JB^flststj 9di to aoneailsen dous is^Ai (5) bfla 

*,afiXijcieilS ,ST*' bsniisIqjBoo as^afflsiD «ilJ to eax/ao ©Jsiolxoitq 

•Lsaf oJ aflaloJtlti/fi ©oa»3iXg»ft X'3tc>i^*»cfJt*5i*"oo »w«l to t^itmrn b aA" 

,Xj80^:riioi»q^ aX iioiJ9»tcfo »fi* 3taM^ »W ^"■^•urt^fli »xl;r e* %l9t&mlxo'tq 

to Bsaao XHf'iffl nl fl&v^ aoUouiiSinl jfoo;?8 a si noi;fom*ani ^ilT 

a&id°oj;n[;taiii sjtU ^Lflixi^ 9/' ^msd ^£ bbao •jU' ot 'xaXisia iBiosisuio « 

♦treqortq saw 
<sone£>iva to flcisuXoxa i)aa ttciBBltabs. sxi? no gaiXwi sxlJ io1 

-ioiisqu<i ©4^ to ?nej!S3liJLf(^ ^Ai ^b^noliaem »vod« aii 
»59i)B!Bi©©'~i 8a«»go sri:^ fi«a S^ai^Tsi si xiiiuoo iooO 




316I,A. 160' 

IKC, a corporatiOHj 247 E, 
poration? JCS0' P, HOOKER and 
FRANK S. SLOSSOM, doing business 









This appeal seeks to reverse an order of the trial court 
sustaining defendants » motion to strike plaintiff *s amended coi&- 
plaint and its decree dismissing same for want of equity. 

This proceeding was instituted February 1, 1939 by plains- 
tiff. Wo W, Daviess, against James P. Harding, John P» Harding 
and Harding Hotels, Inc, (hereinafter for convenience referred 
to collectively as the Hardings), 247 S» Ontario Corporation, 
John P. Hooker and Frank S, Slosson, doing business as Hooker & 
Slosson. Plaintiff's original complaint having been stricken 
on defendants* motion^ he filed an amended complaint June 20, 


The amended complaint alleged substantially that the 
Hardings were desirous of purchasing the equity in the property 
at 247 East Ontario street^ Chicago, as well as the second 
mortgage outstanding against said property; that on August 1, 
1937, they entered into a contract with Hooker & Slosson, real 
estate brokers, whereby the Hardii^s undertook to pay said 
brokers a fee of $5,000 if the latter consummated the purchase 
of said second mortgage and equity upon terms specified by the 
Hardings? that the second mortgage and equity were to be pur«- 
chased in the name of 247 East Ontario Corporation which the 
Hardings proposed to organize j that Hooker & Slosson in turn 
entered into a contract v;ith plaintiff, a real estate salesman. 

\ , ( ,S8f?IV V^ .•" .W 

■ob 200D ^THDOO | ' . , ' I 

( ea^nxtx-c:; phi 


j'-'risl&i 'J andlneviio : • •.olisu'il^fisx-r: .■ "" ^alsd'oH jnUbisH baa 

3& rrsafoofe as assnlntrcf sn-io^" ^xioeeoXa ,8 jfaBi^ has i«3looE ,^ nriot 
ns^oi^^e itsecf 3/iiv.sxi cJ-nisIqjJioo laiilslno 3'1:"»-ljfllBl^ .noaeoXa 

"?;:ti©qoiq Bdi nx -^jjiirps »jci.+ salEBjioiJJti *^o eifoiiapb e^ew esnXbrtsH 

fjnooP8 9di 36 XX ow a;^ ^ogBOlrf::^ ^J-seid-a ol^scJ-fiO ;J2b^ ^•^S *a 

^X cj-acajj/i no J-iBil;f |-Yd"^»qoiq &lee ^J-ehIasb sniftnr.cfscfiK) ssa8;Jior(r 

Jaon ^fTcaaoXC A isifooR rf::fxw ;toBidnoo a o;tnl bsTSCfno -^sricJ- ^^^^X 

ericf xtf fi©lxlo9qe sciad- noqu ^cflrps 5ns sgisgd-iora fccoosa fclse I0 

•ri:f rfol.d\Y xToW.sioqioO oli&iaQ d-asK ^•^<^ lo smsci 93fii al Jbeasria 

xiiijcf nl nossoXa & leafooH d-^itt tesinsgio oi byEoqoiq a^flXbiBH 

^aasaXsa ©d-ecJ-as X„60i £ ^'tlidiiljaXq rfdiw doiSMitfloo & odnl bsisdxts 


whereby they agreed to pay him one-half of the $5,000 commi&sion 
after they had received same, if Daviess performed all the ser- 
vices necessary to consuniLiate the purchase for the Hardings of 
the second mortgage and equity on the terms specified) that plain- 
tiff did perform such services, purchased the second mortgage and 
equity in behalf of the Hardings who advanced the purchase price 
for same and that plaintiff caused the second mortgage to fee 
assigned and the equity transferred and conveyed to the 247 East 
Ontario Corporationj that the contracts between plaintiff and 
Hookar & Slosson and between the latter and the Hardings were 
fully performed on the part of both plaintiff and Hooker iz Slosson. 
prior to November 1, 1937 at which time Hooker & Slosson rendered 
a statement for their $5,000 brokerage fee to the Hardings, which 
the latter have failed and refused to payj that although plaintiff 
has made repeated demands upon Hooker & Slosson to institute suit 
against the Hardings to recover the $5,000 commission due them. 
Hooker & Slosson have failed and refused to do soj that one-half 
of said $5,000 conEEission due and owing to Hooker & Slosson is in 
equity due and owing to plaintiff. The complaint concluded with 
the specific prayer that the Hardings "shall be decreed to pay 
the said sum of $5,000, together with interest thereon from 
November 1, 1937 and tim.t one -half of said sum shall be paid 
directly to John P, Hooker and Frank S, Slosson, doing business 
as Hooker & Slosson, and one-half of said sum shall be paid 
directly to plaintiff." The amended complaint also prayed for 
general equitable relief. As heretofore stated defendants* 
motion to strike che amended complaint was allowed. 

Plaintiff's theory^ as stated in his brief, is that "the 
promise of Hooker & Slosson, real estate brokers, to pay to the 
plaintiff one-half of the commission Hooker & Slosson were to 
receive from James P. Harding, John P. Harding, Harding Hotels, 
Inc., and 247 East Ontario Corporation, is an enforceable agree- 



' . 

:-_.' 'j.'".4U.^* v- 

f>91??f»i^'~ ' 




■'^ i r-l.^. 

■. r' 

•■■ r'-,r 


irriilh :'■-.!■.':• rboltlosqe jbeisJ- ©d!;t no xilispfj Jbnfi ©ass^rfom frnoses sri^f 

•i;" '■ v;i;r!:{-'rot^' ,?-finr'^f^ ;: ' ' _. . -^_ -:.™. ^ fvi8f?s rrol 

' T%U--'i' ■■'■■■ ■■ '■ ■ - 

-■=^3.«j©2{oicr 000 ^^$ ile^i 101 iasBLQiBiB b 

'.'.:■ -iji. liOiKaiiaoeo 000 1^$ fciae lo 
ji;^.Y j-;.«j..' / 'tij-niisXq o^ ^Iwu bn& 9Sib xiXiip9 

bl ■' "' ■ l«r-~£ifo otM ^^osBoXcs i> isjiooy 8B 

lo'i i:sx.=-*xq oal^ ^xii^Li^iici iic^jiiaffiB sfl'i: "»lli;falBlq oi- %LioS)ti.b 

9sii oi x&c, uj- ,a-..'j-^:o ^njesr.r -[oon lo oeiiiaonq 

^2l9;;toH gcl&iBH ^gnXfe-isH ,<il JSflot ^axiil- . acntijl- so il .avisos i 


mentj" that "since Hooker & Slosson have neglected to Institute 
suit upon the claim, plaintiff is entitled to relief in equity 
as a partial assignee;" and that "the court erred in dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint foi- want of equity," 

The position of the Hardings is that "the amended complaint 
of the plaintiff stated no cause of action against the deffsnd- 
anta;" and that "the alleged promise of Hooker & Slosson to pay 
t© the plaintiff one-half of the commissions they might receive 
from the defendants was but a mere personal agreement, and did 
not constitute an equitable assignment ©f any claim of Hooker & 
Slosson against the defendants," 

Plaintiff asserts: "Defendants, Hardings, contracted with 
Hooker & Slosson, brokers, to pay them $5*000 coBmiissioa for cer- 
tain services as brokers. Plaintiff, a licensed real estate sales- 
man, performed all of the said services under an agreement with 
Hooker & Slosson, whereby the latter undertook to pay plaintiff 
one-half of the $5*000 when received, ' Plaintiff has performed 
all of said services and his right cannot be defeated because 
Hooker & Slosson have declined to sue the other defendants," 

The defendants, Hardings, urge that "the alleged promise 
of Hooker & Slosson to pay the plaintiff one-half of the commis- 
sion, to be paid by the defendant when earned, did not constitute 
an equitable assignment of any portion of the claim of Hooker & 
Slosson for such commission, but was laerely a personal agree- 
ment between the plaintiff and Hooker & Slosson," 

The only question presented for determination is whether 
the agreement between olaintlff and Hooker & Slosson amounted to 
an equitable assignment of one-half of Hooker & Slosson* s claim 
against the Hardings or whether it merely created the relationship 
of creditor and debtor between plaintiff and Hooker & Slosson 
when the latter collects the $5,000 comiiiission from the Hardings, 

111 Wyman v> Snvder, 112 Ill» 99, where the facts were 


Biij^lf&at oi be:fot>L^f>a sv&rf aos,MoIB A 'xeafooH eonie'' isdi "{iaem 

".•^;fJ:iip» 1o :tni5w 'ict int&lqmoo a ' lll^iilslq 

X£^ 0* itOEBoXE jl. 1S2I00H lo «>aJaso^q bssslla sfii" ^jsri;j- Jkis "ja^Jne 

©v^eosa d'dgici x^rf^ snoxRalMiaoa wW to lleri-exio lli:ffllslq srl^t oi 

bib has ^iOBm.B&'xs^ Isnoaiftg ©Tiea b d-Jtrd a«w Einsfeaslel) ©ri;J moil 

:5 '^^loo'il to ffiljslo 1E«« lo' :tnsBfii3lRS6 6X€fB«tiup« cLc Biisil&enoo ion 

.':tiw SsisBi^noo ^S33c:i:.5ifiE ^acfnefenelsQ" tdJtczBB lllJaiBl'i 
-isfi M>1 ffltoig-eJflsasos 000,^$ serii -^sq od tai9:iIoicf ^noesolci A lealooH 
^^ ;?aasDiX s ,^liiflisIS{ .sia^oadLes afiaxvies nijii;- 

.. itaRfffQ*:! • Dise afiJ" to lis beiaiolieq ^OAin 

VtliiL: -AooiiBbciu tGi:fBl Bd:f •^cfsisxlw ^no8 3oX8 A isjfooH 

feesTiolisq asfi lllJxiijBl'l ' ,b«vl©9©^ fisrlw 000 ^^$ ©rici- lo IXfiri-stno 
9ei/6Q9cr I)sJ-e»'ie& s*cf .to'tfiijsD Wgli airf f)fLti aeolvisa Msa lo XXb 
" . a;Jxisfiifisl»6 tmiC. . iif^niXosf) ©Tad iioeaoXa ^ 'laiooH 

f!>Riffiorrq fc©s'?^.r.r« arii'" ;tjsrld- ogix; ^83ixX£>isH ^sd-flsfxneleb sriT 
-•aXiiifiBO^ . - . .ari-sno 'itl;'-aJtflXq ©/.{j- xsq o:^ aoaaoXS & -xeifooH lo 

s^jt/J'XcJ'anoo ;tQfi bXJb ^b'^ni/se nerfw .tnefenel^^ b exlcf ^d" feisq 9<S oi ^aols 
& iG^: ; ; ctnsEttt^Xaas sXcfsd'ljjp© as 

*-fsj»'S3a XaKO«:!i . 'isfli aB ,^ rjigelaraoo di«&8 tol noasoli 

",flosaoX8 t* T^?[ooR boB lliunlslv. ericf f!©»wJ-£cf :tn»ar 
i©ri;t9riw sX £K)i?s/i.fcirr«d't- oiaea&iq aoXd-e©i;p xlao si-l' 

aJteXo a'lxos?.- . .u-<5no la iaemaglsBB Bldi^ilnps as 

qldznoii&Xoi ©if,t fasiBs'io xXei: i, .. ■.rorlJ'sxlw no a^lb-xsh ari^ d-anx«a6 

floaaoXS A leifooH M-y 'i-tldaXsX.i iiso»;cf^'Ci loidob fcna no;tlbeio lo 

practically identical with the facts here, it was held that if 
there was simply a personal undertaking on the part of the original 
broker to pay the sub-broker or salesman ©ne-half of the commission 
said original broker collected on the transaction such an agreement 
was insufficient to constitute an equitable assignment of one-half 
of such eomcdssion. The Wyman case holds squarely tliat such an 
agreement as the plaintiff herein made with Hooker & Slosson that 
they would pay him ©ne-half of the $5^,000 commission when they re- 
ceived or collected same does not operate as an equitable assign- 
ment of that portion of the commission which they merely personally 
agreed to pay hia« 

An equitable aKsignment is such an assignment as gives the 
assignee a title which, though not cognizable at law, equity will 
recognize and protect. To constitute an equitable assignment there 
must be an actual appropriation of the fund, or of some designated 
part, portion or pep cent of it. ( Story v. Hull « 143 111* 506.) In 
the Story case the coia-t said at p* 512. • 

"Appellant wholly ignores the distinction, which is clearly 
pointed out in W yman Vt Snyder ^ 112 111, 99, and also in Trist v« 
Child f 21 Wall, 4-41, between an actual assignment cf a part of a 
debt or claim or fund, and a mere promise or agreement to pay a 
part of such debt or claim when collected or recovered, or pay 
out of such fund«" 

iJi Hibernian Banking Ass' n v. Davis , 295 111* 537, where 

the question of what constituted an equitable assignment was pre-* 

sented, the court said at p* 54-5 « 

"Counsel, however, lose sight of the difference between an 
actual assignment or appropriation of the fund and a mere promise 
or agreement to pay out of a certain fund when it shall be 
collected or recovered. It is only where there is an actual 
appPopriatioa of the fund that an equitable assignment arises* 
It does not arise from a promise to pay out of a certain fund 
when such shall be created, S^orv v. Hull. 143 111* 506; Qm^VQTi . 
v. Boeger . 200 111* 84, « 

(To the same effect are Farmers State Bank v- Kidd^ 313 111, App, 

132j Bell & Howell Co« v. Spoor. 22? Ill, App, 2^6',_Fjie^m^ v, — 

Equitable Life Ass urance Society, 304 111* App. 5^7i Armstrong 

XjBnlgl: :ij*<i ad^ ao sfiJU^c^Tcbmr Icaceistq s ^Xqmls saw etsri:^ 

'sd-^Bii lo JxisaiasJicEii alGfjsllujp© ilia ©cfjjd^lJ^enoo od- ^«ft±©i:'t.lx;8iii: a«ir 

"-^^Xsae aX464;lJ;(^« ae ^ e;iv«a«QO ^Ois a:&9tr mk^ fes^oelXos to bsrviso 
^XXaaoB'i^q; \;is^©ffl: ^Sil^ doJUlw noissXiiattoo «if;f 1© ac3ii;^io^ iodt to &nem 

3XX(g ♦<! ^s £>ifla :fiiroo arid- »8s» T'ZQC^e «i» 
■^XiB^Xo P.X ffoMw .£toXJ"afllisil> sxid^ a^iGH^l xXXorfvr d-flsXXeqgA" 

jiX-HiS^^i^-fc os-t^ ^^' /"^ '-Eii SIX *:^-::r:' ." ~'r-l ~'- "'-" --'--■- 

Yaq 'XO ^ ai lO- . . ". :Io io .-< :3 lo J-Tsq 

V,oi-ij.:;!: rioue 1© lno 

•"Oiq as¥r jxtsicn^is^a sXcfsiiifpe us fy&^i^Stijzaov t&iiw to noictasi/p erij 

■) s lo Jjjo \;s<i ^'^ ji'i'- IO 

Xf : . -fe il .bsiftVGOSi ^o :)0 

.sf.s.t'i.- ■: 6aul QcU^ lo isoi.^ is 

r^ii/i li.' ■•.J B E9t:1 ©aiiB &v:. fl 

.iifiSSiSEfi l^^-' ^ ,v..-. .... . ■ ' ;> '^o' IXiiXis -J"f 

..-,■. .1X1 OOS ^.^ . . ^ 

,qqA ,1X1 EJ-t ^, . , / -jliiB^' ^4iP^^ '-•■ ... ^"^^ toells eiaae ©licJ- o¥]h 

»'^ ^m^^'t^ ^^^^ •^<^ » i^" n xooi^ j^ ^v ^qO Xj:»woH ab XXag jS£X 

fi^t^n^aaiA j'^X)^ .ciq^: ,XXI M)£ ^^eXooS goiiflijydCA ell J sXcfBCflxypg 


y. Zoonis. 304 111, App. 537J 

In support of his position that his agreement with Hooker 
& Slosson did constitute an equitable assignment of one-half of 
the $5,000 comifdssion plaintiff relies principally upon L awis r^ 
Braunp 356 111* A4>7t The facts in tlmt case are not comrjara'dle 
to the facts here. Thep© the court held that the facts were 
such as to establish an equitable assignment. Here no facts 
ape alleged other than the mere personal promise of Hooker & 
Slosson to pay plaintiff $2,^00 out of their $5,000 commission 
when they collected same from the Hardings, 

Plaintiff also cites Schwartz v> Tudrman,. 232 Fich. 345, 
That case is not in point. There a partial assignment ^-^as 
admittedly made and the only question was whether it ?/as enforce- 
able without the debtor's assent. 

Under the established law of this state plaintiff's agree- 
ment with Hooker & Slosson did not operate as an equitable assign- 
ment of a portion of the debt due from the hardings to Hooker & 
Slosson but merely obligated Hooker & Slosson to pay plaintiff 
one-half of the $5,000 coicsaission when they collected it, / 

Under the facts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint 
the Hardings are clearly obligated to pay Hooker & Slosson a 
eoionission of $5,000 and have been since Novamber 1, 1937« 
Hooker & Slosson are obligated to pay plaintiff one-half of said 
$5,000 when they receive same. The Hardings have persisted in 
th^ir refusal to pay the $5,000 comioission to Hooker & Slosson, 
and Hooker & Slosson have just as persistently rsfusec? to compel 
the payment of same through appropriate legal procGedings. It 
does not appear why Hooker & Slosson have not instituted legal 
proceedings to collect the $5,000 commission from the Hardings 

who are unquestionably solvent. If plaintiff had alleged in his 
complaint facts which showed op tended to show that Hooker & Slosson 

si*w a^Dfil eif.-^ :t)ajFt;t blsd ftmo. ©xU aiteriT .9i»£l a;to«l ©ri;t o;* 
£io±e8±E!ffloo OQO^^I it&tl:f It© .^£10 OO'^^SJ^ tlid-alfJc- x&q. ot ftoeeol?. 

--aglBaB BldBtiisps &a a« ©d'a'j®q» ton bib ^o»acXo & teafooH ri^Xw izism 

ll'Xrhsi^'vj:" ^G^l'oi Hossol? * ^©jfooB b^J'sgiXo'o ifXs'isffi c^ira aoaeoXS 
. uSalXoi . ♦riw noXeaJteffltoo 000 ,?C- s£f^ 'So IXfiil-siao 

,^£v t > 'jfifi OOO^lJl! "^o rrolselfflHOO 

Mbs Ito IXari-'Bao llXtwXsXq xaq o:i fee^tsglXo'c ©ic floegoXci A nsiooK 

fli l>s»5£i£-ioq yYari egjsiJeisH oriT •setae eyXeosi -^s^;^ rtsrfw 000,^$ 

Io<i/c-/t :v' *;•? ?::.'! ■'••:; vIc^tl'-':'^!: .:':.ii/f; eT/sri n^aaoX^ ■& i^iiooli ba& 

.... ,-..,- ^ --'■■^ ....^.„. -.„..-.,/:.•.,. ^. risifoiffcf ©a[£8 lo ir,'^s[%&L Brli 

Ifi^eX 6?';ti^i.t3fli .ton -^vsii nosaoXR ;?■ isaiboH y^ i&dqqp. Soa Z9ob 

R-)rr ^n•■rr.:TT '.rT.l psO't"'- ffo *'"'*> f'l.Tff^-n'' r;'",A ^T'-'J? e>(J-; .i^eiToS 0;t R§fl£fca&0O't£q 

noaeoXE & tr»3fooK ctarii vQde oct f)ebn»:t to fc^wods ifoixiw 8;fo3l itnlaXoaoo 

li&(2 failed and refused to sue the Hardings because of connivance 
or collusion between the former and the latter, an entirely dif- 
ferent question would have been presented. 

We are forced to hold that since the agreement betwes2i 
plaintiff and Hooker &: Slosson did not operate as an equitable 
assignment of one-half of the coias-dssion due Hooker & Slosson 
from the Hardings, no liability can be imposed upon the latter 
under the complaint filed in this proceeding*. 

Ho question was raised in this case as to whether or n©t 
Hooker^/ Slosson are directly liable to plaintiff* 

For the reasons stated herein the order and decree of 

the Circuit court of Cook county are affirmed, 


I^^iend and Scanlan, JJ», concur* 

'J J.-. -., r., -. 


^vB^a&is^&iq a^ed svmi felxrow xiojufsewp ^xi©^©! 
;iTs:j'.iST^.- ari;t eoxLte J-iuiJ- JbXorf o;t JbeOTol sua &r 

'ia esToab feije loi^'ro ©£[it xiis^eii b&isi^s zjio&q9i sii& 10'^. 

tb^nnx'-Ja bib x^txsuoo 3I00O lo Sixioo ;ljLuoiJtO sric? 

4fiuoco© 4i*T.T, ^^ritjijisoa 5jub Jbnelo:^ 


Begun and hold at Ottawa, on Tuesday, the 5th day ox"" Hay, In 
the year of our Lord ono thousand nine hurtlred and forty- txvo 
within and for the Second District or the State of Illinois: 

Present — The Hon. BLAINE HUFPMAI^, Presiding Justice 
Hon. PRAM 11.1 NR. DOVE, Justice 
Hon. FRED G. V/OLPS Justice 
E. J. WELTSR, Sheriff 
JUSTUS L. JOHNSON, Olerlc 3 1 6 I.Aa 306 

BE IT KEJlSMBSilSD-, that aftei-^arde, to-^lt: On Septe^iber 17, 
19^2, the Opinion of the Govrt v:&s filf:;d in the Clerk's Office 
Of said Court in the v/ord.s and fi2:ui:*es following:, vizi 

GEN. NO. 9798 

A&ENDA NO. 20 



May Term, 1942 

316I.A. 3 06 

a corporation, 


EUGENE L. FRUM, et al 

COMPANY, a corporation, 

a corporation, et al. 

Treasurer, etc., et al., 



KUENZEL & FRYE, a corDoratlon, 
Appellant . 

DOVE, J.: 

02 .OM Aatir-^-DA 

seTe .OH .Ma 

SET 511 
eiOSlIJJI 10 THUOO 'dTAddl<lHA 

ToiHTsia Qiiooae 

T" ^K 

^ ol~i» 

S^'CI tRTfeT ^bM 

Man's X4a?iA 

-50 THUOO TlUOfilO 

,YMA^-^O0 YJqWe 3H0MT^3 

.la ^re ,MUH'? .J awaou 

,nolJ?TocrTOo a .YUA'IMC 

^YIIAq.MOO YJiWe 5«aOMT83 
.1.3 *9 .noiJBioqioo 

\:inuoO .iHSaoWUOY .H H3TJA 

,nol:f3TOa"roo h /3IH'i A J3SK3U 

: . L , 3V0i 

This case Involves the question of the right of aprellant, 
assignee of a lease, to remove certain equipment placed In the 
leased premises by It and the lessees, under the terms of a 
lease executed by receivers aopointed by the court In a pending 

The question arose in a suit instituted by Westmore Buoply 
Company In the circuit court of Du Page County to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien on certain premises in the Village of Villa Park, 
improved with a building constructed for use as a theatre, garage 
and other business ourooses. In that suit the Chicago Title and 
Trust Company filed a cross-bill to foreclose a trust deed. In 
January, 1928, the court appointed the Chicago Title and Trust 
Company and Chester R. Davis receivers of the premises and author- 
ized them to rent or lease the r^remlses. 

The receivers, on Sentember 1, 193-5, and annually thereafter 
until August ?1, 1938, leased the ^remises to E. W. Kuenzel and 
W. F. Frye, oartners doing business as Kuenzel & Frye . On July 
28, 1938, a three year lease beginning August 31, 1938 and expir- 
ing August 31, 1941 •w?.s entered into with the approval of the court. 
On June 23, 1939, with the lessor's assent, the lease was assigned 
to Kuenzel & Frye, the appellant corTDcrstion. The lease i-rovides 
that the covenants and agreements therein shall be binding unon, 
apply and inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the 
parties thereto, and that the lessor shall have the privilege of 
oanoellation at any time by giving sixty days' notice to quit. The 
sixth clause thereof provides: "Thct lessee shall not attach, affix 
or exhibit ♦» « * any articles of permanent char'^icter to any window, 
floor, ceiling, door or wall in any place in or about said premises, 


fSnBlLeyc- Jo iJriglT sri;! 1o nolJasup srii ssvlovnl ©sro alxlT 
sriJ ni 59oeIcf Jnsmqltjps nlB^tso svomsi o^ , easel e "^o s^ngips 
fi lo acmsJ 9ri.t isbnv ,899^891 <?riJ fcne ti xd f^eeloneia bsaaa 
gnlbngq js njt Jiuoo sriJ ^^^ Bs^tnloqcfi 8T9Vl909i ■'tc? csJuosxs eafis 

X-^ciauB 9T0ir:fP9W YCf beJjJCf l;fenl Jitr^ z nl eaote aoIJ^eup srlT 

s ©BoIo&TOl 0.1 Y^nw^O 95a'? ill lo cftuoo Jiuoiio 9fiJ fit ^neqmo 

,3iT«^ ailiV to s'gBlll'V 9riJ njt fgeslmsfrr nisitTSo no nsll 'aoinedoe 

9gi3'x,-"e (StctRerirf >; sjs e^u tot fcecfoinJanoo -gnlbllisti s ri;Jiw Bgvotqir 

afiB 9lJiT os«oiriO 9ri>t ilU!3 J£jrl? nl .■Dseocrruo saenlpccf tsd^o 5r 

nl .b'^eb i^.u-^J b ssolosiol oi i I Id -an 010 e fesillt YneqmoD inut 

a^atJtT Bne 9lJiT osROiriO erii Bsi'flioaaB ^fiioo 9fi:f ,8291 ^xnaucip. 

-loxlitwe ofiB aeaimsTq sriJ to sTevisosi nlvaQ .H ToJagriO JbftB ^Hflqajo 

.a9al£D9T7 9ilJ 93B9.E TO ^tnsT oJ mad? bes 

*T9d"*i.B9T9riit xl.l.auc'.nn bna. ,f-5PI ,1 T9cfnieJc98 no ,R'ievi9oe^ edT 

,5n:.? Ig.snsjjX .W .3 o;t '^e5lin9icr siii bo^.&fil ,80^?! ,15 Ssu-guA Ilcfn 

TClwl, nO .©Y.I'? * les.neuy. «5s aaanlsud sniq^ aisnctiAo ,8^1,1 .'• . 

-ilqxe &£be 8£eX ,I!l iJ?.L§iiA sninnigecf 9=1391 tP'-x 9eTri} r ,85GI ,-- 

.Jti^oo eiij lo Ii«TO«iqq/i eriJ rlJlw oJnJ: bgtsJn? apw li^.ex ,IS J8iJ:4i»A gn 

b9ngl33«; asw gRs*^! Qcii ,:fn9si8s s '10339I 9£lcf riJ£w ,?^?',0I .SS 9ni;L n 

aaclvOio 9asel 9riT noUp/roqioo J'n^IIgacB 9riJ , e^-t*? i& IssnsxjX o 

,noqu gnlbnid 9d Ilarfq nleigfU ?,Jn©rredT§a fcne. sJnjsnsvoo 9ri;t i'Bri 

9ri? ::o anglaai. bns eios^sooije sd.t lo ^Titsned 9ri:f oj STunl fina '^Iqq 

"io asellvltq eriJ svari IIpxIr lojjggl sri^ i&dS bns ,oi?^i&cii aeliiB 

ofiT .:}Ilio oj soliton 'a-^& x-^^^j'^ gn^vlji xd 9fnlJ ^ns ;Jfi no^JsIIsona 

xl"i"iB ,rio3.^-:f':' Jon ILerie! 99939I J^rfT** :3951vorta "ioeigriJ eauBlo dixl 

,wo5nlw ijnR ocf TocfosTsrio Jn^nscDiaq lo gsloi* 'dirlxs i 

,3 9sim9'T-^ 'biaa 3-yods -to ni 90?>.Iq Y-Tb nl Haw to ioo5 ,gniIJt9o ,iool 

or upon any of the appurtenances thereof; * ■«• * and shall mske no 
changes or alterations In the premises by the erection of partitions 
or the papering of wells, or otherwise, without in each case, the 
consent in writing of lessor fi^st had thereto; that all the erec- 
tions, additions, fixtures and imnroverrents , whether temporary or 
permanent In character (except only the Tiovable trade and/or office 
furniture of lessee), made in or uioon said premises, either by the 
lessee or the lessor, shall be the lessor's property, end shall 
remain upon said premises at the terndlnation cf the term hereof by 
lapse of time or otherwise, without compensation therefor to the 
lessee." Pider "A" attached to the lease provides: "That the lessee 
shall entirely et '^ds own cost and expense during the term hereof, do 
all decorating. Installing, repairing, replacing and adjusting on the 
interior and exterior of the demised premises, including boiler and 
roof, necesBRry for p,ny reason whatsoever. That any and all installa- 
tions made in the demised premises, as a result of the work to be done 
by the Lessee as hereinbefore specified, shall, as of the elate of such 
installation, become a part of the real estate and the procerty of the 
Lessors, and shall remain in the demised premises at the expiration of 
this lease by laose of time or otherwise." The lease also contained 
the following provision: "In addition to the Lessee's obligations under 
this lease and Rider "A" hereto attached, Lessee shall, to the reason- 
able satlsfsction of Lessor, ccmclete the following work on or before 
October 31, 1953: - 1 - Make the necessary reoairs to roof. 2- install 
a new hot water storage tank. In the event Lessee fails to comely 
with the previsions of this paragraph, the Lessor shall have the right 
to complete this work and charge the cost thereof to the Lessee. The 
eaid cost shall become as additional rent for the month following the 
completion of the said work by the Lessor and shall be payable to the 
Lessor uoon demand." 


on ejLsffl XIf- [to^tBdi aaonBnsiJiuqqfl eri^ "io t' 

snoi:t f Jt.p,-.-r "io no.tjos'i9 sriu x;<J eseirasiq sriJ nl snoi:t3T9JI.£ -r---) sagaarl 

9ri:r ,93.iio xloiis nl ?uorivtiw 49sIW'ieflJo lo ^<^v "io snJttaqaq srW i 

9di xd teriJis ,39aiaisiq Jbisa noqw to ni sbBUs ,(9©58sl to stu^Jlniij 

.riBris I^n« ,\'i' a*T0339l sri^ 9cf Ilfirfs ,iORa9l sriJ to asaae 

i^cf 103"^ -^ri ;T"^9;t oiij '10 nolitfiniime^ ariJ ;ta as ; oiQB noqu nxBcne 

9x1;? oj ^ol^^ediJ noliJaansqajoo JuoriJlw .eaiw^ioii^o to sitIj to seqa 

99'»ssl '?ricf ;JB£iT" :a96ivoTq '^^p.^I erfJ oj bsrioaJS'a 

t? • 


9ri;t no gnioaiit^'ja £)nj3 snloBlqet ^sniilBasi ,snlIlBJt8nl ^gniJsioosb II 

feflB leliocf ^nlDUIohi .asalmeiq bsalmsb nrf* lo toiTgJxe fins lolis^tn 

-BlI.t>.;j3rT.t LLn kne Y^ns ^srlT .•T9V9oa;Jaxlw no3B9t -^ns tol ■^iBaa909n ^loo 

©no6 ■^ ^riJ to cfluoai b sjp ,s98l(E9iq bssi/r.efe 9fl;t nJt gfesm anoi 

rioijg to e.ic Oil..' ,£)9itl09q3 giotednie'^: ^sptaeJ eriJ ^t 

ef[:f tc t;J i^r.A iJijisQ Ibsi eriJ "io :f'iBq b soicoacf .noItfelleJar 

"io CIO- t Js aseimeiq fessimeb sAi nt nlamei IlBrie bne .eioase 

benlBar os^sl sriT " .9siwt9ri;fo to smli to 98aBl yd aaBsI aid 

igbnij ef la,:- a'99a83J sffiJ ocf no*^lDDB fli' moiaivOTa gnlwollot 9r 

-no3B9^ , IlBrie 99839J ^bedofiHB oistsd "A" tsbir bne 98B9I a' 

g-fotec^ 'f ow anlwollot sri* site: :o noIJoBlali'aa die 

IlfioBn: ailsqsi -^iBsssosn sdi tiiiiM - - :6S>'."I ,IS •i9do:fc 

yI inioo :.'j elxBt 99as9j *n9V9 ariJ >^i>-T0J3 isiJfiw Jorl W9n 

Jrigi'i aqeT^i-i ^ anolalvoT'^ ;?J 

Bri'x ■.; 'loo'-iariu iaoc si-iit o-g'szLi. ■ -^iiiS aJeiqicDO c 

QriJ a.jl. tncai 9riJ lol inst l&aoiitbbB a£ sinoovO Ilpria ^aoo bit 

erlJ oJ clc'.Ji'stiiq scf Ilaria .5nB rtoeasJ 9ii1 vd Xtow bisa saJ to nol^falqmc 

'• . bnsmeb noau losas 


There \ieve no seats In the theatre portion of the building. 
Some time after the lease was made, Mr. Kuenzel, one of the lessees, 
went to the Chicago Title and Trust Company and asked permisBion to 
put a roller skating floor in that part of the building. Mr. Bell, 
of that Company, told him to come back later and they would let him 
know. Upon his return Mr. Bell told him: "You go in and put in that 
floor and take it out any time." Construction of the floor was begun 
In the latter nort of May, 1939, and finished a month later. This 
floor is about 60 x 90 feet, a small soace being left on each side to 
allow for exoansion. The skating surface is nailed to ahiplap laid 
on 2"xl0" floor joists resting on 8''x8" stringers suooorted on 6"x6" 
poets resting on the concrete floor and cut in various lengths to ac- 
oomraodiate the slant in the concrete floor. The shiplar) was brought 
to the level of the stage, the finished floor was carried over the 
rough stage boards, and the skating area includes the stage. Other 
than where the finished flooring is nailed to the stage floor, no part 
of the roller skating floor or the structure suonortlng it is nailed 
[or attached to the building in any way. 

Appellant also Installed a Hercules hot vjater boiler to heat the 

garage. It was used about three months in 1939. At the time of the 

■hearing it was not in use or connected in any way, but sat uoon the 

basement floor. A V/hiting stoker, not attached to the building, but set 

Into the boiler was used for heating the main oart of the building and 

a coal fired hot water heater was used for the acartments upstairs and 

the beauty parlor on the first floor. A Modine blower unit toheat the 

jskatlng rink, and toilets in the ladies' and the mens' rest room were 


[also put in by the lessees or by appellant. 


.r^..-^ - ... «. - . - :^ nol:iioa sTCfssri-l eriJ nl aifsaa on stow siarIT 
,8388 391 edi 1o eao ^Lssneul .tK ,3Jb£cn a£5W sajsal acii t^its 9mli ^, 

,lle'! -' ■ .^nlfillticf 0ri:t ^o Sisq Jsriit nJt looll snx;fj83tE isIIot e 

■ trf-^ .^.jow y.6ri;J £>nj8 isjJbI jfoacf omoo o:t mlri 6IoJ ,^n«qinoD J«fl- 

Jfin>. .. • i""^- "^ f- '"•••■•- t."->v'. :miri 5Io;J LL'iS .iK nnu^Hi «»irl noqU .wi 

nugsd - . .„. ,. : ;, JjojJtiJBnoD ".emij vn^ ;t£;o ^i s^bJ fina 10 

8lr<T '^w.-tor ri^noffi e Bexlainil fine ,G5CI ,^:fiM lo Ji^ii tsJJfll 9di 

o;i Bbl, .i.c.. .lo 3^91 gfiiad soeqR IIj&iT'a fi ,;tfle1t OG r 09 .toocfs ai lO' 

bi?^l crasXqlria oJ BQller, al soe'^ixjb gnlJ<?:^a srfT .noianpaxs -lO^ wo 

•'5x"6 "'- r--^i'''Oo,qsj3 aiegnirrJa "ex"© no gnltseT «Jelot tooX^ "OXx'S 

-OR oi .....Z siJOltAT nt iiso htiB tool'^ sJetonoo arfj no gnl^fasT aJi 

(frigiJOTCf eew qslqlda ariT .tooXI Bisionoo eriJ nX ;Jn.eXa ecii 0i£Sbom\ 

srirf T9V0 bsiiiflo aj8w looXl JbsriaXnil driJ ,egf<Je 9ri:f lo XaveX sri* 

"i'^'f"''" B^ia arid- asbi/XonX usi* anllisafa etii bne. ,af)ieod sgiscfa xlgj 

Jisq o.> ''i'^r 9S£:ra 9£l;t oi b9£tsn eX smXtcoX't bsriaXfiXl erii eieriw nj 

^■^•'^. rf-- ~r, t+.-^'^.-rrnr. r, ., n^ n !_;-( S d siH to looll gnXJcjfa taXXoi 9X1^ 

."^^iiw- x^B nl ^nXbXIud eriJ o;J fierloB^fJfi 

9dj XXoo' "n^iA'A jod seXttoisH b t}eLls.3nal ohLs. JnaXXaqqA 

9r::. , ;..l- ^ricT cfA . GSeX ai sri^fnosn eetriit ivod» fessw bbw tl .ass* 

9ri;f nocrt! iJ*^?? iud ,^iF.w x«^= nX £>9Jo$nnoc to e^u nl ion f3fiw il gnXij 

^•9^ d'wd .giiXoXiiJC' sxij oJ ^sdoQcT^Js >Jon .'i^aCoJa ■gnX^lriV A .tooXl d'naffisi 

Jbns -gatbltuti sriJ to utac nXsm odi gnXJjei^fi toI dsbw 3bw T°XXod sri* o; 

Bne BTXeJ'aqu sin&^iiAq& Qdi toI dqru asw TSitaori t»Jqw Jori fiatXl Xboj 

9ri;t Je;'/rlo;J ;tinu tswoXd snr'.'^s' t .looX'i ;f ai tl sriJ no toX'r^!^ ■\jJLj?9d ^ 

ci'^'^iw iTi-n-i'Y +.=!«>•-!• '-ins^.T -^Hj .?9X.5flX srlJ. al aisLloi bna. ,j{.rtti gnX.. 

. trt ". I [■; '0 "' vd TO a5^9^P«r ;^n',t /d i'i o'mor 0« 


On June 13, 1941, Walter R. Youngberg, County Treasurer and 
Ex-officio Collector, was apiDolnted receivea:' of the oreraises for 
the purpoee of collecting over 112,000.00 delinquent taxes, and 
the former receivers were discharged. On August 18th of that 
year, on motion of the successor receiver, he was authorized to 
enter into a lease with ap-oellant, expiring June 30, 1944, and 
to insert therein such provisions, covering, among other things, 
removal of articles installed by the tenant, as the receiver 
might deem necessary or exoedient for the proper protection of 
the property. Pursuant to the order, a lease was executed, provid- 
ing that the skating rink floor and the other equipment mentioned 
might be rcT.oved by the lessee at any time during the term of the 
lease, provided, the oremifiss were returned to the condition which 
obtained before the equipment was installed. On September 19, 1941, 
the court entered an order vacating the order of August 18th. 

On October 3, 1941, the receiver filed a petition, reciting 
that the equipment was claimed by arcellant, that other parties 
claimed such equipment is part of the reel estate ??nd that spr^ellqnt 
was willing to enter into a lease with the right to remove the equip- 
ment at its termination. The petition orayed that the court determine 
the ownership and character of the e:.:uiT:raent, and authorize the pro- 
posed lease to apoellant, or a lease to ^ome other tenant. Appellant 
filed a crosR-cetition alleging it notifie'i the former receiverp that 
they, contemplated installing puch equipment as would m.ske the theatre 
portion of the building usable as a skating rink snci that they consider- 
ed such equipment would be trade fixturP!-:! removable at the end of the 
term and that the receivers ag-^eed thereto. The cross-r)'-~)titlon alleged 
that the equipment can be removed without ihjury to the premises and 


Tol p,3a-t.Ti9T:a 9fl;J "lo "^svieoot .&a;Jnloqr-[ ,'TOooeIfoD olo'i^lo- 

^aexB* Jnswpnllsfj 00.000,SX^ tevo gniJoalloo lo saorntua 9 

Si^rij lo riJ8.£ JauguA nO .be^iBdcalb aiew atevisosi TSinol s 

oj 59sX'ToriJ't/B sffiw 9il j-^ovisoQi t03R9ooue 9rU iO ncIJocn no ,'x« 

5fi.:. oe snut, gniTiqxe jCfnsIIscrqa riJlw ©ssel a oSnl fa^i 

,8?^niii;J tsrijo :^aonia ,sfi/.tsvoo ^snoiglvoiq rioi/s nlsieri;! ^Tseni 

levlooe'x sriJ a.R ,cfnsne^ BriJ xcf tsLLBiistil •'sIoIjt^; to lavoni 

lo nolctosoOTa 190:010 sricf 10I JnalJbsqxe 10 Yisansosn ffi99i> Jrlg 

-6ivoT0 ,h«;twosxo r*^w 98391 s .igb-^o sriJ oj ;fn£iii?;iy^ ."yiJisqoiq 9 

ban.. . Jn9fl5qi.up9 isrl^o eriJ ftfls "jooIT: 3fnii gnliJsTia exli isdi g 

arid- to SW0j 9di -^aitub emli ^ns Js eeaael sriit ycJ fisvocei ad ;txl§ 

riofn bfloo sri* 01? bBtnuiQt siew asaimgiq srtf ,59&Jtvoiq ,a8ja 

,,pr isdmojos"? nO .caii:Q.J3njt se.\': (JngaiqlupB sxlJ' sioled ftaniscf 

i^fjyiuA to le&io 9riJ ^nlctjpofiv 19J&10 ne fisisJne ^ijjoo 9 
,^, -.1? ,I!^oi ,5 i&do;JoO no 

v:d fcsjciB : nsmqlups 9ri;t ^£ 

Jfijalle it nnP 9*jR:ra9 I«»i 9ri:J lo i^B- si Jn9fficriup9 rioii-. fcsmli 

_qjttjp9 Jrisii sri^f ciilv 9BBBI -^ Snilllw 5 

snlffl'-ecr •: ©Jiit J«d:t 5©x«TCf nolStiQq S' I3enlmi?;t a^tl J£ it 

..o-v ori^w* fens ,crfl9aJoiw 9 eriJ "^o ic-^ooTerir 5ns alri^isnwo 5 

crnRl^e t leri^c -^0 .JnalXeqqB o* 9a£9l fiei 

jg,; gnlB9.riB noi^-lJeq-aaoif: e £>s. 

g^jj- ^saiqlup: oeirslqinscrnoo X^ 

j^^ Jnajnqlups dous 

59B9IIB noiJi?^--«^o-TO sril '^^-^ ^'-^ **^ ^"« "" 

6ns s98lBi9iq sriJ oJ -^mtril :Juori:riw bsvon-^i ed hbo Jn^irqlupo eriJ ii 


prayed the proposed lease be approved, or that appellant be 
allowed to remove the equipnsent. On the hesrlng the court found 
that the equipment belongp to the owners of the 'premises and dis- 
missed the cross-petition for want of equity. To reverse the 
decree this aopeal is prosecuted. 

No complaint Is made of the order of September 19, 1941, 
which vacated the order of August 18, 1941. This leaves the 
question of the ownership and the character of the equipment 
and the right of removal, to be determined tvoro the lease of 
July 28, 1938, with the former receivers, which the parties 
hereto agree was entered into >?lth the gpnroval of the court. 

Appellees rely uoon Rider "A", leaving out of consideration 
the provision In the sixth clause of the lease: "(except only 
the movable trade and/or office furniture of lessee.)"- There 
can be no doubt that the sixth clause thereby excludes 
from Its terras all trade fixtures installed by the lessees. It 
is noticeable that Rider "A" provides that the lessee shall ''do 
all decorating, installing, reoalring, re-placing and ?.dju?ttng 
on the Interior and exterior of the demised premises, including 
boiler and roof, necessary for any reason whatsoever.'' Another 
provision of the lease is that on or before October 31, 1938, 
the lessee shall: 1st, make the necesss.ry reoalrs to the roof; 
2nd, install a new hot water storage tank. This hot water 
storage tank is the only hew equipment called for by the lease. 
It is not claimed that it vjas Intended that a new roof should 
b4 installed and the clause mentioned expressly refers only to 
its repair. The roof and the boiler are mentioned together in 
Rider "A". We think a fair interpretation of its terms is 
that it refers to the installation of repairs, replacements and 
adjustments on the boiler then in use, as well as to the roof, 
and not to the installation of a new boiler. When Rider "A" is 
jonsidered with the exception in clause Sixth, it is obvious that 
the word "installations" in Rider "A" has no reference to trade 

The testimony and the manner in which the sk?.ting rink floor 
iLs constructed show it can be removed without any damage to the 
building, excect inconsequential nail holes in the rough floor 
of the stage. The testimony also shows that the stoker was In- 
ptalled by removing the grates and front door of the boiler, 
putting the burner and conduits therein and Placing fire brick ■ 
pound it and soft cement putty around tne front; that these 
md the hopper can readily be 


ed insLIsqq& iBcii to , bovo'T'Ta'B ©d «j3jS9I Ssi^oaoTcr sriJ bs^ 

bauot i'TUOo srfl gnii^^er! 9riJ nO .in^aqlupe (?/<? svomet oJ bswo 

-ai£> 5ns sseiffisiq ariJ to aisnwo sriiJ o;t fj-snolsd insmqlupQ sriJ J 

8ri:t oeTsveT oT .xilUQ?> to Snsw toI noirfl^ec-eaoTO 9riJ 598 

,1-^QX tOI "rBCimQiqeQ lo 'tsbio 9xl;J lo sbfUB ai Jnislqanoo oM 
sri:t aevpel siriT .I^^I ,81 JsugwA lo teftTO 9ri;J 59Jbo«v Co 
insi&qlupe edS "io 'Y9;tosTBrIc) ©ri;J bns crjtri3i9n»/o 9fl;t to nol:f« 
lo eaesl ariJ tro'i'l befiimtsJeB sd o^ ,I«v0ii!9T "io IrigiT eAi 
Boti'i&q sriiJ rioinw ,5'T9Vl9o?»t Tsm'tol erlJ ri;Jiw ,8C^";I ,8S X 

Xir.o jJosoxs)" :9!?i=i9l 9rl;J to spupIo aixlfn erirf ni: noislvoia 

v-TrnT ."'.99aQoI Ic e-^ijtifsiL'l ©oltto "ro\frnjB e&^tJ ©Idavoin 

seftiiloxf) -^deiad;) ©gL'sIo dixlp. sriJ :tBri;J Jduolb on 9d 

J.. . ;?Ta3l eriiJ -^d r)9ll>?.^snl BsnuJxit ^b^Ti IIb lasiiTs;^ ecfl m 

Ob*' iXfinfl ssaeel aris ;fBd:f asbivoig "A" TSbiP ifprtj sldf-solJon 

5;nJtJ=!ij(,J3i7 fefii" ■ontr-'eLae'T j^nlTiPos't ,^^nijla;lnni j^nluatoosb 
gnJcDJjIonl ,8e3i:ffi9Tq osBi.nel) 9il.t "to Toita.Jxe fens T0iT9;Jni 9ri;f 
T^rfJonA •* .T:«v90>>Jjpiiw rroasftt yO)?* "^ot Y'^^'^B^oen .toot brm tsL 
,8G*?I ,15 TsdoJoO 9iol9d io no Jsri:? *?! eajssi eri^ "io noiaxv 
;'iooi srii oJ ?iile>ae'i xi.&'i'=iSOBn 9ri;f ^Jsji" :XIeris 998391 
•I9J'3W Jorl BifiT .infl^ 9'5B*To;ta T9:fBV ^on W9n e IXeJanl , 
.eanoX sriJ ^d 'fol bellso inenxqtupe weft ^Ino 9ri.t a/ yin&i ©gsT 
filxioxta looi wan b J'bhJ Jbebna^n/ esw Jl iR£i:i berlBlo ion at 
ci a'TSlf=!'7. x;I=i89nax?» bpnoi^nsm 9ajjijIo eriJ 5ne bsIIaJani 
ni T9xld"9So^ bsnotinsm eta nsliod srict bns looi a4T .tlfjasT 
9X anii©.t sis "io nol J3C}9TaT9ini tIpI a- jfniri-:t ©'«' .••A" 19 
JbOB a^nsoisoBlasi tailisqai lo nol^JaXXjQJani ©riJ' oi ai9l9t it i 
^looT Btii oi 38 XXpw s/; ,3f5u ni naricJ Tsliod 9fi;J no ninsmiau 
at "A" TSiJlfl n»riy .leXXod wnn iS lo noi;Ji^XX£Jani sxlJ oj Jon 
Jbhj ai-'O-Evdo ''I Jl ,riJxX.^ e-ar-.r. nX noX;tq9!jxs eriJ riJXw iJ9T9f)ia 
fibjp.'^i o:t 9on9i9l9t on es; .:.= oX«T nX "snoXJ.eXisJani" bnow 

.3 91Xj':f 

TOoX"' Tinli: gnxcfp3(a arftf rloiriw ni tennjEva; bdi bne, \CiosntisBi axlT 

©rij o;t 9SJ6ins6 xfJi? ^JwonJiw baxome'r sd ft£0 ;Ji woxis 5e;JcLnrfanoo 

TooXl r{:§jDOi eriJ nl ^^sXoxl XXsn IsiJnojjpeqnooni Josoxa ,snix)I 

-ni 3«w 'T92io:f3 srlJ iatii awoxia osXb \nomi:Ja9J 9riT .egBie adi 

,T9Xiod 9rij lo Toob Jnotl bni?. sei&i-^ sriJ ^nXvojaai x^ bslX 

jfolid 9iX'T gnioBXa bns nXsisdJ sJXi/bnoo fins tsniud scii ^nti 

9!i9x1J dsxii :inc"x1 scii br.sjonn x3iucf insmeo itOB bnn it bnu, 

9d xlloBet n&D laqqoil sAi 


removed and the boiler put Into its original condition; that the 
<odine blower until in the skating rink ip hung by rods from the 
roof trusees and attached to a steam pipe from the boiler. Ap- 
pellant conoedeB it is not entitled to remove the toilets. 
k coal fired hot water heater \me inp tailed by the lessees when 
they first moved into the prencipee. Mr. Kuenzel testified it had 
seen replaced on an average of once a year, due to corrosion by the 
lard water of the Village. A-poellant'p v-rlfied crosp-oetitlon in- 
3lude8 in the list of equipment installed by it, advertising- signs 
for the rink. There is no testimony concerning' them. There is no 
iispute as to f u-^nlshings in apartment'^, not owned by the tenants. 

It is apparent that all the equipment in controversy, including 
the advertisinp- signs, was installed by Ar^ell??.nt (or its predecess- 
ors) in and as accessories to the business in which they v^ere engaged. 
\b between landlord and tenant, removable trade fixtures mjay include 
all erections made for the purpose of trsde during tenancy which he may 
lave attached to the freehold while in possession. The rule is liberal 
in favor of the tenant. (Eaker v. McClurg, 198 111. 28.) The early 
iecisidns in England, as well as in this country, were very firm in 
holding that when personal property became a fixture by annexation to 
the real estate by some permanent method the rsersonal r^roperty lost its 
Identity as such and became real estate. The more modern decisions have 
broken away from this rule and & more liberal construction is now given 
in favor of holding fixtures personal property where that intent can 
be gathered from the conduct or actions of the r)3rties. (National Bank 
of the Republic v. vvells-Jsckson GorpoT'ation, 358 111. 356; Thuma v. 
Granada Hotel Corporation, 269 111. Ave. 484.) 


erii S^iii \aolitbnoo isliJtglTC aJI o:fnJ: Jxj7 t^fiocf srii briR, bsvoj 

-oA .TSliod 9fij motl aqiq nsfleita 3 oS foeiiOBJJa fcne eeeaut^t t( 
.si9llo:} 3tii avofTiST o;J JBelvfiJne J" ;tnBl. 

acii -id nolBOiioo oS sub ,iB9\i s eono In st^rt^^vs hb no bsoBlcrei n< 

-nl ■: '-aao'io bBi'ilt'y - ' Jni- fi ^•"tA .^-^sLIlV erit lo is^tBW &• 

3m • :Ji9VJbe , ^x ifd bsllnisni in^mai:- t nl Befei 

on .3X ^v^f&iiT .-T;':;;::* 'fiintsonoo xnomiiB^.' -:'.T .xnii 9f{:f ■ 

gnlfiuianx jxaievo^i J aoo nx j/ismqlupft sri* /If. Isrid" ;Jn^Tf>aqf- 

.f)9SBS~ • ianxewo erio oi ssiioaBe ■ ( 

QfijuJr: .snuixit 9!s>B'Ti 9Xcf«voiB0i ^Jfl^ne? 5nB btulbnal naew^Jed 

YBffi Gii xioiiiw y^oBsciet •gcitivb obsi^ to oeioGrruq ©dJ Tot ^^&fiT• snol^tosts 

IsTScfll si sIuT 9dT .no±R-?9«soq ni siiriw felorieeT'i eri? o? fic-rioBJJB 9' 

yItbs sriT (.SS -III SGI ,gTiJIDoK .▼ leMBa) .Jflsnacf ed-J to tovst 

ni nirs:!! x^ev stew jTji^Jni/oo alriJ ni aa IXsv as ,5nj3l§n3 nl ^att^l 

o:t ttoxtnxBnop. x^ aTuJxit b sweosd y,:fiscfotq Xsnosteq n&riw ^xtii gnlb 

©VBri anolRloaiJ aiehaic 9tom eriT .d^Bctas laei aaneoac -.3 ^;tf:f 

nevlg won ai noliou'r.iPt:ioo Isisdll stem « fcfis slut nini mo-Yl %bvb n9Ji> 

ciso SasSnt JBiiJ steriw yJieaotq iB/ioaiec esTJjJxil ^nlblorl to lOVBt 

jlne.5 l&nolieM) .esi^Ttaq sriJ to snoxioB to JoL'.bno!? sti? moti bsisri^tsg 

.V f5ff!x;E[T ;56f. .Ill 855 .noiJafoqioO noejfoeL-BlIsV' .v ollcfuqsfl s»rlJ 

(.i:??^ .qoA .ill eas ,noi;J«'ToqioO IsJoH Bb&tii 


Appellees' claim that the testimony in this respect was improper as 

a paro]e attempt to vary the terras of the lease is vjlthout foundstion. 

It did not tend to vary the terms but was in line with clauE^e sixth. 

Moreover, the abstract does not show that ,any objection to it was made. 

Section 54 of the L,^ndlord end Tenent act (111. Rev. Btat. 1941, 

chap. 80, par. 24,) provides; 

"Subject to the right of the landlord to distrain for 
rent a tenant shall have the right to remove from the de- 
mised Dremisas all removable fixtures erected thereon by 
him during the terra of his lease, or of any renewal thereof, 
or of any pucoesslve leasing of the premises while he remains 
in poRsesplon in his character as tenant." 

Such right Is upheld in Hopwood v. Green, 310 111. App. 411. 

As the lien of the trust deed and the rights of the lien claimant 
had attached in the instant case before the equiornent was installed, 
their security would not be impaired and they ^vould not be injured in 
any way by the removal of the equipment. One holding a mortgage on 
real estate has no equitable claim to chattels subsequently annexed to 
it. He has oarted with nothing on the faith of such chattels, and is 
not entitled to the property of others. (Thuma v. Granada Hotel Cor- 
poration, supra.) 

The following things have been held to be trade fixtures and 
removable by the tenant: Wall sheeting nailed to strips which were in 
turn nailed to walls; an office p'srtltion attached to wainscot and 
ceiling by quarter round moulding; cold storage room with strips nailed 
to wall and floor; a partition with a door in it. (Ward v. Farl , 86 
111. App. 635). A scale house and two bins to hold crushed stone; a 
lunch room and office. (Hopwood v. Green, supra.) "Ozlte" carpet 
padding glued to floor; "In-a-door" beds, china f;nd Iritchen cases. 
(Thuma v. Granada Hotel Corporation, supra.) A sprinlcler system 
Installed in a garage. (National Bank of the Perrublic v. -.veils- Jacks on 
Corporation, supra.) Three ovens, one of them extending from basement 




■git yric? 0^ 

-v-rf Ilfuia o 

^ JnsT 

■ iX» - 

09 aim 

TPteJ e 

■^ub T.M 

il evi<?gi^r;: 

to 10 

-:- '-t- n.t 

■oa nl 

.ritfxiH s^.sjaIo ditv sail ni ac'v Jwcf fjcrtaJ" 9tii xtv.y c;t 5nsJ .5 

^ ri:?!,?! 9riJ no ^frWt^r' rf^Mr .r>«=)i'Trn eari 9H 

■•'> sriT 
z sldevo, 
. 9li«n .1" 

. (?-^6 .qoA . 
-Is S^i 


fcundation through first and peccnd story of the building through 
openings left -/(/hen the building w?^,s built; a boiler enclosed In a 
brlclc jBC^et; p.n engine, shafting, pulJeyp and wheels. (Baker v. 
McClurg , flurirs . ) 

Anpellees urge that becsu?e the rink floor >.'as ppeclally con- 
structed for upe in the theatre and might be injured in it? removal 
Indiceteg It .vsp intended tc con^'tltute b oert of the re?_l estate, 
citing 28 C. J. sec. 15, p. 664 and Owlngs v. Eetes, 256 111. 553, 
Manifestly that dostrine does net spoly when the intention to treat 
it as perirenal -cro-oerty is ex-ores'^ed bet'iieen the T^arties, as it was 
here. The property reaioved xva<? injured in the Ward rj^se, the Thuma 
case, the Baker case and the Hop^vood case, but the right to remove the 
property wa^ nevertheless u-oheld. In the Thuaa cage and in the Baker 
case the court held th-^t while the removal of the equipment would 
cause some injury to it, that fact would not affect the -"ight to re- 
move it. Th£.t holding apt^lies here. If anybody la injured by remov- 
ing the equipment it 7;ill be apoellant only, 'ind no one elr^e has any 
right to complain of that. 

Under the above holdings, the skating rink floor pnd the other 
equipment in controversy, including the advertising signs are trade 
fixtures, and under the sixth clause of the lease., the statute and the 
holdings in the cited oases, they belong to appellant, with the right 
to remove thc-m froir. the le£;sed premises. 

It is unnecessary to discuss any procedural questions raiped by 
the parties. The record is sufficient for our holdings -.^/ithout consider- 
ing such points. The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the 
cause is remanded with olrections to enter a decree in conformity with 
the views herein expressed. 

Reversed and remanded with directions. 

riSiJ0'Tri3" ■^CilbLiiid Slit to XToS'fi bnooe» bnc Jsri'l: r!'nt;oTri:t noliJabnuo 
& nl r.'^.^olr^ns Tsllod .?. [iltud asw gnlfti . r ilsl s-gnlneq 

( . f'tat','^. ,3ijjI0d 
-ftoo x-Ci^s-t-scfB aew looll Tlnit «5rl;J sgueoed Jed ^"''^IIsaorA 

iBVom*-'- ?:ji nl 5e"s:jLJ{,nJ: ecf Jriglm bne ©TCtaeritf sricT &9;J.C'UTi^ 

.saa .1X1 dc':- f.-^lr'^ .V •a^rtiwO fcne. ^So .. OS snicTJ 

:^as--r.j o.' r-:^ .. a,'? Jon R«=*of-) fjnti.i'"' .^i:ias1tcie 

BSUjriT pr't ,'=!^'.nf) £tT.sW erid" ni f^errjutfi saw fcevoapeT tcJ'T9-^':>tc ©riT .sie 

exit SVC?! 3IT ©ri,t Jud ,9Beo boovaoE eciS fcne saeo 'toifjiQ ofiJ ,93* 

i«iisi. fi.^^ d>?«o AffiwriT eriJ nl .blsiricrti f^MeleriJisven eaw y.JT9Qon 

Jf*'«>:.f't sri* Josll^ ion blij^vi So&t orjcIJ ,Ji oJ ^ti'tnl 9mo5 saus 

H--r;jrn.i; p.l Y,&odv,n/i ^I . STefl Beil-^a^ gniMon' JariT .Ji 9vc 

^Hr ."9 sno on ^np .■^Irro Jffi»,Xl9Cfcr« ed Xllr Jl JnemqliL'pe 9riJ gr 

.JsriJ lo nlAXcmoo oJ JrigJ 

f9flJ"o 6riJ fjae TOoXI TfniT gnXJfljfs silJ .ssnlSIori evcds* nriJ i95nU 

efc5«f* sTjs angl? gnii^XJtfJvl)® ©rij j;}nibijIonJ; .AjeTsvotJnoo nX JnfiiEqlof 

s£ii bOB sSssisia edi ,©e£sX sriJ lo sp.u-^Id xlJxia sriJ 'isbnu bne .fieiirJxJ 

•trigit 9iiJ dilw «JnsXX©qq.a oJ !§noX9d \:9fiJ ^^s^bo bsiio sfiJ nx R^nlbXc 

.?,3ai£n"<iq besssX gii.1 moiTt aasdJ svomei c 

Xd f)©.=iX.Q'f snolJssup la-^.ub&oo'xq y.a& asi/oeio oJ Y'tfieaeosnnt/ aX JI 

-^-eblenoo JworiJXv; BgnlbXcri -^uo lot JnsXoX'^ljj«« rx rToos-f exlT .aeiJisq 9r 

oflJ One bsaTPVsi sX J'Yi;oo .:fiiJoiXo sfiJ *^o eeiosb ©dT .aJnXoc flotie gr 

riJXw Y^Xran-Ctnoo nX ^-stngb s tsJnet oJ nnoXJowtXft liJXw babn^msT sX eeus 

.beaaetej** HlSTftrt eweXv er 
.anoX-Jo9TXb riJiw inebnenist bnF bee-TOVsH 

Appellate Court, Us. 

Second District, J I^ PAUL V. WUNDER, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and 

for said Second District of the State of Ilhnois, and the keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete copy of the opinion of the said Appel- 
late Court in the above-entitled cause, now of record in my said office. 

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand 
and affix the seal of said Appellate Court, at Ot- 
tawa, this 1.1th day of... January , 

in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundi-ed 
and sixtv.r-.QJJ.e.* 

(79969-3M-12-59) -^,^^ Clerk'ofihe'AppeUoieCourL''' 


COiwPAi\iy,a Co3rporation# 

Appellee # 






App e 1 1 antr'^^'^.is^^ 









By this appeal defendants seek to reverR® an order af the 
Superior court of Cook eounty entered JUne 15, 1942, denying its -^^ 
notion to dl? solve a temporary Injunction issued May 28» 1941, 
i^estrainlng defendant* from "selling, dealing, inetalling, deliver- 
ing, distributing, " and from advertising or solicitation and de- 
livery of any "Zephyr extractor, zephyr wash r, * ^'' * or other 
Zephyr laundry aachinery. " 

April 14, 1941, plaintiff filed its verified complaint against 
defendants alleging that on or about December 2, 1938, feurray Cohen, 
of Hew York City and the 2ephyr Company, an Illinoig corporation, 
with its prinoip«l place of businests in Chicago, entered into a 
written agrecmeat whereby Cohen agreed to purchase and the zephyr 
CoHjpany agreed to sell certain patented and unpatented laundry 
machinery aiftnufaetured by the Zephyr Company; that Cohen should have 
the exclusive right to distribute aaohinery and equipment in New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, ..aryland, Delaware, the District of Columbia 
and the New England ttatee; that the eontz^ct had been asi^igned by 
Cohen to plaintiff, the Cumin ings-Landau Laundry Machinery Company, 
a corporation; that the parties entered upon the perforoiance of the 
contract but defenuants violated the agreement by selling laundry 
machinery and equi sent In plaintiff's territory, as a r-sult 
of which, plaintiff had been damaged $20,000, The prayer waa 
that defendants be enjoined and restrained from violating 

'' ( 

U>-> .^.X O^ JL.O S Y«^^H!^^^'^ -^"^^ 



OA.T^'i'U XHOTUOCJfi.'ITai ( __ 

10 Tfmoo aoiHa^ioe mo/i'4 



, ..^''" \ 

afiiT io Te;;'io ix£ e»tav©T: o;t 3[«>08 »tfaaJbn9t96 XftoqqB sin;? X8 

-levlXeJJ ,®niIlB;rtflX ^gniXi&sB t»«XIXa8" mo^ aJxiAbnelsl) sninian^ie*! 
-»6 has, nol;t»iiolXc3 to snlrltievfca aonl fens « ,;gcX*ir<Jl'x^8ll) »8Jil 

(^3nla;^ii d-nlixiqaoo J!>Si*ti'i9v atfl delil ttX^nlBXc ,X>eX ,*X XX-jqA 

,fl©ilcO ^Biiui^i. »(J£6X tS TscraftoeG cftrccfjs to no tMii ^^i^aXX* 8^flAf>adl»£ 

tOoiJsioqioo sloniXri ajs ,Tcn.sq??oO nxrfqsS aeC^ *fl* X^iO i^oX w«M lo 

£ o^Jni 5«Wfad^n6,o3SU»oiJElO nl s?>»oi«JiKj ^o ••iXq Xaqlooiiq t*X tiAt9 

iX^q^S ^* 5ne ©is^rioituq Kit b»»n:8« jsaiioO -^dartewlw ^aisK^frxsA flsJ^irnr 

XtfefyvfiiX &»dfl»«Jj8qm; 6i$a Jbs^ffo^^Bq'^%^ XXm o? 59irq[|« in*c[®oO 

viiicY «eS5L fii *fi^ffiqi«p9 5nfl ^is^cXxlojaaj <PiZu6l'ti^lh oJ W;?!-! •riauXoxe ad* 

BiGffiEwXoD to 3-|>iT.tala erfs' ,ox»w«X©<:i tbcjal-ji!*;- tSinuvXijanna^tXariet w»ll 

i(<i £>9n^X 9« mi'te^ &£tf ^^o-eicffioa 9xi;f *Aci* ;»9;rBtll £>fusXi|n3 v«if ad* Am 

9ii* ^G ao;-ji5fiT^olT:»q •f^i noqu ftwrtefna .siai^tiBq ^Ai itAdi ;aoi*&ioq*xo9 » 

tt£ariW«X gfilXXaa x^ *n^aw^T:ga ea* bad-isXolv sJBja&noteb iud *o>Aicfnoa 

^Xtfe-^i IS 3« ,Tno*X'n>?;J a'ltXJnleXo «i Jnaa lupa baa xtsaldoJUi 

ami tf-x&TLq 9£fi' «rOOO,OSri l>a9Aau6 a&sd &Aci ttX^ni&Xq ^deXds to 

;§nX*^XGiv fio^l 5drvi«'i;fB*}i l>fi« JEteiiiotca ad a*nsl>flala6 *ad* 


the ter^B of the written agreement and for an accountings The contract 

was attached to and made a part of the compjutint. 

Uaj 12» 1941, some of the defend&nte answered denying that 
plaintiff had coaplied with the tenia of the contract or that defen- 
dants had breached it* admitting they had snade sales in the territory 
alleged to be plaintiff's but denying that such sales were la 
violation of the terms of the contract or while It mis in existence. 
May 28, 1941, the court entered the order sought to be 

- ^^g^^ ^P which recites that the matter caaje on to be heard on mjtion 
of plaintiff's attorneys, for an injunction as pray9d for in the 

^Terifled coHsplalnt^ " and the court having heard the argument for 
plaintiff and in opposition thereto, the argument for defen ants, 
and having read the verified cos^lalnt and examined the exhibits 
attached thereto," and all parties being represented, the court 
found that equity had jurisdiction and that an injunction should 
issue. And it nws adjudged and decreed that defendants be enjoined 
until the final determination of the cause, from selling, advertising "^ 
or dtstributing machinery in plaintiff's territory, as above stated. 
June 6, 3.941, some of the ptJtor defendants filed their ahewer 
adopting the answer of aefendmnts filed May 12, Nothing further 
appears in the record until aearly a year thereafter when, ^c y 1, 
1942, defendants filed an amendment to their answer deleting from 
answer the allegation that the contract entered into between the 
parties was a contract for "an exclusive sales agent." And averred 
that the contract between the parties was void because it w&p in / 
violation of section 1, of the Sherman Anti-Trust act, 16, U.3.G.A. 
and paragraphs 569 and 573, oh. 38, 111. Rev. Stats. 1941, 

On the same d&y, defendants filed their verified petition 
to dissolve the temporary injunction, in which they pet up a 
number of matters which need not be mentioned here, and also that 

-nstsli jj&ri5f *so ^©aiS'eo© wi:f lo surest aritf xf*!*? &«iIq;«o« £«£( lll*ffl«I« 
at »nmi J9 9i^e dotra l«£f* %al%n9b Sud 6*l:'iltnl&lq wJ ot bw^ellM 

i»ja[ sd o:J" no ci5«© is^^aiR siiS^ ^js^iftT ««f Jt©d^ iJoijtftr'lv*^*^^ ■ 

^.vi., ^ismugia ail;? ^oJert^d^ ooi*J«cqoo nt bam tlltalalq 

s.l'idii ...i,,i«R«x?} boM tal&L<mco b^l'ittw •dt &6©^ ^gaivAd Aha 

Blwc-ria aQii?©nirt«X «« i*«dt l>«a ttcl;iotbal'wl f>«ri t^lwp» tsiicf fem/et 

eX ^.<3ie. ^J^r- -'•■■*■■■ "-•■'Mt 'rES^.X e iX««IMB Xl;t«u Mo©*«i <»«» ni ntseq^A 

. ii. *s .15 JL !- - V i;ai;/Xo;-:» iia* f&t *s»iB^ito» « saw s^lij'iaq 
« . * . V I x..(i'-ljf!£ fljEMsraeds ©ifcf lo ,X fic.i*»»s lo aotisLoir 

'• *9a 1®'^^ xloMw aX ^sL^li^tmtGl x^&toeputf ^liS «rXoaaift o* 


the contract wae void because It provided that defendant, the 
Zephyr Company, which msnuf&ctured the laundry machinery, could and 
did fix the prlioee at which the machinery was to be resold by 
Cohen and his assignee, the plaintiff, contrary to the Federal and 
State Statutes, abore mentioned* 

May 7, 1942, plaintiff filed a reply to the answers and 
the amendment thereto and thereafter filed its answer to 
defendants* petition, setting up among other things, that the 
contract did not riolate the Federal or State Statutes, Afterward, 
June 16, 1942, the court entered the order appealed fiH>m, which 
recited the matter came on to be heard on defendants* motion to 
dissolve the tem^or&rj injunction "heretofore entered in accordance 
with the prayer of a petition filed by the defendants and the answer 
thereto filed by the plaintiff, and the Court having heard both 
the argument of attorneys for plaintiff and defendants" the motion 
to dissolve the temporary injunction was denied. 

Counsel for plaintiff say it is indispensable to an 
understanding of the present appeal t ^at it be shown what occurred 
between May, 1941, when the injunction w&s issued, and June 15, 1942, 
when defendants* motion to dissolve the injunction was denied, and 
they say that during that :eriod the court considered "voluminous 
testimony aad. exhibits" which do not appear in the record. That the 
court heard the testimony of the principal defendant, Harry iioplin; 
that Jyne 6, 1941, the cause w&b referred to & master in chancery; 
that •« Tithin that year, over 1250 pages of t stlmony and over 150 
exhibits have been introduced before tm Master and CJuuicellor, » 

This evidence is not in the record before us altiiough a report 
of the proceedings on the trial is in the r^^cord. The only 
evidence shown is two exhibits - a letter dated December 3, 1941, from 
the Zephyr Company to plaintiff, and a letter dated June 2, 1942, 
from plaintiff to defendants. 

The order awarding the injunction and the order denying defendants 
motion to dissolve the injunction, from which we have above quoted. 

1!^ 6lG»#'i ed o."J OBW t'taisMoAa »cUr ti&Jubi t& (^dMiq •!» Xlt bib 

©Ofi^fe-^ '^' i$3^is^ «s*t«loiJ9^»ri« a&lioavlaJt iptJBi;e^««t eil^ ftrlesali* 

^f o B«iAsa l^ialvm iiifeO «d5r Ittui «lH^fiiMic> «ii3^ ^<J belli oi9n9tlit 
v^ " ^^ ^ n&bft«t»b hBJ^ miaJLAlq lot )»x«OTOjr^£ lo itiBKifyta Kii 

.,.; i^Mii»ni»qBliml eX ti \Aa tllttUalq tcl XsemroO 

'.■^. ;• ^f*vo fe«i3 ^i3o«XiJe..w .^ «i5»J8q 03SX %W7^ »*-M. 3^* aXii^rxw" tmtLi 

^- ■xgM&ii$Sj& &a snotf^ i.'/tc'^--'^ '^v-jij ^i ^oxi sX .=5Dii®feXv«' aXxl^' 

4I110 ed? ,Jfe90*at •xi^ ..... .^ XnX'i* exiJ ao asflXJ&o©o<yxq aii;r lo 

acii ,.. t'- 'i^aeaea I>9^.«a9 it-^J-eX it - ^itiilti^ - - :^ sX xarode somAlT* 

,8<raAbfl©lal) o;? llXi^oX^Xq «oil 


Indicate tiiat no evidence was oongidered by the court in issuing 
the injunction or in refuging to diseolye it. Obviously we must 
p«es on the ease as It apperre from the record before ue, 

Dtfendants' position is (1) that since the contract 
provides that defendants, the inanufaoturere of the machinery, may 
fix the prices at which the purchaser is required to respll, the 
contract is illegal under section 1, of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
act, and that it is not rendered valid by the Mill' r-Tydings act which 
amended eeetion 1, (8) That the temporary injuncti n should be 
dis-^olved because aft»r it war isfi^ued, defendants terminated the 
contract, as they were authjrized to do by the eiq>re8g terms of the 
contract; and (3) thtt they were not estopped $o exercise their 
right to terminate the contract by anything they had done. 

On the otaer side, plaintiff's position is (1) th^^t the court 
properly refused to dissolve the injunction after he had considered 
the pleadings "and beard the testimony of the principal defendant,* 
since the evidence and exhibits, taken into consideration by the 
chancellor are not before the court; (2) that defendants have, on 
numerous occasions, violated the injunction, as a r-'sult of which 
they have been held in eontempt|j and a fine imposed; (3) that since 
defendants were guilty of breaching the contract and depriving plaintiff 
of the benefits it was entitled to under the contract, they cannot 
8 months after the suit was filed, cancel the contract; tiiat "The 
) , Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits combinations of trust or 

conspiracies in restraint of trade intended to control or eliminate 
competition. The fixing of list prices is only one of many elements 
to be taken into consideration * * * in detei mining whether a 
combination is in restraint of trade « » * », That act is not 
applicable to the fixing of a competitive list price by a manufacturer 
for his commodity in open competition with 14ke commodities on the 
market, and nut intended to stifle competition*" (4) ihat the notice 
of cancellation given by^laintiff^ to defendants was insuf ricient. 

Since we have reached the conclusion that the contract is in 


4?}ue3 is. . ctiittts'l^ nct^tonulaX wtt 

m<>'i'i «■% 9to.qis il gui &aAo ^t fio, aaAq 
5 OCT si al ooJtJieoq ' atrial) irsltQ 

esd^ t^llf b«ntup9i at aegadotuo; ad* Aoldw i& ssoiiq wri* xll 

Sistutt-lieui i!U4«i:ife «dJ lo ,X aoid'oea nefiiu; IfiSoXIi si 3'9«^*ao< 

;efi inum teil^ ;ri3iit (S) ftoa iSoAt^aat 

tnisc ;'111;ffll«iq ,©6i8 -tsftto oil* nO 

l»o^9M8Jii)9 ojfti xToltfe»/urtfii «ui^ eYloaslA oi bnaut^i xlTaqoi^ 

** «ta^ffs>t€>fi lAqiouli-q mii to i^aoiKi^ae^ ftfi^ Anaaif boA* 8Bfiif>«'»Xc tdd 

t «ifnfcjbfi 5.riJ s'jol*d *on :5i« «xoXXdonadc 

90Ri . : ^.'^oq^i dnit « bus if#<pid^flO0 ni &X9ti Hd^cT ovAd x^J>i^ 

ttiJfilAlcf ^cilviiqs:' ntJnoo S(£(J ^ixfaj&ercoT to x^Xiug 9^99 titeAba9t«t 

^ -7x100 mit lefefiu o* 6«»I?l*ns -saw *I a^ilaiawf ad* t€ 

; oisi;rnoo &£l:r ImooB^ ^b»ll\ haw flun 9tit t9ttA aAtaom I 

TO tttJsn oi^i^nidBCO B.ll4ld&tq ^ioA ^sirxT-i^nA aaa-7«A 

d^ne Sflixit tiff •i!ioi*i*9qao« 

oi^ATQEglaaoo o^ni a^Xs* mT ad 

^ ; si iioi;fiftiil<teofl 

•x»^«*o V t^i^aqi' Ixil iwi;? o^ aXcfaoiXqqj 

ia-XoofiiffiDo faifcl ; x*-ffco>'SBfoo aiif ~^bt 

aoicTQffl «Hit ;r . o?aioa p-. Ji^n fecui ,#a:tf^Bfl 

•^r.'^ioini/nni; 9itm ^uiasH.a^tBbjOti^liltatiilujys^ aarig iiol^aXXaonAO tc 

to&iitiioo adit ifaiitt' acietrlsnoo 9fi:f £>edotr>r'<<x ^yibd aw aaais 


▼lolation of the sbersan Anti-fruet act and tberefolw illegal 

and void, this is the only oonteatioa made by defend, at* n-cessary 

for UB to eo'^elder. 

SClOtlon 1, of tide Shswaan /mtl-Trust aet of July 2, 1890 
prorl6PBi ••STsry contract* combinatioB in tiM form of trust or 
otberwiae* or conspiracy, ia restraint of trade or commerce among 
the 8?>Ter&l statee, or with foreign nfttione, i» hereby declared 
to b^ illegal: * and the section then provides for a penalty for 
the violation of that eeetion. 

In 1936 the Legislature of this state enacted the "rair 
Trade Act" (ch, 121 l/2» par. 188, «eo« 1, ill, -ev. iitats, 1941) 
which provides that "Sec, 1, Ho contract i»©iatiag to th'^ sale 
or resale of a ooBi?iti:>dity which bears* or the label or content of 
irtxieh bears, the traAli »ai%, brand or name of the producer or owner 
of such coffifisodlty and which is in fair and open ooapetition with 
ooffiiuodities of the ease general clafis produced by otherg shall be 
deemed in violation of any law of the state of IllinoiB by reason 
of any of the following provisions m&ioh siay be contained in eueh 

*(1) That the buyer wii:: not eeell such commodity except 
at the price stipulated by the vendor, 

"(t) fhat the producer or vendee of a eofflraodlty re uire upon 
the sale of such oomwodity to another, that such ourchasf r agree 
that he will not, in tura, resell except at the price stipulated by 
such aftkxx producer or vendee.* And by section 2 of that act 
it Is made actionable to knowingly advertise for sale or sell any 
ooffimodlty at lese than the pr ce stipulated in the contract, 
pursuant to section 1, of th^' act. 

S«otioB 1, of the Sh«?r«aa Anti-Trust act above quoted, was 

amended by an aet of Oongrees August 17» 1937, by adding a provision; 

"Tiiat nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall render 

illegal* contracts or agreements prescribing /prices for the resale 

^««i« »0T»B«!; 'j«i:f 10 *alaiit»««f 111 «te>«*^<<^Ao« to «flaMrK«ifti 

, .$»«B «sdl .lifter ,SM XSI »ito) «t«A OMd 
iQ tei9taxi€> to I'^dnl ^lif to jS'jjmmS ilt»l4iir V-^^'^''*** » ^* •XatJW -in 

Idil 8fll^0'S€^. ftdt lo <^fi£[ to Uumt ,lfYJMK iiunt ft^t fSlAftd d9itb 

mti& miMio t<S bnottbonq i<|A|«i iM^^ttfi ftMM «lSt lo i»l# fftjiBWii 
nc^d ^?»t^ mxi$ le iral tf)"* '^ oeitalciT fil ftntil 

'if^tMHM o# t<^i&<Mno« i£afft Ic i; 

XSi^ il?if' -JO «X/ TlJ*r?»vft3i xlfialm&trA ©;f 9l<f4aoi^»jB •&«« «i 

^vv!w «j^:!irotfi;» sv«d« to» ^<ttf7t<-X;raA ni»rt«<ifi «di ic «X itcitOft« 



of a ooa^odlty wkliek bears* or the l&&el or container of «hieh bears* 

the trade mark* br®.nd* or name gf tiie producer or dlst itoutor of 

attob coaraodlty and whleh is in fr@e aaA open competition with 

eomiaodit&as of th«/general olaes produced ar distrilmted by others* 

vlien contract* or agreements of that description are lawful as 

applied to lntra\Btat« transactions* under any statute* law* or public 

pcliey ao* or hereafter In raffect in any State, » 

Counsel for plaintiff contend th&t by the •rontract in question* 
plaintiff is the exolueive sales' agent for defendants in the pr^? scribed 
territory and therefore the contract is not iavalidated by the 
Sherwtn Antii-Truet Aet* and in support of this the case of United states 
V, (General ^electric Qo ,, 272 U. S. 476, and other authorities are 
eltsd. And further that: "The Intent to oontrol and maintain prices 
and stifle ©ORpetition in restraint of traae by contract or atJa^raise, 
and not tlm fixing of list prices* is condemned by rtes shertaan 
Anti-Trust Act** citing united ai^;,8 8 v. M^fonite Gorp-. * 516 U, 3. 
268* and other oases. 

Whether* under the terms of the contract, the title to the 
laundry laaehinery pas ed froa defendants to plaintiff and the goods 
then ra«a3^d by the latter in the s eeif ie territory, or whether 
plaintiff Is the exclusive agent of the defendants in selling the 
good8» amst be deterained from an examination of the contract Itself 
and not by any designation of it made by either party, i:>endix v. 
Stayer Carriage Qo .. 174 111, App,589, The controlling question is, 
will the carrying out of the contract tend to stifle competition 
by controlling and fixing prices, 

f|^ contract recites thst the iephyr Company 16 en^ged in the 
■anufacture of certain laundry and dry ©leaning aachineg; that 
Oohen is engaged in selling varioue kinds of machines and that 
he is desirous of selling the laundry e ulpaient manufactured by the 
Zephyr Company. It then provides: "this is a sales agreement for 
an exolueive territory; that the party of the first part Lthe Zephry 

^•?t:« a«l*i'«o«l#«A -^iwtJf© fe«« ,tTI^ .fe .1- SVS . » oO ■ ■ .:^ •^ 

£iBef«!«^ «fili! i|c( &«3ffi«&ai<o al x^^ainn 9%li )o ^iiiiiicit «iif;r tea §ki 

, dl5 ««^oD ^$Xm?j^B^ .V g»$ft,a »»»i,jaU |jb1;?1o • »#oA #8in[T«lf JU 

afeocg »riir ins* Wiifil&lr; oi 9in»ba9^9b mtn\ b*^9»<i f'^n-tile^M x^hmiMl 

tmt ||«iXJ:®« 0-f nin^.bn^tBb wit Itt *fl«»?gja »vX»i^f»rft f»ii* Hi tlXfnXAX^ 

*^ Si-ISS£ •t*'?^'<? t®fi(ri«» td oe)»«ffl »i to a&itBftfilsnfo xa« t^ J^on *ni 

iimit \6»nttiomi 5piia««Xo vr'* J^k* VrAowftX j«i«i*T«« 1c wriErtoAlwaJM 
iCTBrf«f«ii {Mfc*j .':'taQ Xsnl t*^^ ®»'<y ?ii.<* ;t*o^i-rtf>* oriiio'Xex^ at 


Company] agre s to sell, and the party of the eecond part [Coiien] 
agrees to touy# " the laundry find dry cleaning machines and 
equlpaient from the Zephyr Oompany, that It la agreed tht^t the 
oon iraot Is an Illinois contract "and all sales shall be considered 
made in the City of Chicago; » that all such maohiaery sold to 
Cohen for installation in the exeluBlv© territory "shell he sold 
at the list price" of the Zephyr Goffipany, "less the discounts 
hereinafter set forth," By ths next parai^^raph it it provided 
that it shall be la force for « period of 3 years with an auto atio 
renewal for the same number of years aid a further reaeiml of 3 years, 
but during the third 3-year period either party may cancel the contract 
by giring eertain notice to do so within not less than 120 days after 
the date of such notice; and the paragraph continues: "uiach of the 
automatic renewals « ♦ * is subject o the condition * * * that Cohen 
"buys a quota herein get forth In l^aragraph Minth over the three (3) 
years period immediately preceding the renewal period* « Cohen was 
then given the sole and exclusive right to distribute the laiindry 
machinery in the territory hereinbefore mentioned. By the 5th paragraph 
it was provided that the Zeplayr Cprupany "agrees to sell and deliver 
to" Cohen for which Cohen agrees to pay the prices fixed by the 
Zephyr Company at s ecified timee by cash or a draft on a Mew York 
or Chicago bank; «the list price of machines less forty per cent 
!J4(^) discount, upon receipt of invoice; the party of the second part 
to be allowed a discount of forty per cent (40^) on all j^rts 
purchased from" the Zephyr Company, "invoices for parts to be billed 
two per cent {2%) for cash in ten (10) days* net cash thirty (30) 
days* Date of invoice is understood to toe date of shioment, ♦* 

That the Zephyr Company shall "fix and determine list price 
or prices at which its laundry and dry cleaning machines, * « * 
shall be sold to the retail cuf^ tamer, such prices* however, are not 
to be any hi;her than the prices at which « *^ *» the Zephyr Company 

6? bloe f^9Sildosm A0U9 ll» ti^f •» ;o8^1iiO to \*iD mW tU ^bam 
Ales »d XXi";ila'»t'X^^^'**x®* 9wl!iulox» fMLS al acUAlLit^mal io"J wufoO 

«Xjfi.. &5tt« flii £4:rXT» »'XJ^»X 2 10 4ol^»cf « teX ©MOl al »^ XXaxfa si iaM 
t3iB€tx £ *o XjwresfW ^sxWiwl a Ar a aisn to iMEBsra «««& «<* "xot lamattfn 

i«& OaX &aiii «»»X *€>JK i5iri*Xw oe a& oiJ ^^oJUcb iiiA;t«iwi a^iTi^ y^d 

94$ 1© jte*®" jR^wfxiJxsoo £(q«'tsi«'S«q ««iS J&rss. jsoXiJ'oa ifOHa to vtmh tlS 

asrfoO Jfifii^ rioJ*lMoo 9di c Joetcftfa »X -^XairaaOT •Jttibm&SttM 

•seviXsx^ Ma XI»s ©d «»«'«»«« -lft«<|teqO •»t«!iq«bS «fiW *6il? i^^Mvo^q «t«w *1 

«4fd X<^ bsiatli eseX-j^j, «fiU x«<?; c* as'ftiiB* a»rfoO A&Mw tot 69tfQ9 "e^ 

^to^ ao !rt«Tt6 ja 10 iteAO xd eemU A9ltXo«:'» #» xnxiwO "xtrf^E^S 

t«^e ^«q t'^'xot aeeX e«i«LXAft^^ te eoltq ^eiX 8<{^'» ;jtfitJ8«r o^aoXiiO 10 

it^Bq Mt>©a« ^d^ to %&^m *ff? ;»»iovnX to ;rqX'?o»^ fto^ tteyteelfe (I^H 

8ji^ XXi6 lie i>^) *aeo Ti?q x^''«>t to ^nuoeaXI) a *«woXX* 9d ot 

fisXXitf «*<i ©* e»^5M? i?/t B^eitvni" ^xr-«Q;®oO •x^ifgAS ad* *mont A#aJirf©iwQ 

(OS) 1""^-^^?^ ^ie**** *fio t«x^A (<JX) ntttf^ni ^pao tot {^) ta®© Tceq ow;r 

« ♦»r»e«ttriii« to »^d& «f &^ 6t/o*8'i»Jw» aX ••i«vsl t© ii;r««:%ix«* 

ani'Tq *«iX ©iiljrs^4«»6 A<ia xi'l"' Halls x*«<?«©0 tt^qeS «y£iJ ^ariT 

,,;j!kf^;iii©.&ff?. atai«s«Xo X*s*' '^«« t^xiuml ©tX fltoXdw *.a ©©©itq 10 
t^m vm t^mrmiQti ti<ia©X^«r ^©v© «'S9aio;^^^&© ItM^tit^ ©dtf cit JbXo© Mf XXatfa 

«or any other manufacturer or distributor of similar machines, 
sells the same to any person, firm or corporation," and that no 
change In the retail selling price shall be made by the zephyr 
Company except upon 60 days^ notice In writing to Cohen, "The 
present listing prices are set forth upon a schedule hereto 
annexed and signed by both of the parties * * *, and these 
prices shall be the list prices until changed In accordance 
with the terms of this paragraph, " The contract further provides 
that all laundry machinery and equipment manufactured by the 
Zephyr Company and shipped and delivered by It to Cohen "shall have 
placed on them, at a conspicuous place, a plate bearing the 
name and adress of the manufacturer, which plate shall not be 
removed" by Cohen, nor shall he permit anyone to remove such plate 
so long as the machines remain in his possession, "All of said 
machines and equipment shall br advertised and sold as 
Zephyr-machines and equipment," 

Wf think a contract, sch as the one Involved, under any 
construction of It, even If the machinery were sold by the Zephyr 
Company to Cohen or his assignee, the plaintiff, and the resale 
price fixed, would be valid by virtue of the provisions of the 
Mlller-Tydlngs act, and the Fair Trade Act of this State • But the 
liilllei^Tydings Act was passed In 1957, about 2 y are after the 
contract In question was lade, Ssnd there Is nothing In the 
Mlller-Tydlngs act that can In any way be said to validate or attempt 
to validate contracts made prior to the enactment of that act, 
Friedman v. City of Chicago , 374 111. 545, Rothschild v. Village o f 
Calumet Park^ 350 111,, 3S0, 

Upon a consideration of the contract, we are of opinion 
th&t It provides for the sale and purchase of tiie laundry machinery 
by Cohen or his assignee, the plaintiff, from the zephyr Company 

,8«tiiiiofli lAllmlB te lotmH-ztmlh to ttruft^A^tum T«d9o >pu n** 

mC?» .S9dc^ oJ B*^^^'"' *^ •oi^cii *9\Bb 08 «&«pf #q»oz« iilb<|BcO 

oiv^ttL 9lBh r>.ti fl.qK M^ol tM tFiM •eolrq j^^sll i^BMsrq 

osedl boA c a«i^i*q atf^ lo die^ itf bMi^a teA »«zmw» 

9aa&frTC9e« «1 »«icuttlo Il^mr •••i^t; tmlL tLS 94 Ilmim BMinq 

^^►f^--^, i^^^Ttf'^ JoBT^BOc atfT • Uloar^aTAfl liiil ^o B«T«t •itt ittlw 

^? td ftsnrtoi&laniaa t2«i^i»p9 Aos t^«ald»ja x'lJb.'VAl IIa ^a^ 

*Tafi LL^i»* ««!oO o» tl x* b^nmli^i tea frvqqi^ tea XAaqBoC TfiiqAS 

•£t 9ciTA^ 9^^q a ,9«Al9 BVo<^«iq»ae« « ^£ ««9di oo ^•oaIc 

etf ^cji Ilsite viMlfi lUUtm ^i9n3rt9M'iMaMm adl tc sserfta btiM «u£ 

9t£lq ii«r« 9ro««<T o^ eecxca li«Tcq «1 Iliads Toe «<«ifeO itf *A«Toc«r 

M2» "^c III* •seise "^stoq siif al mM^m»%' jsmntrintm Mli aa ^ol 09 

= -i t^^j. j^-=^ft!i a^f £iAd« iatrnqtrnp* Abb tsoiitoA* 

.rixasqlirp* ]»&• ■ %m M>M-nxii<T « : 

V^ labxi. ... ^ aa do & «to«T^eeo « l«liC# fV 

~ -.-_ c,-- -: ^^^^ , ,. x^infiin^g stfl^ li iist» »#! lo »>ltMrT7£iicc 

9dt .. -, . - x7CfTq «i? t« Mi^nlT itf MXsT W hlmm «>«ril •©1t~ 
sd? ^i?€ • »ta^e slil^ )c toA ^ftjKiT xUX «i£^ tea «l»s syU^t^^-rtsXIiS 

T-^. .. ^^^^«oa si 9T«tf$ 60m «•&&- siw aci^tfirp Al t^Jnta99 

- — -^ — **aft2I«v eJ bl9m »rf x«r tiw si oa* #a^ #»8 «i«lbtT-^»IXlK 

.i.« :«i* Ic 3t^Mi^a«ce =^' - •» "-tT'^ •*«• •7s»i#a»« •^aftllar o? 

.^^5 .1X1 Oe^ »iTa<^ t^mals^l 
^^^^.. ^. ^<. >. . .. ^;,ltJMblM£L90 a ooqu 

XT?£iMaa« TTteval «n^ lo Ii» Mi? ?el aaJbircTq 91 9afi; 

X««^'' •'▼'-'i;3l ertJ fcci . , - . c-t^: .: mid to BoctoO x*' 


and th&t It fixes the resale prioee and is therefore contrary 

to the proTisijRS of section 1, of the shernan Anti-Trust act^and 

unenforcible, Boston Store of Chicajaro v. i\a'^rican G^raphophone Go. 

248 U, 3, 8. 

FroB what we ha ye said it follows that defendants* motion 
to dissolve the temporary injunction should have be^^n allowed. The 
order of the superior court of Cook county* overruling the motion 
to di'-eolve the temporary injuneti >n is reversed, 

Matchett, P.J,, and H*Surely, J,, concur. 

'%%i3«%i:rao£i &%<itm._^ii'<i 9X bii^ »«oi.-rtq sl«e«*x n^ stxit ^i iiuii turn 

. . . ai« 

ntaosioo t«t «Xl»iiff€:ija £»£: .... t 'aile;tAM 

42SS4 y 

) / 

00,, a O^TPor&tlont 

'"'•-■.... Appellee, y 

■""•••v,^ y ) int>:kl)dCuto/:y APi-'ffAL" 

T» "*•"--... /''' j FROM^ SUP.fiacjR COUf 

""■""■'-^ /* J OF dpOKyCOUNTY, 

HARRX KOPLIK, et al.^ ">^'>'*.^ ' 

Aop«lllmt(i» "^""'''^'^., 




In a petition for a rehearing, counsel Bay: •♦It le filed 
because »e earaestly believe that the Court ie In error in 
deciding the meriti of this litigation on a review of an 
Interlocutory order denying an application for dleeolution of a 
temporary injunction. " 

In passing on the In Junctional order involved, we considered 
only the verified oomplelnt and the answer. The only evidence 
which the record showed was before the court was of no moment. 
W« held that the contract which w s the basis of plaintiff's suit 
and which was attached to and made a part of the complaint was 
void and unenforceable for the reasons stated in the opinion. The 
question of the validity of this contract was argued by counsel for 
both parties and no suggestion was made that w<^ vj&Sl no ri^t to 
pass upon the validity of the contract, until the point was made 
in the petition for rehearing. Counsel in their petition say: 
"Whether the contract is vjld o&onot be determined from the face 
of the contract al:>ne. This is a question of fact to be determined 
on final pleadings and the hearing of evidence." And in support 
of this counsel cite McDougall Co . v. Woods . 247 111, App. 170; 
Friedman v. Peofeler . 255 111. App. 199, and other oases, in 
which it was held that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to 
pz^ serve the mat ers in Statu qug until the court haA an ooportimity 
to consider the cause upon its merits and that the m rits of a cause 


4 .la ^^ ,.u^--iOa[ liifiAH 

.vMl^O SM Gtf[H.efVXJS(i ao*iV<OP«0 30IT8Ut.HM 

" «aoi:;ror5jutfii x^'^^'^'t^f 

^inm&em oa to '■'■m>9 f^£i:$ eaolsd ami bmiotUi ftrtooei mit AolAti 

^lii-i r:*lvJ:ri^r.i,'!lr,- Jo glafld no^+ i £.< it©Mw *©<gtT:;taoo «^* iad^ bled tW 

aBw ]f£tidicpTOo wli to S*saqi e a&,^ ba& oi b9d9»it* »am diotdw ba» 

'Cil XsRsfiitfe© Tprf bms^iSi 8J» tOJ&iJfftoo sifiiJ to i^^'^fcilav stil;? tc xioIJafti/p 

&&&t 9d^ isa'il b9£iliTt^^ r>i) sd Jcn>;«o fexvv &1 toani^Re^ &dt rtaritwfW* 
t^oo . ntojEi«iftiv® t® ^gniiitad; adilf Aiis a8iil&««Xq X&alt a© 

;OVi , , '^^.MidlL •'^ » oC' XXi^2-^ f Vfi<lQfc. SJXO X38fiWOO «1X(* to 

c,j. ,-r:^<- 'V ii.! , , .-ii aas •i&MiiaS .' fisfifealsl 

■li«y*TtoQco /jis OMi ^tiieo arid" Xljfiiw 9«p u^t^ik^ n. ,in atfi" . «»Trt»« trtq 

9ftuao 'to at If a. ®ri^ ^«r ' 'iTStt sil. aoqu »8U«s arf;? 'ss&iaiioo o;f 


will not be considered on an Interlocutory appeal from a 
temporary Injunction, a demurrer having been filed to tbe bill. 
Those eases were correctly decided on the facta before the 
court. But the contention that a temporary Injunction In all cases 
le to preserve the status quo Is erroneous when a piled to a 
different set of facts* A preliminary Injunction may be mandatory. 
Peoples Gas Light & Golte Go . v. Slatt.ery . 287 111. App. 379; 
Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Go . v* Klamath River Lumber and Imp>Co .. 
86 Fed, 528; ftulnn v. The Foimtaln Inn« et al .t 218 111, App, 260; 
Watson V. Smith . 180 111. App, 289. 

Moreover, where It appears that a suit Is based on the 
validity of a written contract, which Is made a part of the 
complaint, and a preliminary pr- ventlve writ of Injunction Is 
awarded, the basis of which Is the validity of the contract, 
obviously If the contract Is void as against pub}.le policy the 
Injunctlonal order will be reversed by tals court on an 
Interl-^cutory appeal. 

But counsel for plaintiff »ay that In our opinion we held 
that If the contract were entered Into after the passage of the 
Mlller-Tydlngs Act and the Fair Trade Act, It would be valid 
and they say this can be shown by evidence on the hearing of the 
case on Its merits. But they further say In the Instant case 
"when appellee undertakes to exercise this right In tte trial 
court It will be faced by the contention that the decision of 
this Court on this appeal from an interlocutory order has 
established the law of the case and that under the law of the 
case this contract is void, whatever the facts as to its r^n- wal 
or the acts of the parties under it." We think this argument is 
unwarranted because It Is obvious that when the case Is heard on its 
merits, both parties will be permitted to put in competent evidence 
tending to show that the contract is valid or invalid. 

Tj^e petition for rehearing is denied. 

„ ^ ^ ^ R'CITiARING D^ISD. 

Met«h«tt, Pg J,, and M«flur*»lv,J. ,ffo»i«u"r». 


j3 ss&tt I*©qq« f'foJwoo It »cr ill a& no Asnebisno* orf :iott lltm 

»rf* ©ToTtecf a;*o«t ad* no b9htG»& xXt©»'ri«c stew a«8«'3 esoilT 

is 0^ bitXlr & csxfw siroeco'iie at fiffp axfj^i^jta oxif «T*i8«snq o# «i 

j9VS ,qq:^. .XXI Vaa , t:^oJt-%I6 ,v . 00 MqO i ^^fitaU ajag ealaoe*! 

;0©s •gqA *XIX SI9 . « I^ to timl alB^nt/o'^ 9il!f ^v aaXiag ;8sa .b«'4 M 

•Ses .qqA ,111 081 ^dJlB^ ♦T flOa^^W 

«& %e ;h[aq js ebJm el lioXxiw ^;rodi;rno« fio^^fliv « 1« x^XMIbv 

al jR0l;J3xmf.fl-^ "it. tf^li* OTi^aev-iq ^lAnlaillsiq a baz «*nlsIqao» 

(j-QBt^x:ico dd;t lo lilblljsv »tii aX doJLdw lo bXbskS Bd^ ^be!ylAWa 

erf* '^silcc aiidi.;.. f- ^Jasja ei^ Mct ei io^niiaco Bdt ti x-C^^olvcfo 

* Iji eqt.; '^ '410*00 oil o Jnl 
!._ _ .. „ - i .„ .;sd* •<?;«« Itti^nlsXq lot Xesflwoo Jirfi 

.... JL^v 9«f ftXiiOTT .ti t*oA IJ^atT il&l eci* X>cb toA 8SiiXincT-^»XXill 

('--'■^ y.r •pjnii&eei sdi no eoa&birfi ^d OTrada ©tf a»o lirit x^a x^^* *^* 

. «.. ^OMttml Qtiu al \AS isdJiHt x®^^ *^fi ♦.a*lt?a a*i no •a«o 

l3liJ^ 9j^^ flJt JjQfj^X's aid* dsitrxsrxs o* «»a[**i9&iiy ©eXXsqqB aedw* 

to n;.isXoeJb »fi^ JjsriJ noiJnerfnoo sa^t ^d i)90«l »d IIlw *i d-ix/oo 

sari Tstftic ^TtcSwooXToJni OB bciI Xa-gqa aid* no iiveO iiri* 

9ri* Ic wsl ' ' " nm; *.Sii* fena »eao srf* to waX ad* feaiiaiXdi»*89 

• Xr.rY >fl®*i «*i Od . > >« : ^ '^''' i9Te*aritr ^61cv ei *ojs^*noo aid* saAo 

ei *fi"MM»T|'X" '^ • ■ ;Inlii.. ^ '' .*! isJbcw r. ^m-^-.- ^xi* to 8*0fl ©ri* no 

a*i no in&sii &i •^^: *^* sftdEw *«£i* auolvcfo «uaos9Cf bt*^ oBntjaMOis 

Bor '- ■•'■■■•■'' 'hqaioo at Sua o* j&©**isrxeq ac aSltf'JSq d*o<f ^ati-^^m 

... -.,,^ ... liiXJST Bi *o«'i*noo ad* *3d* woda o* ^jslbn?.* 

3 1 6^'.Ar^^ 


^'^REWRf'^S LIMITED^ U.S^A., INC., ) 

^:'& corporation, ) ^,^,.^''- 

^* Appellee, ^^f'^'^ 


DREWRYS BEERS, I^>w4,a«fi-ooratlon, ) FROJ^ SUP^OR C 

and HAROLD NIMZ, „..' '"""*-^. 

yf-"" Apoellanta. 


This is sun appeal from an order denying defendants* 
motion to Taeat* an interlocutory order which provided for the 
issuance of an injunction without notice and bond "for good cause 
shown* and for the appointment of a receiver without plaintiff* s bond. 

Plaintiff says failure to provide bond on application for 
the receiver, was an oversight | contends that defendants cannot 
be harmed thereby because plaintiff owns a majority of stock of y-^ 
defendant ooiriorationi and asks this court, under Section 78 of ^ 
the Civil Practice Act, to amend the order by providing for plain- 
tiff* a bond, and affirm the action of the trialreourt. 

Kie order appointing the receiver without requiring 
plaintiff < 8 bond and t.rithout a full hearing, after notice, 
Justifying its excuse, violates section 54, Chapter 22, Ill» Rev. 
Stats., and an order appointing a receiver without notice la 
Improvidently entered, unless the complaint shows an emergency, 
in which notice would unduly prejudice plaintiff's rights of 
endanger the property for which the receiver is sought. Simpson 
^» AdkinSf 311 111. Aqpp. 543, Chapter 69 on Injunctions, section 
3, requires notice unless waiver Is proper on allegations of 
complaint and affidavit, and section 9 requires plaintiff's bond 
unless good cause is shown for waiving it. A finding of "good 
oause shown* Is insufficient, unless good cause appears from 




..Ulrli j.A4lC^U^. 


; .A ,IXC!. , , MHO 

9BU&0 &QOS 10)" &no<;f &a.s n^lioa itsosiit^ aoltoasJlal tt& I0 saiuvsa 

"io irf^sc^a to x*-'^cLBffi A afiwo Ti1ltal»Sti •3U/:o«ti x^foi^rf^ J&9f?XAri • 

.V9S , ,12 ^sJ<jsfltO j^fl iJoWcea e©J«XoiT ,»fittox« »?! sa^'X'^'^'^ 

Bi eoiJfoft tist>fi7lv t9rl9Q9t » galJnioqga *t«2)no a?^ J>ns ,a«J<;3' 

I0 aJdjji^ ffi*HX?niaIq e»i&wt«'«l tlubmj bLu9V osiiTofi ilo4^ II 

nci*o©8 ,anoi;t£»m»r,nr «% ^- •s^tn-ir'r *f:>e *qqA .1X1 XX* ,fflUMi » 
to ©nciJfi:^XJ vi4«f aaeXviw ©oi^TQH •-•niupen j 

tc.oi.*' "-r v'.nl.r n.f V .fvTnv -^ci nvodi Ri 9S(i.«o &093 *8#Xfl 


the record, W&gncr v, Okner. 308 111, App, 601, That finding hep« 
reete on the eoQDlalnt whleh must alldge sufficient facts justifying 
the finding stn& excusing notice and bond. 

The ooaplaint alleges thjt the IndlTldual defendants are 
president, vice-president and secretary of the defendant corporation; 
that plaintiff ovne and possessee 549 of the 350 shares of stock; 
tj^at the business of the defendant corporation is excluelTe sale 
and distribution of plaintiff's beer; that defendant corporation Is 
Indebted to plaintiff in excess of 39,000,00 and Is unable to 
pay the indebtedness; that plaintiff owns the ootor trucks operated 
by the defendant corporstlon and has a chattel mortgage on the 
fixlmres and eoulpment of the corporation; thet th* defenajsnt 
corporation is insolTsnt and its officers refuse to execute settle- 
ment papers nrep&rsA pursuant to agreement to settle plaintiff's 
clalae and that the officers threaten to collect outstanding 
account? receivable and withdraw money of the defendant corporation; 
that an Individual defendant dr«^ and cashed a check drawn on 
corporate funds payable to cash; that defendant corporation has 
Inventory sufficient for only a fet days and plaintiff can no longer 
ship to defendant because of the state of its account and that It 
will thereby lose custoajers and It and its stockholders and 
creditors suffer Irreparsble d^aage. Plaintiff on inforaaation anfl 
belief charges the individual defendants have used and will use 
corporate defendant's money and accounts receivable, for ourposes 
other than corporate to plaintiff's detriment; thit plaintiff has 
no legal reaedy and unless individual defendants are restrained 
from collecting accounts receivable or eelllng inventory or aspets 
of the corporate defendant, or from withdrawing money of the corpor- 
ation, the corporate affairs of defendant corporation will be 
wrecked to the daaage of the iiilalntlff as stockholder and creditor; 
and alleges a receiver should be aooointed to keep the business of 
defendant in regular and noraal operation until disposition of the 


#ij^ s«r. t&i vital 9ilJ ^HdJ •t3»XXs liii»I<3ao9 «i!'' 

;aoi*;Cv -fl4tii«ie5 «ri^ lo X'X«^9'Xd«a JbiSA «rj|i»Bla««sq«»t>lT ,tfi«l>l«»^f 

971S&I ;ol?siC(irs8o $A«>JbaelftJ& a/it lo eaaoieiicf aiU ^t^l 

09 dJb&Sfi9li»£ ;rAiU f: ' it^niblQ to iiolifutftttalft l>a« 

; .«eBTa Hi ttltifli^Xq «t t>at<ia6Al 

fi9i&'i^<^ hdMt^^ idea 9At as^c lllJalar. s.^A:} \^»»al>%t<i*bnL ad^ x^q 

«ya fi- '$^tfAit« d a«il bam a*$X^u%injnG9 SsiM^mt^ a49 ItT 

?tL^^fi«>lfc& «ri^ *aH3 jrt«l*r«io<rieo a^ ^« sa&mqXMtx» btt» a*i>tmtxlt 

•»X*#@* ^st9»ii9 e* ««4tftsi »*taei";to a^£ tnn Scmvlc*ml tit no l;r jsf«<rfoo 

in%l;f«nr»'^o$ JiWir'nAt«6 afl^ lo ksacsi vis^idil^lw Aitji aXcfsvlaMst s^ni/oosa 

umjA ffoltj^€N3*roo tfLft68«ta& Jalfcr tfi[eA« &i e ifcflol a^^^ocri** 

Tp?5fler on cas 111?ji1jsXc ^ft?- 9i«* v»l ^ ^{Xa© lot Jnaldlltiya xnota^Yal 

.[i bti& tauQ&ot statu 9ni \g 9»y:.:9dd in$Aa9t9b •$ qlila 

^afi B*isb£oM9e4t a#i fiAi tX ta£ ft&so^ejue asoX xcfa^'Hitf XXlv 

ftae aGlJ.4Jrac^/Jl frc tll?fil«r^ *«IBMi^ »Xcf.fl«»<l»Tfi ^att^a ^T;ci^l6«»^o 

esfi XXlv ^tfy b9e.v 9rsuA »ia»bi^\%b Isailtwlbri %Gf aagri^e lalXcv 

l^alaXij t Nrft ;£r«a«ln3raA «*«l#al«.-- nicr^oo ttwl* «t»ilto 

fr^niT^ssi V1& 5tfi— ci^'^pf) XsMlJlylfcfli aafiXiw £a* ycbm^o^ tKg»I ©n 
i*t ^'icJaQ «XcJiivl»««'s •*etfe»9A ^l^otXXoo ao^l 

9d 1 11'^ r^-i; * c -j.-c Jfiaf.a*»'^c; •■*itc«oa a^W ,nol5 

5'?o<lJ&»'if> £n-d t^^f; re?:;. --'-■' 7? ^b li^niHSr ©ri;? '■c »|^?,Rsij6 eitr e* fcaias^w 
'to i,->e.n.'?^: . ^_ . :.•» K^'c-' r-, -J '■ ft'crv - f>ifl'3S»^ m aa^aXXa !>«* 

t.r.r -fslf. J"l;inr roii^- ni ;rfta£«ataft 


In the affidavit plaintiff's attorney affli^ns that he kas 
knowledge of the facts alleged and that they are true in subatance 
and In fact, except those on Information and belief, which he 
verily believes to be true. 

Plaintiff does not allege that by its ownership of the 
majority stock, it can not correct the matters complained of within 
the oorooration without calling upon a court of equity; and doee 
not say why defendant oorooration is unable to pay Its account 
with plaintiff* Its allegation of insolvency is a conclusion; it 
does not alleg* that Individual defendants did not have the right 
to refuse to execute the papers; nor does it sufficiently charge 
why the outstanding accounts receivable should not be collected 
nor corporate money withdrawn; nor that drawing of and cashing 
the check was not proper; nor is it shown why defendant corporation 
should lose any oustoaers* The allegation on information and belief 
is insufficient for it does not indicate for what purposes, other 
than corporate, money, merchandise and accounts receivable were cp 
are intended to be used* fhe affidavit accompanying the complaint , 
does not add to its sufficiency* It is evident that good cause 
was not shown for excusing notice of, and plaintiff's bond for, 


the appointment of a receiver* 

For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the 
order improvidently Issued) Section 78 Civil Practice Act cannot 
apply to make it valid; and the order denying defendants' petition 
to vacate the order of June 27, 1942, is hereby reversed, 


«ri rioi/!w tl;»if»df fic« aoi}jet"notnl no eaori^ *qs»x» «9a«t nl b. 
ed# 1© a[ldatert»ro bJI i:cf ^«xiJ ©g^XXe Son saoJb llUnlal^ 

.. i£iola&lnsn£>o ^ si ^eaavXcBCEi lo aei^jB9»lX« ■i'l .Dl^niAXq Ai 

^!4^h^ ^tfi A,.-' •^.^fi >fr-. sst.'ior.r' i«i-Afc £»vhlrtbal J«xltf".^»atXXj» Jon •• 

«.e-»r,arr^r, t.,^' ?«/T ff-^wo ^rcfftVl^osi 9Jru/e90A }^iba&t%itto siW x 

M " tfl^bfielefe "^rinr flworis Jl ai ion ;i«qonq Jon ««w 3[a«{lo » 

iffliolai no acl*«gaXr« trlT ♦a-ttBOJew© x«a woJf ^Xwo 

•j-ijv 4» .io«-jioq Jsflw lot ttrntilbal icn asc/- *' ~-* *n9loltti;afli 

:t«w •I«f«Tloo©*s «Jfgt;ooo« fina •«16fl.ario^*«' j^o-ntu ^*«f«1loq^oo n^ 

asses ells' gfllxnecro!O5>0« Jir,e.&ltt« »tlT «£eau ©d o? bstnaJflZ o 

^' yg© J&cos t&Ai .tn«&iv© 8i '^ ^laneloitlAjri ^" '* hbs ton a* 

^^ot Rnc.^ f -r ■ - '.,^j^j ^T;- e,r,i*on gniswoxr ict nwoiia ten a 

*-Y«irleeorr s to Jii«aJnloqq« ? 

Jennao Jaft. a^lJoai*? XiTiO eV noiJoeS (ftetfeai \£ta9Mroiqml i9b 
nolttteq *9tn»bm\9h ^at%n9b loMe 9tit btiK {JbiXsv *l 9Ajia ot x^ 
,i>9nt9vm xt^'^'f'*^ cl gS^01 ,rs •nt;! -'to ariJ sJaojiT 





?oiRi of Pawnee, In San^is^a 
County, Illlaola, % 


ChXtteivl&n, Jasaes, 'H, Fielliyj 
Carey E, 3&n^e i\wX it. B* 
of AudiUtf»a of tiie 1'own of 

^la^ Termi. d* 194S 
Agenda No. 2 


316I.A. 807' 

Circuit Cv:>ur 



Yh» P€t.lti<m0r-Appell«!e, fcum of Pawn©*, SankftBUMWi 
County, Illinois, filed suit in tHe Oirouit Court of aaid Cwunty 
Al^ainat aem^re of tlie Bo^rd of Auditors of the Town of C'lpitaX 
of said Couaty, Def aiici,aat.«>-A|>peliai»t«t li^reln, praying th«it a 
p«r®«E^>tory frit of slandaaus be ord«r#d. to issue out of mX^ 
Court coBaMtmlias tiie DefeiaaanitR-Appellants to audit and upproY© 
for payaent Xim olala of Petitlondr-^peXIee, leased upon a. final 
Jud^ent entered by a Polio® Nfaglstrate*^ Ctntrt on 09tou«r I6« 
Xd-4yo, froia w^lok jud^i^ent no appeal had l»e«n tiyst^n. 

The ioandamis suit %&» filed on June 13, 1941, and 
after hearings thereof, the Court found the isoues in favor of 
the plaintiff fmd ^tered Judgment for Petltloner-^Appellee and 
against Defendants-Appellants, isrrmting the ^V'rit ae prayed for 
In thie petition. Frooi that. Judtpiont, the i>efendant»«AppelXMits 
have appealed to tnis Court. 

- 1 - 




' K^ 

Mi&§ <OK iMfMl 





TiMt pt^titian isULleged tlie eatrj ot the above Judg- 
si&nt la txie PoXioe ''^j^iji^letrate's Court on Ootober 15, 1941, 
for l|173.^ and for $&,40 ooists, tma that no appeal was takon 
tiierefrom. Xt was furthor alleged tiiat a oertlfied oopy of 
aaid proceedings inoludla^ Judipaent entered therein wae pz*eo 
sented by tae petitioner to the Soard of Toim Auditors of said 
town of Capital on May T, 1941, witli petitioner »» attached 
affidavit Uiat it wae a Juat and oorrset olaljs or o^iarg© 
agaltiist said town; tlaat the B&mtd of fo«a; Auditors la,&8 refused 
to audit a£td allow aald Judssae&it claim bo tliat provision could 
be oade for Its payment. It was further alleged i.hat the audit- 
ing of said Judgment la a ministerial act not Involving the 
exercise of offlol^il dl@oretlaa, and that Vm refusal of @ald ' 
:-;oard to audit and allow ih& uame wm@ arlsltrary, unlawful f^M. 
la violation of their les«tl duty to audit and allow the &mm 
as a claim .a^inst ssald to«in. Then follows petitioner's ppfi:y&r 
for a ^rlt of Mandmaus directed to the respective :isteiabers of 
iiald 3o&rd ooi^andlng theia to aMlt and approve the @ald olalii 
for Judiyaent and coats In favor of the tcmn of Patmeet and to 
£3alce a Certificate of their aMlt and the aiiiount thereof to said 
Town of CflNPltal and deliver the same to Its Town Cleris as re- 
ctulred toy law. 

Defendants -Appellants filed taelr answer denying 
that petitioner had obtained aald Judgsient for siaid asaount and 
coate, or for any amoimt, alleging that after trial of aaid 
eau««« the Police llia^atrate announced that ae wotUd $^lve hie 
0|>lnlon therein on the day follo^lns i^tnd that defendants are 
not advised and do not know whmm juo^naent ^nm entered la @ald 
Cause; that on October 2§, 1940 » qu® dollar (tl.OO) was tendered 
to and accepted i^ @ald Police Haglstrate for a transcript of 
eald proceedings, vhlch was called on Hoveiauer 16, 1940; that 
defendants deny that a certified copy of the proceedings of the 

lo %'^.iu jt,t-j<iiLa'jii>/jt %,li«iii# b9»*SJjn n»^w*ttjl iu« .*' i 

-iirS(| J3£w ul^to/i.! Ii«i>a»^£»» 4WMSj^irt, Stfilb^^^tU tt^li^ 4 

tei^^&if Ax^ ii'%&^ilMt>A itwoT \o jBf<i«oa fal# ^«rf4 )iv«o# blMM SMUafnt 

U^^^^mJGbjj s.-^^f'n^lu'i^ soft- SMSsa «mI# woXiJB boM Slbtu^ o4 tnuHt 

.^1 o' ^j^^ ie«xii& i><i« .»iJE»uA «>j t^ATb x«a»x *a<ua )« M»i4AXttXv m 

o^ mm ,«i€«^ to avpt »^ *fce> -xoY£.!r aX AIM* JbiW ■fli—^mt "K^t 

■•-.sfeaR 'sXeAi^ !*»Xit 5-irf5».iX#<K|^V>si*Ui4««lt«C 
jbXii^s^^ 9A amxiS bmmia^tmx' ftSJe^^i^e^ 99US4A «<tf « — »<!• 

.ui»«iftb!t^^ >^^ %%it «^/!'X^h1^m$« 9&XX«»f &X«ft ^ h9>HSH9^M iia» •! 

'(^viittovai-l uc s»^lJUm Bftiw iu»i4Mr ,i;a0XI>«««e^ 6X«« 

Polloe Magistrate's Couz*t, Inoludins @«^l<i Judgment and ooBte 
were presented to %lm Auditors of the Toim at Capital by 
petitioner or any person for hXa on May 7, or tbat petition- 
er's affidavit of oorreotnea@ of eaid olaia was attaohed« 
and states that in Febrtiary 1940, there was presented to tsaid 
3oard of Auditors of Capital Townsaip, a letter froa ti&e 
Poliae lla^8trate» whioh in pi%rt aet forth that on Ootoi:>c»r 
23, 134D, a Jfuoi^ent amounting to ll?6.^ plus eouurt oosts 
of #6.40 was entered against Capital fofmship in favor of 
Pawnee Township; that said letter w&s aeeoapanied by what 
purported to te an affidavit s&mA statement by th@ Supervisor 
of said fown of Pawnee « piu*porting to certify that C-apital 
Township is indebted to smid Pawnee Towneiiip for the antowcit 
of said Judgment and ooats; that i»gain in Hay 1941 the »&BSt 
etateiaent ^^ said parties, purportins t>o be subsorioed and 
sworn to, vma again presented to the 3o«ird of Auditors of 
Capital Township. Defendants admit sM&h auditing to be a 
ministerial aot bat. deny that it does not involve official 
discretion. They deny that such refus^al to audit mtd allow 
Judgiiient la order that same ®ay be jmid was arbitrary, un- 
lawful und in violation of their duty and say that said 
olaisB is unjust mid that tliey ar$ advised that such JUTi^J^iaent 
is a nullity, mxid aa^ that they be dismiased with their costs. 
The «ajnswer is a denial of affirmative allegations of the ooa- 
plaint and created no new issues ncHr defense which required 
a reply by the plaintiff* 

AppelXants^Defendants assigned error, 

(1) In holding that said claia was presented at %ii» 
propex* times 

(2) That said olaiat was presented in proper fora; 

(3) That said olaitt was prap&rlar presented; 

(4) That judgment ims a valid jud^paent; 

<5} That the <:^rder of the Court is contrary to lav, 
«. 3 - 

^^ XnJl<!i»0 to Mi^ •h^ to nt'iStiMtA «fLS t»i bmiommt^vii 0Vt^ 

^:> <idV«A ini ail£jeitF*e1 iJ»#£<;#vO #it<iXiQMi &«*»#2» aunr 0K«4I$ to 

^.^-4» t^ b'-finr ^^«X JbJtA^ ^Mi# ;qliteflv»t mmma^ 

'zoftlv^Ml^' ^tt4i eci «tf vi Jbv^oa^ruKt 

>^ »<L^ °X(»t qJUlAISWo. !»«li«r«>i L -. -j^titmL •! qliteMMl 

o^ l»3L<t»"s i^^fti ^ft^ tA«S "tmfi .a<iXie*toiitb 

"im ^vs^^utltn& nam; t^ x^^ ^mh^ $mfis it#&^ ni #aMij|Mtt 

Mj^ <i^<^<i V'8) t^^& \tut> 'U96i to floiJiiXoiT Ki ba* JJrtnml 

,-so'*ri» !)ai\&j.%s,ri »jrAfii>fMit«iS««#aiiiX»qi|A 
Pil? Jtii fe«4iW:<=«'i.i s*»»- »Jt«X9 Ma. tUblGSi nl (i) 

tlMi^A^ftrKi xi'x^KiOHq ttJC(«? mluLb l>X«a #«<!: <&) 

A^eXl«e-Pf» tit loner la Its ticlet r«Xlea 1^01% t^ 
folIovlQg for Af flnaoi-ioe of the Oraor of the TrliU. Oourti 

(1) That no Report of the Prooeedln^ a,t %h» trial 
was filed and Inoorparated In tne reoox*d filed in ti^ls Court, 
and slnoe error aealiyied for reversal Involved natters of 
evidence, tiiie Court of review oarmot oonalder the eaiae and 
siiould dlaolee tiie appeal or affirm Va,& Os^er of tne frlal 

(3) thB.% in tne abeenoe of euon Report of l^ooeed- 
- ln|(« at tile trial, this Court la required to presume that 
' tke frUH Court imd suf flolent evldenee before it to Justify 
issvm,n<m ^or^'a Writ --f Maadaame. 

(3) H&at the errors aeslsned were not baeed upon 
leauee made ^ tke pXeadlnsu. 

(4) %at the auditing of a Judgamtt aisalnet a 
town preceding provlaione for payment. Is a mlnlssterlal aot 
not Involving official discretion, the tserforjscnce of wliloh 
can be ooereed t^y niandmvius. 

{&) That juoi^iient b^ a Court having Jurli»dloUon 
of the parties and aui^Jeet jaattt^ eanaot be eollateralljr 
attaOKed In a Buandataius proceeding Isrcught to enforee ite 
pigment, laut Its validity eould only t»e qisestloned by dlreet 
appeal or petition for Writ of Gertlorari, r j provided lay lew. 

Slnoe no Eeport of Pt*8eeedlnsa at Uie trial ncaf 

.any Oertlfleate of thtf Trial JTudiie tn relation thereto vias 


' Inoorporated in the record, this Court is not in a position 

to review errors a«ei£:ied vhloh are oased upon a^tterie of 

evidence aot so ptPeB^rved and therefore not oefore this Court. 

iCUpatrlok v. Sohaltt 303 111. App. 15, 24 N. E. (2<i) 224; 

People ex rel ileDonough v.'^Jherwin, 361 111. 403, 196 N, E.343; 

lUurtford Aeeident & Indemnity Co. v. Federal Elec Coarvany 

887 111. App. 616, 4 H. E.(ad) 806. In the abeenoe of a Heport 

- 4 - 

i#jen b&rltamit Xa«r«3wv»<x -tot l>«RdJt*a« 'son'sa atmia kmn 

X«X*x? «»jiJ to 't:»in ' Qii9 snXVUi 's.o Xiiecfctto »Jii# anXAsit l)Xtfoii« 

%%k4^ totit^ 9ea#l>iV9 ^a^lollXifm hmd ^«ufoO X«l^ •«(# 

l.tlJ^ttq «ws X«iq[«|«i 
tnoqm'- ,^X0 .(iqA.XXZ Tat 

©f Prooft^dlngn at %he trial, this Court is required to 
ftSAUse that tJ4« Trial Caur^ Had sufficient ffvidence before 
it to Justify ite order. Kilp»trio>t v. SeJamitt, nuora. 

It ifl th« veil settled law of thizsi state tiiat the 
auditing of a Judgaeiit aisaia^t m toma so %ha.t provisions 
tsay ^ im,^e for its p&ymtnt is a miniaterial aot imd when 
la proper fojw itairolTe^' m* ®x«r0i§« of official di.««sr«tiaa, 
\ and suoii audititsg aM approval laay properly Oe oo«rced by 
aandm^AS prooeedlngs, Feopla ex.rei Baird & Waraer v. Lind- 
heiiser, 3?0 111. 424, 19 U, n42a) 336; Town of Lyom v. 
CoolQise^ 89 111. aS9j People ex.rel ll^Tymoxid v. Chimvsjo ft 
A. H. Oo. 193 111. 3S4,a67 - #1 M. E. 1063J PUToell ▼. Town 
of Sear GrmK, 138 111. S^4,530 -S8 M. S. 106S. Judgments 
a^eiinit %om%& are a to'm oharg® ajid wiiea oolleoted »re to 1m» 
paid to t&« persons to whom taey sliall Imve been adjudged. 
fMe Board of Town Auditors iaas ao discretion to refuse to 
audit a valid Judsaentt asalnst a town. loore v. Town of 
Brownias. 373 111. 683; 37 S. S. (ad) 533. 

Xa Town of Lyona v. Coole^e, et mX, 69 111.389, 

&38, it is aptly said "Slanidamug la tli® proper remedy for ea- 

forcing ta© Judgment 5*s«inet the "town by eoiapellins tixe 
;^ard of 4uditor^ to audit m%^ certify the aiaouat neoessury 
to aatisfy th& Judgment, whieh is deelsared by t^e lat^ to be 
$k town onmr^e, so t,im% tiie satae ^^s^ be included in tUe aiaoimt 
of gioneya to be levied on tlie taxable p£*ope2*ty in the town, 
»nd when oolleoted, paid to the persons to whoa it h^ia been 
ftdjudsed. The People ex. rel Glty of Cairo, 5<> III. 165; 
City of Qlney ▼. Harvey ibid. 454j Ro^rs v. The People ex 
rel m id. 164; Feoria Co. v. dordoa, m id 435." 

It is alleged ia the petition ^ind admitted in the 
answer that a dtatesient was filed with tiMs Board of 'I! own 
Auditors of tae Town of Capital oi^itainine a reoital oonoem- 

- 5 - 

leMv Nift $o.f. Lmi'mS'^inlm « ai :^^mc%.fiq »#! tot •I>a« ^tf '%am 

.'i .K 8ft» cea.^fi® .1X3 '^^-^^ ,,>i?»ino «xjMie !• 

.iSea ib^) »n .{! T« <««« .XXI S^ taRXRvo^ 

«d oi ^.(>rX ^* vi i»r3MuCe«fe «i ii»iii« ^4mms^l *At t^iiMi ol 

/i##«f ««i!t jx i^ai» oi? ^'js«»Q*t»q »Mi i$4 hlaoi ,6$JO»iX^^ iiMkr AAA 

^a£x .ax 06 t»i£<io tc t^io x«»^ .x» •x<{««<( ma: *bm9^\M 

' .^i> ^ ■'/ tcag «noiAnt»«) *v .»& jaX^ttcK'. ;^X .AX 6» Xv% 

il».- ' ^ fi>»l«r i>»Xil mtm 9tma»^A99 » *»M I^vmb* 

log tkt JudjgpiMtetit l^ the Polios Ilij^striite ^'^ocoHiwttllta t)^ a 
pturported affidavit of ta« Supervisor of th.e Town of Pa^aee, 
certifying v.xe assouat aad aaturt of tiie claim, during the 
moaUi of February oiJixL aigain ia tiae aioatia of l^, iat4i, pur- 
porting to be au^soribed aiM sworn to, was presented to 
tix« Board of Auditor® of Oi^itaX foims&ip* leithftr %h» 
tranaoript tt,or form of %m judgs^nt befor® the Polioa 
8la8l«tr&te« wkie^ i0 alleged to lae a nulXit;^, oor tii» Oi^itv 
Of toe affidavit aoooiitpan;ri£i£ tJ2@ oX^iim filed with ths Boaxik 
of Toim Auditors are preserved ia t^ record and iir® ti*ere- 
for« not before tiii@ Court, fm m&t^ ount&ntlon here tliat 
th«i aasae Is ix*regular and a imllitj eatt tev« no foroe n.& 
ogaiaat the affinitive fiBdi:a@ ausd order of tii« Trial Gowt 
tco t^« eoatr-'iry. 

While we }mv& aot fully dlaoussed, w© have or«re- 
ful-ly ©oa8id(sred all fiaeigsmenta of error set forth, in 
D€sf@ttdaiita-Appellattte brief and we find no reversible en;*or 
in tli« rooord. Tli@ Judsooat of the Cirouit Court of Stm^smm 
County will tla^erefcKre b& nftxvimal. 

- 6 • 

» ygi :s»u^4».>ooA in^''ij}i 

.if'iioo*i m£S al 



(}«a0ral No. 9346 

Mildred 3^l£a3Psai>n« iiifflliUstra- 

trlx of tae SsialN^ Qf Joim Z, 
Sturgeon, Deoe^ed, '"""'*'--««„^ 

Term A. i. 1942 


A«^enda Mo. 8 

)«J 1 ti 



) ^ 
) Appeal 
4^ Clrovdt Qairt of 


Cllftoo <4uartoa« a raloor, hf 
Lest^ K. Vaaderer, ais Quardlaa 
ad intern, 

Defendant-Appellant ) 

aiESs, p. j.s *««***^' / 

Judgment was entered upon the Terdlot of a Jury in 
an aotloB at law in tort in the Circuit Cotu't of 'lontgomer^ 
Couatj, Illinois, on Deoemlt>er 31, 1941, for the aua of iSO(X}.00 
and ooets of suit, in favor of tfaie Plaintiff-Appellee, Hildred 
Stui^eon, Administratrix of the Estate of John E. Sturgeon, de- 
ceased, &ai. against the Defendant-i^pellant, Clifton Quarton, a 
minor, represented by Lester K. Yandever as his attorney ;md 
Guardi/m ad Litem. The suit was based on the alleged negliseooe 
of the defendant and arose out of an automobile collision between 
two oars respeo timely driven by defeMant Quarton in aa easterly 
direction and siy plaintiff's Intestate sturgeon in a westerly 
direction along Federal Aid Route 38, a *blao& t^" highway 
with uaaariced center, at a point about one mile west of Litchfield, 
between 1:30 and 3 o*clooJc A. M. of ^igust 4, 1940. The collision 
resulted in grave injuries to both drivers and in the subsequent 
death of plaintiff's intestate Sturgeon on v'^ptember 2, 1940. 
Successive motions for a directed verdict for the defendant were 
interposed at the close of plaintiff's evidence and of all the 
evidence, followed by defendant's motions for Judgment notwithstand- 
ing the vez^ict, and to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, 

- 1 - 


tjff xa-At^c*© 

10 Xt'fJ 

,' >t«t&r<^i«il.. --'^ OC:X iiiiVtftflKf 

net «»o,iJ-. «roXXot ««#ii9MT* 

All of wiUch motions w«r« denied oy the Trial Court. F'roa 
%k9 Above rullQge and Judgaent, the defendant has perfected 
an appeal to thle Court. 

Before the trial, eult «ae dlsntiesed as to Coy 
Ouarton, father of Clifton Quarton, who had oeen joined as a 
fto->defendant therein. 

The oomplaint alleged that defendant negllj^ently 
(a) failed to keep proper* lookout for weett^ouad traffic ;(b) to 
aaintain good and suffieient brakes <m hia oar; (o) to give 
warning that he waa about to turn his vehiole from a direct 
oourse, as required by Sec. 66» GPh. 95^, 111. Rev. Stats.; 
(d) drove eaae at exoeesiYe speed without proper regaM to 
traffic and use of highvajr in violation of Beo. 49 of said 
Chi^>ter| (•} failed to tiu*n to right of center of hlg^vaj 
while paesins in violation of Sec. 56 of said Chapter; (f}drove 
to left of center of hi^hwa^r againat plaintiff's iBteetote*3 
automobile. IXie Oiure Qsf plaintiff and plaintiff's intestate 
««• aleo alleged. Def ei^iant* s answer denied all said alli^a- 
tioaa of neslii^ence by him or of due care as alleged )xy plain* 

(M appeal >def «andaat assigns error by the Srial Court 
in ovtoTuling hie various motions; in adiaitting inoonipetent 
evidenee for plaintiff and exeludi^ng eospetent testiMooy offered 
by defend?int and in giving or refusing certain instruetions 
offered by the respective parties, and asics that the cause be 
reversed by the Court or rewersed and re^uided with directions. 

As to the tirae and place of the ooUisitm, the location 
sad conditi(»i of the wreoK^ oars and the subseqiient ph/sioal 
condition of tae parties, the witnesises were in substnntial 
agreearat. Froa the evidence, it appears that on August 4,1940, 
between 1:30 amA 2 o'clock A. M., defendant Clifton 4uarton, 
aged 20 years, whose father was a farmur residing nerr Litchfield, 
111. , was returning hone alone froa a daaoe at the ** Golliseus^ 

• 2 • 

"■ Xftini'i .,..- 

-'Um iS»lifv to ISA 

'■'':^-- *^r^4» Mil 

■."' .ijMKtj^ am 




«s&^«Aac>i. ■■■■ .>.'Uife,i4--i- 



^'■iii.i' ■•>. 

^i.- v«X.^«l (ft) 

• ^Mcnb (&) 

ii* 9i^J& f'^JUi 10 •«£»^ila«<> '^« MNUL4 

4 «Jlw: 

ijS©itfv4(M JsrAgUf|i'».'J'.*i»6 »*«S .wi*.:. .*'tS^ &»?:&«»*&.-sr MU iw j3G>^.». 

^SlO^H-Ji.fiU*' Sii^J.Jtl*) 4A»ii*i'^''i>.i^ , 

■ ;.: ' -li'i^Uj^A i»AM^ .«a*ui«Y CM btifill 

*']{ti^«)0 ' -^ii'i ..r-^i MMuO.' A ffio'i^ dAOJLft maoA nfUenti^^i tMr «.IXX 

or Tarro*8 BaUrooa at 3eald, where he had gone about 11:30 P.M.; 
that he was driving a 1936 Chevrolet sedan owned by his father. 
In an easterly direction over Federal Aid Route 38, a hard sur- 
faced "black top* road, with unmarked center, known as the 
Litchfield-Gillespie road, at a point approximately one mile 
west of Litchfield; that the plaintiff intestate, J<^fcui E. Sturgeon, 
aged 35 years, a laborer, who resided with his wife and five 
year old child in Litchfield, was at that time and place driving 
hie 1933 Oldsmobile Ci&a^9 along said highway ia a westerly di- 
rection froffl Litchfield toward O-illespie, after leaving " Skinny 's" 
restaurant and tavern where he had spent the earlier part of the 
night, when the collision occurred between the two oars going 
in opposite directions, wherein both the plaintiff^ intestate and 
the defendant sustained serious injuries and plaintiffiyintestate's 
death followed on Septeaiber 2, 1940. The testlaony further shows 
that the ahock and injuries to both parties rendered them uncon- 
scious of and unable to recall what occiiirred at and iiffi&ediately 
before the tine of the collision and that no other person or 
persons occupied either car or were present at the tiaie and place 
of the collision and resultant injuries. Ho marks of any kind 
Blade by the wheels or fraaework of either car were found on the 
•black top" which might otherwise have been circumstantial evidence 
of the respective locations of the two oars on the highway at the 
tiae of the collision. Scattered glass was found on both sides 
of the road and in front of both cars. Bie left front portions 
of both oars were badly laashed and twisted ft^om apparently violent 
iiapacts clearly shown on five photographs admitted in evidence 
by consent of parties aa showing their true condition. The wrecked 
oars were found at a distance 40 to 50 feet apart. The Stiirgeon 
Oldsoobile Coupe was standing at the right or northerly side of 
the road and was facing westward in the direction in which it had 
been traveling, with two wheels in a shallow ditch and two on the 

- 3 - 


SUio^ ?*Ttfi« «s»J^ &«'<* i*e8w«»o fe*s;«*o©o iioi«iXioo •ai iwwiw ,^i%ls 

••©x'r: -'"-'-.A ^^:«)!iir»o.^ •jsij ..OlfeeX ^^ Tca«i«e4 -.■jee no l>«»oXX©t tiJamb 

f«?3f;j-'.^ ciijB .«aiX^ wi^ 4* jTnw^^^iq s-^idw io iiBa tfte*i» l>iiiqi»890 8is»«<^E»q 

9onel)Xv© j:«l^i54Si?ei»*j0*Ui> JCii'»« 9v*fi fgX'anaiJ^* ijc(|g,Xtf> ii??t«i% *^ni :^a«Xd* 

a»^Xa ii4r©s ^« laeijio':! »«« aa«X& d*^»MfioB .ocXaiXXoo *ii^ ie aaXJ 

8«oi^xut| ^*io*t <J^«X fiflS. .fc-XJic xLi^td to ^isa'xl «X i)e*i bmQi 'dH^ 1© 

^fieXoXY ■%X.tM»'W-o<}* lao'il bt&43l9J[ ijaa saSiknffl u.Xi5«a iri^w «•*»© ii^ocf ^o 

roe^^/ii-. ..' -^<|» .4r»»'t Oi 9^ ^s?' pciiAJBXXi a ^s Maxot ♦•!•» «nuu» 

^*ii <^i 4«X2i* «i j0Mii*»9'aXb j^*^:^ «X ,{>*isw*8*w ^jt«At mm £«a !»«« «tf4 

- t - 

9ds© of tiie •'blaok top* , with Its left front wheel bent down. 
The Chevrolet driven by the defendant was found at the outer or 
right edge of the opposite or eouth side of the "blaoV. top* 
portion of the roadway in the direotion in which the o&r nad 
been traveling eastward and wae lying upside down with the front 
•nd faoins in a northeasterly direction. Some springs and parts 
of the oars and shattered glass were soattered on the hi^shway 
between the two oars. Cm, the following aornlng, a epot reaestblins 
blood was noted hj one of the witnesses on the northerly side 
of the center of the hi^way. 

The first person to arrive on the eoene shortly after 
the ooourrenoe was plaintiff's witneee Herschell Donaldson, who 
resided in Litehfield where plaintiff intestate and defendant 
also resided. His testimony waa imoontradioted and was corroborat- 
ed by nuserous witnesses ae to oonditiona at ^Uie eoene of the 
eollision and was in substanoe as follows; Tbat he had oocasion 
to drive along the Litohfield-aillespie road at about 1:30 o'clock 
on that aorningj that he there oaiae upon two oare - an oldsiaooile 
standing on the right or north side of road and facing we@t, and 
a Chevrolet lying upside down on the south side of the road, facing 
northeast. The oars were approximately 40 or SO feet apart. The 
Chevrolet waa aljsoet in the ditch and the Oldsmobile had two wheels 
on the shoulder and the two left wheels on the *bl«tok top" road; 
"when X got there I got out of car and the fellow in the Oldsmobile 
0oupe (plaintiff' 3 intestate) was standing up and holding his ara 
on his forehead. I aei£^ if he was hurt but he didn't answer. I 
told hia he better go and get in lay oar, and I would take hia to 
the doctor or hospital. He didn't answer and I went to loo]£ in 

the other oar to see if I could help whoever was in it, and when 

1 got over thex^ the/fellow (defendant) was lying in bott(^ of 

oar. As I resoember, the osr was upside doim. He was bleeding 

^roai nose and mouth and there was quite a pool of blood there. 

- 4 • 

..mmi£> ^m^ £mm *mi^ tli%- •#! Aii^ , ^i^ 3faM»jM* 9^ \9 mf^ 
rif) *ie- ?.'.??? -^ri* ^m himat anew .*iMSfc«s»'i»J& mdjr \ci a»-ir.S-tfc- .t»lo'xiq»^ mET 

imsi -imf )«ti.^ t^^jiv »x aoU^siMnajt^ ctcUF al ^imbmn sjU lo iioi^*B»q 

&A'J»<4.%«ilytir ^ ''<««» ew# eoi$ir -misum 9nAM i^;^ it«iU isKliruMi tmiit ao 

Hlist^M 0«$- kind i^M^iimiMfy ^si-S M:m i^ilh^tii ul itomlB bmi ^^Saftt^A^ 

{hfi&'s, ^^i :%&/^.lki*' «^ Hi! tiX-3^Mv ili%l oni ^t&S bUA vtstiUilfsd^ tul^ iK 

^ItHkss^MbXO m^ i?i iiTG.rjL^'t aui tm* '<-tw 'Ito' ia^ ^cs X ^i^mmU ;?«» I Atitir'' 

a£tl&«lg Xcf «JRW 0fT .ISVO& AMSqi/ 'lil« 1Ci»« dit^ 4*XMUMkilff I !9A *'Z*o 
.9'»(l&.7 MoJtf t«) I«U>q A «iilii/P MAW 91t«&t &«|» it^MME |$IUI 9900 Mi^rtt 

- » - 

I turned him over so lie wouldnH strangXe In his own blood« 
took him toy ahoulders and tried to piill iilra out of the car, be- 
cause I thought he was the voree hurt of the tvo. I couldn't 
pull hla out. Sis feet and legs were evidently ovaght under 
the cushion." Witness Donaldson then telephoned a call for the 
Carroll ambulance. He followed the amoulance back to the scene 
of the accident. He testified that he did not talk to Quarton 
at the ear because "he was passed out, and didn't say a word;* 
that until he went to call the ambulance, hla was the only oar 
there other than the two involved in the collision. He stated 
*I didn't pay '^n^ particular attention aa to where they etniok; 
couldn't tell whether they struck on north or south side of road. 
I didn't look to see, one way or the other. There is no curve 
In the road. At that point there are several feet on each side 
from '^black top"^ to ditch, it is quite wide, not muoh of a ditch; 
would say from the 'lOlack to^ to the fence was 13 to 14 feet; 
quite wide on both shoulders. The road is level. '^ Sturgeon 
spoke no words that witness could gather but Just moaned and was 
mumbling someone's aaae but he didn't recall who. 

Wayne Bandy, a State police officer, of Litchfield, 
testified that he was called to scene of aocid@nt about 2 o'clock 
in the iaoraing, arriving about 2:15. He gave similar descrip- 
tions of locations of cars and of highway as other witnesses. He 
stated that there were no obstructions on highipay which is level 
for at least a mile and parallels tJie Big Four Railroad, and that 
he coulcui't tell where the two cars collided on the highway. 

Clarence Estell of Litchfield, testified that he was in 
the used car and repair business and knew Sturgeon ^ho had done 
work for him; tJiat Sturgeon's 1953 Oldsmobile Goupe would go 
56 miles an hour when drivsa on the afternocm before the accident. 

Jaaes Ronan, a garage raan of Litchfield, testified that 
he went out to 8«ene of accident in early aorning of i\ugU3t 4th, 

- 6 - 

i*nhlit€ic . »# ««!.? tc 4^*J!|l »»*!«'» edJ' sa'* ojS t^j^aoiia X 9«immi 

*:^o^ A xtm ^^s&ilb hum ^imt h9^iM% bmsh Ari" &aua&»d «xao qMJ i< 

•£.;«& '\&ljKr, **r^'* *"«w »iM «aoji^Xi»cfe. siii XJjso »«t J«s« Sii Xi4i3*j <t«ii^ 

b^^tJ^B vY. .M...zBX£l0t> ini& ffli firvXcfcX o*-* »if*f luKliT -fsiii© »'mJlUi 

j^€»f»l *X oS iiJ. aistr 9f©ii«1t tutJt a* ^c4 ,^o*sid'^ eui* moti x»4 i)Itfo« 

ftoee^s^'.'''^^ ' . rsv*X Bi l5ao«x ^liSS* -«'aKs*i««>jl« ^©cf b© »^1»- 93litp 

■■■■■■ IX*®«i ,t*«RS<X^ »i£ ^.v« -.--.r.i.a »»9fio«Hn©e aicii<i£iaa 

^.d'.-.av,:».x,c^^. .'.o i-snoXn© ®«XX»i5. !»^.e#a J» .T^&flja* »sit^W 

-yd ,a©«s#iSs^Jt» -^SJl^o «« V'?-''ii:j..a lo a-aat. to aaoi.?ie©oX to •scl# 

j;«v.©X «1 Jileii-:- a.M co? sfloX^ajyrtis^ti on #is»w evdiefc^ 4:«^ Jb«JfA«lt 

•;tft.ty fji.^.r' ,I>«4&-'UXj^j, -liMl JSi8 eiii 8X»XXjkiac5 i>£»a alio « ^anaX .i^ji ■stft- 

,^:mi^d£L 9di ae Isa^Iil'i&ib s*©^ &wS ^M n»xiw iX»^ #'ci>Xi«» Ml 

• € - 

where lie "found two Tery badly wrecked autoiaoblles.* Subiitaii- 
tlaXly the Bw&e looatioa and deserlptlon of the oars »nd hlghwajr 
was given by hXm && i^y other wltaeseess. He testified that "there 
was quite ^ Mt of glass on the road - glass and aprlnge and 
parte of the car&, scattered from one to the other on highway 
for distanoe of 15 feet. There imas quite a bit of glass in front 
ot both oare, aleo glass on pawement between the oars. Thez% is 
nothing elae I oan add aa to condition of the road.* Qa cross 
examination he stated tnat "glasa was sea tiered from one oar to 
the other » el ear aoross the road and between the earn, I didn't 
loo|: to see whether there was any marks by whieh 1 oould tell 
where the oars oollided, and. didn't reaoh imy decision as to that.* 

Harley Carroll of Litchfield, testified that he was the 
embalater and funeral director; that about Is 30 in the tiorning of 
August 4th, he received and responded to a call for an aj&^ulaiio« 
to so out to the place of oollision; that Stux*g;eon had already 
been taken to St. Francis Hospital in a private vehicle; that the 
occupant of the Chevrolet (defendant Quairtan) was still in the 
ear imconseious and one of the passers-by, who had stopped at the 
scene of aooident had a flashli^t and witness got inside ear 
and foui^ defendant Quarton, and des(sribed his Imnditlon* Be 
further testified that "Leighton Brawley, ay father and a fellow 
named Wolff were with me. Ut, Wolff rode to the hospital with ae. 
la order to turn around, X had to pull out to set out ©f the debris 
of wreotege. I dida»t want to get glass in ay tires," and pulled 
t^ ahead of the Sturgeon car to tuns ground. The loo;?tioii of the 
Oars were ag in described hy hlsi. ^uarton's ear was 3 or 4 oar 
lengths east and 40 to 45 feet distant froa the Sturgeon ear, and 
was lying on its top facing in north<»ssterly direction on oppcimite 
side of the roadway. Witness testified. "I got down to figure 
out how to get hira (Quarton) out of the ear. He regained con- 
sciousness while I talked to him and he ealled ae by name. * 

- 6 - 

ai. wnadf .aausta f»ji^ is;ii«i9;S'^ ^09i»>v«q <ut auUka QNaJLs «a«c«o iUod' ta 
^*n&i.b X .9'XM> #i^i p!i»>:»«<tat)( t<}.e |3m<^ 9Sii sacioa rtaelo t<»MUo «il4 

to a^iirwift sjfi* ul OS:X #«<hJ* ^asi.*? j-soje^fiib Xu-xariit bf^» •tvftXiKfn 
94.;.> :f^: ,^> -'OB Mu^i^Bwamm vtam 

sil4' 1. OCX •ii'T .Jw«in>nLi i,riJB^- . tiio>i^VJ^ aiU to J&i«wi* ^i 

%f' , . ^i^m -'AftO »*ac^-;.--^:-' ,miji led £^(^j:«io«»£> KXr»a •*»* I'TUrt 

...-.., ,'jus<3 afeaSRW^a m^ ajoY: ,... - „Ji ^«»f#t f> o^ 0*' '•■x'^^ i-»«e »K«^aMi 

©•aaj^^.':- ....^ -.- .... . ■ '.-^fi.tit .xfi(HiCMo<x tjUr ic sJ^Xt 

That th& witness later Inquired of Quarton at the hospital 
as to how the aooident ooourred and he answered "Karley* I 
don*t know. The last thing I remember le passing the outskirts 
of Hornsby." Hornsby is between 4 and 5 alles from seene of 

June Sandy, sister &t Sturgeon, testified to the age^ 
height and weight of Sturgeon; tJtot he had been driving a car 
back as far as 19S8j that she had ridden with him frequently,* 
that he was a oareful driver and observed all gipmed lialts 
and traffic laws; that he n&f%r atme home intoxicated and dr^Js 
very little- a glass of beer noi^ and then; that he had been in 
the anay after 1933 for 5 years and had driven a sohool bus at 
Jefferson Sarraoks. 

iamie £<arge, and her husband, of Litchfield conducted 
"Slclnay's Cafe** a restaurant and tavern on Route 66, and had 
known Sturgeon fox* about a year. Sturgeon came to their place 
of business abaut four or five tlaes a week and was there oa 
t/i© evening or aight of accident, with Mr. Dearduff, a contractor. 
He usually had sandwicnes and coffee and stayed from oi^ to four 
hours and talked to everybody. Witness M^uiie Large testified 
that she got to the tavern at lJ30 A. M. of kv^XBt 4yi,*right 
after midnight and that Stux^eon was 'twere and left H^ectediately. 
He borrowed #2.00 froa her stating that he would buy gas and sist 
to d-illespie. He had no intoxicating liquor there and she saelt 
none on his breath. 

Witness A. T. Carroll corrobor-ated the testiaiony of 
Harley Carroll as to both the conversation and condition of de» 
fttOdaat <*^iartoa. ''■■\^' 

Pootor Sihier, atteadlag physician, of Litchfield 
testified to Sturgeon's injuries and cause of death that "I think 
the direct cause of Mr. Sturgeon's death was meniiigitls, caused 
by fracture of the skull; the portion fractured was the area 
above the eye and In frontal sinus; that connects directly with 

- 7 - 

siiw^^ bii^ ^»SmoJt.K&Ssil »tiXi& ^hs&q %^it^ii @£>. ituii jewei oXt1<»^ Jl»i«s 
^d j^s&jg ««2a %Sn(>& SIC tira^yjii i>suA ^su^n^sa^^^^ i^ "slftC d'VMLjJtfi* 

.M.ewi mid m> wioa 

Id rfiO£ixSi^.ii' J S^3J&Ayn(i-& SJ.<>*i%t ■ ■■■- 6fj#«;Ji^ 

^^oliiw '^:-- »®*'u*lnl ij'ui! »§;'»<.. ..i'X2X^»»4 

iJ^iw xX**o»*xX^ !3J^o«i5auo JmiiJ isjoiil* l»ii»%1 al tm* 9f •di •▼oo« 

the oovsrlng of torain on the Inside, mM. 4^/ infeotioa you in- 
haXtt, if taiere is torea.K in sinua wouXo be trajisioit ted to llalnfi 
of the Israln aitd honoe siaenitij^itls** ThXa witaesa alao dleaorib«> 
«d t«o broken rib, oert'% jsl faoiryi abraaions And furtiier injuriee 
to stur^an wnd treatment* first at l&ospital And later Visits 
to offio« from home* As to ciefendaat Qwarton*@ injuries, wit- 
nees stated tiiat iife was oomplaiaii^ of mhook mvX in consider- 
Able pain wnen he ea« him; titiat h» had a broken Xes« broicea hip, 
brol&en pelvis, ioroken elbow and a general Siiooked eondition; that 
be wtm la great pala* Did not reoall as to h&m injuries and 
•aid ^e vae not qualified to amy he did or didn't imve a etm- 
oussion of the Ixrain* He wasnH unoonaelous w.'^en @een at the 
hoeplt&l Could not sa^ exactly what tlise had elapsed after aool'- 
dent until m @aw itlm. 

Clifton '<^arton, defendant, called fm* oroes eacamlmf 
tioa by plaintiff ua er Beotion 60 of Cirll Fr&otice Act, (Chap. 110 
of 111. aev. Stats.}* testified that he drove a 1936 Ghevr^et 
Tudor Sedan on Mtguai 4th, 1040, over road ^o^n as l^itohfleld* 
Ollleaple Head. It was hiis father* 3 ear, driv«» ^ith this latter* e 
perodsslon. That he left ]iallro<^ in Beald a quarter after one to 
one thirty; eoaHnts hom& throu^ G-illespl@ a.nd Kornsby, «aic^ le 
4 or 3 anile® from the @oeite ulsiere he mm tdd that tij^ accident 
ooourred. That he loade a atatee^ent to the a^r^kn^rt** I don*t imotsr 
vbether I was asleep or not at the tl^^ of this accident, I resesber 
natiiln^ of the accident." Witdieee state.'^, *I would say the reason 
X don't re0WiiU)er whether X vas asleep at the time of accident or 
not, was uecause I don*t reisee^r the accident. I doa*t r^ienber 
it at all. I don't r^&mammr anything Uiat happened frc^ the tlae 
I left iomaby or about rlomsby until X was in the hoepltalj* was 
in the BalXrooa danoinis*- went alan@ <• reoeaber aeelois i''i!*»nk NlniBoas 
there - was sober ;ill evening • cmly intoxicatini; liquor of wc^ 
klad or cnaracter he ttraaic that evening was one bottle of beer • 
vae al<3»e in tiar while driving near Homaby; was driving then 

- 8 - 

-dJn.&'iBlj ■ 

•^Jt»r ^eal'uisft.* fe»jr.:J"i^-.A?'" Ji..,-i-in«lal) o* r. ._ . ©ei _ . , ._ 

le«£i«<(S£u. ■ ■»'^- 

* - .-■ *T V ' .* / 


06 «Oi.»';-- 

i..' ..'»V ivi.*' 

.;M.qt-?;o..i.iii^ i%«s 

'.X! J£:«l>i&£. 

ojir "ji 



:..■! ^.XUiUV '■:■:- "i**' - 

Xy^jli);- ^lOX i. 

si^j^ aii^ 

about 40 mlXen an hour - ear was in perfect ooMltloa. witnoss 
lived In Litoiifi«ld- was 30 years* old - ?u:*rlV€Kl at Ballrocrai that 
Qit^t about 11:30. 

For defezidant, frwak. B&nx&t^ nimmns testified that he 
reaided al^out six xoiles aortiiveet of LitoiifieM witii iil& fatherland 
attends 0tllespie Hl^ Soiiool; tnat a© eame alc»ng the Litoafleld- 
^llespie higiaway between 3 and SJl5 A. M,, shortly after the 
collision; that he had been to what i@ known ae Tarro*^ Ballroom 
with Huaaell Wolff. Saw wreolced oars. Sturgeon wae hanging on the 
ear door with his arm againat his head; they tried to get hiio to sit 
down ^t he wouldn't stay there, witness described location and 
oondltion of ears sa etated by other witnesses. Was aequalnted with 
Clifton -^^artoa for 2 or 3 y&mrB, He wa® lying in the other oar, 
gasping for air, the aeat was on top of nim and his feet dansXed 
undco* the dash; tried to tallc to him, he was ^sroaning and unoonseious; 
was bleeding at th€ loauth and noee T«ry bad; blood on the inside of 
the oar and around hie fmce and baek of his tiL^Bid whei^ he was lying. 
*we carried the seat off Qutarton^s body and ay friend{j^S8ell Wolff ) 
got his feet out firom under the daeh and straightened him out; I 
undid his tie and straigatened his collar sq he could ^eathe. I'he 
eMubulance oaMe and took Quarton to St. Francis l^epitaJl. Sturgeon 
was taken to the hospital by some other iaan. ciuarton did not at any 
time while I was there or at the hospital, recmli what Imd happened. 
I had seen Clifton i4uarton that evening at the Golliseusi Snllrooa 
la aenld, 10 or 15 minutes before I left. When I talked to hia he 
eeeised perfectly natural and sober. I was in his ooiiF:>any about & or 
10 minutes that night.^ The other occupant of the o?^, i^ussell -'^'olff 
gave iMietimony similar to that of witnetsa Mismone. Witnesses Philip 
Brown and i^'ranklln Orr testified in substance similar to the other 
witnesses as to (K>nditioa and location of oara and roadway* 

doctor IJUfer, of Hlllsboro, testified that "It is very 
poaeible t>iat one who Is injured and receives a severe shoclc and a 
broJsen hip and a Inroken elbow and bruises about the aouth and fao«^, 
on account of the shoelc does not recall the accident occxjirria"^ 

- 9 - 

.OS MX JirocTr, .Ijf^lj 

moo^lnB ?.*SfttAt vr. jj'To; • : a^m: l>«ia tif ^jwirf ,'BOlslXXoi 

ad^ IXC ;■ s.if?<? sa03a*£«^l^ vv,-: •,<3,a«*?^ *^. .. rxt»«ijifr ^li 

lie 9^- ttfii: J'3e ^'^ bf^ini t:aiiJ ;tR*^iK itl/!' ^3/ ' m 

lmM."aos "•;?df*s»i:isU teiB^ini.:?- •■a*i-j ■■^;.. .i^a nwoJ 

l^!«>.C??ft«!& ^i90\ nlA hnM MXti lo ;{C'J wo' ea*- ., iib iu".- ^clq**; 

t« eiiitir^!! «.?iit '«© l90«Xcf ;ia&ti x^t »»oja bjfe 'fi^w<-a; 9ui ^jr iif^lbi»*l4 m& 

.■^i'r ^ hM^- elf! to 3f««tf t>«a •ofil «l/t 'tmisoTn hnr <*b» 9il. 

( 1:1:1 &v? ilobsii,: >&«»X'*1: tie few "efto* 8»iro^njw^ Yto *««« iAi oai-nuso »» 

■^di .^diM(3i^ bSii'9^- -w^' &» "i«»XXuo tfiiS tf&m'' 

nioV XX*Hii:> -'.^aa^if 4'«lU ««#mXH 

,.\', '^X£«ic« 99eiMUX^ 

ftnd also for a©ae little time before the occurrence of the accident 
ftBd floiae little time after thsX. la lay own experience I have hnd 
oasea la which that has JaLappened.** The injuries where this occurred 
were concussion. A head injury usu&lly causes br?iln concusr>lon, 
and oan or will usually cause a Xoee of mamory. 

Coy Quarton, father, testified he lives 3 alles west of 
Lltchfleldf oaoupatlon« farmer. Father of Gllfton Qus^rton; r^ent to 
scene of accident atjout 9 o'clock the followintj i-i^rnlu^ and observed 
eonditlon of the road; then there was nothing only glass over the 
road and aSiat he believed to be :^lood on the north side of the road; 
ne blood on the south side; it ^as in the car and the car had been 
aoved. Slass was practically all over the road, no particular spot. 
It was on ti^ *blacic top" and some off of the *olack top*. His sea 
Clifton ^uarton has drlYen an automobile since he was 13 or 14 years 
©Id and he has ridden with hia quite often; when they ^o together 
Clifton usually does the driving. Question: " Xou oay tell the Jury 
what his habits are i.^lth reference to driving and what they were 
in 19401* IIr.(Jodfrey: " I object to hie habits of drlviiig." Sustained. 
Witness taen testified t^iat Clifton drove to High School regularly 
for 4 years froa the fara 3| aHles. In August 1940 " I had a Chevro- 
let autoiaoblle driven hj sy son that evening; it was a, '36 isodel 
Tudor la auober one shape. As fai' as I Joiow the lights were all right; 
brakes should have been ©ood, just had them rellned,* 

The foregoing is the substimee of what T/e deem to have been 
the ffi&terial testiiaony. It is ^iven aore fully because we hold 
the deterialnins issue s.nd assigniaent of error before tills Court to 
be whether or not as a matter of law, prima facia proof of the 
aeoeseary eleiaents constituting plaintiff's alleged cause of action 
Is shown by the evidence, facts and circumstances in evidence and 
reasonable or lesitiaate inferences tkerefrom. 

Concerning tne aiotloas interposed by the defendaiit for 
directed verdicts In his favor and for Judgaent notwlthst^Lndinfi 
the verdict which were denied by the Court, the applicable rule was 
set forth by this Court in the cases of Kane v.Wehner,312 111. App.391, 

-10 - 

IkAii jittH I £>OA*ii:9<s»» 09O x^ ... i^;r 'x&^Ia wuiiT mlsJXi 9/eycti bm 

»{l^ 'X€!Vt> &A«XS tlijKO ^a<1wO£! ?j^ a<l6li^ iB«iiit ;^£0^ SiiJ t& /K-l^Ubil;; 

js^ttc^ lifid "SAn ftidl iau» i»e ^4^ ni ««« il {9i>is xi^uoe «d^' nc b^^LS 9 

■/■: -"^ ^l ?«> £Vi e«« «it »^iii« •Xi<3lojBe.Ji»* aA ii*vi's^ - - ^ -. -^-t^x 

Q'nai's: %Siii ^Ml^r jstm &«i¥iifc oJ *«.f{8-x«^«'3.. if.llii 31*; sWdjui aia J«il 

-^I'XiU/Ja-^'^ £&o«£»^ ^IK oJ- $vc)*s.6 fics^lXXl) ^lu:.;} i^&lli^ea^ a«lU ««dii#X 

X<»£k:^ diT* « is« ^£ ;^«iiit9<7«> i^ul.:^ £oft tPi TifTl'Xb dXXcfo»C'li/« i» 

'*.lJ3nXXd*£ si»d4 bjtd i3«t tii^i'Oe £i»i»a ^j-iiSiH b£jfo£jk «i9af«a 

«<il^ to lo«t«i M»At .<^1^(^ i^BS. 1c 'x^^^Rt: & •« iom 10 '£»fl^ttulv • 

^l^t,q<^; USX su4;,'j«> r*b.!^o mat m ^•xtfcD awT t^ jW's** -• 

(399); 39 H, E. {2d) SI, and OiXIett v. wuilamsvillo Stat* WauO^ 
310 III. App 395, 34 li, E. (^d) QS&, and quoted with approval la 
the reo«nt oase of Dre^n« v. Five Gent Cat) CoB^atiy, 313 111. 4pp. 
539, as follows: *'Upon a taotlon of the defendant for a direoted 
verdict, the Court oan only detemlne whether or not there was 
any evidence, ^hioh, with all reaeonaQle Infereaces therefz*om, 

: Viewed In the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tended to 
prove the aaterlal allegatlona of the eon^lalnt c»r soae oount 
thereof. If there was sueh evidence. It beoax^ the duty of tne 
Trial Court to deny the defendant's aotlon for a directed verdict 
and to subalt controverted Isaues of fact to the Jury, eubjeet 
only to the giving of proper written instruetlone oy the Court 
as to the law applicable thereto. A motion to dlx*ect a verdict 
should be allowed If, when all the evidence is considered, with 
all reaeon-ibie Inferences to be drawn therefroa In Its aspect 
^oet favorable to the party against whom the motion Is directed, 
there Is a total failure to prove one or more neoeesary elements 
of the case." 111. Central i. l. Go. v. Oswald, 338 111. 270i 
170 U, K, 247. These principles, in varying languat^e.have oeea 
frequently announced and applied uader th@ particul^ur facts 
and circumstances arising 1 i numerous eases wuioh h^xve t»en re-> 
viewed oy the supreme find Appellate Courts of this State. The 
Mboe rule la applicable in passing iQ>on a motion for Judgiaent 

S, notwithet^iding tne verdict as in motion© for directed verdicts. 
Synw«lt V. Klank, 296 111. App. 79; 15 ri.K, (2d) 8»6;L.anifiore 
V. Larliaore, 399 111. App. 547; 2o H. E.{2d) 903. In either 
case, if there is no evidence oefore the Jury which, with reason- 
able or legitiiaate inferencess therefroa, when viewed In the light 
ttost favorable to the plaintiff, tends to prove all of the necessary 
elera»nts of the plaintiff's cause of action, the motion should 
be allowed by the Trial Court, ixaii a failure to allow such motion 
becomes reversible error. 

From the foreg ing evidence, nothing appears as to how 
the eollialon actually happened; which car, if either, was on the 

^s^y^t^^Aii^ •{»o««'£ivtii4 »j;<ak«m)M«^ 44* ^ii^** ,a9iA» ,(»9is«iri^Tt t;^ 

&fjtit ^isNT^j^lti^oe «i 9vn&bXr» f^At IL» fmav ^ti j^vcIXa •cS bltroiit 

;ij^'-' ■■ »i>iBwao ..»•*#.©♦** •^- X5WMfi»0 .XXI ".deju) mU 1© 

0e«c ipf> fi^i^hiym^l mi'V^tmw fU gWXqioiiI'x^ «:^«i'4 .V#f: . ,'i^ OVX 

rj©*jiiniv^ :<5©8 <i!»fi) .36.*iA «I ;ev .^jqA .XXX C%a .irnXa .V .'XoiTAXi' 
•5l««i^if« «! ,SOfe 0(1^)«S .*' 05^ j\VM,g<;A .XXJ Wfi t«l4>«;X'i*.i .V 

wrong side or oT«r tlie center line of the highvajr; what speed 
eitiier oar waa traveling at or near the tloe of the accident; that 
either oar was traireling at an exoeeaive rate of speed, having re- 
gmrd to the traffic and use of the highway; whether either oar 
had turned to the left In violation of any statutory i^rovision or 
that the braices on defendant's oar were in any way defective, as 
oh;H*Sed in the complaint, is not affirmatively shown tmA does not 
appear from the evideno« or reasonable inferences therefrom. The 
foregoing coi^rehend all eatress allegntions of negligenoe. Frtm 
the evidence, the taamier in which and place in tne highway where 
this oollieion actually occurred is left purely to conjecture. 

Under the laotione interposed, it i»eoaase a question of 
law whether the z*ecord contains prima facia proof of the nee«s@ary 
eles^nts of plaintiff's alleged cause of action (111. Central R*H. 
Co. V. Oswald, supra,) ^ndi we hold the reoord to be Imrren of such 
proof. While it la pvouliarly the province of tha Jury to pass 
upon controverted questions of fact, their verdict cannot he based 
%pon mere oonjectiire or irpeoulation. fh» faet that eithdar or both 
of the potties was injxired or tjaat one of the parties subseqiusntly 
departed this life as a result of such injuries under the facts 
.and oir cuius tanoes appearing in the evidence, which is not conflict- 
ing, did not constitute prima facia proof of any negiifSeiwe alleged 
la the ooi^laint. Casey v. Chicago Hys. Co. 269 111. 386; 109 H.E, ' 

Plaintiff contended that tint blood spot at sorae undesignat- 
ed point north of the center of the highway, referred to hy Coy Uuar- 
ton as having been seen on the following; day, wa?' a circuastance 
tending to prove the place of the collision. This inference was not 
in accord with the evidence which showed that the Quarton car in 
^^iiloh the defendant was found to be bleeding and unconscious, lay 
upside down at the south side of the road and was lat^r turned baolc 
onto the highway and taJcen to towtt« and that Sturgeon, whose eye 
was out and whose face and head were abrased and injured, was, accord- 
iiig to all witnesses* the only person foimd out of his oar and on the 
highway before UMBjrIon was moved JCroa his car to the ambulance which 

,flKyitirt»itJ s^cusoniivtAi «l<iiit.<»»*i*'i w eoiOiifiiYa »Jtl;f 00^ luBOq^ 

.rt&i<^99taoG o;^ ^XsTxiq ^»I »i &«t«u»©o tXXifttf^e^ nolAiiXo* «X£J 

^•isaiswJafi »ii^ ^o "Jcto*! itiftAt «Bi^cr *isli«t^no4 Moo«i siU "si^jdJaiJlw waJ 

n*fi»0 .Sit) oeiiOA Id (Hftuso JCWiseXXs «'^\i^rjJLaXq to -JfsactdXfl 

jl»s>?! t« «»*rsatf wf ©tf ^o**^ Ml^ tkXoil wr ' •? .ot 

f>«;^i:a« as; -i t«« *« l©r«q aiiliail ««!i*ir: si'iA.tiiisnoo io« fclfc «SDi 

.?,?? eoi taas .1X3: r 3^ c^aviitcd .▼ x^«*iO .^flXexqfireo 9sit m 


-ojyjp to- fje.'x*s»1 81 jtis^wla-t^' 5*1 i to l»4f!fi»© exi^ to d^ioa iflX«4i in 

^ •*0m-i*1:i*i alilT .noieXXX©& <Mi.t t© »a£X^ »ii/ »tr<yxq o^ SOl*c»J 

fUt fi^tfoda cUaiikw i»enttblv«i f»i!i^ lijrir^ tnoo9» fiJ 

.tdftjUfaoL' f»i5 J5isXI>9oXcf •« 

SO^ &«l?i?6i4 *Mi^«i sppw boa ii.i /> •ditqt 

,v,.>: US %^tfds^(i %di oint 

-imoo^A ,««« .iJft'xat^!! feiw *#&A^« 9'i9'af W9il iu(u» ••isl; ^todw &CUS iao sm 

9%Qo6^ &A Vs» }kijs^'»»if, A theory eajuiot 1m snid to !»» «tt(%bXialiifd 

;^i t9ar Qlrmi^sstaiitial mdeao® uoXeas th« fiij9t9 »rm of mtoh a nature 


A «iiii so related a« to asa^e it t^ <»ll7 <»<»i<slu^i9ii tl&ftt <M»uId ^ 

as 1^. E, (2d) 397| K«ll«y V. FubUs 3Qrvlo« Co. SOO XU. 4pt>.3S4; 
31 M. S. (3d) 435 «3ornn ▼. CMoago CtitjT IWf. Co. asi tU AD|».ie9, 

flM plAlatlff*^ ooaoluislon to %he eontrajc«3r oould «m2^ bm Ta^tnA 

upmt ©0iij«etur«' and ^«eml.^tl<m. Thu? n^m> Is ««i?4'f> tni« of 

0o^»&«l*£i contentions eotte^rrilag t^^ preetiiec® of gla^sa «t4rif««i wwtm 

ttie Hig^^ay fe©t'*«en ami In frcwat of festn o-^jp®, sjad oona^nijiag tJk« 

eao^ltlGH of %h9 froat v-lieel of t^ oidis%o&ll«. 

We have enreftiliy essaiaed the ateetawtst nM. th» istc^t^ti* 

I tloofi of r«6:p«etitro imrtl^js- e<meernlF$i; %hi» fm9%& nau Qlr'^anfltt^uMefli 

J Iti 0Vl(left<3Mi imd w« mns forctKl, to Mopt ti&# eoi»»liiij^lmi bM, I^ l&old 

/\^r®la timt tft©r© is la this reaoi^ ao affliramtlve pr»af of a^ 

alieipd a««slig®aoe cwa tfci© p«irt ef t&e defenaaat. wit^ymt i9u«4it pr&of, 

%h& plaintiff haB wliolly falX#d to eetabliaJft iwr pr%^ faei** oau«« 

of aatioB .%nei % irenilct ommot stand. 

/ t3i« Coixrt properly adaitti^ t^atlaoay dondnmlJis t^ 

f ArlTlutt imdlt@ of %im d«o«M«dy In th» ^&b0vws of ^^a oeaui^^jWfi 

\ «lta«wi as to «likat aQtu&lly hj^s^^twd. It l@ el«»>'%r fi<@si tli« testl* I 

laoiiy ami titcm a^ l«iiSltliiaat« infereiui^^ %is&r&i^e'm&, tMt ii«iti3^p tlM» 

i l^lalntlff lat«@tat« twe %^ ^Bf<Biadem% tu Vain m,mi vmte abOL9 to 

# ttatli^. wJjat tools plao* at or laEWSdlat'^ly prior to tJi® tlsw of th« , 

' 'X'tolllsl^a fma SF.vw« ressultant injxirt®* to laotli pnrtl^®, ?ij^ «iy i 


oon0lu#lciii to tiae OvwitMmy iRmld he so ?:it v?yr*l?jaoe with th© tcstl- 
tao&ty aa to h^ merely ooxijeoturml. .^d tMe mslt Imhni fll«Kl ligr 
th® def^ltJbmt la til© first iastasas© or "agf «ouater-olRl«, no greater 
aoi=* 1«0® reaaoas far rweovery oould Have b««a pr<n»«3P3Ly ur^ed by 
tHe d$f«adaiit iaid«r t^ rooord her«iai than lu now oonterwied on 
b«ll»lf of t^ plaintiff f:ir r®oav«r:/ by her. Althoti^Sh tia^ proof 
of pialatlff lat«9tat«*s drivlais iiablts ^ece properly .ndialttod nxiA 
l>rap(frly eoa9id«n»d an bsarlag lapon tue quo@tlon of ^Is dus oar«|» 
itteH •vldemoe did not to aay «xtft»t t«rtd to $a«talii or provo tlM 

*- 13» 


^ 'k 

#J5^ _ ■ ,.- " ■.*" «*"■» -rfV *'■'*-' "--^ "W ■«■■ %» **..-- «- «W ■ 

4A' -•"'«) >^ .f^ ..iXZ X06 t**-;**' . — .'^ ,^,....,^-.^. 

-, ux S6» ►•o .f ttt >&tio.. ««i«oiiio .."- '^-'oo |2^ iii£^ xe 

'.ikirm\ i?o;^;'9t: .e.'t'aJEj*, to ■WJn^Jitr'i^ «j:wl »|»ijr;'i«M6«K>0 «^«1 " ■ ■ ' - - ' * ^^tyBllMO 

■ '• ifc;!so.M«?&;a!i* iioii^ftk^-; '^f^i<rm $""■ '• '" 

sitil.s;CAJ «j3- i^-• 

^ «4»ii& 

plaintiff's contention tji&t the defendant was guHty of net^lliseno* 
viiieli proximately caused the eolllBloa, Injuries and resultant 
damages claimed in this suit. (Casey v. Chicago Rys. Co. supra; 
Besouskas v. Kruger, 298 m. App. 46S; 19 N. F.» (3d) 116. In 
the absence of euch tegtlaony, wnieh it was the afflnoatlve duty 
I of the plaintiff to produce in order to sustain her cause of 
\, motion it becaue the duty of the trial Court to grant defendant's 
ilotlon for a directed verdict or to grant defendant's subsequent 
motion for Jud^ent notwithstandins the verdict, and failure so 
to do in the absence of such proof constituted reversible error. 
Since «e find ana hold that there is no evidence in the 
5^ F«oord which, with legitiaate inferences therefrora, tends to 
^rove the necessary elesients of the plaintiff's cause of acti<m 
as alleged in the oosiplalnt, it oeco&ies unnecessary to pass upon 
appellant's assignments of %rror concerning given or refused 
instructions, aside froa those directing -^ verdict for the de- 
fendant, upon which we have ruled, or to pass upon the admissi- 
bility of certain evidence concerning which errors were assigned 
by the appellant. No cross-errors were assigned herein. 

Finding reversible errors in the record as hereinabove 
indicated, the judgment of the lower Court will be reversed 
and t«ae cause remanded, with directions to set aside the Judgement 
against the defendant and tne order overruling appellant's aotion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; to allow said motion 
and eater Judgsaent notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the 
defendant in bar of suit and for costs. 


- 14 - 

nl .ail (&^) ^ «|| «X tSti^ .q«;A .iXI deS ,i«»^S <v iift^&u&x»a 

o4 s&n^Jf ^ffloflsi^s-sor ??»or.yT:*lai; 9^«fii4'XfeS>X uilv \tioJAg brto09i 
-»l? etiS tot ioiMev || ^.Uq^'iHj i^eoiiV Kunfti cM>is>d ,sc«l.J^f trsjajfti 

fM'-i'x^yt^^ 'Sd Xliv >^uoO tfi'^ol eji.1 io Jii9fi^'^«t d<iJ «l>»Ji:9X&stX 

aS2«. HO. 9339 




October Term, A. D. 1942 

316I.A. 309 



Plaintiff-Appell^, ^ 


A, L. GLAiiK, Oonaoinrator y'' 

of th0 Sstato of :JLLA ii.^-^' 
RAI!^i?!iC, an incoiapotoni/ 

Def enflanV^pellQ© • 




App@aX fpoja airouit Oofeirt 
Gj^^0 idoiahty 









Plaintiff -Appellant, hereafter referred to ao "olairant," 
filed ita olais in the Oo-onty U';;urt against the Katat© of Slla Ut 
aainey, an InoorapQtent person* Olaisant appealad to the Oirouit Court 
fron the Jud^nsnt of the Ooijnty Oourt, and tills appeal la froia the 
judgHont of the Oirouit Court. 

Ko i\3.93tion of the stiffioierioy of tl^ pleadlnps ig raised, 'fhe 
Olaiaj was heard hj tlio -Jiroidt Uourt vtrlthout a Ji^ry. Claimant intro- 
duced ovidanOQ in support of its olai:?. Dafondant off ©rod no ovidence» 
coimaol for dsfoMant -atating the ©state had no ovidenoe to offor. 

On iiaj mt 1941 » Slla 1.;, Rainey '.Tae adjudged inooapotont and 
a oongorvator for her ostate was appointed. It ia not, ooyit ended tbat 
the olais is affeotod by any q.ii93tion aa to 3uoh inoor^potoncy. 

Olaisatjt offered and thare was admitted in ovidenoo, without 
objection, a,3 Exhibits 1, 2 and 3» thro© r/ritten instriJiaonts, each 
dated aM oxsouted "by Lrs» Eain©y on :.'.aroh si, I958* One of csuoh 
Instrur^ents raa aa follows; 

c;':^g£.c;.^ :,. 



•rii^.ti:.. :■ 



"In Goxiaideration of their umertaking tlis 
publicii-tion ontitlO'Ci *rinoyolor0dla of 
Amarican Biography* and In turtLora-nQO 
thoreof, I horoby authoriao The "jtierloan 
Hiatorical 3ooiety, Ino., or aaoigna to 
reaervs spaoo aiid QKeoute on 3toel> a 
portrait of iiemT '-• iialney fom^Moli I 
agroQ to pay to then or their order the 
sum of TliTQ© Htsidrod and fifty dollars 
i^hsn angravinp; is ootDpleted asid proof 
ftumisliod. I al3o author! I'i© thosi to 
print, oopyric'^,t nnd insert tho re luirod 
number of impreaaioBa in said "rublioation* 
I also aere® to f^ari^iah the photograph 
within ten lay 3 frou» the date hereof ♦ 
VoltiSG not inolu'ied in this oontraot.^ 

Another of such inotrur-enta .^aa in identioal vrorda aM figures, 
exoopt tliat tho portrait wao to "bo that of - rs. iiainey and the prioo 

Tho third InotrumeRt was addressed to olainant and stated 
that ;'r3, Hainsy agreed to ta!-ra ono vol-aro of the 'niblioatlor! and 
pay ciaiErAnt therofor |2S«oo upon delivsry at her rogidanoo* 

The Oirouit Ooiirt allowed olairaswit a rooovery of $S5.00 
baaed on tho third inatruiiient, and no oor'.plaint as to suoh allowanc© 
ia raad© by sithor party. 

Tho Jirouit Oourt dsniod, ^ly allowanoe based on oither of 
the othor tm) inatniments, 

A 'vTitnoas for olairmnt testified h© vraa ^lasooiate Mltor 
of th© publloation in quostion, that he aa^ Mr 3. Rainey si pi said 
thr6« inatrumonts, aijd. that hJ.a co^pasiy engravod th© portraits of 
•Hr, and Lira* Hainoy. Ho -cms then 3ho?m two ei^ilbits nimberod 
4 and p> respootivoly which wor© lator admitted in evidenoo. Eg 
tostified tliat .:2hJ.bit 4 waa a atool e- qravin? of :-rs« Hainoy, and 
Ssdilbit 5 a atool ongraving of Mr. ilainoy, an^-l that ho Buboitted 
3uoh oxhibits to :j'3» Sainoy on April ?7, I9m» and isoourod her 
approval of tho aaee. At the foot of saoh exhibit 'vaa t?ritten in 


handtTTi ting,* Approved 4/:37/39j* and icsmodiataly below this '^as the 

written aignaturo "Slla lU Kainey." The i^itnesa testified ha oaw 

her ^;?rit0 such signattsrea on April 27 1 1039. 

Thar© was tJion introduce in erridenoe as Exhibit ^, a vcluiae 

of thQ publication in question for the yaar 1040 • Tho witness testified 

that the piottir© appearing on a certain page of suoh ryublioation Traa 

tho sane piotur© and printed froa the sase plat© aa ?3:f libit 4? ajTd 

V, that another piotxir© appearing on anoth^* pa^© ^aa th© oaE© picture 

^ and prlntod froa th© ©aia© plate aa ^ishibit 5. He- further testifiod 

that an engraved plat© anrl th© prints tharofrom are both reoosnlaod 
aa 3t9©l engravings and thrit an engraved plat© ia onsjrrived by hand 
frora a proto graph. ' 

All of tho foro?^oinf' ovideno© vm,B adzsittod v;ithout objection. 
All ofauch ovidsno© V7a3 unoontradictedj and it 'wa;3 not in any way 
i inhoroTitly irsprobablo. Where th© teatissony is uncontradioted, either 
A^y positive testlisony or cirounatancGS, %nl is not inherer^tly 

improbable, it oannot be rajsoted. (Kellmv^ v, Jov.qb, ^C)0 111. f'j'B.) 

The ^lip-ient order of th© trial court rocitea t>-a,t nuoh claim, 
except for th© §25»00f was diaallo'^ed for (I) "failuro of pr-of to 
sho'v? the ©xQCiition on ateel of portraits of Ella K» and Henry T, 
. iney," ar^ (2) "failure to in.y,l.ra deliver:/ of t^m portraits on atoal, 
etc. to "jra. aainey," 

Kelther R^hJ.bit 1 nor 3:xhibit 2 contained any provision ^-hatsve! 
raiuirins? tli© delivery to :'rs« Rainey of any portrait on 3t©©l, and 
coumsal for dofaniant doe© not aaS:© any auoh oontertion before this 

HO fault ia ''ound by defendant -ith th© ©neravine-© ilontlfiod 
aa liKhibitG 4 and s. 

^■^W /ri\ f^^»r^ * '^^Oll-tj 

The only defonos argued or reliod on "by defendant ia that by 
the terras of each of said Exhibits 1 a«d 2 the claimant f?aa required 
to ©xeout© (or engrave) a portrait on steel, and that there io no 
evidenoo proving or tending? to prove auoh execution. 

By the terms of each of suoh fisrhibita l and 2 olalriant agreed to 
publish the publication in quoation and in 30 doin?; to execute on 
steel a portrait of iir. and V-ra, liainey reapaotively, for the doing 
of which J.Trs, Rainey agreed to pay olaiijjant a certain aum, such 
pajriasnt to be nmd© by her lihesa the engraving ■:i&b completed and proof 

^thereof fumiohod to her. 

If 4/ 

In '?ebst©r»B Collegiate Dictionary, engraving is defined ag 

"The ■■•ot or art of proluoing upon hard laaterial incised or (by 
extension) raised pattoma, ch-oraotors, lines, ©tc», esp. on metal 
or wood," and steel an§r>^ving is dsfined as "Process of engraving 
on steel} also an iinpresaion fron an angravod steel plate." 

It is our opinion that the undisputed evidenoo affii^jstively 
sho^B and we find that the steel engravinffs required by Exhibit a 
1 and 2 were duly jnade or caused to be isade by tho claijiiant. it is 
not deni^ that L^Mbits 4 and 5 were steel onfsravinc^s of Mrs* liainoy 
and Mr* Hainey respectively, furnished to her by the claimant, o.nd 
that Hra. Rainey on '.prii "7, 1939, wrote on each of ouch eshibits 
hor approval thereof. Sein?^ steel ^iff^vin^s, it necosaarily follo^^e 
that such engravings vrare made from engraved steel plates, and that 
3Uoh enc-raved steal plates were iriade or causeii to be rsade by claimant* 

It ia our opinion ani v;© find that ,-i-rs>>%4r^" l^j.lly ootspllad -.Tith 
its p;irt of the contract* The trial court therefore erred in not 
ar.taring jud^ent for the p-la ^ rt^ivi f for the full anount of ths claiin, 
to-^vit, $675* 


"^^vjin^^ ^pr 

rto 9df 

•>.+(?> iisfk.^tr ,! 







''wsiO.AA Js*. *0 SsJ 

t..ft nfttt^^^n 

The jvilgrsent of the circuit court is roveraed vdthout re'-anding, 
and juci?^T359nt is ontsrod hore in favor of the olaiB-rsnt and againat the 
jstato of 311a. "• ilair>0y, an inootspetent personf for tho sun of ;}e75# 
and coats of* auit, to be paid in iue ocxxtbq of adrninistration* 

aovoraod aM JudgEJsnt h^pQ for 1675. 



0«nerpl NuEber 9345. 

Ajrenda nuntoer 7, 




OGT0B2R TERM, A.J&i 1942 

S16I.A. aaa 




Plsl nti f f-Apptilef^- 


BA.HK OF BmJS3EL|/' & 
Oorporr t ion,,/ 

DeX e n^an t-Appel 1 ant 



-■'^ This Is an appeal from the Clrcsult Court of Oalhouft 
County where Geoi^e aelsler, plaintiff, recovered a judgiaent 
against the Bank of Brussels in the sua of $1,247. 50, for fraud 
and deceit. 'Sba case was heard before the Court -rlthout a Jury, 

The plaintiff filed his coaplalat on August 19, 1939 
which alleged that on February 25, 1937 he conveyed 7^ acres 
of land to the defendant; that the defendant represented to 
hiffi that hi a title was defective, by rtaaon of an insufficient 
description; thst It was necess ry for hla to deed the land to 
the derendsnt so the title eould \K) quieted; that the Bani 
held a mortgage on said land for fifteen hundred dollars; 
that the defendant ststed to him that it would deed the land 
back after the title wa« quieted, and that he, relying upon 
tiae said atateaentfi, executed the deed; that said statetaerts 
were false, and thf.t the Bsnk f;^lled to reconvey but refused 
to do so. Instead deeding it to « third person. 

on September 3, 1941 the Court mf>de a finding and 
entered a Judgment in frvor of the plaintiff and against the 


'3 KOOllJilO %0 

~».iii-^»-:X'.-^v. f:'^^./: 

.:.-<■. ^IX^is^nt £t« to R09»n t^ tJivWoiltl^ nw alils ^M^^iO aid 
fr? |jo*.t »if# fb99i) P* *Ic( not t^ *»«o«ff enw ?1 i«& {fl«Wqjhtde»I> 

{;«t«XIc{« £)«rr6niitf nftStflSl T/^Vfmtil ftl»« ao «3|«;ii», .w... ^ ,.. .. 

.^,, ,... , ,U *iMftf fins ,Jb9#»il»jP MIV ftl^il ««i* «r«^lA \. . 


delendent In the suje of 11,947,60, «snd on the same dsy the 
defendant fflRde » motion to vscmte «alft .^udgaent. On October 
11, 1941, th« Court aodlfie<? th€ Judgment and reAuctd it to 
tfee sum of |1S47,50. 

Plaintiff h«?p esflgne* croisg trrore here on ©ccount of 
the reduction of Judgaent entered September 3, 1941 end points 
out that the raotlon B.fks merely for a v^Cfftlon, end doei not 
Include a modlf Icetlon, further that the appeal wn? from the 
Judgment of October 11, 1941 snd that no appeal was tslcen from 
l^e Judgment of Septerabf-r 3, 1941, «nd th©.t the motion to vacate 
wee not supported by en afi'ldftvlt as required by the Civil 
Practice Act. 

Section 83 of Chepter 77, Illlnol® Eevlsed Ststutes, 
1941 provldess "Any such Judgment, decree or order msy hct^ffter 
be modified, set aside or vecfted prior to the expiration of 
thirty days froc the date of its rendition or in pursuance of 
a fflotion made within such thirty days, vfcerever, unr'er the lew 
heretofore in force, it aslght hf>re been siodified, set seide or 
▼aested prior to the ejcpiratlon of the tewj of court et which 
it wftg rendered or in pursuance of a motion »i©de st thst tene.* 
This etf tute -pae approved June 21, 1933 and under its provifilons 
if the motion to vecete is caaie rlthin the thirty dsys sfter 
the renditic?n of the Judgment it le rot neceBBBTj that the 
BMjtlon be verified or thut there oe an sffldwvit In support 
thereof, PlRintlff in support of their cro«*f! error contend 
that this et= tute it repealed by Impllcf tlon by the provisions 
for the vacation eM setting ppide of jud|iB©nt«' contftined in 
the Civil Practice Act, Ohspter 110, section 174, p^rafraph 7, 
on seoount of the Civil Practice Act being approved two dgyc l«ter 
thtn the etstute quoted rbove and entitled nn Act In relf?tion 
to flnftl Judgffients. The peotion in the Civil Practice Act 
requires 'upon good csu&e shoim by affidavit,* 

.„..;,., ^«. -.,, ^-/.iir»J| sloRilXX ,TT "1©^ .,.....• *w .... .. -..,.: 

>i:p# 4fta« «JI|sit£J!)OyEi a@»4 •vsd ^4bXs ^i «adTd3t n^ ^ ^r 

''•»>9^tti»Q ■*%en'S9 ntmp •si«rfJ to dr«tet<3i^« oi lti*=' f '--^i-f/ 

Th« question raised on th« conflict of these two statutes 
is disposed of by the Suproase Court in the cs'^e of Frank v. 
Saloaon, 576 111, 439, in which the Court stated: ^Section 3 
of "^yi set in relation to final Judgments, lecrees and orders 
ol eourts of record in criminal and civil proceedings and the 
power to modify, vscste or set aside the ssme* (111, Rev. Stat. 
19S9, chap 77, psr. 84) ^bb enacted at the ssme session of the 
General Assembly sis the Civil Practice Jict and thsy ar? 3n pari 
ffisteria. » * «■ (pnd)are to be construed together, (People 
V. Wallace, '^91 111. 465; People v. 01evel?'Jid, Cincinnati, 
Chicego Rtid 3t. Louis Rsllwey Go. 306 id. 459. ) ♦ * ♦ The 
well-settled rule of st^tutony construction is thst whe*^ there 
is found in ?? statute a psrticul&r ensctaent, it is held to be 
operative as ^gjainst the ^ener?! prcvipi'^ns on the subject either 
In the s^ffie act or in the g?nersl 1©*8 relating thereto, (bobbins 
V. Comrs. of Lincoln Trf^r^., 55S 111. 571; Hsndtcffskl v. Chicago 
Consolidated Trection Cn, E74 id. 282.) here, «s here, the 
legieleturs reenacts a forseer stetute, the effect of *hich has 
been Judicially construed, it is preeuiaed to hsve been reenacted 
in view of such construction. (People v, Illinois Centre! 
Rallrofid Oo. 337 111. 276j Spieha v. Ineull, 278 id. 184,)^'^ 

Applying these principles to the set in relation to final 
Judgments, chapter 77, section S5 will control. It has long been 
the esteblished law th#t the Court during the term in which a 
Judg:!!5ent iree entered could aaend it or vacste it during the tera, 
Unbehaha v. Fader, 519 111, 250. The emendment to the statute 
saadt in 1933 simply limited the tiaie to thirty deys after the 
entry of ^ Judgment rather tht^n during the term, The cross errors 
assigned are not well tsken. 

The evidence shows thst the plaintiff was a man of 
limited business experience, ^*io laoved on the trnct of Isnd in 
question in 1920 <^.nd continued to live there until February 25, 

1^- -fcis 3 sis ■««>l'Ue' 

^>i!. «««ji»' aAfd. Www avv ^'^-'^. 

at? 0* il ■ ': t^rs^kfa^B •■■. 

snide! '• 
,Bn«. Jtsttsaiis. 3ii-3iii i-sf-ic: ■• 


WfSf, — llTlnr^ by flshlnisr bM f^srmlnp ttes l^'nd. He Pfive e 
arcrtgRf© to the Bank to ssourt fifteen hundred dolli^rs in 
IQ^g. Hl« wife died in 1938 after #?lch his health failed, 
and he shortly thereafter hecame involved finencially. He 
8»w the Bank offlcisls a number of time© early in 1937 f?nd 
advieed them thst he would have to sell the for® to clean up. 
After that the eeshler of the B«»nk, Mr, Zis-rsng, called on 
hlffi and stated that the description of the land was* defective 
and that it would be necessary for hi® to fieed the property to 

"^ them «o they could quiet the title, and that the Bank, would 
deed It btcSr to hia, after this w»8 done. He poeepted their 
proposition and conveyed the title to theaa, Nothing In the 
l»ecord dlsclof es that the Bank brought any proceeding-e to quiet 
the title or correct It, Shortly after obtelning' title, the 
Bmik. entered into negotlptlona slth « man by the naae of Dustheimer 
for the sale of «i€ property, without any authority fro® the 
plaintiff pnd without bis Itnowledpe, Durlns* the tlise of these 
nerotiationis the plaintiff brought a aan by the nsase of Steffens 
to the Bank to hsve s contract drswn for the sale of the land 
«t 0. price of thirty five hundred dollars. 4 contract wet 
written signed by Steffens and the plaintiff, pM e deposit of 
one hundred dollars w&« psid down. This eoatrsot was witnessed 
by Zlgrang, cashier of the Bank, This all occurred on April 1, 
1937, On April 14, 1937 steffena and "ttae plaintiff went back 
t» V^9 Bank to p«y off the mortgage. They wer® told by the 

^' officials of the Bank th»t the mortgage had been sold but they 
would get It back, iBisd to cose back later. 

It appears the Bank rawde sn sgreement to sell the property 
to IHisthelmer, On the 17th of June, Dustheimer and Steffens called 
at the Bank and asked for a deed to the property. The president 
of the Bank refused to do any business with ttiem but referred them 
to the lawyer for the Bank, wnd they wait to the lawyer's office. 

£il saiiiX&li l>e«cJE«iiri^ afV^^Hl ••tirj 

. r; ,w? ot, fW.T^j| ,at^ OJ fe-:,_^ .,,--? &^"f«Vr.->' •:.- *<srtf'^'».•■ 

8£A^.^ ... ^.„^i •.4^ :i|Bi««ija .•■^iA^IboctJ tin J^'^'f- ■ 
f-,Bf •;■■»/-. '..7 -"^w ;^(^5SfX#llOd sX/ff .nwofr Mnq »«» E'<-,r'nr> !.«-Tr>rT. 

,. - _ aai*ti»»9« XX« tXrfT .ite«S «riii - . , 

,9^a:^mtm 9fl!f Ito t*<| o^ ■"•^ 

:fn9^i«tf(4 9<n .\3T«q(n<¥. Kit eS k»' ^* 


k dead wes made cortveyiag th© property to Dusthelmer and from 
Du9thel-£©r to at®flene» TMs '«{i^ all done without the knowledge 
of ti:e plaintiff, k few days &fter the Bank transferred the 
property, the plaintiff i?ent to the bsnk &M in anger stated 
that h® <ildn*t koow they were going to deed the property, a a 
he h»d a oheaoe to sell it ertd have Bass,e aoney over the rnortgage, 
ligr&ng, i^o hsd been essbier of the bank for thirty years, out 
Mio at the tliiiB of the trial was not an offieer of the Bank tout 
6: stoolcholtJer, testified In oehsif of the i>l©i«tiff aad corrob- 
orated hiia in all material respects, Duethelsaer and Steffena 
were not celled bb witnesses by either side, fbe only official 
of the Bank to testify *&.8 *r. Beiikea, the president, nnd he 
filled t© coatrfedict the plaintiff* s evidence except tj-xst he 
stated he did not ji«rsonally authori2,e anyone to mnke an 
agreement to deed the property back to Geisler, or as far as 
he could recall th#t the Board of Blrectors did not give this 

Ihe cle«.r *ei^t of the evidence under the record on 
all sfeterlsl points ia with the pl&intiff. The defendant 
contends that even though there wee frs5ud and alerepresentatlon, 
- Gelsler Is estopped to b«9e en action on It because of 'his 
failure to cct pronaptly &.£t%t tke a&me Qnm4 to' hie knowledg«, ' 
About t«D years expired froaa the time Gelsler had knowledge 
of the fraud until he filed his suit, fhe general rule is 
that s person who hse suffered from frsvid and deceit, upon 
obtaining full knowledge of it must act promptly. It eppears, 
however, that for several -acnths after the conveyance Steffena, 
tbe purchaser, permitted Geisler to stay in potseesslon. It 
furtiier appears that at the time Gelsler conveyed to the Sank, 
they told him to go ahe^d end sell the land and clean up hie 

debts, Although it appears that in June, 1938 Geisler obtained 





^ Xo &o ■" 

li* m?.i 


knowledge that the Bank had conveyed th« land. It does not 
app»?>r that the Baiik, Steffens or ^mathel^isr ^ere not going 
to account to him for the difference between the purchase 
price of the land '^nd the n^irtgasge liens thereon. It also 
ap5)e»rs that Steffent gave CJelsler seven hundred dollars to 
pay off the second sBortgage, which was held by the estate of 
0-elgler'g father, who ixas decessed. It doa?? nnt appear that 
Geisler had full knowledpre of all the meterlel elements of 
the ti^nsftctlon In June, IQ.*??, 

The olrcuraet'jnces and incidents mirroundlag the 
transaction were sijoh that Geisler wag lulled to sleep for a 
considerable space of time r^ftf^r ths oonveyancai These 
clrourastances top:ether with the f?5Cte, that (^elsler was3 s. man 
of limited business experience es well as Intel lecttial capacity; 
that he had dealt with this bank for many yesra; that he had 
confidence in it?! officers end ^ent to them '.«'lth all his 
business tr?yi8a€tlon8, .«nd f>elsler did not at ru^ time after 
the conveyance by the Bank expressly effii^ the transaction^ 
in our judgment Is reasonable excuse for ISie del,«!y In bringing 
the suit. ^©stLSfceJCDes 

^e feel ths t; the Trial Court reached the correct 
conclusion end thet substantlsl Justice wpr done by the Judg'ment 
entered here, and the same shsuld be affirm ed. For the reasons 
herein assigned judgment is hereby ef firmed, 


5!jnisi5t-:iU r.x ViX».*» arf? tot »«i}&x« »X<feno? 

ftnoe&»<i •/iJ ton .ijeuTJ^ 

^rtc- noX5i;ioroD 







=y Tern,^^. D. 1942 

Jerm No. 42M6 


Plaintiff -A:jpel>'fee , 


31 « 

Agenda No. 5 

Appeal from the 
.Circuit Court of 

son County, 


jCHAS. P. DAVIS, Do^<6g 

Business Under t^e 
I Fictitious Nane/and 

Style of Hiil^TI^i\L- 



/ This is an appeal froia a judgnent in the anount of 

13,000.00, entered in the Circuit Court of Madison County, in 

ifavor of Appellee LEVI DaVIS (hereinafter called plaintiff), and 
against Appellant, CIL\.S. P. DaVIS, doing businos under the ficti- 
tious naxie and stylo of Hannihal-Quincy Truck Line (hereinafter 
.called defendant). 

The suit was brought by the plaintiff, against the de- 
fendant, to recover for personal injuries sustained on the 17th 
day of January, 1941, when he was struck, while standing on a side- 
walk, by a truck belonging to the defendant, and which truck at the 
tine of the accident being driven and operated by Donald Young, 
an employee of the defendant. Fron the evidence it appears that 
this accident happened at the northwest corner of the intersection 
of Belle Street and Sixteenth Street, in the City of Alton, and 
that Belle Street j-uns north and south, and Sixteenth Street, east 
and west. 

Plaintiff testified he had left his home, about a block 
Tom the place where the accident happened, and that he was on 


Belle Street, on the sidewalk, and that when he walked up to the 
intersection of the two streets he looked south, i. e. , he looked 
to his right, and that is the last he ronemhers until later that 
night when he vms in the hospital. The seriousness of the injuries 
the plaintiff received are not challenged on this appeal, nor is 
it urged on this appeal that the verdict is excessive. 

Donald Young testified that he was employed "by the de- 
fendant herein, and that on the day of the accident he started from 
St. Louis, Missouri, at about 8:00 p.m., and was going to Quincy 
by way of Yilton; that he was familiar vdth the route, having driven 
it five or six tines, and that as he was passing through Alton, on 
Belle Street, after crossing Sixteenth Street, going north, there 
is a big hill. This v/itness testified it had been snov.lng and 
raining and vras turning cold, and that after he crossed over Six- 
teenth Street to go north, and started on Bcllo Street, about half- 
way up the hill the street vvas cindered, and from there on, over 
the top, it was just ice. He further testified that after he left 
Sixteenth Street, he ran up the hill as far as it v/as cindered and 
could not go any farther, and that he then set the brakes on his 
truck, that the brakes v/ould not hold and that the truck and 
trailer started to slide back. He further testified that he could 
not control the truck vdth the brakes on and that he put it in 
reverse and opened the door, and that he was guiding it back dov,!! 
the hill when he saw a street cutting out to his left, or to the 
south, and that he cut for that street, but the tractor slipped 
and the back of the trailer ran across the curb and struck the 
plaintiff herein. From the evidence it appears that there were 
four v/heels on the tractor and two on the trailer. This witness 
testified that he sav; the plaintiff herein and hollered, "Hey, look 
out I" From this vatness' testimony it appears that he did not have 
chains on the wheels at the time of the accident, and that at the 
tine plaintiff was struck the wheels on the truck v/ere turning 
around, rolling backvmrds, and that the brakes v/ere not on. 


Petar M. F. Bomier, called as a v/itness for the plain- 
tiff, testified that he saw the accident as he v/as operating his 
car on Sixteenth Street and had just uade a boulevard stop at the 
Belle Street intersection; that he observed the truck backing dovm 
the hill with all the wheels rolling, ajid that he did not hear any- 
one say anything, nor did he hear a horn sounded; that he saw the 
truck when it jumped over an eight-inch curb and hit the plaintiff, 
who was then standing on the sidewalk. This witness testified that 
as the tractor and trailer backed down, "it looked like it was on 
the left side of the street, that it zigzagged." This vdtness 
further testified that the streets were not slick enough for hin 
to use skid chains. 

Defendant contends for reversal of the judgnent in this 
case upon two grounds: (First) That the facts disclose that plain- 
tiff's injuries v/ere the result of an unavoidable accident, and 
not due to the negligence of the defendant; and (Second) That the 
Trial Court erred in giving an instruction for the plaintiff. A 
fair consideration of the evidence in connection v/ith this case 
persuades us, and we so hold, that this case should not be reversed 
on the assignment of error hereinbefore first referred to, for the 
reason that an accident for which no liability exists is one which 
is the result of an unknown cause, or is the result of an unknown 
or unexpected event happening in such an unusual nanner from a 
known cause that it could not be reasonably expected or forseen 
and that it was not the result of negligence ( CO RNl'vELL . v . BLQ OM - 

An issue of fact was presented in this case that we 
believe, and hold, v/as very properly subraitted to a jury for their 
deternination as it is solely a question of fact for the jury to 
deternine whether the injury was the result of an unavoidable acci- 
I'dent, or negligence ( LEVY y. CHICAGO CITY RYS. CO ., 187 111. App. 
[64) . 

j Y/e have examined the instruction, the giving of v/hich is 

i 3. 

issigned as error in this case, and while the instruction is 
subject to the criticisn leveled against it, the giving of the 
Lnstruction has been held to he not reversible error ( EDWARD v . 
IILL-THOlVl/iS LIME Sc CM^MT CO . . 378 111. 180). 

There being no reversible error in this record and the 
judgLient being anply supported by the evidence, said judgment is 
lereby, accordingly, affinaed. 

Judgment affimed. 

NOV 2 t942 


This is an appeal fron the County Court jf Madison 
County froLi a finding in favor of Dcfondcnt-iLppollGe, STOLZE 
LUMBER COIylPii^IY, a corporation (hereinafter called defendant), 
and against the Plaintiff-Appellant, CmUiLES H. THEIS (here- 
inafter called plaintiff) . 

This suit vtfas first brought in a Justice-of-the-Peace 
Court, and the trial resulted in a judgnent in plaintiff's favor 
for $250.00. i-ai appeal v/as taken to the County C.jurt cand the 
cause v;as tried before the County Judge, ivich^ut a jury, and re- 
sulted in a finding in favor of the defendant. Iji appeal to this 
Court followed. 

The evidence discloses that tiiis is a suit in v'hich 
plaintiff seeks to recover a real estate broker's coiiiission of 
$250.00 fron the defendant, being b'fo jf the sale price of a parcel 
of real estate in Grajiite City, Illinois, sold by the defendant 
to one Lurton George. The evidence shov-s that the plaintiff is a 
licensed real estate broker in Granite City and had been in that 
business for twenty years last past. In Septeuber, 1939, plain- 
tiff contends, in a conversation vith an official of the Stolze 
Lunber Conpany of Granite City, that said official told hin the 
defendant wanted to sell the property, the sale of which furnishes 

i^r- 1 . 

the basis for tho cjiij::issijn claiuod by plaintiff in this case, 
and that after plaintiff had conferred v/ith ojiother .official of 
the defendant Coupany, that they told hin they v/v^uld be glad to 
have hin sell it if he cjuld. Plaintiff testified the sale price 
of the property was fixed at ^6500.00, and he v/as authorized to 
shov/ it to prospective purchasers. Plaintiff contends he inter- 
viewed several people vvdth a view to interesting then in the 
property, and finally, one of his prospects, Lurtjn Gejrge, in- 
dicated that ho was interested. Plaintiff testified he tjok 
Lurton George through the property, and after he had considered 
the natter, Lurton George inforr''.ed plaintiff ho \-ou]-d buy the 
property but v.'ould not pay nore thoji $5000 = 00 for ito This offer 
was subnitted to the defendant Conpany and rejected by then and 
a counter-proposition of i^5500o00 Vi?as nade 'oj the Conpany, but 
Lurton George refused to offer nore than |i5000.00 f..^r the property. 
Plaintiff testified that the defendant C.npany at >^nG tine agreed 
that they v>/ould accept $5000,00 net t.> then for the property, and 
that if the sale was nado on that basis, plaintiff would have to 
get his connission fron the purchaser. 

It appears fron the evidence that in tho early part of 
1941 the defendant advertised the property for sale in the Edwards- 
ville and Granite City newspapers and the sale price was designated 
as being $6000,00, and finally an ad was inserted in the paper 
stating the price to be $5000.00, Plaintiff contends he called 
to see the defendant a week or tv/o before the last advertisenont 
was run and told Mr, Phillips that he had a buyer ready and vail- 
ing to take the property at $5000.00 and the naioe of Lurton 
George as his prospect. It appears fron the evidence that the pro- 
perty v/as sold to Lurton George for $5000,00, Plaintiff contents 
he is entitled to a counission of 5% on the sale, jr $250,00, V^ J/ 
Plaintiff contends on this appeal that defendant entered into a 
secret agreenent viltYi Lurton George for the sale of this property 
to avoid the paynent of a connission to the plaintiff herein. 

We are very nindful of the established law that should govern 
that state of fo.cts, if true, hut vie fail to find anything in 
the record establishing that contention. 

Fron the evidence produced in behalf of the defendant it 
appears that Mr. Robert M. Phillips, acting for the corporation, 
told the plaintiff that they vrould not tie themselves up v^ith 
anyone on the sale of the property, and that if plc?.intiff sold 
the property it would to be a cash transaction and handled 
ontirel'y by hiti, and that defendant resorved the right to Liake 
any deal it saw fit. It further appear:; frou the evidence pro- 
duced on beheilf ..-f the defendant that v/hcn pJ.aintlff CLXie to Mr. 
Phillips and stated that he could sell the property for |5000«00, 
that he was told that the only way they v.-ould accept such an of- 
fer would be for hin to secure his cor:.Tiissi-.n over and above the 
#5000.00 cash net to the defendant. 

Lurton G-eorge, the purchaser v;f the property, testified 
that he v^as contacted by olaintiff, but that no deal v.-as closed by 
plaintiff. There is alsj the evidence of Mr. Phillips that he had 
talked to Lurton George, the purchaser of the property, prior to 
the tine plaintiff nentloncd his nano to Phillips as a pro- 
spective buyer ;f the property. 

This case having been tried lij the Court, vdthout a 
jury, the finding of the Tiical Court on the controverted facts 
is entitled to the srne weight as the verdict of a jury ( MOORE v . 
DAVID J. MOLLOY CO ... 222 111. App, 295). Tne judguent of that 
Court, v..'ho sav; the v/itnesses and heard then testify, is conclusive 
on all questions of fact, if not manifestly against the v/eight of 
the evidence ( SHhPLEIGH HD W. CO. vs. ET TERP RISE FOUNDRY CO .. 305 
111. App. 180; MTgYER vs. PIENDRIX, 311 111. i\pp. 605, 509). 

A careful consideration -)f the evidence in this case 
brings us to the conclusion that the finding of the Court, in favor 
of the defendant in this case, is not against the nanifest v.reight 
of the evidence, but that said finding has abundant support in the 


evidence. The judguent of the Trial Court, being correct, the 
saiie is hereby affimied. 

Judgnont s f f i iTie d . 



10V2 1942 





Af" /»-— 


CQMPAKY, a-^qrporation, /' 





copartners doing ^]5usiness as 


/ Appellees, 





Lundoff-Bicknell Company was awarded the general contract 

fo/ the erection of the Higbee Department Store building in Cleve- 
land, Ohio, The general contractor awarded defendants herein, 
E, ?/, Kaiser and A» G. Kaiser, copartners, doing business as 
Bo B, Kaiser Company, the contract for the plumbing and heating 
in said building. Defendants in turn engaged plaintiff. Standard 
Asbestos Manufacturing Company, to furnish and install the covcr*- 
ing and insulation for the plumbing and heating pipes and fixtures 4 

The complaint alleged substantially that January 14, I93I 
plaintiff entered into a written contract with defendants under 
the terms of which it agreed to furnish and install "all the 
covering and insulating for the Higbee Department Store at Cleve- 
land, Ohio, "which defendants were obligated to furnish and install 
under their contract of Ivovember 12, I930 between them and Lundoff- 
Bicknell Company, the general contractors; that the contract 
between plaintiff and defendants was subject to all the terms 
and conditions of the contract between the defendants and the 
general contractor? that the price specified in plaintiff's 
contract with defendants was $14,700 "payable in such proportions 
and at such times as it is received by the said E, B, Kaiser from 
the said Lundoff-Siclcnell Ccanpany}" that thereafter on April 21, 
1931 plaintiff entered into an additional written contract with 
defendants whereby it agreed to furnish and install insulating 






y'■^JOO XO.OD .Titoo. 


^H5?3L,.. , 

•. ,p, • 

-■<ioT,^ ,r .a 


SB aaexLi: 



-! 3. ^ , 

, oj..i.i #9 «S 

d-oBid-noo Isisnsg ©rid- bebiswjs ss'sr Y^eqitroO IIsrDlo±6&-11ol>£UJJ 

aB eaeniaircf Jgrtiof) ^s's.ond'i^qoo ^isaiB)! «t3 ,A tnz leexc:. . 
3iij:j-j3®ii fcas an±tJM/Iq ©li;^ 'lol d-oaicJ^iwo e45 ^-^isqcioO leaiJsS .u ,1:. 
lne.ha&iZ ^llld-nlfilq ftssfi^ne nrUv-t nl ad-nfifensleC ^gniiJIxucr f)Xi38 ai 

. ^rmd-xil hiia asqjiq gniifsexl tifLa iaitfcu/Iq arlo lo't noWcljjani fens ani 
.l£(;U ^M YiBwnaL lisAi ^XIsid-nscfedJLfa bsgsIX.s d-nlfil qmoo arlT 

mij LL2^^ Llsrizn'L bns xlaiffml oj- JbseigB di iloldw lo aaii&d- edJ- 

— ©vsIO d-fc; aiodo- dneffKfiBqsa ©scfalH ©!!;)■ lol gnldslxrsni f«Ls aniievoo 

IIsJ-aiLt bnn risxnijj'l: Qd bsd-sslldo eisw ed-xi£;f)ns>lef) rioixiw" ^olrlO ^bxisl 

-'llofcnuJ Jbna msrld n(?9wcl-scf 0£^I ^^fl locffirevo ' '2o dof>ijaoo il&if* isboLf 

dosidnQO ©fict dMd je.'jodoBid-noo lBi6nr>a ^^id ^ijnBqinoO IlsroIolS 

amisct erid IIjj od doetcfjuE asv; adi3Le.f)n0l@I) ba.% lllonxclq n9ew;t9rf 

sricf ins sd-jEufcnetel) 9i{;t nsswd'sc' J-or-id-ncc end- *io efloxd-ibnoo bnxs 

a'Tild-ixlr.Iq ni foeillosqa eoliq eiid ijsrid" jiodoB^d'nbo. Ifiisnas 

p.noijoioqoicr i'.^vz nx elcfR-^sg" OO^^^I'ji a."' ;..ift :&-i^'5p5 rf.-.h; ^or.iinoo 

iHD-il 'isei/ , , M;.8 sjdd- •^j€f Jbs-viooe-: :;1 ::; ... ^.i_i. .ii.. . ._ bsi& 

^IS Xliq^ no isdlBS^SA'd daxid »;>EHjBq(noG fl©xi3lolS*.llol2njjJ Lisa ad* 

A>sim dr-anJ-noo rK-.ij ?-:/,' Ii\noldi:i rv, a, o^r::- r.crr.-hrr.- •>*^.^■'■r[i,BIq I£9I 

Sni:d-£X;'P '; '• f ::; m-in-Ai/ o, =.— m_;- ji xuim:.,:\/ adrtafenelsf) 

materials for the drinking water supply pipe and the balancing 
tank in the aforesaid Higbee Department Store for the sum of 
$1,000 J that plaintiff performed the work covered by the aforesaid 
written contract and at the special instance and request of defend- 
ants par formed extra work on said job; that payment "has been made 
to the defendant, S» B^ Kaiser Company by the general contractor, 
Lund offt^ic knell Company, in accordance with the said prices speci- 
fied by the plaintiff j« and that there is a balance of $7,250^34 
with interest dme plaintiff from defendants. 

Defendants' answer denied that "the work and labor performed 
by plaintiff was approved by defendants or anyone else and alleged 
that a great deal of said work and labor was the subject matter 
of many controversies and disputes between the plaintiff, the 
defendants, th® general contractor, the owner and the architeeto^" 
Defendants' answer specifically denied "that payment had been 
made to them by the general contractor or anyone else" for the 
items with respect to which recovery was sought in the complaint. 
The answer also alleged that the extras in question were not fur- 
nished ay the plaintiff at the special Instance and request of 
defendants but at the special instance and request of the ovmer. 

The cause was referred to a master in chancery to take 

proof and report his findings and conclusions relative thereto* 

The facts appear sufficiently from the report of the master which 

is set forth as follows in the abstract of record: 

"That the plaintiff, in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of the contract ■♦*■**" between the defendants and the 
umdoff*^icknell Company, completed the work called for in the 
contract [between plaintiff and defendanis] (plaintiff's Exhibit 
'A') and performed the work in a workmanlike manner, all of 
which was duly approved by the defendants, by Lundoff-Bicknell 
Company and by the architects, and that there became due to 
th6 plaintiff by reason thereof the sum of $14,700} that said 
amount is admitted by the defendants. 

"The Master finds that while the work mentioned in said 
Exhibit 'A« was being done, the defendants ordered and directed 
the plaintiff to do certain extras and additional work; that 

lo igi/a «il^ TOl ©TOcJ-^ iasm:}iBq,B<l 9««fgiH fcijcseftiolB ©xtJ' flJ: 5ta«;J 

5££i Ks©tf 8/ui*' cffl©flr^«q iiaSji {€ol fciae no ilnow ind'.xs bta-jolieq sine 
'1030 2 asoiiq felaa s/i^ xlijtw ©©asf>iooos el ^y,aBqF^oO IlsmioiS^xlobfltfJ 

bssr.'II.';: DHi. ^:: ..-,-:., _- £j£££b^i^t»fe "Sjcf bevoiqqs esw Illd-filBlq -^cf 
T9ci^?.Ti ^©©t^'^'s BSiS Sjsw no^al fcn« iliow bt»e Jo lesb J-Bsig b isdi 

",Jo©;tij£isi/5 ®fttf biSB ism.. -. ^lod'csi^noo X^^-ienss ©Md- ^sJiiBbneleb 

silo nol "'•>vrc g^cr^ns 10 tcocfas^dTioo I^^ioxies add" "^d sa-di oi ebAta 
,d"nli8lqfltOG ... ..1 tii^ssiiz esw -^tsvodsi risirlw oi doeqaei rid'iv; acrdd"! 

lo ;^e5>i:ff9T fcnxs osnscfsxiJt Icloeqa ?if:f *b l*i±^nZ«Iq ari[;t -^c; bedeta 

*odi:>i9ri* «vl*a£el: snolsi/Isnoo Me esnlftail aiil iioq^i tn& looiq 

net'- "^l- — 'n.+ "io i-soqe^ ©xIS- tfc-r'i ^^Ictnelsi^tirE ^s^qqA aiae^ exfl! 
;6ioo?.'/ I0 io^iizdiR 9rid ni avrollol sb ridrtol :^' " -.^ 

©/:, J-fcf **^- toiia«.xioo ©iU 10 aiiolsivoiq 

?)r(^ ...■ •^^..' a-iuy. -u.^ ^edsXqaoo ^-^ • "^ /'"■■•":':.• .a>-llo|jriJ3J 

Id Ilii , '• ■: •- - -- -, £iHj3 (»A» 


the plaintiff performed said extra and additional work which 
was duly approved by the defendants and by the Lundoff— 
Blcknell Company, 

"That the work xvas done In a workmanlike manner, and as 
a result of said extras and additional work, there became due and 
payable to the plaintiff the sum of $4,871*29, The Master- iTinds 
that this item is disputed by the defendants who contend, first| 
that this work was not ordered by thea but was ordered by the 
owner, and second, that if the work was ordered by them, there 
is no satisfactory proof that the v^ork and materials, wnich formed 
the basis of the claim for $4,871*29 were furnished, 

"That on the 21st day of April, 1931, the plaintiff entered 
into an additional contract with the defendants (plaintiff's 
Exhibit «C») by the terms of which plaintiff agreed to furnish 
and supply certain insulating materials, etc., and to furnish 
and install the same under and by virtue of the said contracto*** 

"That the work was performed in a workmanlike manner and 
was duly approved by the defendants, et al,, and there became due 
to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000, and that the defendants admit 
this item* 

"That while the plaintiff was doing the ?vork imder the 
said plaintiff's Exhibit 'C*, the defendants directed plaintiff 
to do certain additional ?/ork; that this extra additional work 
was furnished and there became due and payable to plaintiff the 
sum of $222,30, which item is likewise admitted by the defendants, 

"That It was stipulated and agreed by and between the 
parties that the defendants are entitled to the following 

"Cash payment to the **-* [plaintiff] $13,000,00 

"Pro-rata back charges as admitted in 

illxhibit 'B' , . 456.00 

"Direct back charges as admitted in 

Exhibit 'B» 87,25 

"Total, $13,543.25 

"The Master finds that certain disputes had arisen between 
the defendants and the general contractor as to the amounts which 
the defendants claim they were entitled to under their contract 
with Lmidoff-Blc knell Company, and negotiations were had between 
the parties; that the total amount due to the defendants under 
their contract was $223,870,51, defendants received on account 
$192,325.66, leaving a balance of m^31, 54-4.85; that said item was 
paid to the defendants under a settlement whereby certain monies 
were deposited with the Guardian Trust Company of Cleveland, Ohio, 
under an escrow agreement dated the 8th day of December, 1932. ^^** 

"After the filing of the siiit herein, the plaintiff received 
from the Guardian Trnst Company, on account of its c3.aim, the sum 
of $4,906,74, which plaintiff credited to the account of the 
defendants, and there is no contest as to this credit, 

"The defendants did not receive the entire amount which 
they claim was due them and to their subcontractors, Spf elf ically 

■ -^d £>c:isb-io J- on c alrld" cfBri^t 

beeiol^oliiw ^: ilJ- loo'iri \ ; on 2I 

«J.r,-i,-..i;. -ij. fiov, c;.--»*iV8<f-H' 10'i filial & :::'4,J : -; .,ia3d SXlJ 

• y- !.-.'') iX'^ 

^11'^'^- xo ii:s£) ^8 IS srl^ 

:■ -flT" 

:■ ■^IWf) 



eri^ o;f 

♦ fis; 

fx alxl^f 

w ifiriT" 






£' ■■■ ari;t ilvixw ;i-OfficJ-noo I : . a& oial 

ilalinul oj fxia ,.od'9 ^b: . .i cxec/ieo \Iq . 

'■■■ «:t" ■::"■-;.' ■••'-" ;•-■• -^-o sjj..i-i.i.v i;^^ tl; -r j^ju, saee stit IXisJ'Biii. uh^ 

■1^:"/ « Hi f ■-■-:-,-. -•• - - -••-" - 

.'-^©wd'ejsf feae ^jt. fcssiSjB bae bsi&Jjjiil^z saw JJt ^sxff" 

00*000,£X$. J.itrttBlq2 *^ &di oi ia^K^iiq xl8«0" 

iil beiiimbs 8fi aesiiiffo 2fostf bJ'st-oi*!'' 

00.^ , «K' jMirfxr; 

ill. b»;.^Simb& as assiBrio listd cJ-oaalG" 
, .....^ 'C» Jt^iMxZ 

"^l ■ , .LbcJgT" 

': 'b tic. , -, 

• J'i^e'io fc. . ^J ^ 

H^ldn &mjosas e.iiSn^ ad^ &vl ... lb aioHba^teb »riT" 

Xli»atl±OFG[c ,3ioooeTCfa©5>dj6f8 'iiofW oi bus m®d} 2Xf6 asir aiijlo y®^^ 

the shortage amounted to $<1,^4A-,B'^, showing a loss to the defend- 
ants of 14, f" 

"The plaintiff was not a party to any agreements of 
compromise or settlement between the defendants on the one isanci 
and Lundoff-^icknell Company on the other hand. 

"After the settlements were consximinated, the defendants 
released and discharged the gtaeral contractor and the owner 
from all claims that they had, both on their o?ni behalf and on 
the behalf of their subcontractors, and the claim of the defe?.id- 
ants, both on their own behalf and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
was extinguished, 

"The Master found that the plaintiff had at no time 
granted to the defendants any authority to in any 
way or reduce the claim of the plaintiff in any amounts, and 
if any reduction ©f plaintiff's claim was made by the defend- 
ants in their settlement or compromise, it was made without 
any authority from the plaintiff »" 

After analyzing the pleadings and the evidence the master 
concluded that the material allegations of the complaint had been 
provenj that the eqiiJLties in the case were with plaintiff j aad 
that there was due plaintiff from defendants $2,854»31# which 
included a balance of $2,343,60 for extras and $51C.71 interest 
from May 31, I936 to October 10, I940* 

All objections by both parties to the master* s report having 
been overruled, they were allowed to staiii as exceptions thereto. 
The trial court overruled all ex^eptioijs to the master's report 
except that which concerned the right of plaintiff to recover 
interest of $?10,71 frm May 31, 193^ to October 10, 1940, which 
allowance was recoBHaended by the master^ After sustaining 
defendants' exception to the allowance of this interest, the 
chancellir entered the decree in plaintiff's fr.vor for $2,343»60» 

Plaintiff's appeal seeks a modification of the decree to 
the end that certain items of interest be auded to the principal 
amount of $2,343,60 which defendants were decreed to pay plain- 

Defendants cross appeal seeks the reversal of the decree 

for $2,343,60 in favor of plaintiff. 

The evidence amply sustains the findings of the master 

'sSKis X!'- ■ ;•- '■■'■ -■■'■■'■' ■ ■'-■'^ '■ '■ --'^ '■■'' 

Mb ^ 

;tiFG£[J.|w ©bsai asw ;tl ,- oo io dri^ir.el^jea ■ ■ a;tflfi 

. tial»lq P;io moil ^,; .u-io;...i:f£ XOG 

n-ot: t-iid d-xiijslqfiioo sxiu lo euoWassIIs lali9i&m sx^cJ' ^jsd^t D9i.jii.5noo 

5£U5 :' " ■ 'aig fJKlw s-xaw ®e«o ad;f -^ a«i^i#p» sd* ^juii jUBVOiq 

lioJ: , .>^^S$ e^smbaslBb soil ViiJtalslq •ob eaw 9tf?d:i iodi' 

is.Q'z^inJ: , '^" ' ~\'"'\ '" "0 asnaliscf jb bsbalpat 

i'i fceuisoxicc xioJtilw J-Bxl;t Jqsoxs 

te^oafc ©itJ lo X/sfissvs^ «A<* cMess Xaeqqs Rsono 8:tjiiSl)n©ls»Q 

/nxofliiiXq lo wval fix 0dȣ*^t5^ ^^ 


and the decree of the court that after plaintiff had completely 
performed its two contracts with defendants and furnished extra 
labor and materials as requested by the latter, there v/as a balance 
of $7*250.30 due and owing from defendants to plaintiff 5 that lay 
31, 1936 plaintiff was paid $4,906,74 on account of such balance 
by the Guardian Trust Company of Cleveland, Ohio, out of an escrow 
fund theretofore created for such purpose; and that the balance 
due plaintiff from defendants was thereby reduced to $2,343*60* 

It will be noted, however, that defendants were not liable 
to piy plaintiff this balance unless and until they received pay- 
ment to that extent from the general contractor j, Lundoff-Bicknell 
Company. It will also be noted that defendants did not recelTe 
from the general contractor payment of the balance due plaintiff 
but that defendants settled and compromised i^lth tlie general eoi>* 
tractor for an amount considerably less than the balance due them, 
which compromise included the settlement of the balance due plain- 
tiff and deprived the latter as a subcontractor of its right of 
action against the general contractor and the owner. 

The master's findings concerning defendants* settlement 

agreement with the general contractor, which were approved by 

the chancellor were as follows: 

"The plaintiff was not a party to any agreements of 
compromise or settlement between the defendants on the one hand, 
and Lundoff-Bicknell Co., general contractor, and the owners, on 
the other hand, *** After the settlements were consummated, the 
defendants released and discharged the general contractor and 
the owner from all claims that they had, both on their own behalf, 
and on behalf of their subcontractors, and the claim of the defend- 
ants, both on their own behalf, and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
iras extinguished. 

"The plaintiff at no time granted to the defendants any 
authority to compromise in any way, or reduce the claim of the 
plaintiff in any amount, and if any r<?duction of plaintiff's 
claim was made by the defendants in their settlement or comproBaise 
it was made without any authority from the plaintiff," 

There is sufficient evidence in the record to support these 

findings and it cannot be said that they v/ere against the manifest 

"^Is.telqBioo b&£i 11 xJ-n Jtalq lei'ls iadif ^owdo M^ "i© ssioeb srLt Iuib 
£*hx9 fcexIsln'XB'i iaxfi z'Saabaelsb xldiw Bd-osidrioo ow:}- aii beaioliBq 

tjbM iodt i'i'y.t;ialBlq o;t ^ia&baf^'t&b moil gnlwo ba& 9ab O^.O^^S^'^^^ lo 

1I0T9S8 HB "io :Jxro ^olxlO ^JbasIevoXO "io ijnisqjKoD #-ettiT a&ifji&uD ©xU" xd 
©ssrtslKd ©ifcf d-fifld^ fens {^aoq'iirq flaxra nol bsj^BSio 9^olo;f©isrf;f bout 

BLdBtl ion fiisw 3:tii«l3n©'it>fc ;^fl£ij ^i&vm.'od ^feoion s^cf Iliw jI 

-\;fiq fitflwleosi ■^©xl^ iXtim bns aaelmj aofiaXed alriJ "^lld-iilfiXq x^ -^^ 

XXeiDf oiS-llobfixjJ ^ioicB^;J"noc. Xsieasg sffJ moil :tnsjJ-x© cfaxid' ocT d-flsffl 

ffwtBOQi &oa btb airiBbaoleb $£d& be:toii «cf oaXa XXlw il .■^6<lffioO 

lli:;tiilsXq siit ;©0ixaljsd' sjdct ^o chustnxfiq "to^^ORiiaoo Xfiisneg ©ilcf aioil 

^.too I.sien93 oxicf x.yiY7 bealffioiqiBoo Ms btXi:tee aiiiBba»l»b iadi ivd 

t^iaory &vb Boanl&d en^ £iMii assX xldaiGbl&aoo iasjonB as lol loiosii 

"OiBlq swb sonaXacf orlJ ^o inoBiQLi:^s& etii bBbaloal ealffio-xqaoo jdoJblw 

^o d-iia-ti eJl Jo noj oBz:inoodi:a s as isii&l odi bePfliqsb ba& Vili 

.'isxiwo sxIJ' laia icKfoaiJnoD Xbigxiss ®^^ ifsmijRSB aol:toB 

d-asxaeX^tJ^a ' actnabaslsb gnin^sonoo sgxiXbnXl e»i©d-aBat exlT 

jgwoXXot aB »i9w TTOXXsonBxIo siiS^ 

^fcns-ri eno isd;;J no a ' ' ■ ■ ;> 


r ' 'v^ ^^ul iXo fiiQ^' .' C*ii 

^MB ^s'. . j lo "^.^^ 6icr..s 

ealesoiq&oo i:: ; iaXo 

' „ . . . ^ _: v/ :?! 

weight of the evidence. 

Since it is conceded that defendants did not receive from 
the general contractor funds with which to pay plaintiff the 
balance due it, no liability could attach to defendants for 
their failure to pay plaintiff, unless they had precluded them- 
selves from making any demand for payment upon the general con- 
tractor or had released said general contractor from liability 
for payment, "Provisions in subcontracts that the subcontractor 
shall not be entitled to payment until the contractor has secured 
his compensation from the oimer are valid and enforceable j but 
if the contractor has by his own fault lost the right to payment 
from the owner, the subcontractor will be entitled to his com- 
pensation," (17 C, J, S, 1058.) 

In Rumsey v. Liv erjs^ 112 Md. 5^6, the question was pre- 
sented as to whether a subcontractor was entitled to recover from 
a general contractor where the latter by his own act lost the 
right to payment from the owner. There the court said at pp, 
55^2, 553: 

"The payment of the compensation he had earned from the 
defendants could not be perpetually postponed merely because 
the company (oimer) refrained from paying its debt to the 
defendants (general contractor) or because they osiitted or 
refused to enforce its collection. They could insist upen 
their right to withhold payment from the plaintiff until 
their receipt of funds from the company only by asserting 
their right under their contract with the company to the 
payment of the sums to which they were entitled. *** If the 
defendants eomaiitted a breach of this condxtion in consequence 
either of neglect or affirmative election, both of which are 
charged in the declaration, we see no reason why the stipulation 
in question should still remain available to them as a ground for 
postponing the payment of the plaintiff's demand," 

In Foreman-State Trust & Savings Ba n ^_, kA^^r Estate q:^ .„ 

Frances Tauber^ decM v. Joseph Tauberj executor Estate of Max 

Tauber^ dec*df 262 Ille App« 614, this court, in an opinion 

written by Justice Otto Kerner, said at p, 617: 

"It has repeatedly been held that where one party to a 

contract shows that the other party has deliberately made it 

impossible f or ^the ^contract to be performed by some act of his 
done prior to the time that performance was to be made, such 

aK>i5t3v,.©vlooai ;i'on blh aiUBbaQlQb i^i befesonoo ai il sonlG 

tot a;Jnii£)n9i.s£) oi xjoait^^te Muoo tj:^ il id isil ott ^:fL •trft aon/jlscf 

-noo Isisnos Slid- aoqis ^^nBin^nq lol Lnflsasl) -^hb ^at:A.Bm aoil aevle^ 
ogcMIlcfBlI iHOi*!: ioSossi;ia<oo X^ifiaeg files beeBels"! ftaxi 10 loJOB^i 

bBiuo-: io:^o&^iaoo 9d;^ IX^asj ^nafs^sq; ot bel^ldim ad d-oa lifide 

:^ff4, {9ldsBQ'%o'in@ ba.& bilsv si& i©iiwo &di adl nol:J'8»H©qjnoi) std 

Jasat^-sq od- J-jIgi-i sj^d- cJaoI j-Iifel awo alii y<^ ajad •tocfosncfcsoo erid- 11 

(*8^0I ,ci .1, ,:, ^I) ''.eoldBan^q 
:oldaejjp mi ,©-^^ ,£>!; Sli ,^8^ev lJ .v re&Bit;^ fli 

©Idljn© asw Todoe^laoocfife js isridsrfw od- as te^nee 

J" OB Jttwo &M Y<2f 1&SS&I edi ©isfiw ioicBi;taoo iBiefl^j a 

Id 9*i»rfT .■i»iiwo ©fid taoil iat^B^sq od ddsli 

add laoil bsnte& bad ari noij^s^neqaco »xfd lo dn9iiixjs<? 9^" 

eeUROBd x^^^^fs fisisoqdsoq x-E^I^J^^- '^" ' ""' '''^'^ ■-''v-'- ■-"-? - -^ -^^ 

10 bBtitmo Tjsrid- oecBofcicf ^o (no.. :^ 'l^3.vjl .. ■ ' 
noqu :j'2tual hlsjoo xsrV:: «noid-o&IIoo a?! 

Xlujoxf llidriLcIq ed:f rcoi't in9finci3q blorirlj . ■ u Jii.^x-i -i^-iij 

gxiiJissas Y^f yXho xn^isxio arid aio'sl s-fem/l lo ;fqlooen ilorid 

9ffd od •-■••---- ■■■■:^ rirj-xv d-SEtdnoo ii: -^ ■ --^--.r -r^-^- -,t"-':t 

f . .cdoipJa eviJ . 
rto.!: - j>; ;-iH^ viiv itj. -^ ••■•3 sw ^itcu.'i-'Zo.j ■ • • 

'•?-'■ ' s Es^ aisfid- oJ (ilsiup'i Hide . 

'' .bft!itaeifo ct' .;■• r jn.j;.r?iq e.' " ' " > i^riQi^fx^c "^iut .?i";i; ■XK^jRoq 

nolniqo ne lix ,jui:;oo aitl ^ ' ' , , "' ' " ^Hy^^eh t- i^djL'c," 

ai^ to :;-c ' '" ■ 


act, in law, amounts to a prevention of performance," 

In affirming the Taaber case in Foreman Trust & Savi ngs 

Bank V, Jauberj^ 346 111, 28 0, the Supreme court used this language 

at p, 286; 

"It is well established by the authorities that a party 
to a contract who by his deliberate act prevents the fulfillment 
of a condition on which Ms liability under the contract depends^! 
cannot take advantage of his own %Tongful conduct and assert the 
failure of the fulfillment of the condition to defeat his lia- 
bility under the contract," 

Since defendants without plaintiff »s authority entered Into 
the settlement agreement with the general contractor thereby re- 
leasing and discharging said general contractor and the owner from 
all claims that they had against them, including plaintiff's claim, 
they must be held to have wrongfully brought about the extinguish- 
ment of plaintiff's claim against the general contractor and the 
owner. In our opinion defendants are clearly liable to pay plain- 
tiff the balance due it» 

Plaintiff insists that it is entitled to an allowance of 
five per cent interest on $7^ 250,24 from October 22, 1931, when 
it rendered its statement of account for that amount to defendants 
after the completion of its work and payment of said account was 
refused, to May 31# 193^* when it v/as paid $4,906,74- on its account 
by the Guardian Trusc Company. In the first instance plaintiff 
predicates its right to recover the interest above indicated under 
that portion of sec, 2, par, 2, chap, 74, 111, Rev, Stat. 1941, 
which provides: "Creditors shall be allowed to receive at the 
rate of five (5) per centum per annum for all moneys after they 
become due on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument ;, 
of writing ." (Italics ours.) There is no merit in this conten- 
tion. Plaintiff's right to- recover herein is not based upon its 
written contracts with defendants but rather upon defendants unp- 

authorized settlement of plaintiff's claim with the general con- 
tractor, which extinguished plaintiff's right to recover fraa said 

".o: ■ - - ■ 

■"fiy : oi QldBlI -^-T'Tr,- r. ..?,,, ,-,,r .aolniqo ix/o nl .aenwo 

«wJ. sab eanjslfid erfJ- IIW 

itexiw ^Ic<^I t --^ i uoJoO moil ■^Sx.O'^S^'^i?. no J-eeis^/il faeo leq evil 
a;t;Kiifsiie'iefi Ov^ Sauom.?, SbtU lo'i ctruiwooB lo 3aBei^S&is 8:tx beiebnel ;fl 

■^rarooofi ad-l no -^^.do^:,^ Msq saw Ji -t'- ^o£^I ^I£ v^ii Ov^ ^besjiflei 

^i*^l .^J-jeJ-c . , ' "^ ^ ' •" .--J;. ^' ,'1,,- ^' .Dtu .ta iioX^noq ied^ 

■^Cerid' iB^lii K-(;rtxo-t XXs ^ol o.,r;ix- loq, mss^aot loq (^^) evil ^o »^«t 

-«9^aoo ei::;j nl Jlt^ffi on ai sfjeffT {.ani/o aolXeJi;) ". atiiJiyp lo 
ad"! iK)q« bsaficf toa 81 itXsieil T[ovooei o;t id^li £'llici'nl«X'i .ftoXJ^ 
-«ai;' s;tnjobnelo!) noqa i&di&i ivd a^asibus'iQb fl:^jtw &ft>ariaG^o ei&i^lvv 

-coo Ii.'it-iif3 or 'l^tj^lJ-nJ. jiisfiisX^dee besiioxidxre 

general contractor and the owner ^ 

Plaintiff claims that in any event it is entitled to re- 
cover such interest because the foregoing balance was "v/ithheld 
by an unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment," Just what 
are the facts? As already stated there was a balance of $7,250#24 
due pleintiff from October 22, 1931, when its demand upon dofend- 
ants for the payment of its account was refused, until May 31p 
1936, when it received the payment of $4,906,74 from the Guardian 
Trust Company, Certainly plaintiff was not entitled to Interest 
from October 22, I93I to December 8, 1932 when defendants entered 
into the settlement agreement with the general contractor, since 
It is conceded that during said period defendants received no 
payment from the general contractor either on their own or on 
plaintiff's behalf. At the time defendants' settlement agreement 
of December 8, I932 was made certain funds to effect such settle- 
ment were deposited by the general contractor in escrow with the 
Guardian Trust Ccanpany. Before these funds could be distributed 
said trust company was forced to discontinue its banking business 
because of financial difficulties and it was not until I936 that 
the escrowed funds were released for distribution. It was oat 
of these funds, which were held in escrow by the Guardian Trust 
Company, that plaintiff was finally paid $4,906.74 on lay 31, 
1936. Surely defendants could not fairly be charged with unreason- 
able and vexatious delay of payment of that amount during the 
period from December 8, I932 to May 3I, 1936, Although this suit 
was started May 22, 1934 no effort was made by plaintiff to bring 
it to trial until the cause was referred to a master for hearing 
December 5> 1939* more than five and one-half years after the 
coimaencement of the action. In addition, as the master found, 
there was a dispute between the parties as to the extra work 

and materials furnished liy plaintiff. 

It would be highly inequitable under th~ circumstances 


ts&^e^:''- -' ^sl:t5*n9 d-cn 8bw llUnlalq ■^Inlaj-'ieO ,^njsqiiK)0 c^amiT 

on l)©"yleooi actn3fenf*e& feoii^q Mjse gjilti/b iBdJ bBbBoaoo ax ;fJt 

ftvro lied:^ no lericfjrs lo^Josid'nco X£''i©n9s sri* aioil ineurjfiq 

:taei>ies'i^£; cTnsiaeWd-ss * ziciBimBtsb salt ©xLI ' / Ifidscf z^tlf^alelq 

h'^uCX'Li'dlb ed BXxJoo Bbfisfi szeiH 9T©t?>H .-^aqjaoO cfaxriT ttatbisuQ 

i^^i bf_^i Itomi ion esw il bna Bftltluol'^'iJtfe iBJtonfinll lo sai/soscf 

SeniT osli-itii;^ siiJ' vd wonoae al bi»£l si©w rioJtriw ,2bni;l eesrfi lo 

^I£ ^jbM J20 I»\;,^0^^4s4 l)J»iBq xllisrtil asw ■!1Jt:faJ:&Xq ;tarb ^^sqmoCi 

"oajssifli; xfd-lw beafjiis) pel Y-r^-t^'*^ *ofl ftXj^o© eJ-nAftrtelreb XJ^etoC ,d£^X 

©rfci' gutiXfB ^fiiroaus S&M>} lo SoBsnxsq to xeS^b zijolctaxsv btia sXcfa 

^iiK! siili d^ssoAilA ,d£^X ^I^ '^bM od- <;£^I ^S i^djceo'^a moil £>oliwi 

8iit«f o;J llJt;fiilsIq ijcf abxafi aew J^rrolls on l^£^X ,SS x^ll bsiiB^a esw 

3£tl7so£f <r©l 'i&S&iZ-r^ 6 o;t fceTrslen: esw 9zbbo »At Xictm; XsXicf o;t ;t± 

«rid- leilfl s-iB©-^ IXxri-i^flo ban »v±l nisril ©lom ^^£^X ,^ lodm^o^Q 

^^bmro1 i^iemi sifcf tctiftfce fil .aolias sdi to ;fjtmii9aanBH09 

::iow si:fxs wit? oo- 2« soiSisq «^itf fl^swv'^&<f 9;tir<7alf) b esw ©frerfct 

&^ORe>iZfmo^lo vd^ t&bass ald&iJtitpo :ii ocf blMom iX 

to hold that defendants were guilty of such unreasonable and 
vexatious delay in withholding payment of plaintiff's claim as 
to warrant the allowance of interest on its balance of $7>250,24 
from October 22, 1931* when payment of same was due, until May 
31, 1936, when the Guardian Trust Company paid it $4,906,74 
on account of said balance. 

As to plaintiff's claim for interest On the balance of 
$2,343.60 found, to be due it under the decree, v/e think that the 
chancellor was fully ;Justified in disallowing same in accordance 
with the equities of the case. Interest on this balance was 
claimed for the period from Lay 31* 1936, when the $4, 906,74- 
was paid plaintiff by the Guardian Trust Company, until the date 
of the entry of the decree. As heretofore stated there was an 
honest dispute as to at least some of the items of extras and 
although this case was pending for almost two years prior to 
May 31, 1936 the first day of the period for ?/hich the interest 
under consideration is claimed, plaintiff permitted this suit to 
remain dormant until December 5> 1939* when it was referred to 
the master in chancery. 

Other points are urged but in the view we take of this 
case we deem further discussion unnecessary. 

For the reasons stated herein the decree of the Circuit 
court of Cook county is affirmed. 


Friend and Scanlan, JJ,, concur^ 


vf:,0$S^^4^ "to 90«bX.: :;9'i«;tni "io sonswolio ©xl:f ^xistiiuw o:t 

^eM llSmi ^^Gsjb saw 9ffi/=a 'io cfnaiExsq asxiw ,X£fX \SS istfoisO bigiI 

.eatteXflcf 5JtBa lo JflBOOOs no 

'iid& :toi ^aRfad0£> a*i:t -t^Bratf :tJt siffc ecT oJ" fitojyol 0^,£*£,S^ 

eoafifiiOD; ;?ni:woIIfiaI5 ni fieillj-siif, xJ^I^^ saw 'xo£leonstit> 

eit acW" "io 90ioe J-sssI jb oj- as ec^i/qaib j ssnoxl 

ow.t c^aoffila lol gaUbnec saw escscr 8±ri.+ rigworfcfls 

d-58T©;fn" •■;:■- io1 boli&q ^ii.i Jo ^sl) cJ-eiil sric? ^£^1 ^I£ t^-'i 

oj^ beTtiele^ eisw ^i: neriw ,^£^I <,'^ mdaisosG iJEimr tnaai^o!) nljearaT: 
d"J:ifoix; ioe5 exld" flis^ftri fcs^aits afioajG':?n ©ifd' 'lo'T 

^ixronoo ,,I.I. ^nsInsoB baa bnot'fi 





PAULA BAtXSia. and 


316I.A. 442 




i D 

Appelleer. "■^-'■-■--s.J^^^^ ^.- 


On October 29, 1940 plaintiff, Bessl^^-Siaon, procured a 
default judgment for $424, 60, which Included a finding of malice, 
against defendants, Paula Balasic and Alfred Balasio, This 
judgtaent was set aside on March 19, 1941 after a hearing on 
defendants » petition in the nature of a writ of error coram 
nobis to vacate same* On April 7, 1941 plaintiff filed her 
notice of appeal from the order of Ivlarch 19, 1941 vacating the 
judgment. All necessary steps were taken to present the appeal 
to the Appellate court for decision, Notwithstanding that said 
appeal (hereinafter for convenience referred to as the first 
appeal) was pending and had not as yet been disposed of by this 
court, this case appeared on a trial call in the Municipal court 
on July 1, 1941 and in the absence of plaintiff and her attorney 
an e^ parte hearing was had which resulted in the entry of a 
judgment against plaintiff on her statement of claim and a judg- 
ment for $63 against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on the 
latters' counterclaim. October 2, 1941 plaintiff filed a petition 
to vacate these last mentioned judgments alleging inter alia that 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case or to enter 
such judgments and that said judgments were void since they were 
rendered while the first appeal was pending in this court. On 
October 21, 1941 an order was entered by the trial court denying 
plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgments of July 1, 1941, It 
is from this order that plaintiff appeals. 

It is inconceivable that a trial judge, unless he was not 

advised of the pending appeal, would proceed with the trial ©f a 

,:)0A0IH0 to :' bfLs oies^; 

( , .OlfaAJii 

( ■ .^ssIIeqqA 

no gfliiBexI & i^its Lh^i ^^1 rfoisSt no ©feias ^fse ajsw ;tis»flisJE'^t 
josago loTf. . "io 9ijtid'«n edi nt. nold-lcfsq • gctnslinsleb 

9iit.:^l^&QBV l-l^^l ^^X rfJO'isM lo rrefcio «di moil lB»qqfi lo eo±d-on 
Xa©qqa esi& cfnaes-iiq afct jEteiia* *»t»w 8C[»d*» ijiBaeeoen IIA .^nsfflsbx/t 

cfsiXl ©Mif I. ■ii®'j€'«i ®orr«in«v/jDo «ol rtPcJTisnXsierf ) Xfisqqa 

2iiW x^ "^'^ 5©soqal£) a^9ti t&x ea cfon 6^ baa gxilfaieq saw (X«eqqjB 

;tiyoo l£qXt>lmfd «Jd[:t rri XI bo Xsi*i:i r .to ^eijEScrifis »8£*) eicfd- ^d^iwoo 

X^ifio^itQ isii fej. .i:sXq lo ©aneecfB srfcf fiJt* liiBB X-^^X ^I \Ijj1, no 

B lo x'^i^os ^^ ^i 5»:*Xxf8©i fs'otriw jfesfl asw sfllikerf ^Jiag zs na 

-s£iL'{, 3 feris fflXj5Xo 1:0 insmBis^B tod ao ItlSalsiq Szal&^B inBia^bvl 

&iii do aiazhci^'i&b lo loveJ nt bins lllfnlslq ^fafliBS^ £^$ lol d'neci 

flo±;f±J-9q j3 belil ItlSntBlq X-^^I ,S tstfo^toO .inisXaisctmroc ' Bi9J-;tflX 

d-Rxicf «J^£ TJgJ tiiJL gnJ:8®IXa B:}ti&ai^biil beaoliaQm cI-sbX sss/li- »:t&0Bv oi 

lod^ne od' io iss&o srfcf ^icf oj^ nG.WolJ&eliir(; on bjsri ;tijjoo XjbIi;^ arii 

©T9W x^ii^ eonia ftlov si9w zinB^rsbvl fiise ;fBri:t fens a^tneagbxTt rloira 

nO ,d-ixjoo eiflcf ax snXbneq a aw Xseqqs d-aill sxl^ sXIrfw b»isfcaei 

8rti"tjn'-:fe iissoo l&iii sd:^ x^ b»i^a» saw isfi-xo £ir l^^l ^XS istfocfoO 

;fl ,X>?I ^I \Xut lo a;:J-n©iasf)i:'t ^^^ ectjBOBV o:t noi;toiB a'llWnlsXq 

,RX«©qqB llWnlsXq Jarli rtDbio alri;? aoil el 


case and enter judgment therein during the pendency of an appeal 
which involved the merits of the same cause. As heretofore shown 
the judgments in question here were entered July 1, 194-1 and the 
first appeal, wherein the notice of appeal was filed April 7^ 194-1^ 
was not decided by this court until February 10, 1942 « "An appeal 
is perfected when a notice thereof is filed in the trial court in 
the form and within the time prescribed. When it is filsd, the 
case proceeds in the court of review not as a new case but as a 
continuation of the one that was pending in the trial court. The 
jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to take the case attaches 
when the notice of appeal is filed in the trial court," Francke 
v. Badle^ 373 111. ^00, It is elementary that after the notice 
of appeal (first appeal) was filed in the trial court that court 
lost jurisdiction of the cause and the jurisdiction of this court 
attached and continued until that appeal was disposed of. While 
the first appeal was pending in this court the trial court had no 
power to enter any order involving a matter of substance. The 
first appeal in and of itself stayed all further proceedings in 
the Municipal courts 

Defendants insist that "in the absence of an appeal bond, 
a supersedeas or other stay order, the proceedings in the trial 
court were not stayed," There is absolutely no merit in this 
contention. Defendants apparently misconceive the purpose of a 
supersedeas. It is only when an appellant desires that hi^ appeal 
"operate as a suspension of the execution of the (judgment pr 
decree)," (Rule 3, section 4, Rules of Practice, Appellate court. 
First District of Illinois), that it is necessary that such appeal 
be made a supersedeas and that bond be furnished* The first appeal 
was not from a money judgment against the enforcement of which by 
exec'ition it was necessary that plaintiff protect herself by having 
her j^^&l macic a supersedeas. Said appeal by plaintiff was fro* 
an c vacating &. default judgment theretofore entered in her 

lissqqs HB lo voavbneq odd" -^li-^iisb ale'i&ii:- J/iemsLj t i^^no Lna ©2bd 
nworia ©•Eotod'oisil ; eA .semso ©faac edS 'i.o Siiliou ori:f bsvXovnl iloirfw 

t^V>^L ^S IliqA Dslll as?? Issqqs lo soid-oxi e>rld- xilaisriw ^leaqqs cJ-aill 

9iii .J'Ujoc' I/aiicf- eiis ai ^ifcrisq asw d-jsfli^ ©ao ©xid lo ixoi;:fscflld'floo 

BsMo ,t7i;oO ©ctsIIsqqA ©ftt lo jaoIcfoifceJtixrt 

3^1132 »>'i'ii.iOi.;' li-i'i^ efiJ- ill fcslll ai Xijeqqs lo so let on s>tii asdv 

:i'wc :':: ni b^LlI aaw (XeetiqjB tsxtl) X/?;9qqB lo 

J-1WOO t;i.r:ci io iiiilJ oii)ax'Uit ©xio ftne eecfis ©ifd" 'lo Koi^oXfceXii/t ^8oX 

©Xir. . -ssoqsX: "^iicf Xlcfrof fesje/nlctnoo feoB bftxloscf^jB 

on bBsi diijoo Xs-tiJ- sfid- ^'^mo eirid- nl anifensq gsw Ijseqqs izill ^di 

.'^oiiBCtec.: i snivXovfLt ^©frio "^« isd-jis ocf iswcq 

a.i; a3££Xi)9soo'iq tsxi^Ti ?X£^'2 IXead"! lo bn/s ai Isdqqs :f8ill 

.^JijjoD XsqladboirM ©rfct 

^Ijaod XasqqB xib lo ©oneecfs aiict al" d'BfiW ;telafii a;^a&&flsl9a 

Xfti^d" sd^ cil 83ja±jc)9sooiq ©fi;t ^isd^o -^sis i&d^o 10 asebeaisqixa s 

zJkdi flX ^iieia on ^XeJwXoads bI 9*i«riT ",bg'Tta:ta d-on si9w ttuoo 

B lo sgoq^jL'q arid- sviaoiaoosiiE x-i^^ns^^qq^ ad-nsfeniJl^Q ,nol^ned"nos 

l6eqq£ ^li'. ..»fi ^aaXIfiqd* xijs e^dw -^tXao el ."M . a Be69ai»qjJ8 

TO d'JxsiaasiDjJt . ':U>o©x9 e>iit lo Holaneqexre .3 bb eiBieqa" 

^ituoo 9i&llfQ(iA ,soli»si'J lo eeXffiS ^-^ «©l;f©(H5 ,;£ sXx^'fi) "^Cssioeb 

X£5S.,iq:. lit: . Tjiiissetnn 3^ il jsidi ^{p.hmtlll lo &oli:^BlQ dsiW 

iScxg^ ^ei±l sjfiT ,£i' ins aaefceeieqwa fi »ba« 9df 

Xd iioiffw lo d-fstfefirsoiolas ©iJd- d-anlBas jflterngbxit x**«oo * «oil :}oa sew 

aeivjEsxi -^cf lleanerf d-os^foiq llldnXaXq ijatU -^jisEseoen ecw it jcio1;Jvo9X9 

l»ril aisw llictniBXq x^ Xfi»qqa Mj£fc , ^jjasbftaisqae « eojaa Xf ii '^®^ 


favor Bxid as aXready* stated all proceedings in the causa W9vm 
stayed by the filing of th« notloa of appaal o& tlks first appeal 
without said appeal having bean oada a suparsedaas and without 
tSM filing of an appeal bond. 

The 2iar« stat«nent of the eireiSBStanees shows that the 
position taken by defendants on this appeal is untenable. If a 
trial court were pendtted to proceed with ths tr al of a ease 
which was already pending on appeal in this court t3a» resultisc 
sitaiatioA might well be that the juds^tent rexKier^d by the trial 
court would b^ inconsistent wit^ an3 contradictory to the judgnent 
entered by this court, 

lltie trial court lost Jurisdiction of this case n^n the 
notice of appeal was filed f pril 7$ 194-1 om the first appeal 
takett in this case, Therefore the Judgsents entered July 1^ 1941 
wer*? void and should have been vacated on plaintiff ♦s notion. 

For the reas<n»i stated tierein the order of the trial courts 
denying plaintiff's K®tion to vacate the judpoents entered July 1, 
19*1, is reversed and the cause is reaaind^d with directions to 
allow th@ QoticHQ, to vacate said Judpients ami that further 
proceedings be had ctmsistent ii^th the vieiM expressed in our 
opinion filed in the first appeal on Febru&ry 10, 19^2, aai 
inxrsuant to ^e Jud^sent of tdxis court entered on said d&t«» 

omm nmrnsw Am Okmn wmMsma 


friend and Icanlan^ JJ,^ concur « 

Mi;? jpsifv? f^i.m ^M^ 1& i!£ai>j^i££.lfi;i J~«-t ^'MWv Jisl't^ erT; 

J..HV '.a 'iwla'i© i>^ i»i««lM^ I?- s^oe^^i sat? tq'^' 

•s;?iS2-S4?,v; #fe£ii- ^«.<- H ^ia« «*A01IV «J 4»JU«a .s4i? WOXX4 

^'Sja-SOC'E' t.tit. ^£miil&1>t M« &B«l*f 

*2239 31 6 I. A. 4/43^ 






corporation, JOYCt &l5:p3TIVE \ / "* i 

AGSWCY, Inc., a corjrbrittcn| 
et al«, ^.A-'' ■'""■'-v.. 

Appellees, ^ """^-^----^ 

JMe Joyce Detective Agency was employed by Goldblatt Bros,, 
Inc., which operated a department store, to protect it against 
thieves and shoplifters. Representatives of the Joyce Detective 
Agency apprehended Lillie Lindsey, the plaintiff herein, in said 
department store and filed a criminal complaint in the Municipal 
court charging her with the larceny from Goldblatt 's store of the 
hat she was wearing at the time of her apprehension. She was 
released on bond after her arrest and incarceration. Thereafter 
she was tried in the Municipal court and the charge against her 
was dismissed for want of prosecution. Prior to such dismissal 
she signed a written release exonerating Goldblatt Bros,, Inc., 
and the Joyce Detective Agency aM their agents from all liability 
for her arrest and prosecution. 

In the instant case plaintiff filed two complaints, one at 
law and one in chancery, in which she named as defendants, 
Goldblatt Bros,, Inc., Joyce Detective Agency, Inc., and certain 
agents of said corporations. In her complaint at law she charged 
the defendants with false imprisonment, malicious assault and 
malicious prosecution and alleged that defendants procured the 
aforementioned release from her by duress . In her complaint In 
chancery plaintiff sought a decree directing the cancellation of 
the release on the ground that same had been obtained by duress. 
After a hearing on plaintiff's complaint in chancery the trial 
court entered a decree which found the issues against her, denied 


( •J'lijaXIeqqA 

00 aOOO ( « ^.Cmi-,BOHS T'lAJeCJOO 

( . OB ..Ofll , 

( .::■:.'.-■ 

Isqiaims^ s/i;t ai: laLcIqcioo Imitsii . Ill lasis r-ioja inestrc^ijEsqef) 

..lolan^dsiqqa i^^rf '^o i^mL: ; gniiiisw acv ©da d-jari 

i«;flfl»t@/ . 't-i^oi^^oni d leit.i:, baod no tesfisXei 

lod :if2ii:^ . ... .^lolnii^ arid- nl bsi'io sbw ©rfs 

X.^^aiiTtKlf' fIot:2 od 'lol'i . Mifosao'iq lo dnsw io1 fieaaJuneib ssv 

^,. . . ^, -ia d-dsXtJ&XoO siiidaieiioxe aajssXei n&d-dliir s fe©n§i8 ©ria 

,noJ:+xfs*^ao-iq bnfi dssiiB leil lol 

^s;?^'^J?^E'r"^e^ s-; r-'eri.?jn ade lioidw ni ^Yi^^OHBilo nl ©no bciB wsX 

flXadi ^.. , : _ 3vXJ»&il©Ci so^oL ^.onl ^.eoiG djfjsXcfbXoO 

5®siiifl© exlg wbX da inXfiXqaoD isd /il .snoldsioqioo fclsa lo Bin®s« 

baa JXiif.eES3 aj3oi:oHi?«B ^-^aetmoztrq^it seXcI lidiw adfljsfcns^s^b cdi 

•rfd bsiUT/O'-^q aiiiubnslsjb dsfW ftftg^i-^^ £>^JS noidL-osaoiq eiJoiolXBm 

nl daleXqfiroQ i&d nl ,3E»ii/fe y<^ lori moil e&BBle^z toaotia^sisiolB 

to aoti QllBoa&o eriJ siilcto©iXI> s»i:os£» b driaxjoa lliinlalq x'JtsoiSLsilo 

»e«s»ii;b ^cf £)ectiBJcfo noecf ^ari eiuae dErid Muoig edi ao •«seX©i arid' 

Isii:; ".i':* yinon-/ iL-^Jm^'o^. .L»*!.lldai:«Xq no jnliaexl fi ^leJ-lA 


her the relief sought and dismissed said ccmplaint for want of 

equity. Plaintiff appeals from the decree^, 

The theory of plaintiff's complaint on the question of 
duress seems to be in effect that her own attorney, the assistant 
states* attorney, who prosecuted the charge against her in the 
Municipal court, a representative of CJoldblatt Bros, Department 
Store and the Joyce Detective Agency and the trial Judge in said 
court conspired to secure the release from her by repeated threats 
that if she did not sign same she would be found guilty and fined 
and that because of her weakened mental and physical condition 
caused by the indignities and assaults theretofore suffered by 
her at the hands of defendants she succumbed to said threats and 
signed the release. 

It appeared that the trial of the criminal charge against 
plaintiff in the Municipal court commenced about noon on May I3, 
I94I; that a number of witnesses testified; and that after all 
the testimony had been heard and the closing arguments concluded 
the trial judge declared a recess and retired to his chambers* 

The substance of plaintiff's testimony in the instant case 
was that after the judge declared the recess in her Municipal court 
trial, her own attorney, one McCahill, who disappeared some time 
after said trial and was not available as a witness in this pro^ 
ceeding, came to her from the Judge's chambers and told her that 
the Judge said that if she did not settle with the defendants and 
give them a release he would find her guilty and fine her; that 
she protested to her attorney that she was innocent and did not 
want to settle or sign a release; that McCahill then went back 
into the Judge's chambers and shortly returned to her stating that 
the Judge insisted that if she would not sign the release he would 
find her guilty and fin© her; and that because of her weakened con?- 

dition and the aforesaid threats that if she did not sign the re- 
lease she would be found guilty and fined, she signed same. 

eSe-TOsb sdcf soil aXasqqs IttialBlH .x;tlx/p» 

— — -^" -:-'■' rio ^flielqmoo a'lliinJfcsIq Ito -^loefl^r ailT 

^■u. 7.U:.&iS siv 4\'^iVio.jcfs flwo leiJ itfijtld- *o«'J't© ill od o;} eaaee Bsorci/b 

sisc^isii 5s^£sq©i x^ "^^^ mail ss&eXen qA} etvoea oi Jbsilqeaoo ;Jriiioo 

fienil faxB Y^-tJ^S ^fli/cl od bXwow aria ©crsa nsie jon bib ^Aa li ;taxtJ 

iioiJifcnco lst)lsxtiq baa l&in?>a bensiLasw iterl 1o ©swaoscf i-iid* tofi 

J.'^Bidi felea oj hfi<Se?i50f}ve &rie sc^jsjRbnelsfc "Jo abasd eiii i& i9d 

jj-giiifis^ 93'ii:jilo limiimlao ajeU lo Xx^l'£^ oil^ ;^£ii^ betBBiiqss il 
^ " o uooc ^sfotfs beouaismoc j-'siioo XBqlDifW*£ erij rut llIiJnlBXq 

•isdi^ Jbit ' ' "jaeoxid-lvr lo lecteun s d'BxU |X-^^X 

.b6ii;,I^iio;i c-Jitsmt'ST^ 'sfileoio aiiJ- Las ^is*ii asscf fc«fl '^jnoai^J'*©;^ 9di 

s3^f3 c^flaifjisl Mi al xsioBliRffi s*lllJ'«l£Xq "to aons^sdx/a ©xfT 

•xjBGt; XaqlsiiriiaiC "t®!? tiL aeeoei ©n';t fcsi«Xj>9b f^gA^t ®rf^ te^lB ^taitf esw 

iWKlcf ©isoa iJ^iissqqjsalfe oxlw ^XlirisOoM ©no ^x?^a^oiiz mto i&d ^ImIi^ 

•orrq eiflo nl sesacJ^lw & as sXcfsXiBV^ ;toji esw tns Xj^I^J^ bls-.a ^tsd^lB 

J-sfi:^ T:&rl JbXod^ btis RTStfesrio s^egBiaft sil:t aoil lod o;t ecLso ^gnlfiseo 

feois Ria^akadlBb »di iLtJtw ? I j:t»a cfon tlb eds li. i&dJ bXBZ sjbjLrt 9di 

isdi 5i&£l eall ba& x^XXjbs isxl feaXl fcXirow ©r£ ©2«»X0i s a©il;t svig 

ion bib btL& iasooitai. ssw »ria Jjs^j ^sniod-jjB 'isri o;t bsizBiorai edt 

io8,d ia&v a^dJ IXIiLbDoM i&dJ is&bsI&i b fiale 10 sliioB oi inen 

iadi '^iiaiz t&d oi beaiviet xX^ioria bas Bi9dmado s'egbxrt edi oial 

bXiJovr Bd essoXsin 9ii;t as Jit a ioti blsaov axfe 11 j^M(;t Jbe^sleiii s^gbisl Bdi 

-iioo b©no:2fia€>w 't&d lo Bnv&OQd iadi baa {led 90IJ. ba.B xt-t-tuj i&xl bait 

-ei orij- jisIe ioii bib ftria 11 ;tfifl;r aitaeocW bisesiolis Bdi bas, aolilb 
.©rasa fianaJfcs «ile «£>ecl1: bfifl V-^-t^S bauot ecf bXxrow eilK 9a««X 


The material portions of the testimony herein of assistant 

state's attorney Myron L. Lewis as to i»hat transpired in connection 

with the trial of the Municipal court case follow: 

"A, After arguments of Counsel were heard, the Judge took 
a recess and went into Chambers, He started to eat his lunch* 
That was customary. At about that time I went into Chambers to 
eat my lunch, thile we were there, the attorney representing 
Miss Lindsey came into Chambers* 

"A, He started a discussion relative to the merits of his 
case. We argued up and backj started arguing the case all over 
again. We argued up and back there for a while* The Judge 
indicated after listening to us, he v/as going to rule with the 
State; to find her guilty. Then Mr, McGaMll said - whether he 
knew the Judge I do not know — but apparently he did. He pleaded 
with the Judge not to give this wcaian a record and the Judge 
indicated that if he satisfied Goldblatt's in some way, why, that 
would be all right with him, but the crux of the matter rested 
with Goldblatts, 

"Q« 'ihat happened after that? 

"A, I finished my lunch, I went over with Mr, McCahill, 
We called over Mr, Boltz, who was from Goldblatt, He began to 
talk with Mr, McCahill about a release, 

"Q. Did you hear the conversation? 

"A, Most of it, 

"Q, ^^hat was said? 

"A, I know he started out by asking for three hundred 
dollars, imder those circumstances he would get a release, I told 
them both to forget it. Let's get a ruling from the Court, I 
told Boltz under those circumstances I would not dismiss the case 
myself. They still discussed how much they were going to settle 
for, I told Boltz not to settle it, although I did not tell him 
what the Judge had indicated because I felt that was more in the 
nature of a confidential indication by the Court, And finally, 
the next I remember about the conversation they practically agreed 
upon fifty dollars, 

"Q, Tnhat happened after that? 

"A, Then Miss Lindsey was called over after the conversation 
and I could hear some of the conversation McCahill had with Miss 

"He said: 'I think the Court was going to find you guilty 
and the only way we can get out of this is give a release to Gold- 
blatt 's, and I have talked them into giving us fifty dollars.' I 
heard them say something about three hundred dollars. She said 
'I will do whatever you think is right,' 

"The windup was that l:r. Boltz had a form of release in his 


•X9V0 .©2flO 

5st , — worn; xui 

od' nsssr' - ' , IdtXoS fieortl E;3W otiw ,s;HolI ,iM is-«^ Sells© »W 

?f)X£8 SAW ia^ »p* 

9il:t fsX iSiOf? H''w .'tpf' . :j siivt tsrfw 

,iiAiiXXol> ■^jlX'i ncqi; 

X20.:: ■■'1 ,A» 

xi bS.iJoo I bn* 

':!- "i-o j'iro J-'^s i^-j^ '^■v-^ T^rjvy yXno B£iJ baa 
- ' ,.^■~... -■ , . ■:..-:::. '.,d I ^jox ^8':f^BXd 

' ,Oii^ii .21 /itiXiiJ iiox levsdBdvr db XXtw I» 
id isX sassXe^ to cjiol a fccrC s^Xoff ,*rM ^fBilJ- b«w qtifcctw @ilT" 

pocket, I did not want that used because ©f certain language that 
was used in the release, I remember I gave that release, after 
filling in the space there, I gave that release to Miss Sheridan, 
a young lady there who was the Court reporter at that time in the 
case, I asked her if she would go downstairs somewhere and find 
a typewriter and prepare the release, 

"Q, Did she prepare the release? 

"A, She did. She prepared the release and it was signed 
by Miss Lindsey and I signed and the money was turned over to her 
lawyer in her presence, 

"Q, Did you see the money turned over to her lawyer? A« Yes, 

"Q. By '//horn? A, It was turned over to McCahill by Mr, Bolt; 

"Q, Did you see it [the release! signed by Miss Lindsey? 
A« Yes* 

'*Q# And did you see the other witnesses sign it? A* Yes, 


"Mr, RISGSR: Q» J-Iho was present? 

"A« Mr, McCahill was, and the Judge was there| I was there, 
and I think there were one or two court attaches, 

"Q, Was Mr. Boltz in chambers? A. No, 

"Q« Was anybody in from Croldblatt*s? A» Ho» 

"Q» Did you see this money turned over to Mr, McCahill? 
A. Why, yes, 

"Q, l^ere was the money turned over? 

"A, Right there, at the end of counsel table at the end^ 
in front of the bench, 

"Q, Was Miss Lindsey there? A« She was right there* 

"Q. 1^*10 turned the money over to Mr. McCahill? A, Mr, Boltz 

"Q, Did he offer to turn it over to Miss Lindsey? 

"A, There was no offer to turn it over to anybody, Boltz 
gave him the money and she was right there, 

"Q, Did the Judge come out of his Chsunbers? 

"A, After the release was prepared, we notified him we 
were ready to proceed with the matter then, 

"Q, Was Miss Lindsey in the courtroom when the Judge came 

"A, She was right there alongside of the table by the 

Jii^v* .iiXH":_ .J Oil [U.U I 

fosscgi &9t£^»Kj ©iie .fcifc ©fie .a" 

^st'T ,A ^if^T-* .>X ■7'^' o b&a^u:i Y^flow e/lt s»8 vox ^-t^ *P" 

,aey . il niia asaa&fKfiiw 'iB&a tdi) pas i^D'^j bib Mi; ,!?»♦ 

^ . ;j 'r-X'?V/ '1- ; : : I bnjs 

'v:;.-rIdftIon moil ixj: tJ^otfviuB seW -.p" 

^IX.; . . . .ote aM:^ '^ee irot ^^ .0" 

. • ., . • ■ . nil 

.■1'. , ITiii «.i-. j.i. i,,_ -_.-_- «y 

, .rrsriJ- -j^xlsli asw ©xia feHis x&aotsL s/la ulii svj5§ 

few jrM 5»1:1I;*oh , isilA .A" 

Tjcf ©Xcf&^f e^i 10 eblagfi©!* »n»£i^ iilsl' 


'^THE COURT: What liappened? 

"A, After the release was executed, I told the Court ** 
Judge - apparently they agreed to dispose of the matter, by 
giving a release and I told them Goldblatt»s had turned over 
fifty dollars to Mr. McCahill for liss Lindsey, The Judge said, 
•If Goldblatt's is satisfied -« I think he said to Mr. Boltz. 
»Is Goldblatt»s satisfied?* He said, 'Yes, Judge, we are 
satisfied,* Then the Judge said, »A11 right, dismiss the suit 
for want of prosecution,* 

"THS COURT: Was this plaintiff. Miss Lindsey there? 

"A, She was standing right In front of the court, 

"Q. Did she make any statement? A, No statement of 
any klnd^ 

[, RIEGER: Q, Did you hear Miss Lindsey object to 
any settlement there? 

"A, No, there seemed to be some discussion between her 
and McCahill about the amount, 

"Q. There was discussion? 

"A, About the three hundred dollars and the fifty 
dollars, and she said: »Whatever you want to do,»" 

Edwin G, Boltz, who was the personnel director of the Joyxje 
Detective Agency and represented said agency and "Goldblatt»s« at 
plaintiff's trial in the Municipal court, testified herein that he 
was not present and did not participate in any conversation or dis- 
cussion in the judge's chambers between the attorneys and the judge 
and that he had no conversation with the judge from the time the 
recess was declared until the release had been signed and the judge 
had returned to the benchj that plaintiff's attorney and the assis- 
tant state's attorney came out of the judge's chambers and the former 
approached him with a proposition to settle; that after considerable 
"dickering" he agreed to pay plaintiff $50 if she would sign a re- 
lease; that McCahill had several conversations with Miss Lindsey 
and that he heard her attorney tell her in one of those conversations 
that he thought the judge would find her guilty; that she thereupon 
said "I think this Is the best way to dispose of this;" and that 
she then signed the release and he paid her atcorney $50 in her 


ri fidi " 


^C'-tIJ^ V- 

:;b -. sjfjxj^ 

1 a salvia 

In.^ xim 

' '^ I « 



' ,ijt iirtJtIsa 


'^q to imsvi io1 

.jiuoo era "io ^rtGi'i. al iti%t^ 3Xii£fte.t3 esw sdS .A" 
lo drtsfflslsdra oft , . ; JTiBmRd-site ^hjb e^iisia etlz blQ ,p" 

»'j£SiOEUf- erf J- ^jjodfi Xiin'fi : 

"*„ofe ocf cfijis^y «;c\ ... - ' ; -„ - .-.; bii& ^ti&llob 
JO'/c L, ._ :.,: oS&^^th Iftfifitoa-xsQ eilcf as* orfw ^Siflofi *{) filwiiS 

m Si^ii ntoiBil 5&11JU«©* ^ivsoo iBqlS'lmM ©lit ai l&lio z^YilSalBlq 

-t^^ -^o n"lt-aT9VjEic»® ^si 0jE ©jjaqioitisq j©h feifc fcns J-a©2siq cfon saw 

.':-■ ^-^sjcfrocrj-s edi ne©woS(^ aisdJeiario a^&^ijj, sriJ nl noXeauo 

- .X...^« i,.v. ..^i.-j '^oflTOTd-fi s»lll^iiJ:©I«I^Bfi;^ ^ilsxied g»ifcf od" bi^a'Wioi bsd 

--■'Saioblsm>o 'iBi"* - • -■'■ :^'IJ-jf&o u- uuij-ieoqo-itx s dLtlw lalrl £>;»rfOBO*iqq« 
-ST 3 nsis IiXiJo a.c. '■- '-•»•^■^~j■ r... ^ ,. ,.-<- ^jjc,^^:; g^j "julioaloii)" 

enoiJEai^^vjsoo sec'- "-' rr •' ''•■ .Siiisri ail i&di baa 

iiidi baa =^ -"-'-•* -^ - ceoqeify ot ^fiw ^soiJ erij el eXfi;^ jinJUfct I" ilea 


behalf and in her presence. 

Other witnesses testified In the case at bar as to the 
execution of the release by plaintiff and that her signature to 
such release was witnessed by the assistant state»s attorney and 
two other persons. There was also some testimony as to plaintiff's 
mental and physical condition on the day of her trial In the 
jLunlclpal court. 

It should be noted that plaintiff's then attorney, McCahill, 
did not turn over to her the $50 paid in settlement and for her re- 
lease, or any part of it. She made a coiaplaint against him to the 
Chicago Bar Association but abandoned same. 

It Is insinuated by plaintiff's counsel that Boltz was in 
the Judge's chambers with McCahill and the assistant state's attornej 
and that as a result of a conference between the three of them and 
the trial judge the latter directed plaintiff's attorney to tell 
her that she would be found guilty and fined if she did not settle 
and release the "Goldblatts." There is not a word of evidence in 
the record that any such thing occurred or that Boltz or anybody 
else representing any of th© defendants attended any conference In 
the judge's chambers or talked to hla during the recess, "i^b&t did 
occur, according to the undisputed testimony of the assistant 
state's attorney, was that when McCahill persisted in trying to 
convince the judge in chambers that plaintiff was not guilty of 
the criminal charge, the judge indicated to him that he was going 
to find her guilty. McCahill "pleaded with the judge not to give 
this woman a record" and the judge "indicated that if he satisfied 
the Goldblatt's in some way *•*»■ that would be all right with him." 
It was then that McCahill approached Boltz in the courtrocan with 
the result heretofore shown* 

That plaintiff was apparently satisfied with the settlement 
at the time she signed the release in the Municipal court is in- 
dicated by her statement "I will do whatever you think Is right," 

a"!*.-: _ ,rrr»,Tt + -^'^:^ visoa oeXs asw »i®i^T „ef:oaTef{ i»4ifo o?r:t 

arid" ^1 Xsii'x; , >> sil? no noicJiSrcDt) Isslcxriq ^^B IjB;Jn9K 

- :ol Me i-s©ai8l;td"©e gI fiiaq G^$ eilj *r?f£ o.t i3vo mui Son bib 

'?ff.t o:' Bid .Uuix'.^!^ :itti-:'Jem&'3 B mbistt ©dL ..:„ lo ;t*[aq ^fi-*' '^o *9sa.eX 

^ rep ^oaoAnisdja vf»tf aoliAiooag^k i*-r: o^- n';':^ 
r^ ...^.; ..-_, — . ^ „._-.. :i«?.tJ:*fli:aXF x:<^ b»;jf.j^Jittrii el .. 

a:.:, w. ^. .1 i^-rs X^XifiS feflfc^o'i 9€f feXjBow ©fit iafW ^©jtl 

ai 0®fi©fcl7s lo .'J.- ::. ^w^. ...i e-isrfT ".c;f;J-aXcffcXo£)" €>ii;f ©cssXoi fios 

nX soiie>'Te-^"\'^''>' zoB b^bn'5:fd-& BirtBba»l9b QtH lo -^ns $fll;Jfl98Siq«>T: sbX© 

to y^^iJm^ joxi aj8W llXcrrLtfiXq i«rit Ei»dKiA£io ill egfiwt eAt *ofllvnoo 

»tXs o-J :ton f)^^!?^ ''^'^ /fJ'tw £>f>,g>/seXq*i UMa^iol: .Y^X-tos iSJCi fiall od" 
f'9i:l3Xj.«2 sd 1i cfi^iiij bBSsalbm):" B%bsil 9d& buB "fcrrooti & astao^ aM* 
",nlii ^jfcr iJrf?: ' ' -Xsw^^ d^^sfl^^ *** ^psir «BOt rtl 8»d^:fEXeffcXot5 cii:t 

«^X el i^yieo XBQXoifiJ?^* odS' ai seaeXsi ©rij bsugla »iJa esnli ed) is 
** ^iii^tr ex ^tdi tsox *ryv»*isriw 06 XXlw I" SnsmB&sf^ iqA id b^is!>lb 


which the assistant state's attorney testified he heard her make 

to McCahlll and it is further indicated by the fact that she made 
no protest that she had been imposed upon when the trial Judge 
returned to the bench and was advised as to the settlement and 

When the instant case went to trial there was a motion 
pending to strike plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff now contends 
that the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial without 
an answer having been filed by defendants, "Parties going to 
trial without raising any question of a lack of pleas, waive 
the necessity of written pleas and formal issues joined," Farley 
V. Deanf I96 111. App* 389 • 

Since there is no competent evidence in the record to 
show that the defendants were guilty of duress or coercion as 
charged in plaintiff's complaint in chancery same was properly 
dismissed by the chancellor for want of equity. 

If it can be said that there was any conflict in the evi- 
dence as to any issue of fact herein the findings of fact of the 
chancellor who saw the witnesses and heard them testify will not 
be disturbed unless they are manifestly against the weight of the 
evidence, Tim findings of the chancellor are amply sustained by 
the evidence. 

The decree of the Superior court of Cook county is 



Friend and Scanlan^ JJ,, eoneur# ' 

Q>b£m eris i^s^w^ •-" -'* —' '- --'tbal rt&ii^tiijl «1 iJt bus XIlrijsOoM o^ 
IfWGil ' - *,^ 5^ iEfcfJtw gftt&ftioo'^q ni; i-sif© ;fa»©o laliccf arid' Jariit 

.v>fi£ .qqA . ' - -^x 4iift»q ,y 

aB fioicifOD '10 £8s-©;5 "5:0 "^liji/a ©ttsw a^tSAferx-'j^aft 9d& i&n:i wcwls 

^X^Jti^B to :^£uw 'lol lolLBttaBiiv 9ri.+ xd beeeiioBll) 

efJv** 'r r! j-osl to exraal -^crts oi^ ss •onsb 

'^on IXiw Tjll Jjs asesiiflicfJtw &Ai w«a oxlw loXXsonaiio 

■^cf b»sii&&B^' '■■■■■ a^atbnll «rfr ,»ofl8bXve 

.aami-^A s3.H0..ia 

♦ yJ:<C/ioo ^.l.T, ^ri«Xn;->t>£ Mk tfieiilC 



, Appellee, 

Sl-eTTA. 443"" 



1 COOK CODNTY-l-^'' / 1 / 
Ap|))^llants . ) ■ '""'*'**«X,,. 


/defendants appeal from aft order of the Circuit court 
denying their motion and petition to vacate and set aside a 
Judgment of November 7, 1941 for $4,013,70 which was entered 
by confession on a note dated October 12, 1935 for $2,900, 

In February 19 27 defendants had contracted for the pur«» 
chase of two lots frc^ Elmore *s Westchester Realty Trust, of 
which Poreman's Trust & Savings Bank was trustee, and by 
March 1932 $2,950 of the piirchase price remained unpaid, A 
deed was then delivered to defendants, who at the saae time 
executed a note to plaintiff for $2,950, payable in monthly 
installments over a period of five years and secured by pur- 
chase money mortgage on their lots. Default iiaving occurred 
as to certain installments, plaintiff subsequently had judg- 
ment by confession on the note for $3,401,25 in the Municipal 
court of Chicago, case No, 2771060, July 17, 193^ an attempt 
at settlement was made, wherein plaintiff advised defendants 
by letter of that date that he had agreed to settle the Municipal 
court judgment on the following terms: 

"We have agreed to accept an assignment of four (4) 
shares of Commonwealth Edison 3tock, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, and we have further agreed to r^^duce the balance 
of the Judgment obtained in the above entitled cause to $900, 
said balance to be payable as follows j Ten dollars ($10) on 
the 17th day of July, 1934, and Ten Dollars ($10) or more on 
the 17th day of each and every month thereafter, said balance 
to be payable within two (2) years, all payments to be applied 
on the above entitled Judgment^ 

"It is hereby agreed that time is of the essence of 
this agreement. All payments shall be made within a reasons- 
able time of the due date, and a reasonable time is hereby 

r p 

1 o d8ex> 




'^nmoo moo 

' ;;ss d-os fenjs ?»j-i!e>jsv o:t noil-Waq Bn« nolctofli lisxicf ^ntijaeb 

bBisSae asw dclrfw O^,£.i:o^l^ lot l^^l ^^ lodmevoV, lo ;fnafiial)j»t 

,00f^S$ io^ ^£^1 ^SI 7!Hdo;J-oC bsisb s^on b no /loiaBelnoo xrf 

lo i.;!3inT yJ'IbsH '^9Cfs0xl•5C^8©?' e'sioaii:!! arotl «^oI ow^ lo ©zaxlo 

vd" briiz ^99J-eu*icf saw jtasg esnivaE d& itayiT e^naonio^ rioMw 

A .Jbisqxjjj dsaiafirsi eoliq oEjadoiuq eil:t lo O^^^S^ S^^I rioisM 

SffiW eaiss Qiij ;fa odtsr ,e:ffiafc/t9l©fc o^ beieyil^b asiiS saw fcssi) 

Xld&aom at oldsx^q ^O^^^S^ nol lllJ-nlsIq oi 9 Jon fi bs:^ifO(5X9 

-ijyq Ycf fesitfoea Bns sTseY rfiil lo b©l'ioq & ^gvo ziaeall<iieal 

b^'ittsooo sfllvfid cHiffllsG ,.3ool ilQci:} no sgag^tTOfi! -^anCMi sefirio 

-gMit f-sit '^rj'iisfl-pftecfi^s lll^nlBlq ^gctneBiIlBJ^an!: nliiJiso od" e* 

lBn:loiiijj.' ex!^ ji| 5g2.,XO*>,c't- ^."i »*<>« «f^ ^'^ noiaatlnco ■%<? innm 

*q«e.^:rc xiB >£^I ,\'X xXatIt .OdOX\^S .©'^ ©3;^o ,oaB£>^p_lo ^IWM 

aln'js&nsl'ife f>»alTrBj5 lll^«±sXq iii©"s«Mff ,9fcj»ai sbw iaetsBliSQ^ is 

Lsqtoiswll BJSii Qli;}9S ot bf^st^ fcfiri sri J-arid^ scfsb ;ts£0^ lo 'isct^sX x<J 

? affile J snJbs-oXXcl 9d& no j-xisffisbiJt ^itfoo 

(■^) liTO: lo ;> fcj ns d ?iSi3 ©▼£xl eW" 

y(.f<»-[!TiHi riolriw "fO ,. ^_ .- 'X ^liOOi ^-.■- r. ovvno; j;:oC "^q :::fjiall8 

^ -^, oi 9etSB0 b&lJiiae Bvoda 9di ni i-..., , -„„..... ^ ... lo 

no (ul$) aiBlIob ne'I :2?/oIIol ea ?il(iB\zq '^cf oi f)±38 

HO 9iom 10 (01^0 gi£iIoG fisT fine ^K^l ^xXi/l- lo ^jsi!) rU'.^I 9di 

eOiiBlscf 5±£a ^isd^loS'isrij- ilJ-noru' X'^csv? bn& riov.o lo ^sf) d5\l adi 

jQsilqqu »cf od^ ecJ-no/iTY^ "^ ' '■ ^sisax (S) owj- alnJivf ^IdaxBCi ad o;t 

^nsuis &ir^ beI;tlJn© svodfi srfd' no 

lo sons c 33 9f£J lo al omi.-t &Rd:f besngs Y^sisii ai ;J-I" 
-noaoen s fl±jri:J'iw ©bsm acf U&dz a^nPOYaq IIA .;tn»ffl«©^8£ BJUi:?' 

■^(f&isil ai wfsJtj oldjanoatiei a bn& ^e:f&b sub &rLi lo Bmti eld a 


agreed to b« five (5) days. 

"It is further understood that In the event a default 
l3 luade in any monthly payment- the judgisent above-described 
shall autoEiatically be reinstated for the full amount with 
the exception of the credit of $220 given on the abovemen- 
tioned four (4) shares of Coaimonwealth Sdison otock, less any 
amounts paid in, for which credit shall be given," 

For reasons ^hlch do not appear of record thst attempted 
settlement was abandoned, and thereafter October 22, 1935 plain- 
tiff addressed another letter to defendants, acknowledging receipt 
of a Judgment note for $2,900 "in consideration of my releasing 
Judgment in the Municipal Court *** in the sum of $3,401,25, plus 
costs," upon the following termst 

"It is further understood and agreed that Lura B. Tackett 
agrees to settle said note of $2,900 for the sum of $800, said 
sum of $800 to be payable as follows: $20 on the 17th day of 
?Jovemb@r, 1935, $10 on the 17th day of Doeember, 1935# and $10 
or more on the 17th day of each and every month thereafter until 
the sum of $800 is fully paid, providing that said sua of ;p800 
is paid on op before July 17^ 1936. 

"It Is further agreed that time is of the essence and 
that all payments shall be made within a Reasonable tiae of 
the due date, and a reasonable time is herewith agreed to be 
five days, 

"It is further agreed that if default is made in any 
monthly payment the full sum of said Judgment note of $2,900 
(minus all payments made to the date ©f default) shall be 
immediately due and payable at the option of the legal 
holder thereof." 

Notwithstanding tha abandonment of the proposed settlement 
of July 17 19 34-, the four shares of Commonwealth Mis on stock, 
which had been delivered to plaintiff, were not returned but 
were sold and credited to defendants' indebtedness. In accord- 
ance with the subsequent letter of October 22, 1935 th^ Municipal 
court Judgment was released and the secured note for $2,900 was 
settled for $900, on which the sum of $100 was subsequently paid. 
The remaining balance of $800 was payable in installments maturing 
in July 1936 upon condition, however, that if defendants defaulted 
in any monthly installment, the full sum of $2,900, less any pay- 
ments made up to the date of default, should become inimediately 
due and payable at the option of the legal holder of the note. 

_ .... : ■ -- 9di 
".---...,., ..._ .- ._ 1 ..-.:.-.:. ../: ,Ml fci:;,^ ■■mrs 

, =,i„,,™ 4 - '£©€foctop •sscJ'1sft'^«4-'.t r.fijg ^lv&aoliiifi<?a saw cta«a»I#^»« 

:-qj:»oe^ 3£(i'.5^.■■^^•/•tJ;T>^-^M ,r.trf-^r:.-,.-.'-r ...-^^.tel laitJQas &«aeeibfc« lit) 

^f ,. . ? '■ ' ^'^.no' r«wi;J:t>JtnBfe a£l# at ituus^bvi 

,:»Vi C Vi. >J 1 

, (^ i \^^.^, ! •„ -I ; -r-i; 'i.' jfv *.>i-j«;j /:.x 

«^ llBjrfe (vtl; -.iic? or 

••fc'xoo&B ill ,ss-fii-M*i-dfe&«i: ♦8.t«iL6sae'1 J-lbeio fcns JbXoe erraw 

b9:ilmJ.9b s^nAb£X6:', foqxt ^£?X xluT, ai 

«T.sq Y«iJ S8©X ,00^>,£$ lo Hu... , -aXXjacrani: YXri:tnoffl x«Ji ill 

■\:X»^«i:Jfc;ata5Ll vjcodj^c' jIkoxIc ^jlU'ril .^b '^■il.; : bjin zitum 

Plaintiff takes the position that defendants defaulted in 
the payment of the $800 which they had agreed to pay in lieu of 
the $2,900 note, and therefore he was entitled to recover the 
amount of $2,900, plus interest, under the terms of the agreement 
of October 22, 1935* Defendants* petition to vacate the judgment, 
on the other hand, alleged that they are not in default in payment 
of the $800 agreed to he paid in settlement of the debt^ claiming 
by way of defense that on May 7j 193^ they had paid to one F, B. 
Cozzl, who originally sold them the lots in question and to whoa 
they claimed to have delivered the four shares of Commonwealth 
Edison stock, the sum of $650, and further claiming that they 
obtained from Cozzi a receipt "as being the balance due from 
the defendants t© said plaintiff," a copy of which, allegedly 
signed by Cozzi, together with the two foregoing letters, was 
attached to their petition for setting aside the judgment in 

In answer to defendants' petition plaintiff filed the 
counteraffidavit of F, B. Cozzi, wherein he alleged in substance 
that as salesman for Howard Rlmore he liad sold the two lots in 
question to defendants} that neither of defendants, nor anyone 
on their behalf, had on May 7, 1936> or at any other time, paid 
to him the sum of $650 j that he did not on May 7, I936, or at 
any other time, issue to defendants, or to anyone on their behalf, 
the original receipt, a copy of which is attached to the petition 
herein; that subsequent to 1934 he did not see the petitioners, 
or either of them, nor did he talk to them by telephone, comE.uni- 
cate with them, or have any business relations with them whatso- 
ever} that he severed his connection with th® real estate firm 
in the early part of 1934 and obtained employment with the 
Peoples Gas Company of Illinois on iiUgust 10 of that year, where 
he is still employed} that since his association with the Peoples 

^J-noMgf^Ht »id^ 9;t»oev o.t noWiisq 'e;t^fca«l©cr .^£^1 ^SS iscfo;toO lo 

'salm.tjilo (i^cfsf) £-£{& Jo tfn^m&lii^z at feiaq scf o;t £>es"x§« DOBS' etii lo 

jEOxiw oS lifts i3ot.1'e9fe;p x^i scJ^oI ^J rn^di Jbloa i^IXjuiiJfcsiio oxlw ^JtssoO 

xld-Isewaotaiac lo 2*^'iisilE tuoI 9£[;t £>«u<ivJtX6l) 9-?sri oi fcaajtjslo \Qdi 

X^ri't ci-silJ sJXteialo isricfij:/! hoM ^Q'^b^ lo so/s ©ii;t ^lioo;?© iioaiJbS 

sjb «»9fti=;Isd ?*f{:f sni^cf ««•' ^{jiso^ic « IrssoD scil bealsd'cfo 

ai d-nSiTTsi-^ut ©rf^t ©fcisjj gai: ;3'©e lol aoictJtJ'sq Tisxfc^ oi Aeiloscj-d-a 


&oa£'^aiit}& al bf*^*i.f- '^•^ flleisrlw ^IssoO ,S ."5 lo ^xvsJ5>illjBi9;tnjt;oo 

al s^ol owi' e«iofflXS biewoll lot a&a^ol&a a£ J-adJ' 

oaoxEta ion 48J'aAfenele& lo t?ii;ti;9fi :is4J. i s j-ix8i)nel©fc oj noi:J-e«0p 

Mr^u ^'snlt itii&c yjnB ;ta tco ^iil^Se ^V ti^ ISO I)flri ^llarisd tlodi no 

^ ._, ^V ^fiM flc ioa hit &d cferii iO«5S$ lo aiwa ^di mid oi 

^lIMcd ii?*rf3- no saoxnti oi le tRd-aafenaleb oct &isbz1 ^omW texid'o -^jne 

noij-id-eq sdf oi bj^rfescf^e si dolrlw lo ^qoo & ^jqlfioei lanlalio Bdi 

^e^xenoid-id'sq arid- ^-^ea cfo/t Li:! 9if A£^I ogr inoifpsacfi/s S&di lal&iQd 

-iimf.attof) ^eaoriqelej;*- ^cf k.-_. lildj- ed .5ib ion ^Jiari;? lo iBdSls io 

<HWB^tjdw ci»£(:t dS'ar scsjat^di^ eam^ltatii "^m svari io« ,iu©jl/ rid-Jtw *if«p 

anil ec^Bd^eo X.6»i ©/id" rf^Xw rwl^omtaoQ Bid ben^Tea »rf tsri^t ji®ys 

Slid- li^iw ./floancoXqfis iwiaXsd-rfo bcm *£^X lo difiq \XtJse sdi al 

a»Xr — -r-^ 'f-^ - ^- T ■ ,, J-£r-j i;v YoIl"i9 IlXie tt md 

Gas Company he has not at any time been engaged by plaintiff in 
any capacity whatsoever^ and that he did not collect, or attempt 
to collect, any moneys whatsoever frcaa defendants, or from any 
other persons, on behalf ©f plaintiff since August 10, 193'-^* 

Plaintiff also filed the counter affidavit of W* C» Tackett, 
plaintiff herein, alleging that Cozzi left his employ in the early 
part of 1934-5 that at no time subsequent to that date did he employ 
Cozzi in any capacity whatsoever} that he did not authorize Cozzi 
to collect any money from defendants, nor did he receive any money 
from Cozzi since the early part of 1934-^ nor did he comraunicate 
with him, or have any transactions whatsoever with Cozzi since 
that time. It is further alleged that ^cember 2, 1935 he re- 
ceived $20 from defendants to apply on said note, but received 
no further payments thereafter 5 that he had no knowledge whatso- 
ever that defendants paid, or claimed to have paid, to Cozzi the 
sum of $650, or any sum whatsoeverj that he has been the owner of 
the note confessed upon since the date of its execution, and defend- 
ants did not, nor did anyone in their behalf, make any claim upon 
him for the return of the note. 

The record discloses that by means of answers to interroga- 
tories propounded by plaintiff to Adelaide C, Rebmann in May, 194-1 
the latter admitted that she received a telephone call on or about 
the 21st day of November, 1940 from Julia Brady, the garnishee 
defendant, notifying her of the judgment in the matter in this 
cause, and on the same day a eounteraffidavit was filed by counsel 
of record for plaintiff setting forth a true and correct copy of 
a letter dated January 9, 1941, addressed to Arthur J, Rebmann, 
one of the defendants, notifying him of the entry of the judgment 
November 6, 1940, and suggesting that he deliver the letter to an 
attorney and seek his advice. The affidavit further alleges that 
defendant Adelaide C. Rebmann, at the taking of her oral deposition. 

d-qas^c^s 10 ^ioelLco .ton Jbib »ii (tsri:? bfifi ii9V?oe;tfir£w -^J-lsaqBo ^iB 

^^.£^1 ^01 :fESJ^iJk stala tttSai&lq. "i© Haded no ^enoaitsq rrextto 

^lifis e-il* nJL Y<^i?*R® 8iri iJlsI IssoO &M^ gfiiSsIXs ^nioierl llid^nlalq 

&f^.otm.r3mciS) Bd bib ion ^^1^1 lo iii^ xIihb tm ©oiiIe IssoD monl 
osGl8 issoO ri^Mw rE9Vses,tBfiw aKol^dfiS/iBi:} XJ^ij evfixi no ,?nM rftlw 

-oe^jsriw ftghelwo/c^ ojr Barf oi( isAi jied-lBeTiexlct a^-noja^Bq isii^tii/l on 

arid- IssoO o^ ^fcisq fnrfif! oi h^^mlcdt iq ^btsq ziazbaie'isb taii i»V9 

lo isnwo 9flj £i©s>cf B&d Mx iKflJ •neveosJ'Erfw cswe •^s 10 ^0^«^ lo Itasz 

«M&ls£> fcxxjs ^fioi*«©ax«* a^J"! lo ecJ^sJb srio asuJts aoqxr 5d«8S^oj> Bioa 9tit 

,©c^on sild^ 'to niiui^i siiit 10 1 mhi 

— i'So-xied-jKl o;? 3i9¥;en'3 'to an.seta x<^f ^tsffj- a»BoIo«i5 Sioosi srlT 

i-J^^X ^^iiM xil itfi«Hif»fi .0 •bkBlebA o^ 'i'ii.tniBlq x<f fe*feftCoqoiq asiic^ 

iuodla 10 £10 ll&Q ©jsoriqsl*^ s ijevleoen #ile iMi fesicfliafeB i9;t;f«I slid' 

X-3WIW00 yd ^fiXll ejBw (tlvsfel'tlsi&cfisiiioo b -^Bfc earee 0ri^ no bas ^9&aBa 

16 tqos iOfti'iQo ba& 9M*i^ « riJiol 3i!iDct<?e 1^tSaJt*lq tol biosei 1© 

^aatmd&K , C, ual;fiA ot b«a««ifcfejB ^X^^X ,^' tTCfiWJKs'^ be^sJb rt©:td^»X « 

^^aaaafcuc ©^ii" 1© XT*a«* «rf* ^o wiri sntyl±J-on , 2*H£j&n»^'9ft ©iJit Id ©00 

a£ oJ ife^^eX srti ^©viX&I) siff Jarf^t snJt:^89ggi«B brt& ^0^1 ^^ lecfjoevoH 

:tMdi eoaeXXfl leri^rrjj'i Jl'V;i!>me orfl .eolYf).!^ sM al©©e fin« xwito^^b 

,noiii:Eoqet laio isii lo anXate^ ?5£f;f cTs ,.aa«»(©fl ,0 ©£>isI«fcA &aaba9t9b 

admitted that she received this letter from plaintiff's counsel. 

In addition to the foregoing documents, plaintiff filed 
a third counteraffldavlt of Herbert J, Walter, an examiner of 
questioned documents, who said that he had 30 years* experience 
in the scientific investigation of forgery, handwriting, identifi- 
cation of typewriting and typewriters, erasures, etc.; that he had 
complete photographic, optical and chemical apparatus devoted 
exclusively to the discovery of facts in all phases of questioned 
documents, and that he had qualified in many courts of the United 
States and Canada in numerous cases, including United States v. 
Alphonse Capone^ State of New Jersey v. Bruno Hauptaaann (Lindbergh 
case) and State of New York v. Strewl (0»Connell kidnaping case)j 
that he had been retained by plaintiff in this cause to examine a 
document dated .ay 7, I936 whlcH purported to certify the receipt 
by P, B, Cozzi of the sua of $6^0 from defendants; that he examined 
the document in question and compared it with genuine standards 
by visual means, with magnifying glasses, under compound micro- 
scope, and under ultra-violet lightj that as a result of his exami- 
nation he was of opinion that the receipt in question is a care- 
fully imitated or traced document, not written or signed by Cozzi, 

Upon this state of the record the miatter came up f©r hearinig 
June 3> 194-1 on petition of defendants to vacate the judgment liy 
confession and the foregoing counteraffidavlts filed by plaintiff. 
All the parties were present before the court, together with their 
counsel, as well as Cozzi and the hand?Titing expert H, J, V/alter, 
In response to the court's question as to what was presented for 
determination, plaintiff's counsel responded that "this matter comes 
on to be heard on a petition to vacate a judgment by confession 
and on counter affidavits filed by order of the court by plaintiff. 
The plaintiff has two (2) grounds as to why the petition should 
not be granted^ First, petition alleges payment in full. This 
allegation is based on a purported receipt, a photostatic copy 

belli lllcfiilslq; ^ 8;tixsjauoofc gfiloasiol ©iU oS aolilbbB nl 

lo nectiiiijRis a£ ^is^I ;'^ ."G ;^T[9dif»K lo SlvabtJlBieimsoo feilrict « 

sonsltisqxs «2iJ8Si!; 0£ £>3ri ®iS d^Bri;t files offwr ^eJ'iisflijjoof) £>9noJt;fa»jjp 

-J;li:;tn9M ^salJ-iiwJDnad ^Tseaiol lo noti&^tizaval olttiaQltiZ sdi nl 

bad ed ^fidcf i^od-e ^a^iXfEsis ^ais^liweq^j- ftne s/iIjI-cwsqx^ "io nojt^tso 

fisfloid-asx/p lo aesBriq II2 al zioB'i. lo ijievooeib 9di oi xle-7tBi!lox9 

beiiMU ©x{;t lo scJ^ouoc illllswp bisri ed S&dS bas ^zia&mtoob 

, ,7 B&iiiio bs>ix0Ct^ SGxbiflo/t: ^r. a^o sx;o"i93iifn nl BbaoBO bOB zoisiB 

d^iedbtad) fifim^QisuB ofn i'ig .v Ysaiei; weK lo sio^c ^agoggP tenoilqJA 

t(s8S0 guiqsxifiljf XXsnnoOH)) jjwe^S .v alrtoY ygVI lo eiaiii boB (seBO 

3 exxixafixa o;t seifso alxl^ ul lll^tnlslq x^ b9al&i9i aB9d bad &d isdi 

J-qleoeTC Qdif X^l&ieo oi b9iT.oqnjq^o.iiivr bi^l ,\ xsu bed-fib ia^muoob 

bealsiBXB od d-srW lain^baelsb moil 0^^$ lo lOfa exi;J lo IssoO ,a «^ X<^ 

8br£sbn£;l'3 salirnss riil?/ > baraqraoo bne nolcfaejjp al iaemsoob edi 

-oioiis bfUfoqaioo iBbtw ^asEgjBlg snlxllaajsra jdcflw ^axiBon Xfii/alT x<^ 

-Ifiisxs aid lo ijjj&ei b qb i&di jdrfsH i9lolV'-&nili! iBhrw bn& ^sqooe 

-©ISO 3 al noMaewp nl ctqlsosi edi iadt flolnlqo lo bbw ©ri nolJ^sn 

.IssoO ^cf beagla 10 afii^^l'm :foa ^iai^mvoob bBVsii 10 be;^B;tlisil y11.i^ 

;^![is9£i rrol qsj &mBO led'cfsa edi biooei &ri;t lo 9S&is Btiti noqU 

\ef d^XfSfagfoift »^^ s^teOBV ocf 8;tnBbffeleJb lo nolJ^iJ-©q xio X-^^I ,£ ©m/I 

,lll:tnlBXq x<f b«Xll ad^lvablllBiectm/oo snloseiol ©rid- bus flolEeelnoo 

lled^ itd-lw zGdi9-%oi ,iiu' fnoeeiq oisw aald-iBq add XXA 

,^e;tXst . . d-rreqxs gnlJ-lTvbiiBii erid bas IssoO as XX sw bb ^Xsanx/oo 

lol 59d-ne89T[q bbw d-firiw od an noldsoirp a'dix/oo f>rid od eanoqasi nl 

asffioc led-d'Bfli aldi^' isdi bsbnoqaoi iDaniroo a'llWnlBXq ^aotiBalat^S^b 

floiaaeliioo x<I Insmabxjt q ad-ucB-^r oj aoXitieq b no biBed sd o;^ no 

.lllcfnleXq ^d doiroo ©rid lo is^t-io xd bs?Xil eilVBbl'rlB isctnx/oo no bas 

blijode aoxiUBq arid- x^w od 8« sbrararta (S) owd aari lll;tnl«Xq •dT 

tildTi .IXji'l nl cfnaflfYsq asQeXlB noxd-ldsq ^^ail"? ^b&dnjsij ocf don 

■TOO© old'B:taodoriq b .d-ql9oei bed-'iocrijw s no bsaed al noldBSsIXs 


of which is attached to petition. Plaintiff is prepared to 
prove that this receipt was a forgery. Second, that petition 
does not allege diligence on the part of defendants to present 
petition to vacate judgment. Plaintiff is prepared to prove 
that defendants had not been diligent in presenting their 
petition," The court thereupon directed plaintiff to "Go ahead 
with your evidence as to forgery," and Mr, Walter took the stand 
and testified in great detail as to his qualifications, the means 
that he had employed in examining the questioned receipt, includ- 
ing a comparison of enlarged photographs of Cozzi's original 
signature with that attached to the receipt, and reasons for his 
opinion that the receipt was a carefully imitated and traced 
document, neither written nor signed by Cozzi, Mr. Walter was 
cross-examined by counsel for (fsfendants .and testified that 
persons do not write the same way all the time, that signatures 
always differ in some slight respect from time to time, but that 
the characteristics of signatures remain the same. The court 
thereupon inquired if there was any other testimony. ■ Counsel 
for plaintiff said that he had a© further evidence, but relied 
also on the contention that defendants were not diligent in 
presenting their petition, and called the court's attention to 
the answer to interrogatory signed by Adelaide C. Rebmann and 
filed May 21, 1941, showing that defendants knew about the judg- 
ment which was entered November 21, 1940 and that Mrs, Rebmann 
had admitted in an oral deposition that she had receired a letter 
from plaintiff's counsel in January, 1941 advising her of the 
Judgment and suggesting that she employ counsel to represent 
her. He also called the court's attention to a letter from 
counsel for defendants dated February 18, 1941, addressed to 
plaintiff's counsel, tending to show that defendants had knowledge 
of the entry of the judgment more than 30 days prior to the filing 
on April 14, 1941 of their petition to vacate the same and were 

ssotm&q &sdit ^baop^o ,^193*101 s 3bw ^qlsod-c ali!;f d-sflt svoiq 
Sn&soiq Qi ^sSaaim^lBb to i'laq s^iit no ©oassilJtb »a©II» rfoa aeoft 

i5sc5sd$ 00" od^ m^niaXq l>©;:^^91c±jE) noqire^aflct d'li/oo srfT ^.rroWUsq 

8toS9» ®^^ ^2«0X:f KOlli: XjSi/p Bill O^ ES llBSBb iMBI'^ oi. &fiillt8«;J' fellB 

l^nl ' soO lo axkI,6'^^o^^OIiq b&T^isilsK' to nosliBqcoo fi gnl 

b^OBti Jm& bPi^&tmi tUsi'^'im^ a asir $qJ:ft2M?a wfjj- iari^t Motnlqo 

ZBVi tsSl&f t'M ,i£aoO ^fcf jbfe«8l« 'ion £t«;t:J|w 59l^±©n ,^n9fflift>ob 

-tfiifJ fcpJrll;^»S!;t &ci«% ad-rtisfeflBl;^ "sol Xs^srjx/oo "^ b»atmjsxO'-B»oio 

aoii/i^iinsie ^acLd" ^sfiii^ fiiif IIje x^ ^^« ft'W ©^Inw &on ob anoansq 

;tii;?oo sii'I ,0«u&e 9^ alas»i: e&raKtsnsle to aoliJelis'^SB^Bilo ©rf* 

ni :tfle3iXi:5 #©« ■»*t«w e;tfl6M©t©b ;tarid^ aoliafitnos f^xJ^t ao oeXs 
od floXtri©d*;ts aJJiweo 9H;t £>»XXs» 6a« ^nolcM^wQ Tlftff;t Sai^tneaeicj 

-SlJiLt sJti- *ifotfG wsiQf 2d-fisl)fxet©fe *sri:f SSiworia ^X•^^X ^XS -^sS fesXil 

iiaBcrcf©a .aitM :i&iii fens O^^X <!"-: i^cfjHsvoM bBi9in9 8«w ridlriw ctnaffl 

i»;f^9X J5 beYteoBi &«ri ©iis :;fafid' jntoX:tl8oqeJb Xs^o n« nX fe8**lifl>« bBii 

9t{S to nori saXsivIc X-^^I ^Ytsjatnsl. xiJ: XeeiMioo s ' itlcfjjlBXq uo-tt 

mo'il tf)J:fGX s 0^ xioi*fi»;f*« t^&tsjoo ©xl^ t>eXXsjs> oaXa sH .isff 

oj Lf^r,?.^'ibLi=; ^i-^^X ^8X •%'izsnde'i. bei&b ^fn&ba^leb -rot Xofinwoo 

oafcaXwomI fiiiri a:rnfi6fie>te5sfarid- woile oct gaifiasi ^Xsaisooo a'ttlJnlBXq 

SOlX^ilt arid' o:t •coX^ 3i^£> 0£ ii»r-^ ©lOia ;tn»ffls&wt «ri* to xt^as Bd:^ to 

©Ttsw boM efli^sa afW o^jsobv ocT aoltX&9q lieAi to X5>^X ,-M XliqA no 


therefore not diligent in presenting their petition. Ho further 
testimony was offered by defendants, although they had an oppor- 
tunity to do so, and the court thereupon denied the petition to 
vacate the judgment and entered the order from which this appeal 
is taken « 

It is first urged that the note upon which Judgment was 
confessed involved a penalty and was therefore void from its in- 
ception, and various decisions in this state are cited in support 
of the contention. The gravamen of the argument advanced by 
defendants is that where by the terms of a contract a greater sum, 
which is not the actual debt. Is agreed to be paid in case ©f de- 
fault of a lesser suk at a given time, the provisions for the pay- 
ment of the greater sua will be held to be a penalty. The rule 
seeaas "CO be otherwise, however, "Where the larger sum mentioned 
*♦♦ Is -yi© actual debt, and a smaller sua has been agreed upon 
as a release, if paid under stated conditions," Under such cir- 
cumstances the failure tc comply with the easier terms gives the 
creditor the right to enforce the payment of the larger sum, 
( Waggoner v. Cox. 40 Ohio St. 539* Am, & Sng. Encyc. of Law, 2d ed., 
vol. XIX, p, 418, sec, 5») ^^ ^® case at bar defendants were re*- 
leased from a judgment for $3,401»25 by executing a note for $2,9O0« 
Assuming that the judgment was collectable, defendants received more 
than full consideration for their note. The larger sum of $2,900 
appears to have been the actual debt, and failure to comply with 
the terms of the settlement gave plaintiff the right to enforce 
the payment of the larger sum. Defendants contend that the con- 
sideration for the release of the judgment for $3*4-01 ,25 was a 
promise to pay $800 in the future and that if it were not paid 
the only sum to be recovered would be $800, This contention is 
predicated on the erroneous assumption that the $2,900 note 

should be entirely disregarded, and upon this theory they argue 
that any sum in excess of $800 is a penalty. It is only upon the 

X^ Sl^viu. 

sVi),:: vfji^M 

^rtx" '■■ .t.- ■■■-:" 

J. ^ ,. ,r J. ^ _ 

■^iL 'i.U ':w 

-Xiiq ©rL" 



Q-} rrof ! ?"to.- oKf .'=..ta«!i) iioqii^sierW' J"xcoo ©ifct JboB ^o« oI> aJ x^^-tiiHCf 

Ijiv.., ••■■* '.-..f;.:,. c..,-:\r n*^«. + rfc ,,r:-Q jJnSIKgfcXft Slid' »^i»OfiV 

Stoqqvz nt '--^*^^: 3%s @d-B^a zldi at aaoial©©!} ^jroiasv feia ^floWq[90 

..Jvi uiivis ^"Sts^ ^iaJtea© 9^^ jd^tJbf? xXcfeiGo oi e^oIJUl »iiJ' seariBJeiauo 
»-s'i ii'i^.. acUielwaslefc i&iS is aaso sxi* jxl '. , ^'>sa ^81-^ .q ^XIX .lov 

ii^'^iiK' AfXqmoo o^ oitrXJkftl Ms ^^cieJb Imujo^ edi xia©d svAd oit, e^taeqqs 
sioiotfi^ oj j-rfjs lX;j£tieXq avsg cl^nsmsXicfsB oiii 1o trntsi 9£Li 

JA Sajw ^Si,IO-^,£$ lot :tnaffi3bjj-5, &tii lo ©aaelsi sif^ lol noliaiBblSi 

blaq, :fon aiew ^1 11 tiidi boB 9'WJii'l Sild- sil 008$ ^sq o^ selaDiq 

sX jaoJW£i»^aoo airi? , »d" blvcm h9if>voooi »cf oct ojus \Smo edi 

e^QU 00^^S$ 9j1j ifaat uoicfqiaoaes 8f«)exioi«t» sii;^ no bQiaolbBvi 

Wgt» xsricf i;io»riJ alrf^ aoqis buis ^fiabijajsiaib >cXo*LtJ-n« ®cf bXwoile 

theory that the note for $2,900 involved a penalty that defend- 
ants seek to sustain their contention that the note was void from 
its inception. Fop the reasons given, we think this assumption 
is untenable. 

It is next urged that even if the entire sua of $6^0 
aeioiowledged by the questioned receipt had not been paid, as 
plaintiff claims, the measure of his recovery would be the unpaid 
balance of the $800 and the legal interest thereon recoverable in 
a proper action brought therefor, and it is argued in connection 
with this point that the note would still be void. Defendants 
cite and rely upon Armour v» Moore ^ 5 HI* -^PP. *33« ^^ that 
case a note for $?50 was given, $500 was the sum actually received, 
and $100 thereof remained unpaid. Thereafter a judgment was ob- 
tained by the holder of the note in the sum of $307,40, The court 
found that the $50 actually retained for interest was usurious, 
and held that plaintiff was entitled to recover $100. In reach- 
ing this conclusion the court saids "The statute allows the 
recovery of the sum actually loaned, notwithstanding the reserva- 
tion of usury," That decision is not applicable to the circum- 
stances of the case before us. Here there was actually due the 
face amount of the note, $2,900, plus interest, less credit for 
any moneys paid, plus attorneys* fees. The question of usury 
is not an issue, and therefore Armour v^ Moore ^ and other cases 
relied on by defendants are not applicable. 

Considerable argument is advanced by both parties on the 
question of whether or not there was a novation, but in view of 
our conclusion as to the validity of the note, discussion of that 
question is unnecessary. 

Plaintiff also argues with considerable force that the 
judgment is valid because defendants were not diligent in pre- 
senting their petition to vacate, ^Vhether the trial court con- 
sidered this point does not appear of record, but it is evident 

tisoiJ. blov ajsw s^OA &sij itidi noJutasd-iios iXed:} nlziBSst oi ieee eJ-OB 

ctl ©lo'iJi9¥os9i noBt&d^ ^Z9'X9itil XbjsI »jl:f fejcue 008$ sri:t lo sonjBiscf 
«ol;tO0nnoo nx B^ng-:: r, ilsierf;*' Jiisiroicf aolis& T:eqoiq a 

' - + ^3i10 0M fV ISKtBLlA Roqv Y-C<>1 f>ilB s^flo 

^isvieo?5i ^jXIijifcToB lacTB 9rf;J &&m Q0^$ ^nsvlg esw 0^^$ vxit ©^oc £ »«ao 
a^ffig^L'i, B. ^0;J1.33iofiT .J&ljsqisx; fisolfimsi los-rsri^t 001$ baa 

«^©iif' « Id-JtitisQ ajQw I'Ud-nlsIq ^Bdi felorf 6n« 

.;d-a ©iJT" iiuoz stli nolRxrlonoo slrfcf ^l 

-.BV'L^s- ^;nlbnjc>cf8fld-lwj-0jnf ,ll»«riaoX Ylljsi;;^06 m!& ^riJ- lo -(jtsvoosi 

-."•.f^f>Ti o bxij . .. .ollqqe, . . .rjotsioeb cfsifl' ^*,x%«^8X; 1o JttoW 

': '■> V-,..:',- .; ^.;,^ tCfB'^i--?:tf£i: ei?Xq ^00^,S$ ^B^orx ©fW 1;o cfflxromB 80sl 

uO±:J2«f>, . 'nx^rf?o.iiij ejuXq ^bt&q sxeaota XPA 

898 30 'i'-'>fi;fo one. ^ ^^looM ^y ^pfjg^, • orio boB ^frireai nB ;toii el 

.oldiKOlXqcfG ten '?>ii-, a^tflBfinslsfc xd ao bellsT 
eild- r/o aslrfiaq iWocJ Tjd b'scfr •■. nsfsirgifi eXdsrteblsnoO 

lo welv fll :tM <ixol:J-isv ■- iiJ > ^ii io i^/U-e/Iw lo aotizeup 

&&£ii' Io noieai/sEl.b ^s^Joi' j x^ltiLav bxH oi a& aotessloaoo ijck> 

.YTtB88?'0snflw ax aol^taawp 
sM cTisiia- ftsio"^ oXff.^T-.fctanoo il:flw msj'gia oaXs Wd-fll«X^ 
-s-k: nl -^nr-g!:' rnx^f^rrloS ocrrofJ f-iX.A- si d-nsaab^t 

—nor rfr^cirf" . -*,♦ tin ^.■*rrf^^ 


that both defendants, as well as their counsel, were advised of 
the entry of the judgment in due time and inexcusably delayed 
taking steps to set it aside. They argue that since the Judgment 
was void froia its inception because it expressed a penalty, as 
they contend, the question of diligence does not enter into the 
case. But in view of our adverse holding on this point we think 
the question of diligence properly entered into the consideration 
of the case. 

Defendants ask that the "decision of the Circuit Court *«•* 
should be reversed." No other relief is sought. Manifestly they 
are not entitled to such relief, Upon the record presented the 
trial court was justified in concluding that defendants had 
defaulted in the payment of the conditional settlement for $800, 
and under the terms of that agreement plaintiff was entitled to 
recover the amount of the note upon which the settlement was 
predicated and for which there was a valid consideration, plus 
interest and costs. 

The judgment of the Circuit court is therefore affirmed, 


Sullivan, P, J,, and Scanlan, J,, concur ,* 

■ .;';,X^e, e ...«e.,.» » —" -^'''-^ '" ^^ '"'' ^ 

'*^"" ■" ..mod ,.«V6. «.o ^o w*i. oi ^»a .^"» 

"^ . .,„! 6.^*«. .i-«<o«. --^9"^' ^" ""^^'^"^ •''* 


^.T, ,xiBlni.»£ fcius ».^ •'i .fl^HIira 

42033 ,3 1 6 I .A. 4 4 4' 


Appellee, ^.r ^ / 


'"^■^"^^ ) COOK COUlTpY. 


ANTONIKA CZAJKOJ^fSla et al^r'"*"'^-'--.... 

i^:pellants. ) "^'^'-— ^, 

/ An opinion was filed in this cause June 19, 1942 and 
thereafter rehearing was granted. Defendants reaffirm the 
assertions made in their original brief that notice of the 
filing of the complaint, the application for an injunction 
and the pendency of the suit was never served upon them, and 
that they first became aware of the foreclosure proceeding when 
alias summons was served upon them December 6, 1940, almost two 
years after the complaint was filed. It is difficult to reconr- 
cile this contention with the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel 
that he served notice of the pendency of the suit on December 16, 
1938, the day the complaint was filed, by leaving two copies 
thereof with Antonina Czajkowski at defendants' usual place of 
abode in the town of Layden, However, assuming that defendants 
were not served with notice of the pendency of the suit on that 
day, and that they resided elsewhere, as they contend, we have 
their admission that personal service of the alias summons was 
had upon them before they were defaulted for failure to appear, 
before the matter was referred to the master for hearing and 
before the decree was entered against them on June 30, 1941, 
It is therefore evident that they had notice of the pendency of 
the suit for more than six months before the entry of the decree, 
but took no steps to assert any defense they might have had» Their 
sole appearance after being served with sumi ens was for the pur- 
pose of challenging the court's Jurisdiction on the ground that 

srij io siold^on i-s^i talari Isi^Ji^iio iJt9f!,t fll ebsm. eflol;tT928A 

£>£X.i ^si©ii0^ iKxjw bevise, isvfsn 8j?v.- J^Jtwa »riJ 1o -^aitftfertsti ©rid" fcru* 
xi&if^ S«t£>e&ooiq s'jjtfaoXsoio'i «»riJ to siiswe «bbc9(J i^aill x^^^ ^sdi 

-»«o©si oif- cfiju-dlllib 8.1 , - eXil aswr &xLl&lqmoo 9tiS *r9d"i£ sifiS"^ 

XSBSUoo a^tllial&lq \o itv^bfXJs Bd:^ diiv aoUa»&noo &idi silo 

a^lqoo owi gnxvefX -^cf ^fcsXil asw c^nl&Xqajoo erW -^sfe 9d:f ,8£?I 

to ®OBlq XjBi/eiJ ♦eJitA£jiX9^«o :^g MBW3>tt»sO AcicoJ-ixA ri;tJb&' loeiad:} 

Bia&ba9lf>b cJ-siict gfjiBTircas ^isvewoH ^asb^sJ lo tmo& r,di al sbods 

BBW anoflusifB EaiXe siid^ "io ©oiviee Xsiioaieq ^arid^ nolealabs alsri;^ 

^'la^qqa oJ- siiilhi'l io1 bBiliJ&t^^b ^tbv ^9d;f «>aolBtf jasil:}' noqc bid 

btts 8XiliB®£t 10?: is^a^i sxict oi bearteloi e^w Ti®;t;ffia edi diolscf 

^eeiDsfc »i!+ lo ^icfue 0r{:f eiol&d sri^fnoai xJte asric^ sioa lol ;tli/8 ail-* 

-Twq 9rf;J lol 2ew Biiojfflifa d^tw bavi^g saiscf rESj-ls «j>iu3iB6»qq« •Xoe 
;fxiil:t arureis ?v»jrft no aotSotb&jL'UJi 8**i«oo 9il;t sjilsflsIXario lo ocoq 


the court had no power to Issue the alias summons in December, 
1940, This contention is predicated on Daly v. City of Chicago^ 
295 111. 276, and an additional authority, Snyd er v. ^aMtney j. 310 
111. App, 297, which is cited for the first time in defendants' 
petition for rehearing. The Daly case, which was decided before 
the Civil Practice Act became effective, is discussed at length 
in our original opinion. The Civil Practice Act and rules of the 
Supreme court applicable thereto empower the court to order the 
issuance of alias writs, and such an order was entered in this pro- 
ceeding, Tha Snyder case originated in the Municipal court and the 
conclusion reached is predicated largely on specific rules of that 
court. Although the Daly case is cited in Snyder v. ^\hitney. 
counsel in that proceeding made no point of the fact that it was 
decided before the Civil Practice Act was adopted. Moreover, 
the alias summons in the Snyder case was issued by the clerk 
without an order of court . There was no provision or authority 
for such procedure, unless the court record contained the original 
summons with a return showing the defendants "not found," In the 
case at bap the alias writ was issued upon the order of the court, 
as provided by the statute, which presents an entirely different 

We again point out, as we did in our original opinion, that 
although defendants had an opportunity to file their answer in this 
proceeding and present such defense as they might have, they de- 
clined to do so and relied solely on the ground that the court 
lacked jurisdiction of the parties. 

In the light of these considerations we adhere to our 

original opinion and the decree of the Circuit court is therefore 



Sullivan, P. J,, and Scanlan, J,, concur^ 


^iscteoysS 1x4 aaoaaraue ^&11& ©li;^ ftiraeJt o;t i^^woq on b&ri i'xisoo &£iS 

j^o.f.s_?140 tP..Ji^ -^..y-.%^#.Q xso J&«^,t«oi5«aq el uOi^iis^nQO ilrfl' .04^^! 

Oie. ^X Q«^-^ .^y.'^^PM-. ^xil%od^ii» Zsiaolttbl& n& bcR ^b^^ .1X1 ^^^^ 

iaiaBM9%®b ai. eaid ia-ill »ri;f •xol f»»d-Jt© 8x xii>iriw ,^?S .qqA .III 

ilJSiiel Js b©aej;?oslt' s.t <;i^vio09^1« ©atAOS^f i'OA ©oi^os«s:<? XtviO axW- 
en;t lo &&lsn tes ;1-5>A e>©l^»»rr^ iiviO aril .nolitiqo Xsatglio luo al 

^£j;i:? "to rf tlr-i i>ilJ:»stqE no ^le^^sX £>34i50il>®iq al fceaofiei noisjjXjjnoo 
,Y6>r^;:}l.d> .v x&jbirii& ixl beila ^X ©ass ^X^Q sxict jd^t^oxflXA ^i'moo 

$0X^si oa 9b8Bi ^X&£>d907q iss^ at X®eiuro9 

XiliodSr 'S.stXvQ'sq on sew e%ss>£SS '^^^O- lo ^&Mo a& iuodttK 

^■j-iXJ^5> @^ ^ «©l)t£o ji)£i;j^ f^u Ijeweei saw Alifi &&IX& odS i&cf ^'s s8ao' 
^ii»T;%)^tllJ& '^Xe■'sJtc^^«i iT*j e^aes^rrq A^lxttf ^o;tv:fB*e sjgW ijcf fjsbXvonq E4 

■::i.f isi rtfiwexis ilQd^ e-LlI oJ Tjg'imf^tjioqqo xus bBii zio-^aelBb riawoxfJXe 

-ejD -^sfi^t ,ev«ii jilslia ^ed^ as aisuel®!) ilojjs ^fnsaa^q faxs gnjifesftooiq 

*ilioo «)ri.1- ;l-'3iicf ^uo^ Gif^j- no xXqIos bBllei bna oa ofc o* btnXlo 

♦ ssiJ-iiiq edit lo noliolbaliui fcesCcsX 

^tvoaot ^, , sIxifioS ba& ^.L ,^ ^nsvlXXirS 





Appellants , 




3161 , ' ' '' 


Defendants Ludwik Czajkowski and Antonir^ Czajkowski 
appeal from a decree of the Circuit court foreclosing a trust 
deed securing an indebtedness of $1,6^0, wMeh, together with 
accrued interest, master ♦s and attorney's fees, foiaid defend- 
ants to be indebted to plaintiff in the aggregate sum of 
$3, 399, 76, The appeal is prosecuted upon the theory that the 
court had no jurisdiction of defendants because the original 
suasmons was not served upon them^ that the issuance of an alias 
summons was not warranted, and that their subsequent motions to 
set aside default and vacate the decree, supported by their 
limited appearance entered for the purpose of objecting to the 
Jurisdiction of the court, were erroneously denied. 

Th© foreclosure proceeding was filed December 16, 1938# 
The property was then in possession of one George Dohse, a tenant 
of the principal defendants. The same day plaintiff's attorney 
served notice on the principal defendants, as well as on Dohse 
and one Gerlach, trading as The Gerlach Company, and others that 
he would seek a temporary injunction to restrain all the defend- 
ants from removing any portion of the top soil from the premises 
sought to be foreclosed, lotice of this motion was personally 
served on the Czajkowskis December 16, 1938, and on the other 
defendants by delivering copies thereof to the contractor who 
was then engaged in removing the top soil from the premises. 


rr-.rr ; rr -!tt 


j;> JljjailO e-riJ to ssioeb iJ ejoi'i is^-qqH 

i ' ■ ■ ■ "' ' :.lsJ.-i OS b^idBbal ©d" oi &ia^ 

; Jia5l)ri©l»fc 1:0 siQliQlbzlisjl on 5fic d^-itfoo 
^^f;^ ^Iji; JbcfTtsp. ion 8 3^ aaonanua 

ba& iSjjslQb &blzQ Jaa 

»£td oi gi£lJ-o!i[;do "ifco €»aoq'iJjvi ®ilj x^l *>faa-3d^ja9 aoilBisaqqii Jbed^lmll 

^tiuiiir.ij ... ^ijijiiov v>5i'xu--:. 6X10 'io fioxaaeaeoq ni nG.r(:f sjb^ X^.*3t&<Io*iq s^T 

oai" ^Binnba&lQb li^ionliq edS no ooIJon bsvise 

^aKf ^naiid-o iJiua ^^xisqimO riosli&Q ejKT 3ii snibsiJ- -,riO£l'i&0 ©no fjos 

-trip" -iWom/toi X'tsooqajsi' is iees Jclxrcns- sii 

j;o;--irt-*cr' -^nj ts<D'x"i IxoB qo:- •.iioq '^ns ^.nlvoaei arortl sin* 

Xliflwoaxeo i:;toia el . fieaoXoeiol ecf o* id^oe 

*ioti^o oiij t8£^I ^dX locfiffeo&G aliawoitsaO eiii no bsvise 

oifw loioaiiii )ii lo»iBiii B»iqoo gul'ssVilefc x^f 2-:ffl6ftiis«lsb 

.sssJbiieiq ®dcf boi:^ 11'.. di gGir7oiasi ni f)S86sn® andi esw 


When the motion for a temporary injunction came up for hearing on 
December 19, it was continued without notice until December 21, 
i»hen a reference was had to a master upon the Injunctional phase 
of the proceeding, fhe master filed his report June 5, 1940, The 
delay between the motion for an injunction and the filing of the 
master's report was occasioned by conferences had between the 
parties in an attempt to settle their differences. The master 
recommended that an Injunction issue, and after overruling excep- 
tions to the master's report, the chancellor entered a permanent 
restraining order in accordance ?/ith the master's recommendations. 

The original summons against the Czajkowskis had never been 
placed in the hands of the sheriff but was retained by plaintiff's 
counsel, presumably because the parties were endeavoring to neg€»— 
tiate a settlement, December 2, after the permanent injunction had 
been issued, plaintiff caused an alias summons to issue by direction 
of the court, which was served on the Czajkowskis Dsceaiber 6, 1940 
by leaving a copy thereof with each of them personally at their 
place of residence. 

Counsel for the principal defendants entered their special 
and limited appearance for the purpose of obj cting to the jurisdic- 
tion of the court "in that the original summons was not returned by 
the sheriff and the clerk was not authorized to issue an alias 
summons," and in support thereof he also filed the affidavit of 
Ludwik Czajkowski stating that he had lived near the southeast 
corner of Higgins road and River road in Cook county continuously 
for twenty years, that he had resided there in December 1938^ an^ 
that he was not served with a summons in the foreclosure proceeding 
until Deceraber 6, 1940, 

January 2.7, 1941 counsel for plaintiff served notice on 
the attorney for the principal defendants advising him that he 
would, on the folloT? day, ask for an order of default against 

GO y^Zt&&d ToX qit sjcso aolioaulal x'^^iOQ^®^ -a ^o^ aotiom arid- sstoK 

:^-i:: »0-r-;I ^''J vxu/u :!-'ior;;;-»-.i ctd[ belli lod'efiSK arfT .anJtfcssooiq atriJ- lo 

■_■. J-3;^{?t sj^T .aosnei«11i£» il9ri:t 9l*^»a oc^ d'qwo;t^.s ns jcti: seWieq 

^ iToqfti: 8»'rft;t8«« etiS oct aaoi:;t 

. . 10t."t.».&|te.(!8lffi3; • ;;nO SfliUCtlBT^tSr;! 

Vt' .: (^ ' aMawo:^^ rl-.l.'. ^ ixioo oriJ- lo 

':!:;■(■ Ilsisoeisq" meutJc^ Id i^&j:. loeisnti"- '^cqos ij^iXilvBel x^ 

.»Ofi Ii.t8»l lo 9©slq 
r.elc«v^s TJt?>^v* JbsTr^nr 5?iir.^n?'?',rb I>:;q irnliv aftj lol X-^eiujcO 

lo cflvftbr'v :. _.__, \aaomiSJz 

■"•'■■'"••'• on aiiw sri ;t£ii;f 


the Czajkowskis and the othsr defendants who had been served with 
summons but had failed to appear in the proceeding, and also for 
a rereference of the foreclosure proceeding, on its merits, to a 
master in chancery. Defendants having failed to appear, they were 
accordingly defaulted by order of the court entered on that day, 
and the cause was referred generally to a master in chancery as 

Thereafter, February 19, 1941, attorney for the principal 
defendants served notice on plaintiff's counsel, as well as on 
Dohse's, that he would appear before the chancellor and ask that 
the default against the Gzajkowskis theretofore entered, be vacated 
and the suit dismissed. This motion '.vas continued for five days 
for the purpose of allowing defendants* attorney to present a 
petition, and February 25, 19^1 he renewed his motion to vacate 
the default, quash the alias suBsraons and retiirn of the sheriff, 
and to dismiss the suit as to the Gzajkowskis under their limited 
appearance. The petition or affidavit of A. ". Lake, attorney for 
the principal defendants, alleged in substsjice that the foreclosure 
proceeding had been filed December l6, 1938j that summons was duly 
issued but was never served on any of the defendants^ that no return 
v/as raade thereon by the sheriff j that the summons was then in the 
files bearing an indorsement by plaintiff's attorney that it had 
not been served; that on December 2, 1940 an alias summons, on 
order of court, was issued against the Cza^kowskis and duly served; 
that thereafter, December 31, 1940, they filed a special and limited 
appearance with affidavit attached for the purpose of objecting to 
the jurisdiction of the courtj that thereafter, January 28, 1941, 
a notice ?/as served upon Victor G. Kardi, attorney for George Dohse, 
but not upon the principal defendants or their attorney, asking 
that a default be entered against the Czajkowskis, and that the 
matter be referred to a master in chancery; that hearings before 

^^ab i&iij iw ^©Sibdiis J lift : ' 'i-ofi-iO ^cf bsd-Iualef) -^laiitfinooo* 

' s;i-£i^f)H«t®fc 3Q±ffoIIjs lo saoqii/q »ri;f lol 

msjQdJb'a ai fioa^IXjs ^ectiiBf)nnls»& laqloiil'iq sdj 
, . 11 ne9d J>firf giilbesooiq 

ia&mssiobai qb aniisecf aallt 

^X*^I ,8si ■^iJiirn'-.T, ^loitse^iedi o ctol;ti>lbel'iiil »tii 

iiioei) T.ol x'^B.ioiis ^iiBts?' ,-D *i©cJoxV ao<iv £>cv*is3 ajsw eoi;foa fi 

2ixl5/j»ja ^^G!^r£oc^;tvJ ilerLt to a^fnaJbn^lpb X«qXoxiliq edi noqjj Joe ;tjycr 

arij v;.rid- ;>nc ^ax2[ewo .-'aaifiigjB bf^i^nn sJ j-X»Bls& a ^erf^ 




mi'^t qift t^^ 



B/ii-" fl"! Ctwfi 

'J X'-'iVs/j ' _ 

the master with respect to the foreclosure proceedings followed, 
and the first notice the Caajkowsklshad that any hearings were being 
iiad was February 18, 1941, when a copy of the master* s report was 
served upon Albert E, Lake, their counsel, who ijamediately served 
notice upon plaintiff «s attorneys that he v;ould bring the matter 
before the chancellor for the purpose of settling the jurisdictional 
question under the special and limited appearance that had thereto- 
fore been filed. Plaintiff answered Lake's affidavit or petition and 
May 15, 1941, the chancellor entered an order denying the motion of 
Ludwik and Antonina Czajkowski to ouash the alias summons and dismiss 
the suit, at the same time giving them leave to file their answers 
within fifteen days, without prejudice to the order of reference 
theretofore entered. Ko answers were filed by defendants, and June 
4, 1941 plaintiff's counsel served notice and secured an order of 
default against the Czajkowskis for their failure to answer within 
the time fixed by the order of May 15, and the master was at the 
same time ordered to proceed with the hearing and determination of 
the foreclosure proceeding without l^urther delay. After the hearing 
was concluded, the master filed his report, and June 30, 1941 the 
decree from which this appeal was taken ^ was entered in pursuance 
of the master's findings and recommendations. 

As the principal ground for reversal it is urged that since 
the sheriff made no return on the original summons, the court was 
not warranted in ordering that an alias summons issue, and under the 
special appearance filed by defendants they were entitled to have 
the summons quashed and the suit dismissed. In support of thi.3 
contention defendants rely on Daly v. City of Chicago,. 295 Ill» 276, 
(opinion filed in I920), holding that under section 4 of the old 
Practice Act, where plaintiff, after filing a praecipe and securing a 

summons, keeps th© summons for more than four years without delivering 

3»:[a;ta jo« fl asxiw ,IA^I ^^l ■^^sxficf©'? bbw bad 

bsv^ee Xls^B-tbSififfll orfe ,i«3fTijOo lieri;? tost&^l . ocfiA noqi; b«vioB 

idtssfith fens Baoimsj- _. srfit i^e :, ial8wo:i{t'>:ir: nnlno^tiiA bns ilwfix/J 

'M7!.-_ : ^ ■ ,, :.-_....._. _ . b?"i9j-n« «iolo:t:vierId' 

■^,. •, • , • -^rti*iii-'^1&fe._ i"-:.-il:fxilBl^ _ .,- ,-► 

atHtl. ^ - i2£a^o?I[;.3sO ©ri:f ;f8iiJtB3B ilu&'i&b 

9ii3- t& ^sw V J....... s^:. ....:. ^v^ \.^.^^ 'lo Tsbio odS %€ bBxtl 9IlU sxtt 

to B&MsalmiibtBii has TfllJ:vL&9d 9d:i riJiw bsssoiq o^ beisbtto »al;t sjwe 

SfiliBOri edi --^'^' ,-r-. r.~N ,;::,r-^. ,,« txrojcf;tlrr sjxlJbesooiq s-uraoXosiol 9ri;t 

" 9ri* f'' , .X.. uii . ^ uM belli n-Bj-ssK ©ri;J tbsbjjionoo eew 

soUl. — '-■ ■;-', -(t^'iiBCf 8SW Xsoqqj? eiif;t dolxlw Koil seitoftb 

.;;no±J-sfeat*iCfiEOoe^ bns agnibnil e'lod'arr - '^j lo 

saw ;'■; " ^^a-.uivija IsialSiio arf;J no ni:xf'- r - • obsci lllitila en:}' 

t>di t&bcs- on- ^^ij<:zt nnojimt}'- ' " Jsif^ Shxt .*■ "-©iiisiifiw^Ois 

evc-i.' vi":iiit;n"'v ' ' ' '^ - '■ "• := c.jts-x3»qq3 lalodqa 

, -'..'■iiarai.'"' '' 'n.^ b^riaBjiffp aflcmj:^- --'"' 

£io Si:. ^ - lebni; ctsri-l BulDlori ^{OS^X fit b9in aolalqc) 

& SCl^u/'je.a biiu jqios-s-ici b giilXi'i i*v ^ rctalBlq ©^®dw ^;JoA 9oJt;tosT:^ 

t^£ila€^vZIeJJ) ;JwoiU-i"^/ sTasTC tiirol nfjri;t arioa lo'l Knooau/R sfii aqssd ^attOiaau;e 

it to the sheriff to be served, the court is not authorized to 
Issue an alias summons vdthout satisfactory explanation of the 
delay, and If issued it may be quashed on notion under a liriited 
appearance. In that Gase no notice of the pendency of the suit 
had been served on the city and no effort whatever had been made 
to obtain service on the municipality. In eocffiienting on this state 
of facts, the court observed that iko authority bearing directly on 
the question under consideration had been cited, "but the mere 
statement of the question, it seems to us, presents a situation 
that should not be tolerated," and stated the reason for its con- 
clusion as follows J "To permit a plaintiff who begins a suit to 
himself take possession of the summons and keep it siibstantially 
four and a half years, presumptively for the purpose of preventing the 
defendant frcm getting kno7/iedge of the suit until such time as it 
suits the plaintiff's purpose for him to know it, seems to us pal- 
pably wrong and should not be permitted," The factual situation in 
the Daly case presented entirely different circumstances from the 
case at bar. Here defendants knev/ as early as December l6, 1938 
that a foreclosure proceeding had been instituted. They were then 
served with a notice for a temporary restraining order predicated 
upon alleged waste of the property sought to be foreclosed. The 
reason assigned for the court's holding in the Dalv case is not 
applicable to the situation of which defendants complain. More- 
over, Rule ^ of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, adopted by 
the Supreme Court of Illjjiois August 1, 1938, as applicable to the 
Civil Practice Act, hich became effective in 19|4 and superseded 

the old act, provides that "(1) '.Whenever it shall appear from ttui 
return or affidavit of service, that a v/rit has not been served, 
the clerk shall issue successive alias writs, on the request of 
the plaintiff. The court may order the issuance of alias write* 
(2) Where the plaintiff falls to show reasonable diligence to 


oJ- h»sd'K}iiiJCi& jixm t 

'.iiJ 4 revise ©^ o;J llliaiie 9^J oi Si 
ffi<dw cfto'Hs an fcns i(;;Jjto ©4^ xro Revise a&9(S b&d 

m> xl^if&^iJb sraiiSs^T XJ>:^'^4c5:S'3 o|P.tad;t fe«VTj:eed<:^ Im/oo sxii ^aJosI lo 


&&i ^.l:^i?«>v?; 

3d-j[iisb£i6l?b 9i©K ,i£Cf Jb ©aso 

I>od' ;;■ c .' . ':tio *£iin .: b. 1.1 a ?•: 1 "^ t s locr.; 

(Salt o;t «X^j&».i. _, ^ , 

-, -. ♦-!. JL . 

rijiw bcvxr-e 
..s>£taXeefi r»Das9n 
^ -■' ' 

'-1 t 

(J ij.-^ i-'J,0 w'AjIW 

lo d'fcsjtfp©! edl Jio ^eJ^liw ^ , .i;.4 £ f ©viegaoajtfs diiQui; liAriS! liaaXo sriJ" 

obtain service through the Issuance of alias writs, the action may 
be dismissed on the application of any defendant or on the court's 
own motion," Under this rule and in view of the affidavit filed 
by plaintiff's counsel showing that the delay in obtaining service 
under the original writ had been caused by negotiation of the 
parties for settlement of the case, the court was warranted in 
ordering the alias summons to issue. Paragraph 2 of the rule 
afforded defendants an opportunity to move for a dismissal of the 
suit if they were able to show that plaintiff had not used reason- 
able diligence to obtain service through issuance of the alias 
summons. Obviously, in view of the circumstances Indicated by 
the record, no such showing could be made. Nothing in the Civil 
Practice Act or the rules applicable thereto has been called to our 
attention which would justify defendants in waiting until defaults 
had been entered against them, both for failure to appear and for 
failure to answer, after they had been given an opportunity to 
answer, and then for the first time moving to quash the summons 
under their limited appearance on the ground that the court had no 
jurisdiction to enter the decree. 

It is urged by defendants that plaintiff was not entitled 
to an alias summons because he was not diligent in keeping the 
original summons alive. From the record submitted it is undenied 
that efforts to settle the case were mafJe from time to time and 
continued after the order of June 7# 1940 was entered. We are 
justified in assuming that these circumstances afford a satisfactory 
explanation of the delay which ensued between the filing of the 
complaint and service on defendants by summons on December 6, 194-0, 

Additional circiimstances of record Invite close scrutiny. 
After default had been entered against defendants for failure to 

appear, the cause was referred to a master, and thereafter defend- 
ants were again defaulted for failure to file an answer. The order 


diio' to aol 




;;£L3i:i t; <:'■ 


: .d;t fiaJifoirii 90l-viea filfc^fcfo 
v:. •, -.0 noiJscHqqB 9ri:J no fc^ESimexb «(5 

^ , _ artoisBLra asils ©lit inlTsMo 
, , ji^ifct ^oile oi side '^i»w X9xl* ^^ *^ 

^ide^i tan 

CXI bfiil tl«oo sriJ 



^lewea^ ot stt'Ilfi^ 
^__ liorit isbm/ 

liOSORf si tl 

.V ari ssjireood aaoaa-i-a BBlIfi ns ot 
-'^ .-^^ils afioaacua XsalS-t'io 


of default gave them an opportunity to file their reply within 
fifteen days, without prejudice to the reference, but they failed 
or refused to avail themselves of this opportunity to cone into 
the proceeding and present any defense that they might have had. 
There is no suggestion anywhere in defendants' brief th£.t they 
have a meritorious defense to the foreclosure proceeding. They 
stand upon the contention that the court had no jurisdiction of 
the parties^ for the reasons heretofore indicated. Under the 
circumstances disclosed by the record, we think their position 
is untenable. The court had jurisdiction by personal service of 
suBjmons upon them, and the decree was entered upon allegations 
of fact and proof adduced before the master which are undenied. 
Defendants say that they were unaware of the proceedings before 
the master until a copy of the master's report was served upon 
them. It Biay reasonably be assumed, however, that they must have 
known that the cause had been referred to a master for hearing, 
because they knew of the pendency of the suit and had access to 
the files which would have apprised them of the order which pro- 
vided for the filing of an ans?;er without prejudice to the reference # 
Having s.llowed themselves to be defaulted, both for failure to appear 
and answer, they are not in a position to complain because further 
notice of the proceedings before the master was not served upon them* 

Lastly defendants argue that an item of $300 awarded plain- 
tiff as solicitor's fees in prosecuting the hearing before the master 
for a permanent injunction, and another item of $400 solicitor's fees 
for bringing the foreclosure to decree, are excessive. Defendants 
have not presented any report of proceedings, and in the absence 
of such report we must assume that the court heard proper evidence 
to sustain the allowance of fees under the provisions of the trust 
deed. There is nothing before us from which we could determine 
otherwise, and the decree finds that the fees awarded are reason- 

cMtlw x-^^: ' "" oi ■%ftimt'iOiiqo n& sa^di itlx/slefe to 

<y}iil isjrac sMM&ioqqa :iliir Ic aevlscinsri:*- It&'^B o;t bsajalei to 

,£iB£i 'vaitslofc XjCEb cfnseoiq fenB sfl-tJ^^^ooiq wit 

X^" ' '■■ ' ■^^tBdvrxoB floliaess/ira on al steriT 

•^eii'i * splits© iiO'iq fc^aoiog-'ittl, &jij o;t eaneleb &volioiliem » avarf 

to ii©.t;folJbai*ixf|; oa bail j^roHoj) 9it;f ;:JjBiI;f aotfaetaoo edi coqw DiiB;t« 

»d^ *£&baC tbf^'^Bttlbtil &'xol:o:j»if>ti &aoHB&i sxii tot ^aeWifiq arfi 

£ftolJ'Oc"i , sTX* fre'm;3ra9 eew ?*T:©»li «£j;J' Jblle ^smd:f aoqsj Rooaaatft 

a-xaloJ 2Sitiii?-?&ciq sjQct" lo siarer-asf- eissw "^^aiC^ ;fjarid- x*»« 2;tflBf)ne1:»(I 

^^al^iB'^d jcJ- &e^5i8<'^.f'S m&nd bad setfijo sri;t ijsrfJ" xnroxoi 

-otq tf^iil. r>aliqq^ avfifi Mirow rfo.triw aelll Sil* 

,m'3di siQiiSJ 69Vi«B ,t©«^j)oiq edJ Io soWmxi 

»0«9Br ^»?|jCLfel>c> oqet xns &s;tctss9nq cfon evRd 

ssiiofjivs 's^go^q fe-r iarti aaoiees ieiM ew J^ioqei lioj/e Io 

- iytJi* ftUsf to «j3DlsJEv©iq (tdi i&hsm e o«swoXX« »ri;j- cls^tawe o^ 

sfltimaa^^ feiifoo ■••w dohhi iso"it at' eTO'^ftcf s£t±rf,toa s.i aisiiT .l>9 36 


A motion for dismissal of the appeal was reserved to 
hearing and is now denied* 

In view of our conclusions as heretofore set forth, 
we are of opinion that the decree was properly entered, and 
it is therefore affirmed, 


Scanlan, P, J,, and Sullivan, J., oonevir^ 

th&ta&b won ei kne gxrliBed 
Biti, ^^ ':t ;tsri* noJLfitqo Tto eiB etw 




doing business as ^jSUamplaln Res-' 
taurant and Ta|)./lfboa et al,, 



.■'■'-'" Plaintiff ♦s face was severely cut and injured as 'the 
result of being struck by broken glass from a swinging door 
leading into the restaurant owned and operated by defendants. 
His suit for damages in th© Superior court resulted in judg- 
ment entered on a directed verdict in favor of defendants. 
This appeal is prosecuted from an order denying his motion 
to file an amended complaint before trial, from an order 
denying his petition and motion for a change of venue, from 
th© court's refusal to grant him a new trial, and from the 
judgment entered on the directed verdict* 

The complaint alleged that December 27, 1937 defendants 
were owners, operators and managers of premises known as Champlain 
Building, at ^4 East Monroe street, Ciiicago, where they conducted 
a restaurant and tap roomj that plaintiff, while in the exercise 
of due care and diligence for his own safety, attempted to enter 
the premises as a patron of the restaurant on the aforementioned 
date; that the vestibule door on the premises, "being constructed 
of defective and damaged glass and without any handle bar across 
the width of the said glass door to serve as a warning to patrons 
of said restaurant, collapsed and broke suddenly, cutting and in- 
juring plaintiff severely? " that defendants knew of the unsafe 
and dangerous condition of the vestibule glass door, or, by the 
exercise of ordinary care, should have known thereof, and it 
therefore became and was their duty to repair and alter said door 

( ^aOYAJlM ♦O 8AGIT102J 

C .|fl£Xl9crqA 

\ ^ 

.TfnT^n-i. ....... ^aO/TT .TASiqA ( «v ' 


( ». .^ .■.^■^- .- ^-- -^: •-^■^:^ 

( .59eXX&q<r^^ 

\ tTflUOD SET •«© «OB!I*!0 SHT aiSHSYIOSQ dmiffi SOI^aUT. .HM 

^c»ob saignlifs £ moil eaalg nsr^o-xcf x<^ aCoifiJ^s ^alsd lo cMi/as^: 

*2d'n/35na'.t9f.' y*^ beiiz-^iaqo bits bom.'o d-ixjeti/js;? asi silJ' oiai :^l.bB9L 

-»33jE/t ni fcsctluasi Jiuoo •xoJtiaqu'g ©ri^ xil BsaaiaBl) io1 ilssa slH 

^acfflficnelsfc to lovsl fix ^olJbiav bed'osnifc s no beie^a^ &aBa 

floljOffi Elri grtix^-^ 'lobio ftjQ sKiil fiod'Jirosaoiq ei Iseqqs elrlT 

isIj^o ne fflO'il ^Ijsi^J- eiolscf d-fljtslqiaoo bsfjnofflfi us 9111 oi 

moil ^©liaev 1o sgnsxio js id noid-oai bns. aoi:ii:isq aJtri yil^sb 

fifid- moil baa ^L&lii wen s mM ;Jjtiiiis oj- lBaj/l@n s'^ixroo ^di 

,ioibnQv b&iosilb orlcf fio bt^i^iae iasssQbsjl 

oiiiilqmBiiO a;: m/oici aeaisisTiq lo aioaBosffl bas Eio^si^qo ^aienwo aiew 

©aloisxs srlj- ill: eliffv; ,^ili.tfiiJBXq Sj^j {mooi qfict Jbus ijciBix/Bj'ssi b 

i©dTio oj I);?;tqffied-jj5 ^i2:!-g)1j3S imo Qld tot ©oaeallli^ Ms 91bo si/b lo 

benolJ-nofTisnols firfJ- no J-njK*iiji?>5as*£ "^il^ lo no'sJ-sq « eb £8E±jKJ5rrq »d^ 

f)s;tsi/'xd"anoo §nxed" ^aeaJuaeiq ©rid- xio loob ©Xifcflcfesv 9ri;f isd^ i^i&b 

seoios ir.d ®XbiiQ/i y^^-'^ :tx/oxf:}'lY/ bns essXs fsegBuaB bn& evlioBtsb zo 

snoid-sq oj §nJ:ni/«f u ae svisa Ovj- noob eafiXs bias eiid" lo ifd^blw srlcJ' 

~ai bfue ^tJisjo ^y,laBi:bvz sioief 5iiii ftoeqsIXoo ^:^a&ivfiisei bt&s lo 

9V:.amj erfj- lo ?;©a2l ad-nsfinslofe c^tixlc;- " |YXi?'i»VBa '5:ll:tittlf>lq sflliift 

ftiJjf TjcJ ^io ^looJb aeaXs sXucfid-apv ©rid' lo floXcMIinoo BUQis:ga&b bas 

it bna ^^lo&iBiii mroriil svari JbXi-'o//E ^onso y^i^^^^K) lo seloisze 

so as to keep it in a safe condition and thereby prevent injury 
to plaintiff and other patrons entering the premises, "but that, 
wholly disregarding their duty, defendants failed and neglected 
to keep the said glass door in a proper and safe condition, and 
also neglected and refused to keep the vestibule at the entrance 
to the premises properly lighted so as to prevent injury to their 
patrons; that as a result of the collapse and breaking of the 
vestibule glass door, plaintiff was severely cut, bruised and 
wounded . 

Defendants' answer was a categorical denial of all the 
essential allegations of the complaint, including a denial that 
plaintiff was injured and damaged as alleged by himo 

The facts disclose that defendants operated a restaurant 
and tap room at |J4 East Monroe street, Chicago, and it was con- 
ceded on trial that they were responsible for the upkeep, mainte- 
nance and repair of the premises. At about noon December 27, 
1937 plaintiff entered defendants' place of business. There 
were two doors outside of the restaurant which led from the side- 
walk into a vestibule about five feet square. To the right of 
the vestibule a revolving door led to the tap room. To the left 
a large plate glass swinging door led to the restaurant. The day 
in question was admittedly cloudy and the vestibule was not lighted 
at the time plaintiff entered. The evidence as to what occurred 
after plaintiff had proceeded through the docaps leading into the 
vestibule is extremely scant. Plaintiff testified: "I walked 
into the entrance ?raiy and I opened the door and the only thing I 
know ■WB.s the breaking glass was falling all around me and then 
blood was streaming from my nose* ^/ell, then I looked around to 
see what was happening and a man approached me and said I had 

better g© and see a doctor. *** X was bleeding profusely and 
Mr« Polichrcaies [defendantl brought me a napkin and I was using 

tu^trti Jneveiq '^cTeTexid' Ms jHoiJibnoo •lAli « al Jl q»aaf oi en oe 
^df,aritc? iucf ^esaiflteiq sxid^ 8£iiis;tne enorriaq "reri;?© fiycuj 'lUd-iltelq o;f 

£)ii.') ^xioj: J:ilwio else bus laqoiq ^ fii: 'xoob saalg bl»8 eilct qe^^I o:t 

9QaBi&im «rf?f d-is sijycfWasv axld- q9©3l oJ 5sai?let bxiB bs^ssls^n oels 

'ilsri^ o^ fiJ^'U^-^ J-xisvsiq o^ ec os boitriall tXieqoiq a««JbH©iq €«U od- 

{>«:j5 5»aJ:»'ia' ^^fio X-CerrevsB asw ^li.tfljkelq ,ioob 88BI3' elircfltaGv 


©ifet lis "io Isiiieb Ieol'Iog^j■«t^ s asw •r^jfrsna 'BJflBbnsisCf 

*ari^ lislct'iJb ij sfllbMofli ^.tnlaXqaroo 9ri;t I0 «i«)l;ta8©lXs iBld^nsaaa 

^mJLsi vcf begplle as'tiesSBfltsb bfiB bsilrtJtti 8«w lll^tnlslq 

ifiB7ijfitR'?i fi bej-fiisqo s^flBBnetPb ;tfiriJ- 98oX*>aib ei'OBi sriT 

-noo ssw :tj: bnis ^o^jsaid'' ^cfssrj.te ©6-ai©f! ^aj&S >^ ia booi qfii 5na 

-^cJ-filAiB tqeos'qc eiid" lol eXcfXanoassi arj$w "^sri^t tsdi l&lviS Ho beBso 

^'^^ i«(iMOs©(I itoon faodB ii- .^eaijssiq ari;? lo nJtisqei ba& 9oasa 

~ebX3 ^jFf:f Hoil JbeX rioiiiw ^tflsiWjsd-asi sild- lo eblzifxjo aicob ow* &t»w 
lo ;J"figi:*i ©ricJ" oT .siBJTpa S^^J nvn Ssods eXxrcrr.^p-f.V^ s o;:^iii 3£I«w 

X^b sfiT ,:fiiB"3EX/sue©i srfcf od- bsl loofe gffls^X^B aasXa sSslq esial s 
f'^-origiX itoji 88W sXucflcl-sev sffd" bcfi yfejyoX© xXBstitiaba 3jbw nolizsBp at 

©ri* o;Jal snlbeeX B^ob s£[;t risiroiricf beb9©ooiq baff llXd^fllfiXq i«tl* 
bfSlXBW I" tbeJtlicfaejt l'3:i:J'iii:53X*i .JtxiBse x^®fli©rid'X9 el ©XxfcfWasv 

I sfllilcf vino erij^ bus loob srfJ- bsnsqo I bsm XBiff sonsa^tn© arii afal 
n9iii bti& sw bimois lis shIIIbI sjsw essXs si3X:ija<5T:ef silcf ssw womi 

oj- bnsioifi beilool I £E9rid- ,IXoW ,9»oh -^cis mcjil 3nlfflB«i:fa kbw booXd 
b/.iri I blr.8 bnr --^ s , . .^^.•. •...- -..-- ... ^jie g^i/jaqqari g^nf tadv sea 

3niai; arw I bas nJtalqen « ©e cfiisxioto [ i^asbaelp»b] ascoiriolXoq ,tII 

my handkerchief, I applied that on my nose *^** and he took bm> 
to the hospital. We went tc the doctor's office first, but 
they said he was at the hospital, so we went oat there and the 
attending doctor at the hospital dress«d my nose,'^ About ten 
stitches were taken in plaintiff's nose and his ia.iury cannot 
be seriously questioned. Plaintiff testified that there T/as 
no bar on the door or handles to push or pull} that the "place 
was dark. I looked around to sea if there was any light, and 
I saw that there was a light in the celling, but it was not 
lltj" that It was a winter day and rather cloudy. Plaintiff 
had knowB defendant Tom Polichrones for many years, had been 
selling cigarettes to his restaurant for a considerable tiae, 
and had frequently entered his restaurant both as a psitron and in 
a business capacity. On the day in qusstion he ims about to enter 
the restaurant for his luncheon. On cross-examination plaintiff 
reiterated: ''fhe only thing I remesibisr was when I got in I 
noticed the glass falling," and two or three times he eaiphaticaHy 
said that he did not bump into the glass of th« door or contact the 
door before he was in lured. There is nothing in the evidence to 
indicate that plaintiff n&s guilty of contributory negligence, 

PolichTvmes, testifying on his own behalf, said that 
shortly before noon on the day of the accident "I hear glass in 
the door breaking. I run over and Mr, Kylavos was holding a 
handkerchief on his nose. I asked him what happened, and he said, 
•I hit my nose, I cut ay nose.' I said, »Let*s go to your doctor,' 
*■** so we took a taxi to the Lakeside Hospital at 29th and Prairie 
and tks doctor had just left there. The interne put some tape on 
his nose, and then we took another taxi back to the l^iallcr Build- 
ing. He said, *Qo on back and take care of your business, I can 
go up layself.' A half hour later he came back to ^A S, Monroe 
and ate lunch, I asked hia who-t happened and he said the doctor 

;forj3L»© xi»?,ni eiei £«« oaofl ? ' lliitrrislq nl lle3t«c^ ©tew ao/Io;tii'8 

ss',«r e'xeitJ' sJ'-sdd" ^©lllcfesi l^l^fntiLr*? ♦bs«oiJ-««cp xlsjyoiioa »cf 

R6&X<5" laiS i&tiJ iSStiq TO xjEiiKi o:} ssUboerf *to loofe 6x1^ no terf on 

fees 4i"il3.ti %£!& Sisr ©ijbiiM lii »«ie 9i hwoiR bsdool I .itefi eaw 

»&B-di BjBtff ,fiiJi6n5 t^j^jj tol aiaaia,TiislIo*I ao')' toufens't^jJ? itwoiri bad 

it ■, 

I li^ iog I risdv a«ir 5«»tf.': ^.iziut^ \Liso ®dT" tfce;^«T:«»it»^ 

XiiB0±;*jsriq|jai? ^ri aoaut-l : <^.^i:f ■xc swn^ fefis "^SftUXfsl eftel* ©lit l>99lJo£i. 

©xi^ to.s^Ji6s ic Q sbsIb ««i^ QtnX ^0^ ^oa bib %d i»tis blsB 

lit sesl^ i*sj1 I" d'it«l)irt»£ r>d;;J lo x^fe sil^ no noon ©ioI^mJ x^t^iorfs 

& i^Xbl9£ a«w bo-wjIx^ »nTc ha^i lavo nif^: X ,3isl2LB©ad noob oif^ 

,!>JL«a eai feaa .^.fe«'ia»qq^ SMv sUA b^te.z I .saoa eiri ho lelfCo,^p3it)aari 

Xiao I ^CESjaElEiftf iiiox "io ftijso wtei feos alocd no oD» ^MeE aS »tttl 

put some stitches in his nose and put tape on it," Polichrones 
further testified that the glass in the swinging door leading 
into his place of business was broken, "There was one h«l« 
broken, not the whole glass." It further appears from 
Polichrones* testimony that the door in question was installed 
in July 1937 aJad the restaurant was opened in Septeiaber of that 

Upon this state of facts the court directed a verdict in 
favor of defendants and judgment was entered accordingly. The 
only ground urged in support of the court's directed verdict 
and judgment is that plaintiff failed to prove defendants guilty 
of negligence and also failed to show his own freedom from con- 
tributory negligence. Although neither of the parties suggest 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , . we think that 
under the evidence and pleadings, the doctrine is applicable to 
the circumstances of this case. 

The rule of res ipsa loquitur . based on the expression in 
an early English case which has been widely quoted with approval 
( Scott v. London etc. Docks Co.. 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Reprint 66?), 
is that where the thing which caused the injury complained of is 
shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, 
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does 
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper 
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation 
of defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. This 
statement of the rule has been in substance most frequently 
adopted and applied in subsequent decisions in the various states, 
so that the occurrence of an injury under the circumstances therein 
set forth raises a presimption or permits an inference that the 
party charged was guilty of negligence. Thus it has been held in 
conformity with the usual application of the doctrine that where a 
thing happens which would not rdinarily have occurred if due care 

eenoiriai:! * , : iJEfq bsw ssoa elxi al fouis^li^ emos iaq 

©lor; one ' '"■■ .nsiioid zm essxilaixcf 1q eo^Xq alxl oial 

aX iolbT 'J adOiS" alrlj xioqU 

;tD Jt£>*iev £>«d-f> • ' ■ loqiy/a jai bo'^iis hawois xJjno 

-iiD:& ssoil mobBs'tl awo ajtd woxfa oi fcsXlel 08X£ fiica ©oiieslXaeii lo 

;ti5ild aULtdo" ow ^'XjLyai;ifDoX £^£1 ISS ^» BaXiioob &tU lo floJt;tJB£»XXqq« 
'cffioxXqqB si &iiXict»o£) exiJ , agnJtljfisXq J&cjb sonsbXvs 9x1;^ lelmj; 

ITI fiolESstqx'^ jO^Mi^oA mix M2 ^o »^. »^ 

I :vo"iq:Qfc xld-Xw i>©*oxfp xXsMv ;3ri do^dw ©E£o xleXXgnS TfXifie aa 

^C'li-^ Jitl'iit'/: ^^X ^^Cl. ,■ . ' ,.-• s^oo G .oie notooJ .v j-J-qqS ) 
•^^ sjEljaXqaaj© x^tdX arij besiiao rioiiiw saixl;^ Aitif •rieilw i^sffc^ e1 

a€o5 ssuXti 3 doifB «1 i-aobXooa esi:t baa 

isqoiq S8XI Xoi^no. jssgsnjaKi ail evarf oriw deoxi;^ IX asqqjBd toa 

iioiiJsiisXq oflaatJa ©li^ nl ^&i>a^bive ©Xcfsnoaja^a eMotljs ii ^soso 

^iXJnejHpetl d^soffj eomior n^ecf eaci sXx/^ sriJ- lo iaeae^Biz 

^ BiTOlrrBV add' ni afloXaXoef) iaswpsecfne ni JbeiXqqa f>n£ bBiqpbM 

£itoied& 8»o£UBJ^Qffiifoilo ejcW i©f>m; xatft^X as lo aonsictxjooo ariJ- :iBdi oe 

erid" ;tiiiid^ ssnsielrtl tm aJ-Xisisq io flo±;rq£U/8»iq ^ seglBi itfiol ^^8 

Gi Mefl used asri .tX sjwrfT . «0£t»al:XB9n lo ^^XXi'a asw t^S'^^s Y^iaq 

. ^z?ti<N J'SflJ- f^fiXiitooJb Sri,? lo aoliiit>l£qq& Iihsbu 9£i) xlctXw Tji-lBiolaoo 

&ttti> ©ub 11 beiiiiJodG ©v&ri TcIit«nX£r[o :fon 5Xj:row rioXxiw zasqqsd gnMJ 

had been used, the fact of such happening raises a presumption 
of negligence. 4^ Corpus Juris II93 and II96, note 59> andcases 
cited therein. 

The reasons for the rule, as frequently stated, are that 
the whole body of evidence may be such that no particular negli- 
gence can be found, and yet the accident may indicate some negli- 
gence, the details of which cannot be ascertained, and the result 
of its application is that the plaintiff is not required to show 
particularly what the specific act of negligence was which pitoduced 
the accident, but is only required in some circumstances to show 
that the accident is one which would ordinarily not occur had due 
care been employed, 4? Corpus Juris 1197* note 68b ^ 

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has in numerous cases 
been applied to the falling of objects generally. Thus in 
Britton V. St. Louis Transfer Co.. 155 HI. App, 3I7, it was 
applied to the falling of furniture from a passing wagonj in 
Connolly v. Pes I^loines Invests Co. . I30 Iowa 633, 105 N. W, 400, 
to the falling of a cast-iron window cap; in Lowner v. H. Y. etc. 
R^ Co.f 175 Mass, 166, 555 N, S. 805, it was applied to the falling 
of a pail of sand} in Polony v. James Brady's Sons* Go^ . (N, J« Sup.] 
126 A, 675, it was applied to the falling of the bocaa of a hoisting 
apparatus; in P oth v. Dexter Horton Estate ^ 140 Wash, 272, 248 P. 
374, it was applied to the roller of a window shade; in Armour v. 
Oolkowskay 95 111, App. 492 (affirmed 202 111, 144), it was 
applied to the falling of an empty barrel from a platform; and 
in Jones v. Riverside Bridge Co.. 70 W, Va. 374-, 73 S. -^ 94-2, 
it was applied to the falling of a board from a building under 
construction. Numerous other instances of the application of 
th« doctrine are cited in 45 Corpus Juris 1201, note 21c, 

XJnder the rule generally applied, there are several condi- 
tions, aside from those directly pertaining to the nature and 

398£i€)&«s ,§^^ ©c^of ^ has i^ll BliuZ SjaqioO i^.^ .eonajllg^n lo 

cfjeul^ SIS ^fca^ts^s xltcsm.^p^iJ b& ^sli/rr ©xid- lol anoeasi sriT 

wo... Vllinl&Iq edS isui^ ^t. aolit&ollqqB aSt 1o 

h&ossbo^q r-f)'; onsgiXsM lo Sob oi.'tto&qa @sii d-firiw xLi&luotiiaq 

&sfb bod issc^ \;Ii: iJ8nJul)io iJuow riotriw eiflo si d'naliiooB 9di isdi 

*«J8d ston ^Y^IX elnxjl. axKjioD ^■^ .bs^oXqaift nestf 91BO 

n.t e/jnT ^vlLaT-^'Hf^, s.+op(,cfo lo snlllst »rl;t o;}- bslXaqs neacT 

.a;i-s , -, ..■ .V •.■■.:..■■_.. „.. iq^o wobniw uoil-ctafio a lo gnillsT- sri^t ocf 

,qju. ,, ,.. > , «- ■- ' saoS, g^Yfiai^ 8i6aB..--"L .v -\^oj;qS: ai jfiynaa lo Xijeq s lo 

'iPfti-^r- •' ^o sfoocf 'Slid- lo sxilXl£l Qdi oS feslXqqs asw iX ^^^^h «A dSX 

, . ^. ^.. ...: .xiaaW OM ,,, g;;|^fi;ta , g Ho;t" t oH iw SxeQ ,v dio^ al {EUi&isqqB 

>,:i 'luomik nl \BbBdp. wobnlw s lo 'i^lioi sd* oi b^tlqqs tarn Si ^■^^'£ 

Siivi ii ^i^l .111 SOS b&mirils) S^-J^ ,qqA .XXI (^^ ^e^a^o^loO 

fyHQ .T'r /^ h, j^r ■. pjoil ienisQ Y^qffls as lo sKlXXel ed& oi belXqqs 

v^-^^ . . .., , ^>V£ .bV .vj 0^ ^,,Qr),e»i)j^tg af>leievlfl .v aeaol al 

lobmi aalMiJjcf i; soil b'lsod & lo gnllXiSl exij ocT fielXqqB asw ;tl 

lo xioicfeolXqq.' '" - "-^r>Hsi2nl iBdSo eaoismi^A .aotioin^tBaoo 

.r'"' •'d'Ofi ^.. -.1. .l.\i/i, gj/qioO ^-^ ai beSto 'sir ealiioob kHA 

lui-vt'ti -••• -c-^xii ^&©lXqqfi ^XXfiisiies ©Xin: sil^ ^efcn" 

. ii;. crt»d-sfi SC-tnl&^isq xltooilh eaorlJ- mo-rl ©biej ^eaoW 


happening of the accident or injury as such, which are recognized 
as essential to make the doctrine applicable in a given case and 
to lay the foundation for the presumption arising therefrom. Thus, 
in addition to the proof of an injury sustained twider circumstances 
of such an unusual nature as to imply a breach of duty on the part 
of the party charged, as required by the statements of the rule, 
the negligence upon which the action is based laust be so alleged 
as not to preclude reliance on the doctrine because of the rules 
of pleadings and proof prevailing in the particular jurisdiction, 
Furtheriaore, the application of the doctrine is predicated upon 
the superior knowledge of defendant as to the cause cf the injury 
under the particular circumstances involved and the failure on the 
part of defendant to explain, and in this connection it may be 
noted that the applicability or operation of the doctrine is 
sometimes terminated by the presence or availability of direct 
evidence upon the issue. 

The reason or theory of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is based in part upon the consideration that, as the management 
and control of the agency which produced the injury is, under 
the circumstances to ?/hich the doctrine applies, exclusively 
vested la defendant, plaintiff is not in a position to show the 
particular circumstances which caused the offending instrumentality 
to operate to his injury, while defendant, being more favorably 
situated, possesses the superior knowledge or means of Information 
as to the cause of the accident and should, therefore, be required 
to produce the evidence in explanation. 4? Corpus Juris 1204, 
1205. The doctrine, although it provides a substitute for direct 
proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable to point out the 
specific act of negligence which caused his injury, is a rule 
of necessity to be invoked only wheh, under the circumstances 
Involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. 

£)»si«3O0&7 '^1" rfoiiiw ^^foja'a qb x-u/tni to Sn&blo&B Bjd^ *^o gxilnsqefsx. 

Bessi^umJSTit^ T»fefMf fe©nxsd-sxfe ''cgjjt'Ol: cib lo loo'i-( arid' oa noXilbbs at 

ifiB^ mi& no x^iisb 'io lissstiii jb ylqiffl o>t ais 9ijj^«n liBX/eiaur fus rioxia lo 

^©Ii/'x ©iid' lo s^n©c!'5vJi£d-r:! edJ- ^^^ bftilups'S er^ ^fossTsdo xii«q add" lo 

a®Iiin »ri;f lo «?j5j»BS©cf oiiti:^itob sua'? ho ©©nslIsT ofeirlosiq oS ;ton as 
.xiolj»lfcsliu{; is-Cj3foJt^-£Xi(j 0d:i nl §aiIlfiV9^q looicj 6a« esiiibsolq lo 

"^nJ n;.j •■-nirij r': -k bevXcvjEnl &eoa£ nBXfi'o±;tT[fiq arid" iftAoir 

ftcf^n. -r, c- utdS al bn» ^aJtsXqxs oi criiB5n«l«b lo iiBa 

■,.L :...:-- ^.. -„ .. aoW.e.Ti^QO 'lo -^j.TlXltfsolXqqB edS i&d:} h»!toa 

d-OQii?) 'to '^;tJ:ri«' i">"-*v^-. -to ©aaeaS'niT sjdct "^cf bB:f nalmis:} 8«Bld'«H08 

«dj7s&t srtd" noqxf eoaeblvs 

;Jjsosfcas«A© j?fi^ .: ^. «tijf n<9id-3i«l>i«isot) add- iio<[J3 i^xsq nl Jbeescf el 

T«» ^ai TjijJtxil add" bnavboiq doiriv -ijsjtfjas ftrid" to looJ-aoo, fcrta 

vJ[9^^£«X36c« ^«Mqf.s arti*tc'oofc e^t ii»±xlw o^ s-aon.'s^&fTjtrsilo.arid 

?-fiJ worfa ibd" fl»Wlftoq tt &i don Ex tllcffixBlq ^cJnafciislsrfe al &©*8»v 

■^dlI«;tiisisRTnd^€n± 3xx±i>n9llo &dS fesajSTBO risMir asansd'CiBUcnlo ifiXxjsld-rsq 

XX^iovfil *ioai §iilfe*J ^d-nfifeaslob ©XIxItst ^-^li^itl eXd ©^f •^bts<|o o? 

floid-fimrroljKi lo siijSQSi to »sf>©Ifiro£Di loi^imni Bdt aoeaseeoq ,6©;}'ai;;fl2 

fe©-Etwp«T: ecT ^9iol'»rtef{J ^fc*jjoria fjrts ^itebios* ^di lo ©8i;jbo sxLJ o;^ bs 

,*OSI el-iia eirqnoo ^* ,ttol;fanjBXqxe ni ^ojfstilve ©fCd soflfioiq oi 

d'SPiib ^ol ediJo*i:.TBefi;8 & gebivotq iJt rigiiorijXw ^anlidoofi sd-T ,?02X 

aii;t :^J:/o cfrttcq o<t 9Xcfius» Rl lli-i^aliiXq 9T:srfw »onssJ:X8eis lo loo^c 

©Xin s «i ^-^ijcrtni aM bssuso rfolriw ©onPsiXsun 1© *ofi cilioeqe 

««ikHs^8«r«)'iX3 «ri:t ishcor ^xJsfJw -^Xao be^ovrtl «rf o;f ^iaesoen lo 

^elcfuXlE-v* ifXlfes^i d-oii bttB iit»a«2f« a± »oe»bl-v« d-oe'iXi) ^I)9vXovn.' 


and accordingly it has been held that the rule not only does 
not relieve plaintiff froa adducing any evidence within his 
power but that, unless plaintiff has presented all the testimony 
reasonably within his power, he can derive no benefit from the 
doctrine. The decisions are generally in accord in holding that 
in order for the doctrine to apply it must appear that the injured 
person was in a place where he had a right to be, and the liability 
of defendant must be predicated upon the breach of a legal duty 
to use care. 

The presumption or inference of negligence arising by 
virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not conclusive of 
the question, but may be overcome by any appropriate evidence, 
and where the circumstances of the particular case are such that 
the doctrine is applicable, it operates to establish a prima facie 
case for plaintiff which, if unexplained, carries the question of 
negligence to the Jury as sufficient to warrant a finding of neg*. 
ligence and support a recovery based thereon. The general rxile, 
broadly stated, is that where plaintiff has established a presump- 
tive or prima facie case of negligence by virtue of the doctrine, 
it is then incumbent upon defendant, if he wishes to avoid the 
effect of the doctrine, to introduce evidence to explain, rebut 
or otherwise overcome the presumption or inference that the injury 
complained of was due to negligence on his part, and in cases where 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applied the burden of proof is 
not thereby shifted, but continues with the party maintaining the 
affirmative of the issue, although the adverse party may be 
required to produce proof to rebut the presumption of negligence. 
Ferrier v. Chicago Rvs. Co.. 185 HI. App. 326; Everett v. Foley. 
132 111. App, 438. 

The evidence in the case at bar affords no explanation of 
the cause for the falling of glass from the swinging door on 
defendants' premises on plaintiff's person. His testimony. 

890b y,l£io Son bIvh sii& ii5il •'escf antl it -^IsrLtbrtoooa boB 

eM filiid-iw 9oael)ivo xns i^alofjbiiA moil lllial&Lq eTslisi ioa 

^ifJ- soil ailiir iiob flso ©fl ^i9»yoq sill islrlilw ^Icfaiioaes^ 

iadS :i&lblQiL at bioij^& £il -^IliJiensg 9i& aaolztoeb »riT .sxiliJoo)!) 

£>s'uj^al arid" S&iii ^iseqqs jsxfffi it Y-Iqqs o;t snirt^oofo ©rfJ' io1 lebzo at 

Xitltd&tL arfct ba^ , Bi:'^ j3 ^J?rl sd ©leilw eoslq b fli esw noaieq 

^cf aniai'iii ronsgllasn lo ©onsislnl 10 noij-qmraa'xq 9X(T 

^o sviajjionoo d-on 8l ^grd-lupol JBsq.1 sei lo eatnioob crLt lo sjjcJ-iIt 

^eoni-feivs eJsliqoiqqs >saj3 "^cf »inooi©vo scf x*" ^^cf ,noi;te9i;p silJ- 

iBti:^ doi;8 ois easo isIx;oJtdifiq eriJ^ lo 39ons,ta0!0ot[lo sriJ »iQfiw baa 

Blas'i BflUiq B riailcffi^tas oi zeiBiBqo it ^9l6&otLqq& £l ealiioob odt 

lo nolcf29iJp sffci: aftliicfi© ^bQoXBlqx^oB It ^dotdff lll^nlfilq ^ol »eso 

•*39fl lo snJtbnil s cfajBiisw o:f d-jHslolllue es X'^^l 9iii oi sonsjllgen 

^oli/'i lisienss 9iIT .not^iGilct bsaftd xisvooei b dfrioqqjtje bnB eonssll 

"qi5iJJE®iq J8 5©riaJ:Icrs;tE© SBci lll;tnlali oiarfw isdi al ^&e;t6;)-8 x-tJbsoicf 

^suiici'Dob ariit lo ejucfiiv ^^d eonssxlgen lo ae£-o ntsgl ^^iq 10 svl^ 

Slid" biovjb od 8??iie ;■; ^ i&bne'ieb noqv Saetisaiorit addi ax it 

Sss^&i ^jalBlqxs o5 soiisfelv© eoirbo-id^fii 0+ ^sfil1:^oo5 ©licf lo d'OsH© 

•^ro/tnl sxiJ- jjEu-fcf »on»i©lfli ^o nol^^qameenq ©il:t ©biooisvo ©alwietWo T» 

sisifw S6>SB0 ni bn& ^JiBq airi no eonpslls nb bjsw lo bealslqatoo 

a J: looiq lo ii9£»ij ->nj:i^oo£i lyj-jupol ^bqI sei 9il:^ 

oxi;^ gninlBd-fllijci ^cJ-ieq on. .aunld-Hv ^BsdHlile xcf®i®rf* ^oix 

9Cf Xfiw ^J^'iBq saiovLfi '?iii ti^vodJlr, ^sweei: »tii lo »vlJ-j3iiri±ll« 

.eoxiealXaen lo jataiiqautia^tq ©/f+ ^j^d^ oocq aoiffcoiq od" bsilapst 

^I^IpX.^Y Ms. l^,Yg id- ... , , ,..,.. .SY.S 0^,4? ^0 .V loii^ a*? 

.8e* ,qqA .III S£I 
lb© jiol;^KnsIqx9 on cbiolla '. aiso s£ii at sapsMvs ©ifT 

.jl ^at^aiyfQ Qdi lao I3 lo ^ntllBl 9tli tcol eauBO 9di 


and indeed the only testimony of record, is to the effect that 
when he walked into the entrance and opened the door "the only 
thing I know was the breaking glass was falling all aroimd me 
and then blood was streaming from my nose," As heretofore 
indicated, plaintiff said several times that he did not bxmp 
into the door or have any contact with it before the accident. 
Defendants of fered no explanation to rebut the presiMption of 
negligence established by the evidence. Since it is conceded 
that defendants were responsible for the maintenance and repair 
of the premises and that plaintiff had the right to enter the 
restaurant as a patron, with the consequent duty on defendants 
to keep the door in a safe condition and prevent injury to those 
entering the premises, the evidence adduced by plaintiff was suffi- 
cient, under the allegations of the complaint, to raise the pre- 
sumption of negligence and require some explanation on the part 
of defendants, if such could be adduced by competent proof, to 
rebut or overcome this presumption. Under the cij^cumstances it 
was a question for the jury, under proper instructions of the court, 
to determine whether defendants were liable, and consequently we 
think it was error for the court to take the case away from the 
jury and direct a verdict. 

Since the cause will in all probability be retried, we 
comment briefly on two other grounds urged for reversal. Immediately 
preceding the beginning of the trial plaintiff asked leave to amend 
his complaint by specifically pleading section 69-29 of the feiunicipal 
Code, which provides that "Swinging doors shall have floor stops or 
other devices to prevent such doors from swinging through an ace ©f 
more than ninety degrees." Although, under chap, 110, sec, I70, 
111, Rev. Statutes, 1941, courts should be liberal in allowing 
amendments, especially before trial, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that plaintiff was injured by reason of 
defendants' failure to observe the provisions of the code 

tsdf d"0©11e 9d' ^biQO&i to xaomlizc:} Xino BdS beBb&t fins 

Xlsao &di** Toofe eHi bBa^qo bn& soiJx;id^i» 9di oinl beilsw ©il nsriw 

as ibftfK)ir. lie gjctllls' ^Ig sm-J:^®«^<^ ©jfl^' 3bw woitit I snirU 

Bioled-ol^i?' .300 x^^' motJ. '^iM&B1i^ e^w booXtf nsild- Ms 

qsxsS ion bib sri d-sri:? RsmtJ iBte^rms bl&s lllixxlslq ^bs;^ solonl 

lo aoiiqauja.«i^q s^iild Sss(i&t oi £ioiiim&lqx9 on fjsnsllo EJ-nEfinslaQ 

5»l>eS'ii - (tic .eoa©6iv© sfLt x*'" b^tiBlXd&t^f^ donaallasn 

ilags'i -QfiJi ?>0i3.£a&d"nlBCT ao'd 'lol sltflaaoqa&'i ©isw B-itaisfenslsb iadi 

g^flfifefts^eb fid "^j-jc^f) .d"it9i;p«*efioo arid" jdiftw ^atoid'ijq 4 as ;tiiBnjjA^E»'i 

^ /ilBlqaoo ©ifj- 'lo siioi;t«|i8lI« &/£J r^bmi ^iaeto 
'lotimiBXqxh bbsob &4lap&'t bak »oxie3lIs»£i lo jsoliqiouE 

.;to±6ne»v a d-o©^±l> boB xinl 

®w ,J&©it;t©t SflEf T^Mlcfsiffoiq lis i^t II±w ©auBO axli 9oni3 

baeam oi n-iBsl f>9^3s 1:1:i;tn,t«Iq lBit& ^Ai lo snlnnlgscf <»xf;^ T^itiBsroeiq 

[sqioifluarM ©xJcf lo ^^-1^ na.t#«J«8 ^gatb&elq t-£X£aillof»qs x<J ^nJtsIqffloo aJtxI 

'lo y^icta -sc^oXl »v.«£i Ilaris 8»xooif> anutgnirffg" cfisrl^t esblvoiq iloiriw ^sfioO 

lo og[i3 xta fisiwiffd :5£rt^J:w8 moit aioob jtfoira drreveiq oi ssoiveb isdio 

^0\i: *08S ^011 ,q^o isirfeijjsf ^risifO£l;tIA ".es'srtsfr'fc -^tsnia nodi ^noar 

gnin^/oXIo fix IjKigcJi:! ocT Mimrie ejixroo ^I^^X ^iB^cie:^^ ,vsfT ,1X1 

8fUt n.^ -'nirftor: si ':''i?'r'j ,Xc2:J- ':•:o'>■c^d vXXaloeqes^ ^Bi-f^ni&iT^fflfi 

with respect to swinging doors, and therefore the allowance of 
the amendment would not have aided plaintiff's case. 

The principal other ground urged for reversal is that 
the court denied a motion for change of venue. This motion 
was presented after the case was called for trial and after 
numerous continuances had been granted. The cause had been 
pending for many months and plaintiff's motion was not made in 
apt time. The trial judge was within his rights in denying 
the motion, 

For the reasons indicated the judgment of the Superior 

court is reversed and the cause remanded for retrial, 


Sullivan, P. J,, and Scanlan, J,, concur,, 

lo sonswolls Slid- ©lole^sric? hnz ^arsoob gxilgnlwe ocJ- d'osqaei Attw 

,ss.eo s^m^tnlfilq fesfclB svfiii cton fclcow d-nsfltbrisffls 9x1^ 

Jsdd- £i: iBaievQ^i i©^ fcsgrru fcrai/ois i^dio iRqrsaliq ©rfT 

aolioffit aMi .sL-nsv lo agnsjio toI noicloai s bsliasf) iissoo «ri;f 

19^*15 feufl iBJtfid- Tol fewIlBo SBW 92B0 orfd" le^lB Jbed'iisasiq saw 

xjl €>bmi &on zbw solcJ^oia e ' llWfiljBlq bas sxfcffioai '^hbot lol snifcnsq 

ioiisqir8 srij- lo inem^bvl ©rid- fcad-soxbrix aaoesei erfcf io'5 


^tij-cooo ^,X ^iijslasoe bus ^.L ."i ^iiBvlIlJLr8 


ARMIN P, HILLMm, as representative 
of all Creditors of Cliicago Bank of 


31QI.A. 44 

1 f 






Plaintiff prosecuted a direct appeal to the Supreme court 
of Illinois from an order of the Superior court of Cook county 
entered October 22, 1940 discharging Harley L, Clarke, a stock- 
holder of the Chicago Bank of Commerce, from liability under a 
decree in the amount of $276,621,44, upon payment of $5,000, 
and also from an order of January l6, 1941 directing J» A, Whalen, 
receiver, to accept the settlement sum in cash tendered by Clarke 
under the order of October 22, I940 and to issue forthwith a sat- 
isfaction piece. The appeal, argued under four separate points 
set forth in plaintiff's brief, challenged the constitutionality 
of the provision of the Banking Act (sec. 11, ch, 16-I/2, 111, 
Rev, Stat. 1939) authorizing the discharge of insolvent stock- 
holders, and involved a construction of sec, 6 of Article XI of 
the Illinois constitution. Pending the determination of the 
cause in the Supreme court Clarke moved to dismiss the appeal, 
Th© court took the motion with the cause, and subsequently in an 
opinion filed November 18, 1941 held that it has no Jurisdiction 
to review a case by direct appeal on the ground that a constitu?- 
tional question is involved unless the record showed affirmatively 
that the question was presented in some form or other and passed 
on by the trial court, and the ruling thereon must be one of the 
things relied upon for reversal of the judgment. The court was 

^ h h 


( lo altisS ossoliiC; lo BioilboiO 11& lo 

( .fiXHAJO .a Y^JHAH 

' ' ^,"X)s cfs ax)'?^-;'^''""* '^■■"^''^^ rir^^nr^O 

^Tiiuoo saif.'?o wormt) SHiaaHaYiJ^a aasM:'? sqitsii^..:. 

X-iiWoi .0 iisjoo iol%&qssii aiJJ- 1:0 %^bio ti& esoit elonllll to 

B i&bau x^tlld&l. , ^0O5©amoO Iq aiaaS og^oJirlO eild- 'to isblori 

^n©Isi: . ^ J:;to®g;if) I-^<?I ^^X Y'^swnst 'lo isibio xxfi aoal oels baa 

iijilO 'Vicf £)sif?i)a©d' da&o ax . .i^insli-j-sa arid- i-qsot)r» o:t- ^isviso©*! 

-J ;:. .■: l-JIwA^ioI sceei od' fens 0^1 ^SS istfo^toO lo lefcio snj- isbtw 

X^fllsaoiiaixSzaoo Qdi bei^iellariv ^Islid a ' llivtnijslq fli riJ-iol cfea 

-ifaocl-a iaeyfloaal lo sai^axfoeif) erid- 3«is±ioii;fijjB (^£^1 .c^ik^S •V9fi 
lo IX sXoWnA lo o .ose lo [iolif>viSaaotj & £)»vXovnl Mb ^eiobXoiI 

♦Xii©qq8 9d^ asiatElfc od- Ijsvocr e^fi^O d-^i/oo siHSiqi/B exid" ni eax/so 
mi ax. YjJnoup9&dsjB bn& ^sf^ti&o erii xid-iw xsoiJ-oxg aild^ iilood^ cfiuoo 9XfT 
aoiiolbalivl oa Qsd ii j&dS bl&il X^^X ,SX is^cfasvoM fcsXll noiaiqo 
-irJlcraii©^ « ^firid" feiufots 9ifi«:5' no Xfioqqa d^o«>T[i:b xd 'afio * wajtvsi oJ 
^XevidBffifii'3:ljB feewoils feiooe^ ©rid easXiu:; hsvXovnl ei xiold^eeup iBrrold' 
oeeaaq teis isrid^o lo jjiiol aiaoa at. Bs^frtsaniq 8Jiw fsoX.tgsxrp arid" dadd" 
«d;t lo 9«o ecf jsim noeiorid- auiX^i srid- iwiB ^dotfoo Xsli;t sri:t Ti:cf no 
aim J'ljjos ©iIT ,v«^iagl)/jt »ri^ lo l,sei»v9*x lol aoqi; fc-siXsT s^tttriJ- 

of the opinion that Clarke should have moved for transfer of the 
cause to the Appellate court and not for a dismissal of the appeal; 
therefore, the motion for dismissal was denied and the cause was 
transferred to this court, Hillmer v* Chic ago Bank of Cogaaercef 
378 111^ 449, 

The only questions argued and the only points presented 
in plaintiff's brief involve the constitutionality of the provi- 
sion of the Banking Act authorizing the discharge of Insolvent 
stockholders anS. a construction of sec* 6 of article XI of the 
Illinois constitution. These questions having been resolved 
adversely to plaintiff, there resiains nothing for us to determine. 
Plaintiff evidently realized the position in which the opinion of 
the Supreme court left him, for on petition for rehearing, which 
was denied by the Supreme court, he m&de the following statement 
(p* 3» petition for rehearing): *^y transferring this case to 
the Appellate Court this court is in effect holding that there 
are no constitutional questions in the case, since the Appellate 
Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon such questions. The decision 
of the court amounts to an adverse holding on the constitutional 
questions raised by appellants," 

Clarke's insolvency was the only issue of fact alleged in 
his petition, and this was conceded by plaintiff. Ho complaint 
being laade as to the reasonableness of the result reached or the 
expediency of the policy adopted by the trial court, the orders 
appealed from should be affirmed, and it is so ordered, 

Sullivan, P. J,, and Scanlan, J., concur « 

^j^ lo nelBissi:} lot b&vots. @VBf! kluods e^ialO tmU mslatqo 9dS to 
tlB©qqc ©ifc? Jo iB&tiM^tb a wl toil |^£ Jiaoo «;tsXXc^qA ejl* o.+ oexfuo 

j,.f>eif?a«oO ,1-0 gffti^.g oj>jsGif('J.MV^'3.!mlW. Jvjoo elrf^J o;t f)«'n©lanai^ 

,^^ .III 8\£ 

c^afivXoeni to 98"aja*i©8ll3 add" ^nliSiiioiiia& it>A sfiiiUuiS sdi lo aol& 

©itt to n ©XaiJTs 1© h .»»« lo coX;Joir£:feiioo a Mb iBi»bXoiiit)o;ft 

l^a^Xoaei a^ecf sulvjari enoWSj^jup eeaifT »xK)Wj3^i:r8flOD sloallXI 

1:0 mbtlqo ^»AS ilolifti^ ai axtlit&o^ Sil* 6eslX«»'i -^X^^n&fcJtv* 51WiX±Bi*l 

. Ldt sAlm©l&a«^ -^S" !(Sfil«ifi«i!(»i •tot isoi^lcJ-eg ^£ .q) 

&10X- . aii^l>XofI J'i>eTtfe Gl 81 f'mot) aXxlJ 3-^»ot> »;tfiXX»q<iA tdi 

»JsXX©J?<iA »jcf^ ©OfliE 4S>3ie3 sjrfi al aiiolJ'Bewp Ij3i«>i;tir^iJ8i30& dtt arts 

«olalo©fe ©xfT »8a6ltJie*?p riofra MoqjGr ae«j o^ noJE^siteiiayt o« Kari iruod 

, a:?rt.sXX0(iqfl t«f feo«X«^ fiua»l;t8«ifp 

(^fjjfe&lgis© • , .„_.,.., vd M'&eiDBOo 8i5w eiatf fea» \m>14li9q eld 

Silt 10 '. rr«^'; :ur.i to i{a©nfl>Id«aiDO»«»i »ifc? o:t es 9fc«t aoSscf 

eT'?^' . ^.. ■,.:.. ^.. i...... i.;t ^tf b$cfqo5ft "tftiXotf aiil;t lo ^dnelbsqxe 

^fes-n^feio 08 el ;?! ibiie, ,_* 'ft^-^ "v^ etf fcJLooxlE moil toXAoqqa 


ReceiTer of Rid genay State Bank ©f 
Chicago, a corporation, ( B» H* 
Molner, Assignee]|, 





eorporation^(^, H, Joiner, Assl«iee), ) 

y AppelleeX ) 



\|316I.A. 446 

Appellant, ) \ 


Koveaber 7, 1930 the Ridgeway State Bank of Chicago had 
judgment against W. D, Martin for $3,250 and costs, predicated 
upon a collateral promissory note dated August 21, 1930 and due 
October 10, I930 for $3,000, evidencing a loan in that sum to 
defendant by the bank. After the entry of Jud^aent execution 
issued, but service thereof was never had upon defendant. Subse- 
quently Charles H, Albers was appointed receiver of the bank, and 
September 11, 1940 he filed an affidavit for scire facias to 
revive the Judgment, alleging that after the allowance of all 
credits and set-offs there remained due and unpaid on said jiidg- 
ment the principal sum of $2,298,74 with interest at 5 per cent 
from November 7, I930, The writ of scire facias issued and sifflmons 
was personally served on ilartin by the sheriff of Cook county to 
appear before the court in October 1940 to show cause why judgment 
should not be entered against him and execution issued thereon* 
Thereafter, October 11, 1940, Judgment was entered under XhB writ 
of scire facias for the stated amount of $2,988,74 and execution 
issued thereon. November 8, 1940 Martin filed his written motion 
and petition for vacation of the scire facias Judgment and for 


( 1- ■ ;H 

■■■■-■ ^ / ■ 

( /•▼ 

i * X %j X 1„- '■ 

asosaera i^& I'-^swaii ^^i^^^^^i g^^qt.Xge to ft: *0£^X ^^ T:6<teevoH uoteI 

^Iftf »i6l* rss&rur fc©«r»^a© saw ^taenQfeiJt tO^^I til ^©rfo;toO ,T©criasrt©ilT 

i!S0l;J]:j9»x» baa ^^,06?^S$ lo JiuroauB fe»:^j»:ts eitt lol: Bfiloal giloa to 

aoVtos: nztiliw siri JbeXlt fll;^*DBi8C OA^X ,8 Tsdte&voi? ,iR>»7ftdd^ &«imtl 

io. «.. ^a®ji^fci/t aaitogl 9Xto€ 9di lo hoWbobv lol flOl;tl:t»<i bam 


leave to appear and defend. June 6, 1941 he had leave to file an 
amended and supplemental motion and petition to vacate both the 
original judgment entered November 7, 1930 and the scire facias 
Judgment of October 11, 1940, B, H, Molner, who became the assignee 
of Charles H, Albers, receiver, answered Martin's amended and supple- 
mental motion and petition, and October 3 of that year, pursuant to 
hearing, the court entered an order denying Martin's motion and 
petition in both actions, from ?diich this appeal is taken. 

It is urged by Martin's counsel that the order reviving the 
judgment was entered thirteen days after the service of the writ 
of scire facias , notwithstanding the provision of the statute giving 
a defendant twenty days within which to plead after service ©f 
summons (111, iiev, Stat, 1939, ch, 110, par. 259»8), and that coi>- 
sequantly the court lacked Jurisdiction of the person of defendant, 
rendering the judgment void. It appears of record, however, that 
defendant appeared generally in the proceeding and participated 
fully in the arguments before the court* In these circumstances 
he waived any irregularities in service of process under the con- 
sistent holding of the authorities in this state. In Brown v- 
Van Keuren y 340 111, 118, it ?/as held that "Whei'e a defendant is 
in court and attempts to make a defense which can only be sustained 
by an exercise of jurisdiction the appearance is general, whether 
it is in terms limited to a special purpose or not* [Citing 
cases*]" In United States Brewing Co^ v, Bdqj. 247 HI* App, 315, 
judgment was entered by confession September 9, I918, and execution 
was issued but never served, August 15, 1925 a writ of scire facias 
was issued to revive the judgment, and September 8 of that year a 
writ was returned bearing the indorsement of the sheriff that the 
defendant was not found. September 10, 1925 the court entered an 
ordeir reciting that the defendant had been served with the writ 
\ It was ordered that the judgment be revived and an execution 
ue thereon. In March I926 defendant appeared and moved to 

sdj ;I:.-./d ,..;.'.■■ ;v o:; floJ:d'i::taii rcjs uoxjoia li^^taeaeltfciiirE Bns befcnafiB 
&&M^. 2M2^ s^i^ ^^^^' Oc?I <i^ ♦tedtesvoH fi«T«#ae ^ir««s8bi/l. l£ici:$iio 

'Blqqsm ba& bQba&ms s'xsIJitiaM Jbsiswaxi-; ^'xevlooaa natocr,." ." asIiadO to 

t ■ . ■ V" 

Sfiirvla sd^i^Bia siiJ- lo noielvoiq ©rid" SnibiXs^faiid^Jcwc^on .. ajBlost siloe lo 

lo salvoes Tscj-ls feiS&Xq oJ- rioiriw nJLritfiw 31{«I) ■^;J'jasw;;^ J-ns£i£i©l»Jb a 

-fioo ^jBidir lyp ^(f.^^S . ^ ,do ^^i^£ ^Ss^S, .ysH ,111) 8flo:iirj0a 

fiod'BqieJ u£)090oic[ 90^ Hi %lle>'SBae^ bt3is®qq^^ ia&baaX'^b 

-xij'j ':/ .1 lo soxvisis £ix sei^irtslwae^t^t ^b. IwyIaw ad 

a± iOL&ba' "^ieriW** ;t#£Cif fcX*fi asw . : 0-Ik£. ^. r'iSi 

beaj:Bi^ti.. ..j .ciiso rioiLrfw ©anslpL s &:i£A o^ ajqfii9;f;ta f)Uii sijjoo al 

„ ■ ■ - -■A'-" ■ 

x;Lt iC] ,d^oa 10 9aoq^=q Isi^sqa 4 «»J feecfliaXX saisJ al aX d^l 
ii^«0'3X9 ta.£ |.8X^X <^ locfatectq-o'S xioXaeslnoo x«f ^»i©d-fl« eaw ;Jn©£isf)jJt 

£t« £)«i,atn:s^"X|»o Mi;f <iS^X ^.OX I9dic9:tq&3 ,b&iJQl ioe. bsw viiiil>a?le5 
;tXiw axl3 xttXw l>*Tifl>« a9©ci feiui ;tii£;6asl9f> sil;^ SsaU jixXd-XosT leJbtio 
xtoXJ'jBoax© fl* ^4is bB'vXyn's. sif ^a^fltafcwt ®^* ^^fd^ fe©Tsfeio e«w and 

vacate the original judgment, submitting his sworn petition in 
support thereof. That motion was denied, Subsequently in May 
1927 defendant filed his motion and supporting affidavit, 
the court to set aside the order of September 10, 1925 reviving 
the Judgment, which motion was continued to May 14, 1927» On that 
date defendant filed a special and limited appearance by his 
attorney, and hearing on the motion was continued to June 4, wh^?n 
the court vacated the order of revival. Plaintiff in that case 
contended that although defendant was not served with process to 
the scire facias^ nevertheless, by his subsequent conduct in moving 
to vacate the original judgment and by filing his schedules to the 
executions issued on the revived judgment, he acquiesced therein*, 
The Appellate Court adopted this view, and in reversing the order 
©f June 4, 1927 held that if a party appears to a cause for any 
purpose wiiatsoever, except only to object to the process OP ser-» 
Tics^ he waives all objections thereto, although there may have 
been no service, citing Dunning v. Dunning,. 37 111, 3O6, The court 
said that the question before it was not concerned with the original 
judgment but with the order of revival under the writ of scire 
facias; that the requirements for service of the writ are "some- 
what indefinite in many jurisdictions^" that its professed object 
is to give warning or notice to the person to be charged thereby 
and that the "only defenses which can be set up in the scire facias 
proceeding are that no judgment was rendered, or, if one was render- 
ed, it has been satisfied or discharged;" that "These considerations 
lead us to the conclusion that the requirements for obtaining juris- 
diction of the defendant upon a scire facias to revive a judgment 
are not necessarily as strict as those required when the original 
judgment is obtained, and that ■•■*•' defendant, in such a proceeding, 
may submit himself to jurisdic jr less definite conduct than 
in the case of an original prf ig, and that any conduct on his 

sii 0oidi;te<j niowe sJUi 'gali:^£m.dus ^ineBmbal Lsal'gliQ &dJ »;*j80bv 

Saivl^f's. cS^I ^,01 i&cfEi^;tqd£ 1© is bio sdS ©fclas iee od- ^ijjoo 9tii 

ahi x^i sonsii5©qqB fiej-iioll baB Islb^qz b belli iaBbaet^b 9ia^ 

Vll:tnlBl*-x .XjsvIv -fcio srio bsi bo&v SrmooBtii 

ocJ- KS9ooi'(j rfcflw fss'^isa ion e^w .tnaMslob dgxrerijla ^Bxff bsbaeSaoo 

♦cUsitsxld" l>e©a®iJjpOG sri ^Sneaigbvl l>svivfti arid- jxo b9U&Zi zaoliaoexQ 

I'^biQ eriij- g023*r*v»i al brn& ,w9lv aMd- fce^qobs ct'aaroO ©cfallogqA »i!Jr 

Xns lot &e£ffe; -,^i3eqqj& Y^tsq c Ttl c^aad" bisrf S^^l t-^ «>«J^*X' to 

«102 TO easoo-iq sd.:^ o^ J-os^tfo Qi -^Ino ^qeoxs tisvsoaisjiw SEoqiuq 

ntiai X01& &i»si:i £[aworfjIjB ^oj9Ted:^ stiotf^ldo Lie a»\rtsw sxf ^soiv 

Simt> sffT ,dO£ ,ill V£ ^atiimiiyCi ,v aaXcmyg Siil.tx& ^Voivise oa n?9<f 

•-^i: . .'.'iW- ^mB'' to ®©lvift8 lot ad'n^as'iii/pcfE »d^ ^m; :V^ 

■. ;, ";9B8^toiq a;fJt J-bjcIJ- ''*anGj:croJ:baiii;t ^mi at ajfinltsfffii -. 

■«rdsigiiit bosiJSflo otf od aoeidq ©tld" o;t eoLton 10 sainisw ev±3 o:t at 

faJtSiat g-iJioa ©ric? al qc i^ee s<f asi> rioldwBsanstob -^luo" ^do ^sd:} baa 

-iftbfiei 8.SW eno 11 ^1o ^fssisfcaet 8.sw cffiaatsbnt om cfsff* ^ts gjaJtLssoo^q 

a«ol;t£ie61gifOo easxiT" i-B£i.t "{fesgnarioalfc lo feeitalcfsa n»©cf a&ri :tl ,be 

Jn^ffisfcut s sfvivst oj- a-islofet »3tloa jb uoqu cfcsMet-ab aifd- 1:o noJt;tolb 

I;iinislao ©rij H©iiw bBilijpfii. »aodi s* ^^oliJg as -^Itieaasosc ioa Bt& 

. "iUb'SSGortq « ficx/e ni ^:ffii.f^lsjb^-^-^:t .ts/£;t brt« .beat&ido aJt cfxiecabift 

part which indicates submission of himself to the court will be 
construed to waive any defect or failure in the service of pro- 
cess," In the light of these decisions expressing the .vule gener- 
ally adhered to, we are of opinion that defendant by his general 
appearance submitted himself to the Jurisdiction of the court and 
thereby waived any statutory irregularities. 

The only other question involved is whether the court proper- 
ly denied Martin's amended and supplemental petition of June 2$, 
1941, The courts of this state have consistently held that a motion 
to vacate a Judgment is addressed to the sound legal discretion of 
the court, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of such 
discretion, the order of the court will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Village of LaGrange Pa rk v. Hess* 332 111, 236. By his amended and 
supplemental petition Martin sought to show that the collateral for 
the $3,000 note, upon which the original and revived judgments were 
predicated, was converted by the Ridgeway State Bank to its own use, 
and was of sufficiont value to extinguish the $3>0C0 indebtedness; 
and it was alleged that the obligors on the collateral had paid more 
than $3iOOO on their respective indebtedness, 

Molner's verified answer denied these allegations, explained 
the transactions with respect to each item of the collateral in 
detail, and positively averred that no moneys whatever came into 
possession of the bank, Charles H, Albers, receiver, or plaintiff 
as assignee, A careful reading of the answer discloses that every 
contention presented by Martin in his amended and supplemental peti- 
tion was fully covered. The court evidently weighed the facts 
presented by these pleadings, and we think it was justified in con- 
cluding upon the whole record that defendant's motion should be 

The order of revival of judgment is accordingly affirmed^ 

Sullivan, P, J,, and Scanlan, J», concur.^ 

bsm b€>bmm& nM x^ ,^£S ,111 £££ ,.eeell .v 3ii &-^ gsj^T ^iy 1;Q "^^-'^-^-^'■' 

Yllin:, ,"S©vi:ss^>i ^aicsdXA .1! eeXiadO ,3iflfid ado I.0 nolEaeeeoq 

-iJ^'C! XB:trtrnslTqi/E bfis bBha<»m& aJui ni ai:Ji«M t^ beiaesBiq noWnecfnoo 

-rt03 ni: 6©lllf:JRut s«w j1 aliilxlcf ©w bfls ^asaii>«©Iq eeeri:}' x<^ Jbe^xiaaeiq 
scf 6J[jb'o£{a aoUom s* iaabw^tJeb isdi biooi>-i slorlw adi noqir gnlfixflo 

..•,-.^,- T. or rtiawhrrffP. 

416I.A. 446"" 

42245 jT / 


Appellee n\ ) / ' 




JOHN M, THOMSON. / ) ^x, Vl C\ 

Appellant, ) \ Z "' 


Plaintiff brought an action at law to recover ts <m defend- 
ant, a real estate broker, commissions on unexpired leases t© 
apartments in plaintiff's building, after plaintiff had ter- 
minated the management of the building by defendant. Trial 
by the court resulted in judgment for plaintiff in the sum of 
$139,60, from which defendant has taken this appeal. 

The facts disclose that Edward M, Coffman, the former 
owner of a building known as 4362-^6 Lake Park avenue, consisting 
of nine apartments, sold the property to plaintiff in December 

1940, Defendant, a licensed real estate broker, with offices 
in the vicinity of the premises, had for many years managed 
the building, collected the rents, rendered periodic statements 
deducting the expenses of management, including his commissions, 
and submitted the balance of the proceeds to the owner. For 
this service he received 4 per cent of the gross rentals, after 
plaintiff acquired the ownership of the building he allowed de- 
fendant to continue in the capacity of manager until the fall of 

1941, at which time plaintiff terminated the relationship* De- 
fendant then delivered to plaintiff seven leases which he had 
negotiated with various tenants in the building, for which plain- 
tiff gave him a written receipt, retaining the commissions for 
which this suit was brought and rendering an account for the 
balance. Plaintiff's statement of claim alleges that defendant 

\ sell 9qqA 

, -moo SIT i/{ioa:»i9o ss? asasfyijaa Am% aoiTaox .m 

at eaaasl jB&iJt<|X£»r£i; no sjiotznlimoo ^is^foid ectBd-8» Xjssi b ^c^ilb 
Lbs.- , '.aMel&& -^cf s&i&XiJo^ erf^ lo ;Jfi9«!©33rtsci eil^f JbsJ-jsalM 

eJ'«si5s;tBd-2 oll)Oli«iq I)©*i3l5£t©a ^fi^aan arid- fe©d"ftsXXo© ,3SiMiif<f sfi;^ 
^3Xioiasx3MOf) air? r^iithsflrM^ ^:fnfmfmBnm^. lo e^aasqxs ©rlJ- ^Jtioubeb 

19^1/1 ,aXBJasri: aao^g etii lo cfnao laq *• £)«Tiesf«i eri «»rvi&8 sirid' 

*i^1& i90iimXX& »fl ^i&Jtiirtf erfct lo qMstsnwo &di b^ttupoa llX^nifiXq 

lo XXjrI Slid- Xid-Utf issflccsffl lo -(pfioaqso ©lit «x simidooo o;t d-nsfjnsl 

wsS »qMexioX;tsX0i Btii bB&Baimis& lll^selfiXq &Ali dotdv S& ^l^^l 

baif cud ricj:r:Tr s^aBsX s®w« llMisJtjsXq o;* 6»^«vi:X'9fc s®/!^ c^asitflsl 

• tisXq dSfJtd: ^ iilbllud sdi al aititansJ- auolTsv ri;tlw Jbd^fal^ossn 

nol auolasJtJKffioo oil^ soXais^tsi ^itqiessrr £[®-t*iiw & mlA svfig T^^-l* 

erid- iQl Jm/oooB im> suirtftL'-ic'^ cii^ id^aoicH asw diea alrid rioiriw 


agreed to manage the property and to accept as his full compensa- 
tion 4 per cent of the rents collected, "it being agreed that the 
said agreement would be terminable by either party at any time} •• 
and that in accordance with the terms of the agreement defendant 
was not entitled to commission other than for rents already col- 
lected. Counsel agree and the court was of opinion that plain- 
tiff's case failed to establish any such agreement and the question 
presented is whether defendant was entitled to retain 4 per cent 
of the rents on unexpired leases after the relationship between 
the parties was terminated in accordance with the custom and 
usage of realtors in Chicago* The amount involved was stipulated 
to be $139»60, 

Upon trial defendant introduced certain provisions of the 
rules of the Chicago Real Estate Board covering charges made for 
dwelling-building management, and presented two disinterested wit- 
nesses, Louis T, Orr and Tighe S, Woods, from whose testimony it 
appears without controversy that, in the absence of any agreement, 
it was the custom and usage of realtors in Chicago to charge 
ccramissionsfor unexpired leases whenever the management arrange- 
ment is terminated. 

Although plaintiff failed to establish the agreement alleged 
in his statement of claim, he argues in support of the judgment 
that even in the absence of a specific agreement the court was 
justified in finding in his favor, principally upon the ground 
that there was no proof that plaintiff knew of the alleged custom, 
and that the evidence failed to disclose that the custom was known 
and established by persons other than real estate brokers. This 
contention is untenable because the record discloses that plaintiff 
was the owner of other buildings in Chicago which were managed by 
real estate brokers and was undoubtedly familiar with usages and 
customs of realtors. Moreover, the courts of this state hare 

*•!•■"■ -'-^ ' —*r^ .'Jis •^d eltfafxlara©^ sd bjj/ow JnemesisB Mae 

-los i5l>j8S'iX.B a^noi lol: njsxi.:^ lexld-o iio±eaijaaios» od" {)»i:tJEins :j-on asw 

fi©eiw;te«r q^liisuolt^Jlai erld" lecflxis aeaflsl bsilqxs/m ao eJ-nsi 9xl;t lo 

Jbe^EXuqxJ^a a£5W LsyvXovnJt ctmitJnsE erIT ^ogBciriO al a^oiHsei lo egaaju 

«0^«^£I$ scf ocf 
:• 'fioiaiivoiq £iijs;3i90 £>©oii&ajtiJiii J-«s£jii»l9b X6li;t uoqU 
'xol &ij£m Rdg^jBilo s«Xasvoc^ ej^fe^-aS Xaefl oasoidQ arid' lo a»Xin 

-*i\tvr &©d'8Sied'nie i: o^^n&as^ivS j:>iis ^iSiiSjaeajaasBi inlfcXiud-gxiXXXowb 

s>g^i- ..;^^&jaiO iix ^^oJXjBfc-i lo 9§fi2« fens jBlDd' arid', ssw :tl 

'-aSiiBi'is ,iit«»jji®ssxtaffl ©xid' 'isvsjateriw as>es©X bsiiqx&njEf lolefloiesliaraoo 

bsgs-XXiJ d-«9iffesi2B ©dd daiXdaiaa o^ bQljt&l lllvtulijXq riaJffojdd-XA 

*n©sf^fcift Q^^ ^o cJ-ioq. rf ^mJtjBXqf.^lot^'flafflsd'S'te aixi nl 

ifoo 9dd- d-flCjaGsisfi oj;'txo»qe B- lo Boneacfs ari«t' ni asve d'BriJ 

mmiT^ jqjj xXXsqlr , aval eJUl Al snlbnll ni b&t11i&u\, 

^JKO^JSJJO fe®s®>£i^^ ®^ ^o weita *ttxJxiJ:jaXq d-Bjd-t looiq on esw ©ttorfj ;farid' 

twoai a^iT sk)c?8jjo silt ijatC^ aaoXosifo ocJ i)©XlBl soneblvs srid- :^eiU ba& 

alrii .3i«:^oicf «#j&#e9 Xeei xiBild- isriio anosisq ^e^ bvAstld^^^ee bn& 

llld-niiili jsfld asBoXt; • e£l^ ssuatied eldeasicw ei. nolia&iaoo 

■'^cf be-^sxtmL 9!i9W j!t>lri'w oaEOJtilO ai e^albllLo iml^a lo -loxiwo ®ili ibw 

•:«£; assBax; iicMw iBxXlia^l X-t^^d'ciiroLm/ 2sw fciu:^ arisa'cxcf eisiBS Xs©-! 

held that in the absence of specific agreement the law will pre- 
sume that the parties contracted with reference to the general 
customs and usages of the business or profession involved. Cooney 
V. City of Belleville. 3II 111. App. 553* In Carroll. Schendorf & 
Boenicke. Inc»f v. Simons ^ 245 HI* App* 586, Mr. Justice McSurely, 
speaking for the court, observed: "It is reasonable to assume the 
existence of some custom in this respectj otherwise, a broker could 
be deprived of all compensation for his services by the simple act 
of changing the management of the property. As the evidence showed 
that there was no contract between the parties with reference to 
new leases procured by plaintiff in the event of the withdrawal 
from it of the management of the property, the custom in the real 
estate business here will obtain,** 

At the conclusion of the evidence on the first day of the 
trial, the court was of opinion that defendant was entitled to 
the commissions in accordance with the general custom and usage* 
However, the matter was continued on request of plaintiff's counsel 
for leave to file a brief, and when the hearing was resumed plaintiff 
produced Coffman, former owner, and he was permitted to testify over 
defendant's objection as to an alleged agreement that he had made 
with plaintiff on defendant's behalf ♦ Defendant's counsel contend 
that this testimony was not binding on defendant, that it constituted 
hearsay evidence and therefore was not admissible » We think the 
point is well taken* 

Since defendant negotiated the leases andmaa&ged, the 
property he was entitled to retain his compensation when the man?- 
agement was terminated. The case was fully tried, and no useful 
purpose would be served by remanding it» The judgment of the 
Municipal court is therefore is reversed, 


Sullivan, P. J,, and Scanlan, J,, concur. 

-■ .ogogS ,Jb«TXoTni noJtsasloiq !£« BsaaJtejud 9ji^ lo aeg-BSi; baB Sffiojauo 

-^..S3alai^2S.-ftiit3S&5 «X *i'^l •OTA .ai IXe t,eXJUY<^^^g ^9 XHO.. M.Y 
^XU-w-^m Q^tS&SJl .iK ^d8c .^qA .III ^-^S j^^smlf, *y inPAit n^^IsjfljMlg 

bluoB <ts:£otd & ^saXwrtsifjO {;f5eqB«i sjtrl^ al moi&iso esoa to soneislx* 

ts& eXqfiiXg ej^ -^t^ aj?olv582 alifi lol flol^aaissqsoo IXa lo bevtt(i&b »cf 

bfiwoMa ©sixebliFS 9dS «A .^ji^qoiq ail* lo iLi^m9^i::£um «id^ sfllgnBdo lo 

Ovt esfisislsrr xi:tiw s»l:fiiiq tiii fi<?©wj9Cf io&'Liaoo on aaw eisiiJ^ .t6£[^ 

Xaisrjs^rjM:? xw eii;? lo ;tasve sxli aJfc lllMXalq x<^ £>3iirocrtq ass^eX wen 

*' a»E afl;> ill mo;tai<o ©d;t ^"^j-^sqonq siivt lo j-nejHegfmjsiE ^di lo ;^i laoil 

".cJts^cfe XXiw ©^9y£i 88»fli;ai;cf o^sctas 
■ri;t lo x&i> itsiirt &sii uo 90iS£i>i:vs fsdi lo ft©iajEfXo£ioo aiit iA 
oi hfflttia& ««» d^js.sfe£i&l®jb #^®£{* BoXnlqo lo Sisw v^iiwo sdi)^ ^XaXid" 

Ios,sxjoo E ' 'lli:-;tisii6lq lo cfgsi/p©^ jtto l)S«i3j;J^.aoe aiwr is^jfi® e^J- ^rt«v©woII 

id-fslBlq i>sia0K9"s: esF suiifiSil »il;)- a»xiw fcja£; ^IsXicf s ©111 oJ- ©v^^eX lol 

•^iid-ss^ oJ- f>€;^d•l:B^©q saw ©jd l»xii! ^isriwo ^««rsol ^OBalloO bettuboiq^ 

'■• bsd &d oJ3if;^ ^txioffissigj? bsSelXs as oc^ as fioJt^fiOt^o &^ toBbaBl^b 

jf»tf»Jiso^:i Xosxiuoo a » »^mJfifiel©(I .IXsrfstf si* iasba^tBt iio llX^nisXq riJ'Xw 

Jiiui^8j*3S) tX ;tfiCif ^itxiafenslrb go gHx&sXsf ion gx^w ■^{nosil^asi aldJ^ 4"jsri:t 

sdJf ^In£rJ:}■ ss' .sXdXeaiabs cToji Sijm e'KDlnfimii fofl« ©snsfciv© xsaieoii 

MfiB-iiBi IX«w 2l inloq 

~ft<Bff'. ©iW' asiiw iJ[oX;tBaxi»qffioo aM ai:3d"»i Ovf ^eXd'XJ'jse ssif ed -^jieqoaq 

Xirlseii Oct tos ^fesloi xXXxrl saw »4b«5 adT .fe»;taHXcri©;t e»w ^tasssgB 

«£U lo d-aflUKsSict »i^^ •^X sffli!>xt«c»i x^ b^y^BH «cf JbXx.»©i^ »»oqix;q 

.I'Sgi^-vei eX anoleied;}- sX d-TE«o«' XisqXoXflaH 

316I.A. 447 





BTEUA lUFkmm, 


nmmA g. crbmb, william a» 

as Trustee, etc., ~""^%. 

Defendk-j\t8« .,'' 

PATTOH (Defendants) \ 

Cross-Plaintiffs, ^v 

RowEM G. cmrm, the state bakk j\ 

OP WOODSTOCK (Woodstock, Illi- 
nois), Administrator de bonis 
non with the Will annexed of the 
Estate of Herbert D. Crumb, De- 
ceased, and AVKKTTB STATE 3Aim, 
Cr OS s-Def endants • 




Stella McPadden brought an action against Rowena G. Crumb, 
William A, Patton and A. Louise Patton, and The State Bank of 
?/oodstock, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of 
Herbert B, Crumb, deceased, to foreclose five trust deeds securing 
five notes of $2,000 each, signed by the Pattons, A decree of 
foreclosure and sale was entered and thereafter a deficiency decree 
nas entered against Bowens G. Crumb, alone, for $11,496,43. She 
appeals » 

The complaint alleges, inter alia f that plaintiff is the 
legal owier and holder of the five notes and trust deeds executed 
by the Pattons, In so far b.s it seeks to charge appellant with 
personal liability for any deficiency, the only allegations of 
the complaint are "that plaintiff is informed and believes, and 
so states the fact to be, that the said Rowena G, Crumb, a widow. 


•>'-> cA.-- 








■ ■ '-\ 
3 C 

£iiaoti ( ion 

• *o !"• .'.on 

. ..C-JO 

■ i. ^ Ai 0^ ^ r r ,i -f o 1- v; rfn r ,-: 

, a j^iKoa»''i9u-;a801" 
..^ ,:.. :,„... ;.,,;..: ->^ ,-. k:.£.l.iLl. 
, ^.;.^':. ,(2 ifiaKfieE 

.. ' ■'•^••< '— ^'^ '.-'' • -> ""Mori fciLB leiiiyo Isael 

*^- *-> n Wi'^ ^ 

./j;:.rvi -:: *uiiii:;*i- ,u ij^ii^vo 

X i' V « J 

is the record holder of the equity of redemption of said pretaisesj 
that she assumed and agreed to pay the aforesaid mortgages." In 
appellant's answer to the complaint, she "denies that she ever 
assumed or agreed to pay the notes secured by the trust deeds 
described in the complaint and denies that she ever in any manner, 
assented or agreed to the condition of a deed relating to the 
personal assumption by her, of such indebtedness and denies that 
the deed to the real estate described in the complaint was ever 
delivered to or, in any manner, accepted by her, and alleges that 
she has no knowledge of the transaction, -»^ » * denies that she Is 
indebted to the plaintiff or to any other person on account of the 
notes and trust deeds described in the complaint and denies that 
plaintiff is entitled to any judgment or other relief against 
this defendant, •* A master heard the evidence and made a report 
to the court. The trial court adopted the fincfings in the report 
and decreed, inter alia ^ "that title to the real estate is vested 
in the defendant, Rowena G, Crumb j that title was conveyed to 
Rowena G. Crumb and Herbert D, Crumb, her husband, as joint 
tenants pursuant to a written contract dated December 12, 1929; 
that pb^slcal delivery of said dead was made to Herbert D, Crumb 
and that Herbert D, Crumb was authorized to accept said deed by 
Bowena G, Crumb on her behalf and as her agentj theit said deed 
provides that the conveyance was made subject to the mortgages 
which the grantees assumed and agreed to pay; tha.t it was the 
Intention of the parties to said contract ths't the defendants, 
Rowena G, Crumb and Herbert D. Crumb should assume and agree 
to pay said mortgages; that the d fendant Rowena G. Crumb had 
knowledge of and assented to the assumption agreement and that 
she assumed and agreed to pay said mortgages and is personally 
liable to the plaintiff." The five lots were sold for $300 each 
and the deficiency judgment followed. 

nl "«3&3e3d'iotS Mjssf^'xola 9£l;t XJS«J o^ bs&'ias buB fesaiaBes oris tedi 

?.ntaQb Ma JnlsIqiBOo «i4t fli fcecfiioaab 

d'£.. : sf-fr&eJcfeltni Aov? 'to ^issf! xcf riol:Jqisiir".2£ Isnoa^fMj 

c:«Tr JalsXqsiOo ©iit ill fcscfi'xossb i^dirS'e© Is^^ oi^i o;t fcsei) adJ- 

;':.:; - -;j -.'■ ^ . , b&Sqeoos ^i^i&nBm ^^b nl ,io o.t be-iEJvlIeJ!) 

, no^.^ OBRaBi^ ©ricf 'io eaJbaXwo/uf ou asri srla 
10 nor. 1:0;; i^riio ^/ib c? arf:? oj- beidsbfil 

j.'^S^i: pi i^i^eiyq eJXL3Co:t 

£j?o.:. ;: no (tooiO .D ansTToH 

.';arie cfjBt; , 5nB dmwiO, ,0 iurewoH 

^Mi bn& d^jcteiaepi^ia floJ:;Jqffij;jaa6 sjfeT oi Ma»^Ba ban to esfcolwoxoi 

XXIjafloa^:»q ::©8a3^ioK £>jt3a ^eq o;t b99i^& fms b9sm^z& ed* 

^3jf5« 00£$ iC?: 5Xo. aJ-oX evlt »riT ".tl.WiilisXq eri^ oct old&ll 

.beMoLlol iaearibnl voaBlollob oiii *xaB 

There is no dispute as to the material facts in the case, 
Herbert D. Crumb (of Harvard, Illinois), deceased, owned a build-^ 
ing at 3110 Wesley avenue, B?^rwyn, Cook county, Illinois, which 
was subject to a mortgage of $7,000, ""lllliam A, Patton and A, 
Louise Patton, defendants, of Oak Park, Illinois, owned fire 
vacant lots in Berwyn, each l©t being subject t© a trust deed 
of $2,000, The five notes secured by the trust deeds were held 
by the Avenue State Bank, of Oak Park, as collateral security 
to a note executed by the Pattons in the sum of $7,400. On 
December 12, I929, Crumb "and Rowena G, Crumb, his wife," entered, 
into a contract with the Pattons for the exchange of the aforesaid 
properties. The contract provided that Crumb "and Rowena G. Crmab, 
his wife," agreed to sell and convey to the Pattons the two-flat 
building, 5ub.1ect to a first mortgage of $7,000, and the Pattons 
agreed to sell and convey to Crumb and his wife the five lots, 
subject to the five mortgages above described. The contract 
also contained the following provisionj that "said first mortgage 
held by the Avenue State Bank, Oak Park, Illinois, to secure a 
collateral loan of Seven Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($7,4-00,00), 
parties of the first part to release parties of second part frcm 
collateral loan," The exchange transaction was closed at the 
Avenue State Bank on February 25, 1930, Crumb, the Pattons and 
Mr, Moore M, Peregrine, general counsel for the Bank, were present 
at the time, but appellant was not present. Crumb delivered to 
the Pattons a deed in which the grantors are described as Herbert 
D, Criunb and Rowena G, Crumb, his wife, and which conveyed the 
Wesley avenue property to the Pattons in joint tenancy, subject 
to a $7,000 mortgage. The ^eed als© contained a provision that 
the granteia* assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage. The Pattons 
delivered to Crumb a deed conveying the five lots in question to 
Herbert D, Crumb and Rowena G, Crumb, his wife, in joint tenancy. 

,88^0 sfij ax. a:fo£l laiT&d^sm edi oi as s^vqalb on al sisilT 
rio-tiiw ^aionillX j^rf'nsoo :Sooti ^wcti^H. ,9jin<?vB ^©12©?; OII£ Sb 8«1 

bled eiev? 8b90'&' i^eir ;ff b^tuo^it asion sVlT'sKT » 000^2$ lo 

Y^ii£/6«B XsT©;tsII • ^ iiB<i ^0 lo ^^hbE 8;tB;t8 eirnsvA sifi" -^d 

.,oi9:?i:£e "^ollw sM ^cfB«'•IO ,0 sa^woH bus" diaifiO ^^S^I ,SI lechseoeG 

^dfiiuiD ,0 BHSwo?? feas" cfffiunO d-£i3\t fesblvoiq issi^fnoo srfT ,s&Wi9qoiq 
d'fill-ow* add- afloj-d's'^I sild- oJ- -yi^'^fioo &£Sp JIp>8 oj- bss-i^B "^©llw 9lrf 

^adoX nvil art;* sljrw sslxl 't>Hs dtatftO 0;J- -^f^vfioo fefiB iles o:t fe8«ijs 

io&i:}a:oo sffT «B6cfi'2S«adB' ''^Wrfs efeg^strEoa »vll sn'^ oJ- j-oeLcfi/e 

aaBSJioffl t^iil &1b8" d^afW tholeirvi^iq snJbrblJtol etii bediBinoo oels 

ii Q^a/oes oJ- ^BionxIII ^:rfiB*f'::i^ j^^sE s^Jst-^" sigi»&vA «m1^ -^cf tlM 

^(00.00-^^^$) aisllocr LeifcroxE >ttfo^ bw&rmisfS nJj&Vsa 1© r*bi Istrte^BlIoo 

ario J-B Ls'scio ali#"^oi;:^D£a^s1;t »sesrl9Xf> srfT ^'.fleol X»T»;fBlXoo 
feHB anoJ-cfs'3 sricf ,cfjr;.' , :fX%'?5 x'izh'i^^'^ ao jfnaa Bt&i'd 9im*^i 

od- boieviXob dies. , - • : i:v; ^^fitisXX^qqs dfiwf «f»Jili arii is 

.'i9cf7r:^H a^J bsdUi^e - mclKr-::- _ .loMfr ai be*>k & sno:J-.tB*2 siJCif 

9tiA be-s^-^vnco /lol: '.- I^in -, . ' :. . aiirf \<teifiD .0 aeevrofl 5ii£ (JtexJiO .(t 

j-{)9t<^j:/a ^'Yoa ... :..:....;, ..l anocf^sSl arfi o^ -^:fieqoiq «>xrn©ve -^iXaeW 

d'/iCM' rtoXsXvo-jiq e fe«^aiBd■^to.o ®c^Xs 5e^& off! .9SBa:t'iois 000 ^Vl » oi 

Od" j!ioJ:.jei.ifp n.?: ■^■'■-■^t -^'r-- b b cfeai/rrO od bsisvJtlsJb 

STibJect to the five mortgages. This deed also contained the 
following, "which five encumbrances the part of the second part 
assume and agree to pay," Peregrine testified ths.t the Bank had 
possession of the exchange contract from the time it was executed 
until the deal was consurmriatedj that he was present in the Bank 
at the time the exchange transaction was closed on February 25> 
I93O; that Crumb and the Fattens were also present but that 
appellant was not| that he. Peregrine, was the attorney that ,, 
handled the closing of the transaction but that he did not 
represent appellant, and that "in connection ^th that [transac- 
tion] Mr. Herbert D, Cruiab executed and delivered to the Avenue 
State Bank his collateral note in the stim of $7^4-00, bearing that 
date, February 25, 1930> payable on demand ^' ^ ^^ such note in- 
cluding therein collateral agreement in which was described these 
ten exhibits, the five trust deeds and five principal notes as being 
collateral to that loan. On delivery of that principal note signed 
by Kr, Crumb, Mr, Patton gave the bank his check for $69.06, which 
was the computation of accrued interest on his note up to that 
date and that pajrment of interest, together with Mr. Gr\imb*s execu- 
tion and di? livery of his collateral note, was taken in payment of 
the collateral note of the Patton* s, and their collateral note 
was cancelled and surrendered to Mr, Pattonj" that at the same 
time and place "and in connection with that transaction," Crumb 
gave his note for $7,400 to the Bank and the collateral note of 
$7#40C executed by the Pattons was canceled by the Bank and returned 
to the Pattons (it was later destroyed by Patton) j that Patton gave 
Crumb a check for $137.28 "for the balance * * * as Indicated by 
the statemanti" that when the deal v/as closed the Bank retained 
the said five notes aM trust deeds as collateral to the Herbert 
D, Crumb note and continued to hold said instruments until Cruaxb 
paid the Bank his note on September 9, I930, Plaintiff testified 
that her mother, Emma J» Diggins, gave the notes to her on March 

Bdi MalfidTioo ozl& bs&b slxiT .esasacfiDia &vt1 Bdi oi iof^ldua 

6©d-^ro9K9 esw #± sfKid" sd^ »>'it cto*ii;t«oo »j£tsdox© sf!^ lo fiolaeseeoq 
^bS siid' ill &ttB&.Biq ajCTT »xi c^sdJ" \b»iBiisim&nco a-sw iBsJb »rid^ IWou 

.fid- iGliBSd' ^OQ-^^'^f ^io itttfE *aild- h± soon Is'xed'BlIpo alii :iaBQ &$&S^ 
•«'a.l s^toa xioiic , bausieb no alcJjsxsfi ^'^ECJ^ «^S x^sJ^icf-'^ ^e^tsb 

niecf Ei: IjeqlDXil^Q s>vi;l fefius afeosfc ;t2j:f'xcf evil ©rfd^ ^2;tlcfxiix© ns;^ 

feeflSla s^ojf iBqioai^q- imii lo 'igTavlXtt* «P •xijeoX i&(U oi iF.neialloo 

itsri^ a^ cjjj ©j-on ^M no ieertscfal I>»/jioob lo aoli&isjqsioo eri:t Sisw 

lo d-usjirxisq al bsiIbS a^w ^scton Isied'^IXoo ?,lii lo Tjisvii'^ii f)ii/8 no let 

Bion Isisd-^IXoo xlsiJd- bne ^z^aoiiaH exW 1© sd'on latt?? J jsIXoo edi 

0Bez 0di d";u d'ariy" "jaojjc^i .iM os' SsialiiCisinjja SiXts fcsXXeonso saw 

cfauix'iC '•^floijoaajaffi^cf ^MJ il:ihi mtio^aao^ al box" sosXq baa emti 

lo ©iton IsnsjsXXos ^dS MiS. 3LnsS stifct o^ OO^^^tf lol 9ioa ztd svsg 

fsirsg aoii&H tzdi t(^®"-'^*s^ '^d ba^o-ij^asfe i©;tsl esw iti) Bao;J;t£'5[ «rfd" oJ- 

.:cf l)sd^«oJ:l>flii f:.. sofiBlacf rrfct toI" 8s,'^£X'| toI 3l»©do b daujiO 

&9r-i:j3^9'i liiXBt? f>di fe®«oXc .^b sffct jtsexlw i^di " i^aaiasd'ad'B odd^ 

d-iscT^is^ erict oj Xb'X3;J£;IXoo eb afe'^sf) d-aui;:f ftos a«jon svil blsa ftxi:t 

dfiiXJiO XJt^nt.* ad^nsxttunJejnUt fcXjsse fiXorl o:t bBmiliaoo baa eJ-on dfiu/iC ,G 

iSsxlletefH^ lll;lHlflX'=i •O^^X <^^ 'i®<fiaeiq92 no dcJ-cn eJui 2lnaa Bdi fiisq 


I, 1931» ^iie record does not disclose ?*ien or how Emma Diggins 
acquired them. The relationsliip between Crumb and plaintiff and 
her mother was such that h© had access to their safety deposit 
TDoxes in the bank of which he was president, and he handled some 
of plaintiff's affairs. She testified that she never actually 
received any interest as payment on these notes, but that interest 
was put upon her book and credited to her account. Interest was 
in this manner paid her to September 1, 1937* and the indorsements 
of the payment of interest on the backs of the five notes are all 
in the handwriting of Crumb. Plaintiff further testified that 
she never had any communication of any kind with the Fattens and 
that appellant never paid her any interest; that she, plaintiff, 
never had any dealings of any kind whatsoever with appellants, 

The evidence does not show who paid the interest on the notes, 
but the Pattons and appellant denied paying any interest on them. 
The principal of the notes became due March 1, 1933. Crumb died 
December 31> 1937* and the bill to foreclose was filed on August 

II, 1938. 

Appellant testified that at the time of the death of Crumb 
she had been married to him for nineteen years | that before her 
marriage she worked in the bank of which he was president for 
about seventeen years; that, at her husband's request, she signed 
the exchange contract in question, in Harvard; that she claimed no 
interest in the Wesley avenue property at the time she signed the 
contract; that she took no part in the negotiations for the exchange 
of the properties and that she never personally had any dealings 
with the Pattons; that she was not present at the Avenue State Bank 
on February 25, 1930, at the closing of the contract for the exi*» 
change of the properties; that she signed the deed to the Pettons 
in Harvard, on the date of the acknowledgment, before R, M, Galvin, 
cashier of the Harvard State Bank and a notary public. She 

unXfita SSS0. woii ^o asrfvT oaoloaxfc iett sstok ftiooei siiT •I£^X <X 
*l3oq«»£) Tjj-®lBe 1j^ei0 ocr aasDOS ftsfi ail cTad^t doue a«w lerl'^oiH lari 

esw tssieJx?! .irjuosoB i&d. o^ be&tbBT.o ba& &)otf iBd noqj? ^xjq 8£W 

11b QtB godson sTll: »flcf lo aiioB^ 5«I* ao d-a<?n©tnl l-o ifnsE^sq 9ri:t lo 

fefiB siio^i+i? ji'iv fenjfc'C i;nc lo soi^tBOicuaBSiioo ijjcib bar! isven ©jfa 

^lllvfitiBlq .. 5iij- ;;i-e©T[S^iii x«b laxf hlaq isven ;tnBlIoqqB i-firi;f 

^asd'Ois Bdi no c^aeied'nl ®JC!(J' fciisq odw vroile c^oc aeob «anef>iv& erfT 

.issdcf no ;ta9T[»it£ti: y«^ saixsq i)slflefe ;Jnj£ll9qqB bns 8fio;t;ffi<? sd:} isnS 

betb (fMfTD .££^1 ^I iisii^ »i;x> •■^;j^t^.:f aectoii '^-rl.t '^o I^rloniiq eifT 

^Si/^/iA no bQllt 3GW s2oXo3'.t' -rli f;n... ^, , . tecfaeogQ 

Or n r r f 

"^9^ ^v^lQd fki^y r2*rl»s(i^' ff9^^9jKlfi lol ffiJbrf od &«J:^i«ia nsscf 5sri axle 

eSLaisrfrx.^ »d* io'^> ^--^ ' . ..u./wa ^-i ^^■'^ -a-^o^ 9£fe ^»i^^ jCfosi^Tnoo 

8SiiiX>3Sfo v;, ,,. vXX^--- •"■• :t Brief bfi« aet^i9qoiq exit lo 

2in«a ©JT>i3 ©xinsv- -.; ...... erie efarict lanod'cfe*! »xi;t i!.tiw 

•«« sxit 'SGt' ^tiyi.ii:.,^ ...J ..J ^x.ieolo 9X1* :ts ,0£^X ,^£ ^isxntf©^ no 

,j?lvljeO .M ♦£ €>«ol9<J ^.li-iiUjjJj&XwortffoB srfct lo »#«Jb srW no ^biJBVijsE ill 

further testified that the deed from the Pattons to the Gruaibs 
was never delivered to her and that the first time she ever saw it 
was when she was looking over the contents of her husband's safety 
deposit box after his death; that prior to that time she never had 
any reason to suppose that the deed contained a personal contract 
on her part to pay the trust deeds j that she never at any time con- 
sented to the assumption clause in the deedj that she did not know 
that the assumption clause Vfts in the deed when it was delivered 
to her husband) that she received no consideration for signing the 
deed and that she did not retain any part of the purchase price 
of the five notes or the Wesley avenue property; that she never 
had any conversation with anyone concerning the assumption of the 
trust deeds; that she never authorized anyone to insert such a 
provision in the deed; that she never took or claimed title on 
that deed; that she never, directly or indirectly, paid any interest 
or principal on the notes, and never received any rent or other inr* 
come from the property and never paid any taxes or special assessment* 
on it. Upon cross-examination she testified that she signed the 
various papers at her husband's request; that her husband did not 
handle many transactions for her but that she was asked at times 
to sign papers in his transactions; that she has not conveyed the 
five lots in question since her husband's death and that she 
supposes the property is part of his estate; that when she worked 
at her husband's bank prior to her marriage her work was general »• 
as stenographer, secretary and bookkeeper, and that she would 
typewrite deeds and mortgages which her husband dictated to her. 
Her testimony that she had no part in the negotiations for the 
exchange of the properties; that she never at any time consented 
to the assumption clause in the deed; that she never claimed title 
by that deed; that she never had any conversation with anyone con- 
cerning the assumption of the trust deed; that she never authorized 
anyone to insert such a provision in the deed; that she never had any 

ytl wsa itv:- '-ri^: 9m':'' "^ '"'' ' "'' -""'di has rteri oi 59i9vll9Jb i»v©n sbw 

:" -^fectBdEirr' ■• - '•* — 70 snWooI asw srie aedir bjbw 

jo^^'zSaoo liiiioni^Ki :> ,os«i-.:xir)-j b^H'u ad^ iarid' saoqqjt/s oj- xxoasei -^b 

~!ioo sffiivt Y^i ■' ■" "V9XI ©rig cl■ad:^ ^eJ&««^ tBis*!.i edS x^q od- d^iBq rrsxl no 

•vQa^ cJ^on ; '^ ;'--" '- ■ ---••'- :yoi:}qs!tvzz& edi od" bsd^nse 

^sisvlXci; 3SW .jx at^xiv/ i^^ec- ' zr^v -'ilo noiJ-qHiL'azB »rii ;tsrid' 

aoliq sSBrioiuq si" '-iBq xasi alBisi ioa. btb ode imdi baB feeeb 

isven ■ -.x-^'i^tqciq b0sibv& x®^^^^ ^^-^ i^ esion svll exit lo 

©f!:t lo noxJciisTESij 8irf;J gAlnisonoo snoTfftB rfcflw nol^tfieievnoo ijnB i>Ari 

B jstiasre d-i©sjil o:!- f^no-^ns fessliorfd^j^re isven sria d"arf;^ jefessb i^ajjid^ 

iJO olcflif' bsfiTJtBlo 10 2ioo^ isvsn eriB :tsrf;<" |fc©9b ail^ nJ: aoiaivoiq 

d-8©ie;tni y^^b hlsq ^-^clJ-oeilf)' -I^foeilfc tTSVsn »rf8 isrfd- jboeb iarid' 

--rd: Tieffefo go imt x^^ B^Visoei levsn focB ^tecfois er{;t no laqloiLtiq ito 

^iisjsaeeE&B lBJta©qs t:o Si^xsi x^^js feieq levi^n 1)gb x;ti9qoiq 9ricf jaotl »inoo 

exf^ fjsnsiE erie :fB£l& feellJt.taed^ erie nold-snlraBX!?— saoio floqU ,il no 

d-QH fclJb Suscfsuff lad^sri^ ^d"a©jyp9i a ♦ hj3i;cf eifil i©if d^B aieqeq axyoiiBv 

il©K±:t etc £)0:tfaB ssv/ ©ria :ti3if:t :trfcf i^rf loJ. enolcfps2nB*t^ TpUMi sIJ&CBri 

©rid- fe©x®'^^ -sri e>riE • ?iioJt>+os8n,sii alri ni aisqeq ngie c;J- 

srfe isd;/ htm rf;ts9& a ' Jeaiitf eiM 19^ sonls noiiasi^p ni aiol svll 

JbsirfTow ade n®rlw j-ijxi^ («ta^s© sL -q st "^iirqoiq 9ri;t sseoqqire 

-^ iBlsfl^S aj8W 3fnow i&d ^>:^£ii'iBm i^d oi toiiq jfnsrf a'bnscfBjJTl isii d^B 

BXjtow oris i&i:li bna ^laqseafrtfoocf 5nB •^i«^9is»8 ^noriq^isonei^e ar, 

,i©ri oj- beiBi:>lb ba&dzud isrf rfoMw as5.escfioffl featj abesb •d'lTwsqx;? 

»ii;f lol enoi:fB±:foa©n erW ni: ;t^Bq on ftsri ©rfe ;t6rl* YnoflLi;^e©;t itaH 

b«fHa>«fioo ©CLt:t ^n£ ^g leve act jasJtv+isqorrq arid' lo ssOBdoxa 

9im b&ai'iLo t9yna »dz S&di {fce&l> «rf;t ni aexTsIo noi::tqinwEafl etlt oi 

-iioo sROTyiB ficMw noWss'jsvnoc ^fts f>Jftd levsn eiit isd:} {b^sb iedi \d 

fieslwrUwB 'lavfin srfa IJari* ibftsfc d^ax;?: nol^tqaofaes srict salnido 

iHB bfifi levsn Bds :tsrf^ ifcseb ©rid' at noialvoiq b doua j-ieanl oi sno-^tOB 


reason to believe that it contained a personal contract on her 
part to pay tbs notes; that she received no consideration for th» 
deed and did not retain any part of the purchase price of the five 
lots or the Wesley avenue property; that she never, directly or 
indirectly, paid any interest or principal on the notes, and never 
received any rents or other income from the property, and never paid 
any taxes or special assessments on it, stands uncontradicted. 

Appellant contends that "the assumption clause contained 
in a deed snist be accepted and agreed to by the grantee* The 
law requires something more than the mere insertion by the grantor 
of a clause in a deed that the grantee assiames an encumbrance," 
This contention Is a meritorious one. In Ludlum v. Pinckard. 304 
111, 449, the defendant was the grantee in a quit claim deed which 
contained a provision that it was made "subject to all incumbrances 
of record, which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay," A defi- 
ciency judgment was entered against her. On appeal to the Appellate 
court the decree was reversed and the cause remanded with directions 
to the trial court to vacate that part of the deeree providing for 
a deficiency judgment (221 111. App, 335, 338), The Supreme court 
reversed the judgment of the Appellate court and affirmed the decree 
of the Superior court. In its opinion the Supreme court states 
(pp. 452, 453, 454): 

"to agreement on the part of a grantee to pay incumbrances 
on property conveyed must be based on sufficient consideration and 
the assumption clause of the deed be accepted and agreed to by the 
grantee. The law requires something more than the mere insertion 
by the grantor of a clause in the deed that the grantee assumes an 
incumbrance. The assumption of such incumbrance is by way of conr- 
tract or agreement on the part of the grantee, and the grantee *s 
assent to such contract must in some manner appear » F^hile the 
general rule is that If the grantee takes and claims title under 

i£«jti no io&iinoo Xxsnoaieq s betil&Snoo it &&iii Qjellod oi noaisei 
evil add- to eoiiq ea.srfSTijg ©riJ lo d"iBq "^jej niEiea :ton f>J:fi ba& fc©db 

':.-tsq t5V©£i foxss ^-^d-^^qo-sq asij- fiioat ©taooxil i&ild^o 10 eJnei y;^ bsvlsosn 

j&®££ii»^££oo ©sifBlo iioiiqmfaaB sitJ-" d'sii^t zbaeiaoo -JaBlleqqk 

©fS ,99d"njsTC3 ®^^ "^cf Oct bse-isB Jbnie 6s;tq»oo;s ©d jtax/ie f>®»!) b fll 

•^^£ ^l^ig^oxi-L , #W. ^:^ "©^o SJ^olicKtii&fli B ei noJtctns^^ixoo eiilT 
fiGJtflw fesGD jtalalo Jii/p js ni ©ectnjBTta arid- sbw ctnsfcnelsfc MtJ' ^?*-^ •III 

s83n.yidr.i-:Kf t lu; o.' ."toH? off?- " sfojas sfiw J" J: Jfiiid- aoleivoiq 3 b^alBSaoo 
«.t'i&.-' .. . ,,.„^ „. ^. --„., oris ssmusEfi ee;tiisi8 Brid" jdaidw ^bioo^i lo 

g;ol snJtiivoiq ssaosi) sxlJ- lo J^eq izdi sJ'sobv oJ- c'-tiKio laJt^cJ" add" ocf 
d-^H/oo sfiis^qifa ©dT .(8££ *?££ .qqA .III I£S) ;tn»ia3tixy^ \oa3lollBb js 

i(-^^^ xEX^ *S^4^ .qq) 

£yii5 xioij-ianefelanoo d"xielsX*3:lua jeio LsiSBCf scT iHoaa bwx&Traoo "^i'leqoiq no 

9>di x^ oi besT^a bsxB he:iqBoo& »cf i)©®jb Qdi to saj/aXo rioWqcu/aajB add" 

KoiJ-isimi 9i©ic ©ri;t aBdi eiom aciilctaifioa astlJ^psi wr/ -:""' .ssctnBig 

i^ as«u.<ae« ss^tas^S Qj[i:t cisdo' 'c-' x;,-' -^•: -^-;--''- -"rj u-jjajtiis sd;t x^ 

B*9e:3ar,ig erfJ- jbns ^eecfiusis 9dJ- '::a jiaq add" no J-flSHeeiss 10 So&ti 

add sliiM ,'iB9qq.s iQim&ta ^issoa ni isim iosiiaoo xioiss. oj dnsaaa 

isJbxufj sXd-id aaslsXo fins aaiiei e»dxxaig srid tl d-sdd aX ©Xx/i Xjsi9xi98 

a deed he takes It by the terms of the deed, yet in order that a 
grantee be held personally liable for the payment of an Incum- 
brance against the property, it Htust be shovm, in addition to 
having accepted title to the property, that he assented to the 
condition of the deed relating to the personal assimption of the 
debt. Unless it be showa that the grantee in a deed has some 
reason to suppose that the deed to him contained a personal con- 
tract on his part to pay a mortgage or other lien on the property 
transferred, and that he assented thereto, he cannot be held, as 
a matter of law, to have assumed such obligation. Thompson v* 
Dearborn. I07 111, 87} Merriman v. Schmittf 211 id, 263) SlaSi 
V. Terry j^ I56 I. Y, 122; Gold v. Qgden. 6I Minn. 88. 

"Applying the above rules to the case at bar, we oome to 
the question whether or not there is in the record evidence showing 
a delivery and acceptance of the deed containing the assumption 
clause and assent thereto. Defendant in error offered no evidence, 
and, as we have seen, the plaintiff in error's evidence shows 
that the defendant in error had nothing to do with the transfer 
of the property to her. There is no direct evidence showing that 
she knew anything about the assumption clause in the deed to her. 
She took title to the property, however, received the rents there- 
from and paid taxes thereon, and while she, under the rules herein 
referred to, had constructive notice of all the conditions of the 
deed, such rules do not go to the extent of establishing an agree*, 
ment on her part to be personally liable for the payment of 
incumbrances against the property in the absence of proof of some 
fact ©P circumstance from which such agreement on her part can be 
shown. The evidence shows that by letter she sent a payment of 
$1000 on this mortgage. Thile the letter is not in the record, 

from the testimony relating thereto it is evident that it was 
written by defendant in error and the money sent by her personally 

©ilcf Oct fesctxiegajB sri ;ti;dj ,V^"i«qoiq sxU- oi 9l;fW £>©;}-q©ooB s^X-t^^Jtl 

ejEi* Jo aotSqmiie,s& iMtoBT^q »rfd' o^ ^IubIbi b9Bb edi lo nolcfllbnoo 

0E03 esri nssfc a £tl o«?tnsis ericJ- ;Jfiri:;t nerofie ed il as^InvJ ,:^tfeb 

-ixoo I^sHosieq ?^ h'^-^fr-stnop isiti oi 6$»fe 9^ ctsrf^ szoqqjtfa o,f isoejssn 

as ^Msi. J ...... ■ ^.j*»'s«i^.J- 6»5^ff»aei« ad iffiif* fetiis ^fcaiielacLBiJ 

^SiiXg 5£dS ,i.:: ... jMJM&^.,.x3LMmZ^^M 5^6 .III ^01 ^sno<iT.B9a 

gnlwoxfa ssstsi)?:"- '■•"'^o&i ©lii «J: ai ©T;arf^ ion to isilcf ©riw nolj-aaxip ©ri^ 

^; ucot.:*- ■ ~ =—'■■'•'- -^ inoMsIsS ,od-»iafl:}- j-nscas bna eeu&JEo 

;t>iiij' guivfoxie ©onoblvo ^o^^'^Ih ou al aisdT .lad Oi? ijit'ieqotrq arid' to 

^'' •' :' b©9b t^ri:}- jEti: ?58«.eIs iSGl>tqiKJ88j8 advt #ifocfB soifiC^Vis vfBaA. ©ffa 

-.'•sno aw^'Hsi Slid' fcsvlsosi ^T«»vswofi ^ij^f-ie^qeiq «/f;t oc3 bL^I;} iloo^ ©il8 

;^t to snotilbn: ' "" ' e«lj-on BrlSs>inizsmo bed ^oi be'iislsi 

-isi§xj KB ssirfelld&j-iii-. *io ^/isjxe eif^ ocf- og ctofl ob aeXi;i dout ^b9Bb 

lo ^risffi^fiq «rfd' 101: ftl<ffijtj[ Yllsctogisq »(i oc^ trrsq isri it© itndoi 

»tf flso i-«isq toil n<5 ^flssieQiSB xlox/a rfoirfw aoil *j»i*t«usi/oiio io io&l 
Jo iaBSS^Bq s tne2 ©ifs t©d-^©i t«f d'a^d' eworia «»£>n<?bJtv«> oxlT .nwoxfe 
^bnooerr eiid- ai ioa si i9itt©X sd:f eXirf'' .©sBiv^wu aitt^ no 0O0X$ 

jl &sd3 ctnsblvs ai d-± oj!?i©ri;t galcJals^ xnomWesct sifi flK)-i1 
•S;IX£nosis<j iQd xd ^it^» t^nora ®ri;J bets lorsot© ul ^asbnelsf) x<f asi&lTir 

to apply on this mortgage* It does not appear that the money 
came from the rents of the property or from any other souree 
except the personal funds of defendant in error. She contends, 
however, - and in this she is supported by the Appellate Court, - 
that this is merely an evidence of a desire on her part to free 
the property of the lien and not evidence of acceptance on her 
part of the assumption clause of the deed. With this we cannot 
agree. In the absence of any proof limiting the effect ©f such 
payment, we are of the opinion that it must be taken as an act of 
assent on her part to the assumption clause of the quit-claim deed 
to her. This payment undoubtedly establishes actual knowledge on 
her part of the existence of this mortgage. It also nega tires any 
repudiation of the assiimption clause in the deed and constitutes 
evidence of conduct on her part denoting an acceptance of such 
clause. It is not necessary, to show an acceptance of such a 
clause, that the grantee in express language accepted or ratified 
it, Such may be shown by any facts and circumstances evidencing 
such acceptance, ?ife think that under the circumstances of this 
case this payment on the mortgage must be taken as evidence of 
acceptance of the assumption clause in the deed," 

The appellant contends that the record fails to show any 
facts or circuBistances evidencing that appellant accepted or 
ratified the provision in question in the deed. Plaintiff admits 
that the assumption clause was binding upon Crumb, and calls 
attention to the fact that no d ficiency judgment was taken 
against his estate by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff does not question the correctness of the general 
rule announced by the Supreme court in Ludlum v> Pinckard^ but 
calls attention to the following finding of the chancellor in 
the decree of sale; "* * * that it was the intention of the parties 
to said contract that the defendant, Rowena G, Crumb and H. D, 
Crumb should assume and agree to pay said mortgages," and she 

^«J30K edi isrfj^ 7Bsgqjs ion asofe il ^eaajcfioai alil:^ no xlqqs od" 

©oiwor, isiid*o xa& moil 10 Tjd-^eqoaq sdj- lo a:tn8^ 9rl:J- motI scibo 

^e/jnstnoo eil3 .loiio nl dnsbfislefc lo ebnul iBaoBieq »di ^qsoxs 

- ^;tiifoO sd'sIXsqaA «dd- ijcf b&)ioqqve el ads atrii nJt 5ns - ^isvewori 

esi' :;g ^ait ao aileefi £ lo sons&lvs as ■^■isisra al airi^t ^firi^t 

Tad ao ^QaBiqBooB 1© 93ne£>lv9 d-oa bas nsil ^xi:j lo ^[Jioqoiq sAi 

iomi&z 9w aJbc[;t il;j^iv: ♦&©©!) sflJ- lo sairaXo nolctqmwaEB «ii:t lo iiaq 

doxje lo .to sll3 arid" gaid-imll loo^q xos lo ©onsacfjG erid' nI ,»9iaB 

lo d'OB rijs a;5 nejfBd- 9cf izsm cfi d'srid noxnlqo oil* lo eia »w ^d-neanjBq 

beQb ml&lo^iiX3[, BdS lo ©ax/Blo noll^qim/aaB Qiii oi ctnsq isxl no iaetza 

no ©j&elwonDi X6JLd"0B sexisilcfsdas x-tb®d-cfx;oJbniJ dnsanjBq elxiT «i9ri od" 

XiiB essvLtB^sn oei .'asfiSJ-ioE! alrii lo 90n©d?Jlx» ©ili lo d^oBq rteri 

a®d'KM:c''&nos bn» baeb ©xfd- nx qcc/gIo noldqiriLgaB ©jIJ- lo aoidBlfcjjqe^ 

dt»fs.e, lo sofiBd"q9oOB na gnJ::ton9J& Jiaq led no j-ojjbnoo lo eonsblvs 

£ xloua lo ©oiifiiqeoos n« woria o:^ ^Yi^essoen ion si d"! .esjjslo 

lisllld'si 10 b^qeo^B sgsjygrLal aaeiqxs nx egd-n&ns ©xlJ iBdi ^sauslo 

i^lt>asblM9 QBoasiQMiiiQito 5ne scfosl ^J^s ^cf flworia »<* -^ca rioxiS ,ctl 

aids- lo aaofiad-sinfc'olio ©fid tebnw d-jifid stalxid- ©?f .soasd-qsoo^o rioi/a 

lo sonsMv .tairai e^^s^iiom bpH jho i-nsa^sq aid* ssso 

"..boob Qxld- «1 sbi/fJld aoliqsmzas adi lo ©snBd'qeooB 

y/i/s vfods od- allsl Jjioodi siid- isd-j abneiiioo irijBlIeqqB arfT 

•xo bsiqeooB d'iiBX/eqqs d'fiild' gnioiisbivs 3aorLs:tsaixroT:±o 10 ad'OJBl 

zitsibB llxd-nl^n »b€>eb a>xfd nx noldaeup nl noxalvoiq tdi bslllcTBa 

aXifio baa ^dmstO aoqu snxbnitf Sisw ocif^Xo xBDld^qiEiraafl 9di tsdi 

jci&±aS 3£w dneffl§bjtj(i ^omloll Jb on d'fixiJ d-oBl arid od^ nol;tn©*d-« 

.llx^nlfiXq xd sd-sd-ao aid daxtlBse 
ifii«ii3S( 0fW lo a8sn.tof?iioo exld nold-gei/p d'on seob llldfllfiX'i 

iiJd ^t'is^i\^X'i ty P^f'r^bf^'"! -fl-t cfixroo erastqi/G 9il;t xd beocujoima aXxri 

nl loXIooaBflG srid lo snlbnll gnlvoXXol erid od nol^fns.-t^B bIXbo 

iteiJi^c' r.rf;t ".o fioldf-p.lrrr. --xfi e,.;v; d"! :f&d:t * * *" jeXsa lo s©ioeb ©rict 


insists that the finding was warranted by the evidence. Plaintiff 
contends that "it is well settled that an agreement to pay a 
mortgage by a purchaser from the mortgagor need not be contained 
in the deed but may be shown by any other writing or by parol 
evidence," that the chancellor's finding was not made dependent 
upon the assumption clause in the deed and that it must be assumed 
that the finding was based upon all competent evidence in the record 
that tended to prove what the intention of the parties was. Neither 
plaintiff nor the Pattons offered any oral evidence as to the under- 
standing or intention of the parties, but plaintiff insists that 
the excliange contract, properly construed, obligated appellant to 
pay the mortgages. She concedes that the words, "subject to 
mortgage," used in the contract "are net relevant to the question 
of personal liability," but she argues that the use of the words, 

"parties of the first part to release parties of the second part 

from collateral loan,'' iBagj^sofflSbc in the exchange agreement/the 

Gliancellor's construction of the contract. Tested by the exchange 

agreement, alone, plaintiff would be obligated t© release the 

Pattons from the collateral loan held by the Avenue State Bank, 

The undisputed evidence of Peregrine shows, however, that at the 

closing of the exchange transaction when Crumb gave his personal 

note for $7,400 to the Bank Peregrine marked the Patton note paid 

and cancelled and returned It to the Pattons, Patton later destroying 

it; that as a part of the transaction the Bank retained the fire 

trust deeds and the five notes as collateral to the note of Crumb, 

Patton, a witness in the case, did not contradict in any way the 

testimony given by Peregrine, nor did he offer any evidence to 

support the verified cross-complaint filed by himself and wife 

in which they allege that the Bank promised to return the notes to 

the Pattons when the loan was paid, but th&t after said loan was 

paid, in breach of its agreement, the Bank delivered said notes 

and trust deeds to Crumb and that as a result of said breach of 


Jpg^^q ftf TEQ 5liit*tiiw isxtto "Sifis xcf amodz od t^^ ^^ £)«efe 9ri;J nl 

3jitti5.§6 8«f d"axu^ J ijxifi bs&b Bii'S nl ©ecslo aoltqat/aeB ^rfd- noqi; 

J&aoosi €>£ici ni esnsi)iv9 d'£»&;t9qm)D lis noqe fceascf bjbw '^nlbciil sdt i&riS 

'Z9siil&& , esvr «§>Jd'afiq ®ri.^ lo aolirt&ial sd:3f ,JBffw »voiq o.1 bsbas^ isdi 

'-lohass sxi;t oJ- as 90j;^e»i:)i:ve Iaio ^na fce-iaHo axio,*^*'? erfj^ ion lllcfnlislq 

.steiajijt I'txd^nijslq cfwcf ^asid-iB<i Sffl lo i3oJ:^ii»d-xil 10 ^nlbnA:}* 

oj oXi&IX®.q<ie 6©itfi8lidc ^bm-iiZGioo \:IiBqoiq ^j-08T[:tf!:oo sgnsrioxs ©il;t 

^2/jiow 0£[,:1 ^fBjdi eofisoiioo 9x18 .Sf)3S3d"'io£i ©rid' xs<I 


(S'SiAj;aoesi&v[^G agiisaoxe erij' aX xjooconec '\flB0X X;3T«d'«XXoD asoiT: 

&di ssssXe'j oJ- jfesd'agiXdo ad feXiJow lllctnXsXq ,9iioXfl ^dneiiissiSB 

,lnsa d^iKt-S ©juw&vA s^ii" ^^ Meii iiaoX Xsisc^bXXoo »i{:t B»il Bflod^;t8*I 

and" d. ^lovewoil ^swoiie ©joiiso'xa^ lo sonsblvo bf^jtcqaifcrm sxlT 

Xfifi02i©q aXri ©VJ3S fitew^iS iie4w fioMofiSiiBi.t asiiMoxs ©ri^ lo gnXeoXo 

^aixoi^QQb loiBl ao^iii'^i ^aiiodctsH &di oi jl fesfiTUJ-si bus fceXXaonso bna 

9fi^ •^av? ijns nx ;iolbeiin.oo ion btb ,98.qo srU" aX aeencMw s ^ao.-tds^ 

sliw baa IXeajaXxi ^cf bsllt d-fiXsXqfiioo-asoio baXliiiSV eri:f AfioqquE 

ocf 8 9^ on ©il:t aiis^Bi oi b^almoio: -skxAil odi imio 9t©XX« xedd doMv al 

esw nfioX bl.'aa isd-la ;JsxI:l ctircf jbiaq ejsw hgoX ©ricf aodw &xio:fi^ 9rf:^ 

2e;ton bl;>e bo«i»vxI«b JkutE sd:*' ^d'noos&'Xgii e^l lo ripjs»«icf aJ: ^fclaq 

*t-o rfoRPiri f,frta ^& ^J-IiTK^n £ EB *af!:J bus ctau/TiO Oct' eb^©b tiufii bim 


agreement said notes and trust deeds came into the hands of Stella 

McFadden, and that the Fattens haye been put to great expense to 

defend this case and pray that the Bank may be required to reimburse 

them with the amounts expended in connection with the preparation 

of their defense. The testimony of Peregrine shows conclusively 

that at the time of the closii^the exchange transaction and as a 

part of it the Pattons allowed the Bank to retain the notes and 
trust deeds as collateral security for the f 7,400 note of Crumb, 
and that they did not even insist upon appellant's signing that 
note. Patton aiade no attempt to explain why he allowed all this to 
be done and the record is barren as to the exact understanding be- 
tween Patton and Cruiab in reference to the collaterali that there 
must have been an understanding is clear » The answer of Avenue 
State Bank to the cross-complaint of the Pattons, verified by 
Peregrine, alleges^ inter alia i 

"That on or prior to February 25# 1930f the said William A» 
Patton and A, Louise Patton proposed to this defendant that they 
would cause the said Herbert D. Gruaib to execute and deliver, in 
payment of the principal of their said collateral note, his collater. 
note to this defendant in ths like principal sum of $7,400 and would 
cause the same to be secured by deposit of the same said mortgage 
notes aad trust deeds as collateral security therefor; and they 
accordingly did, on the day last aforesaid, cause the said Herbert 
D, Crumb to execute and deliver to this defendant his note as above 
mentioaed with a collateral agreement appended signed by said Berber' 
B, Crumb, reciting delivery by him to this defendant of the aforemen- 
tioned mortgage notes and trust deeds, as collateral security to sai( 
note so executed and delivered by himj and this defendant thereupon 
accepted said note and collateral agreement of the said Herbert D. 
Crumb, in payment of the principal of said collateral note of said 
William A, Patton and A, Louise Patton, they then and there paying 

bIL^'u lo Srhn&d. &xif oSai »&&o ztm»b disi^ baa ee;foa blBB ;?n»a9»*r5£ 

oj- ^ajLtsqr© iMfitg o^ SSsq .a«»cf levari snQ3Ss^. nd^ SsjA:^ bsin ^nsbbetoU 
Biijcfrnxs-i- oS bB-stspei od' vas sSaaS ©rid itsiJ? '^^'iq Bna eas» eiitf 5ii»l«^6 

;t^cJ- sisijO^its R»J"iiislI®qqfi ^qir Jet ajEiJ: nsvs ;toa bib -t»ri^ ^afi;t baa 
3l aJtrft XXi3 &«woiI.e ■ari ^w nt^ffx* oi a^qoe^rfa out ebma ao&i^ ,»Sotx 
-»sf %edSmB&'S'i^bn£5 t&MX9 e^i ii&iiad ai fiioesn «BiiJ' feiui ctoob •«? 

site ■ , oflXs el 3iili)ii6.Je'rf»&iiu as ne^tj ©vari tejcfiJi 

♦A fiisXXXlV: m:U ^0£^X ^^2 ^TSi;j'i€rf¥^ ^ ^Ifrl^iq 10 no ^firff 

t<MiJ .fjiidd^ .lnB6/ie'3:^e£! eiri,r o^^ M&©'sfoiq cot:? is*! ^aluoj ,A fcttB flo:t^fi1t 

iU ^HfSViXelJ Bsjs «icf&'o«>3 ©i cteK'TO ,Q '^tB^ia^i bine mi^ ©ejy«s bXirow 

'jSb11qs> Eld ^sd-ois Xs^&;fjBXX<srs &ijs« iXsf{.t lo Xsqittriiiq «ii£i 5o inwexRfl 

ti/ow beta OO'P'^Y^ lo msz liSfLilostt'iq s-sflX erf^ ftl SAabaBl^b aldi o;t SKfou 

©SjaX^r^OM file 8 ®ffi£a ®xicr lo vlaaqeb x^ bt'WiSr^z s^d o^ wobs ©rf^ »«053 

tsxl? Ms iiolsrrfjricr x:tl'mc*^s. Xs'fetjsXXes s^ fif>«»©^ ^faxf'x;^ bOM Z9ioa 

^^'secf-xsH J&Jfcae sjcW »Sifso ^lAX^ets^o' i^sX Tt«b »i^ no ^ftJtft xXanlbior^rs 

avode fiiS eian &tM ^itftliiia»t»& »Xii[j .. , vJtXsl) bet& ®;t«o«x«» o:t «fs»i' ,- 

srfi«»H j&isa td b®iisifi b»M*q£?-=> •^-r ,? r,.r.,s I&i^aXXoo « ii^Xir &»iioJt:>T!??s(i 

B8 oi xfi-KTsea Xai9^fiXX©t ... 4-.... ..... . ..^ .: biiB fiscton ®3«s^noa b9noX;t 

*flr ^i»rfit?H bl„ _ _.„_ :.r^ • c^.y«JJ X«Tt»c!'«l£o9 &iJB »;?oii fcia« bei'qeooA 

the accrued interest thereon, and cancelled and Siorrendered to them 
said last mentioned collateral note so paid, all on the day last 
aforesaid} and the said William A, Patton and A. Louise Patton then 
and there either (1) received from this defendant the said mortgage 
notes and trust deeds, and delivered the same to said Hebbert D» 
Crumb who then and there delivered them to this defendant as 
collateral security to his note as aforesaid, ©r (2) then and there 
directed and consented that the same be retained and held by this 
defendant as collateral security to said note of Herbert D. Crumb, 
in accordance with the provisions of said note and the collateral 
agreement appended thereto; thereafter said mortgage notes and 
trust deeds were held by this defendant as collateral security to 
said note of Herbert D, Crumb 'ontil September 9, 1930, on which 
date the said Herbert D. Crumb paid his said note and this defendant 
thereupon, to-wit, on or prior to September 10, 1930, cancelled and 
surrendered t© the said Herbert D. Crumb his aforesaid collateral 
note so paid, aM surrendered to him the said notes and trust deeds 
so held as collateral security thereto, this defendant having ha.d 
no notice from the said William A. Patton or A. Louise Patton that 
the same should be disposed of, upon payment of said note, other than 
by surrender to the said Herbert D. Crumb," 

Patton, in his testimony, made no attempt to dispute the 
allegations in the aforesaid answer, nor have the Pattons appealed 
from that part of the decree that dismisses their cross -complaint 
for want of equity. On September 9, 1930, Crumb paid in full his 
note for $7,400 and the Bank forwarded the five notes and trust 
deeds to him. If we assume that Crumb later negotiated these 
mortgage notes, nevertheless, that fact, under all the evidence, 
would not make appellant personally liable for the notes. If 

Crumb had no right to negotiate the notes - and the evidence fails 
to show that he had no such right - the Pattons and the Bank, alone. 

fits/. .• .yrrBbtv^^-isj^ btiB feeXIeatfisO bus ^ao&*i»dS ;tae>is»^nl b&atot>B arid- 

tfi^.l •^sl) . ^fcls^ 08 6*0X1 Isisd-jBlIoo b©nol;tn»fl« ^eel fclse 

•toc^^s'? aatirol .A i^ns aot$&^ ,A ffislIIlW Jblss eilt hns jf)i:«aeiol.8 

..jg^nom big: i i&frsleJb aJbci;t fliD«r1: fcsvJteoei (X) leilitls Bietii haa 

»<2 d-i9cf:f©' jiBS ©ilj^ f»&i©V±l9b fens ,BJb»©fe d-eirc^t haa BoSoa 

as ;tii£f'ir='^r^ 2l:xl;t oj- atsxii- fc««!SvlI»Jb ensxfcf fees iisrid- oriw (fMfiO 

.. ;- • _. trui sd^oii *■.;:!>? 'tc acoiaivoiq »f(j- if^j-rijf sciiBfcioooB al 

o^ -^j^Hif^:?;!'. Tr.-T^i.-i-. :. . .i3J6£i:9*i9fe sirf;}' x^ J&Xeri ©"sqw ef>e«b tsx/id- 

iiolilw i.„ t ..;,.. ,. ..3<fiES.^(j9B £i&£ijj rfciiiD .d ctT&cfieH to scton Mse 
....^i;'.j2st®fe aMd- biis od-on bias sM biaq dsua-iO ,^ jfn»cf*sH fcXcB s?x!:f d;tBi5 

'GA -^sil'v:-^- ■^....- ^oi9t&A& -^iiiirosa Xs^scfjsXXos ea blsd ot 

■^.orid- rtotJ-B<I e.^ lO iic;t:f'~ .* -rrslXXiW fclae edi moil ©dWon on 

^:- •' '; ^-*- ■ ■■ i jneiBtBq uj'j^' ,'1o fesesqelfc scf bXirtsrfe scibb «drl;t 

iijo'tqi^ sn; .\j iivzn 'xoi: ^-it^v ii;s f»l;seeno'!l:s ?idi til affoi^sseXXa 

dxtJtBXqisoo-sfi "ID 'xtarid- esssimslt' tsdi seis*Jb sdi lo ii&q SaAi aoil 
sir: XXrl ni bi^sq disi/'iO ^0£^I ,^ idcfmsd-qer csD ,x^lsip9 to cJxisw nol 

sasri^t f)od-sXd-039n leisl cTbu/iO cfsfl;t sanjaeB si? 11 ,Bihl od' a6e»f) 

'^.I ,a9:tort c;ij lol eXcffiiX xXXsnoe^'sq jnaXXsqqjs daCsffl ^J^on filiiow 

3riJ fcns « EQd-on 9j:i:f ©itaXJossn o:^ jrls-ti on Jbiarf dasuiO 
,&noX£ ^lia&E sriS baB snozipA Bdi - ctxlsii rfojLiE on fcad 6d i&di worie o:r 

put it in his power to negotiate the notes; yet the deficiency 
judgment is entered against appellant, alone, although she did 
nothing that would give Crumb any such power. The proof shows 
clearly that the Pattons have no right to complain that the provi- 
sion in question in the exchange agreement was not fully carried 
out by the Crumbs, Neither plaintiff nor her mother wer* parties 
to the exchange agreement and there is no evidence that either had 
any knowledge of the exchange agreement at the time the mother ob- 
tained the notes. We find no merit in plaintiff's argument that 
if full effect is given to all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the exchange agreement and the deed 
the finding of the chancellor as to the intention of the parties 
can be sustained. We hold that the use of the words in the ex- 
change contract, viz., "parties of the first part to release parties 
of the second part from collateral loan," do not support the chan- 
cellor's interpretation of the contract and are not sufficient to 
support the deficiency judgment against appellant. Ho one disputes 
plaintiff's right to a foreclosure and sale of the property in 

The decree of foreclosure found "that physical delivery of 
said deed was made to H. D, Criuab, and that lU D. Crumb v/as author- 
ized to accept the said deed by Rowena G. Crumb on her behalf and 
as her agent," and plalntii'f argues that the proof sustains this 
finding. The theory of plaintiff's case as set forth in her 
complaint is that "Rowena G. Crumb, a widow, is the record holder 
of the equity of redemption of said premises; that she assumed 
and agreed to pay the aforesaid mortgage," Appellant filed her 
answer alleging that the deed was never delivered to her nop 
accepted by her, and that she never agreed to assume the mort- 
gages, but plaintiff did not then amend her complaint nor did 
she file a replication to the answer. Appellant asserts tiiat 
the theory of agency v/as not advanced at the hearing and that 

Xt>n:9lotlBb esl& isx \B3ion 9il;t eSslio^sn oi lewoq eJLri ni :tJt issq 

awoxls 'too^q ©dT .iswoq rlojje y^s dan/TO ©vis tluow iBsii ^cilsiSoa 

-IvoiQ ®il;t iBdi niBlqfaoo od" d'llsli out svesl nnoi:fB^ sfli tB£ii x^'i'^^^^ 

fe«iiieo xllaJ. ion esw cJ-nsatesigs sgusxiox© &d:T n.t aoliaBup al nols 

afiiiieq *rr«w •iod:J'ora leri ion 'I1l:fat&lq 'i9Ait9¥. .acfouiO eilJ- x^ itso 

b&sl i&d&x: on^^foive on ai ©lerlJ- feoB ;ffl9ffle©isfi oan&riDXf) 8ri;f oj- 

:^d" ^neafjjgiy a»1113'nlBlq ui d-ii&ffi on bnti e'A" .8©^on ©rW- bpnx£j- 

^Bi:fiBq Bd:^ lo ixoxd'iiecriiJ: erfcf oi e£ noliaoxisrio edit lo gnlbnil 9f{;t 

«X3 ©ii:f jal sbiow srid" to self ®ri:f i&d:^ bJiod ©Y7 , 5snijs;:f si/g sd nso 

jjid-iBq eeaslsi oj vt!iaq Jsiil &M lo gsld-iaq" ^,slv f_So&iiaoo agnsrio 

-afiiio oxij- :tioqqxjs -Jon ob *\nBOI XjsiscJ-jelloo «oil ;fiBq bnooeE 9ilc^ lo 

jioilli ^ ..-OLB So&n^^oDo ©lid" lo iioi:;)-fi:f®aqi»itnJ: e'toll^o 

es^xjqelb en .^nfill«qq£ d-enljsgs ^^aesaa^hul •^anaistl^Jb eitt cJ-ioqqxre 

ni xi'tecc- als« &h6 eTueoIoo-xol £ od" jilal'i a * tlld-nlslq 


: ^iGvlisb L&oJLsrvda .tsricJ-" fctmol ©nxigolssiot ^o eoioeb sriT 

--ttcuicJjjfi Siiv dmMiC . . ^ . . . -iBm zb\'j bBS>b bt&t 

has llBd&d 'xQd jso dmaiO . . basv/oH -^a 5*=ssh feiee j?il:^ J-qsoos o:!' bssl 

sJLiiif sjaisd-e*fe loo-: ild- 8?i«gin -J.q fwiB '^J^neaB led eb 

Tf^il nt riiio'^. Jfs ?--, ---e::) r.''^'ixtniBlq lo xiosJ^'W" ©d^ .gnlbnll 

^ t ' GftewoH" itBil^ ax drilsJqnioo 

isiut'aas erie tad^t jseelfflSMq Mr.. i^tqniebsi "^o -^cfltrp© ©rl;t lo 

led boXtl ;tn6ll9v „ -sTjj-'rom bjtsaeiola ©rid- x^Q o^ fceeiss baa 

rott 'i&d oi be". : -sw fceal; eilj- cffiri;:t gitJtssIIfi leweaB 

-d-iofls sxiJ- ©fflxrEas ;"• f>~s»i3je oisraa ©/la ^tsilcf bos ^isii xcf bsd^qsows 

£)!£> non jaisilqi' baaaiB xiexlcf ;torf I)xb lllcl^xijtslq iud ^aesBg 


the master made no finding as to the alleged agency of the hus- 
band, and she contends that the finding of the chancellor that 
the husband acted as agent of appellant is not sustained by the 
proof. We agree with tliis contention. We als© agree with 
appellant's further contention that "if Herbert D. Crumb held 
himself out as the agent of his wife (and there is no evidence 
that he did), persons dealing with him would be bound at their 
peril to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but the extent 
©f his authority as such agent;" that "this rule is particularly 
true where, as here, the agent is also personally interested in the 
transsctlonj" that "the authority of anyone to accept for her a deed 
?,'ith an assumption clause, having been explicitly denied by Rowena 
G. Crumb, the burden muso rest upon the plaintiff to show certainly 
and specifically that the authority was grantedj and there is no 
evidence of agency in the ease at bar." The Pattens made no 
attempt to contact appellant, and, as heretofore stated, the Bank 
dealt exclusively with Crumb and the Fattens. It is significant 
that neither the Bank nor the Pattons asked appellant to sign the 
$7,400 collateral note executed by Crumb, 

After giving careful consideration to the instant appeal 
we have concluded that under the facts and the law the chancellor 
erred in finding in the decree of November 8, 194-0, that appellant 
was liable for any deficiency, and in entering its decree of 
December 23, 1940, folding appellant liable for the deficiency of 

The decree of the Circuit court of Cook county of December 

23* 19'*--0, is reversed ijn to to ; the decree of the Circuit court of 

Cook county of November 8, I940, in so far as it adjudges that 
appellant is liable for any deficiency, is reversed, 

DECREE OF NOVEMBER 8, 1940, IN 30 FIR AS f-^ ' 
Sullivanj, P4 .T», and Friend, J,, concur *» [ ti^'" 

ii^i* «©'£ie ©»X* »'- ^zcx:}£:c4rK)o alfSi dStw ®««iaiJ ■tW .loottq 

hl^ii dsmtC ,0. S%&4%B^ Vl" i^^di iietiae:}aot i^sHiuJ. 8*;tn«XXe'qq« 

eaKsirave oii al si^xW Bisfi) ©liw «lui lo JTis^is pcij s.s ctao IXeamIri 

Xl^&lui3.UiBq, aX sXi/n eirlJ' ^tsd^ "id'ess* ilOJ^c es x^ i-io^Huz Bid lo 
ed:f fii b^&B9'j.s$ni xll&aosteq oeXe ai ;tns3a sdi ,ei»jtl es ^sisilir ©in:;)' 

aaewoH x^f Issinsfe T£X:^Jt©J:X<TX9 latsocf b«Xv»x/ ^eaiisXe fxolcJ-qiawBeii hb ittXw 

\;XnjU^'i65 woria oi^ 'jtlWaXfiXq edi aoqju ^eei y«Wii» usoiBif 9dt ^timtrO ,C 

,1 ai &T?>j;lt .f. s j^»;tfidry.£ es^ vli^ojl^:^;^ efW ;^fiti^ ^XXfiSXlXosqe ixxxfi 

iiixJBg srid- ,&«4s^e Qto'io4^'S9£L «« ^bajs ^i'nfiXXeqqfi d'osd'noo o;J ^qar©/d-« 

irL&sllXnsi'- . aojcta^ ©ii;^ &/is cfaoiiO ricTiw xX»vlairXpxs :fXB9Jb 

f>d;t agxjE oi JM&ll&q(^» kmL&E ^aoi^ttfi mU ion 3lfl«S ^dS ^ediisn. isicU 

.dJOJJiO xc^ b^jiiOBXB &iorx XfiieitfiXXp?^ 0C\^$ 

IXsiOfiJeiio «if* wM 9di bsm z^pB"! mii t^i>mj iBiSi b&bsJlQnoo ©vatl sw 

■c fcsiasi) B^'l sut'Sf'^H'?^ cl fea« ,xon©J:si:l9£> •^ae lO*! ©XtfsXX 6»w 


;tefli e.e^hulb ... -0•^§X <": isda^voK lo xSasioa alooO 

.' -a'xeve'i Ei ^x^asioilt.^b xas io1 sXcf&lX si cfjxsXXeqqa 

V... ^, S. „ , - . ., . -- 

» ''■ 

«w ._-- SiSlJV. 


ex rel» ERICK ANDERSON et al., "i '/ ' 


CITY OF CHICA^-'et al.. 



^^ ' Appellants, 


On December 31, 1938, twenty-seven relators filed their 
petition for a writ of mandaoaus to compel the payment by respond- 
ents of certain sums of money alleged to have been wrongfully 
deducted from the salaries of the relators for the years 1933 
to 1936, inclusive, while the relators were employed by the 
City of Chicago as brick pavers. After respondents filed an 
answer the relators filed a reply thereto. The trial court^ 

after considering the cause upon the pleadings and evidence 

introduced, entered/judgment order that a writ of siandamus 

issue directing respondents to pay to each of the relators 

a certain sum of money. The total amount ordered to be paid 

to the twenty-seven relators was $19,360, The judgment order 

required payments for the year 1934- and subsequent years. 

Payment was not required for the year 1933 as it was agreed 

that even if the claim for that year was valid the claim was 

barred by the Statute of Limitations, 

The petition alleges that the City of Chicago is a 

municipal corporationi that the city council consists of the 

mayor and fifty aldermen; that the city council is required, 

under Section 2A of Article 711 of the Cities and Villages 

Act, to pass annually an appropriation bill; tha.t on June 14, 

1933# the city council passed the annual appropriation bill 

©f the City for the year 1933} that Oscar F, Hewitt was duly 

appointed Commissioner of Public Works, with power to appoint 

X c ' ■■■- — 

., . ( ^^ ^*IB is^^KUOEiO •50 yi'io 

«.iiJOo SET "iTO loiHt'^d mw QSHaviJ^ra «AJMD8 SOIT^ ,flK 

«itJ t^ bs^dlqj. ... ._u..I - -iiit elJtriw ^»TiBxrX6nl ^^£^1 od 

eon.-. Ih 'jCJ3' lioefi; aEirso ©rid- sulieblanoo iq^Ib 

fcifi- : w.:^ . jltoj-oj- »i!T .-^cenoftr lo intra atBiTei> b 

i9bic, . u:5iLi.vij.,!jL . '>£^?X$ 8i3w 8iod'sI©i n©vo3-»xtfl»wi sricf od" 

,"-'" " ;/:• Bns •^£^1 1&BX ^•^J" " "^ "^a»f1a:^sq bsiixrpei 

r.-^^i- ""'"-J ■■ -- -•-' - ■"- '-• ■ ;on SBW :f£tein\:B*I 

aow mi.:-. ■; so^; jsii. ';o'. nx.^io ?>xtj' 1:1 n»V9 ^sriJ- 

. -ic" ■ -n ■■' ""1 9d-i?d-6;f3 ©ftt ytf bsiiBd 

'.^xij" 10 tjjaiiuioD IJicriJLroc. Y^tio ©xii .tfidd- 4/10 let anoqioo laqiolmm 

t_i:n-:ji.: ■ "■' • jftsaraebljs ■^j^lll bxis lo^aa 

asgijILiv ^ii;: cclJlo &ii: ' '■ "o AS noidoeS lebaa 

^•^X smiL ISO iaiU jXXicf floiJ il'iqw'ivjsiii .i^^, Tt-!^I.5Jjnnfi sajsq oi ^ioA 

Hid aoli&iiqoiqqB LsmmB Biii bens&q Itomsoo xilo 9tii ^££^X 

Xlub asw d-d-lw«l . cferlc^ {££?X taey €>rf;t nol x^i" arf* lo 

dnioqqa oi i«woq xi;ti:v/ ^aaf-Ml^ olXtfiy^ lo isnoldeliKWoD b^d-nloqqB 


all subordinates of the office; that within the Bureau of Streets 
of the City there has been established a division known as the 
Pavement, Improvement & Repair Division of the said Bureau; that 
the relators are duly certified by the Civil Service Corami.ssi©n 
of the City for appointment in said division of said Bureau as 
brick pavers, and that for the years I933 to I936, inclusive, 
the salaries for said position were fixed for the respective years 
in the annual appropriation bills at the per diem amount of $12; 
that for the years I933 to I936, inclusive, the relators worked 
and performed their duties as brick pavers, but the City failed to 
pay them at the rate of $12 per day but paid them at the rate of 
$10 a day and thereby deprived them of $2 per day for each of the 
days they v/orked during the years I933 to 19 36, inclusive; that 
relators worked five days a week for a period of nine months during 
the years 1933 to I936 and that the defendant was indebted to the 
relators on December 3I, I936, in th6 sum of $40,320; that relators 
have requested the City to pay them their lawful salaries for said 
years, but the City has neglected and refused to make such payment. 

The petition prays that a writ of mandamus issue against all 
of the defendants commanding them to perform any and all acts 
necessary to pay to the relators the amounts owing to them. 

The answer of respondents, filed on May 24, 1939* admits 
the allegations referring to the incorporation of the city, the 
passage of the annual appropriation bills, and the election of 
the officers; denies that the position of brick paver was created 
by the general ordinances of the City, as alleged in paragraph 9 
of the petition, but avers that the position of brick paver was 
provided for by the annual appropriation bills passed by the 
city council for the years I933 to 1936, inclusive; denies that 
the salaries for the position of brick paver weie fixed by the city 
council for the years 1933 to I936, inclusive, in the annual appro- 

S.^j ititi^tsi^ bpis arid- lo noisJ-vid ilajsfl A d'nemsvoiqml ^ctnaowa*! 

aoleaiaKO-D solyieS liviO Piicf x<^ Jboilid^ieo ^jJUfb eis etoialsi ed& 

8B W£»t»a btse I0 tb bJtsa nl ^iisfiririJLOqqfi 10I -^i^tlO sri^ lo 

jSX^ lo cfxitro^a issib ,n®q. sdj^ d^£ zllldjioli&liqGiqqs Lzisnaa adi al 

fiaiicw e'lOo'BXcnE sit;!' ^eviei/Xaiil t^£(?X o;t ££?X ettas-^-.e^^ lol .;t^^ 

o;t bsXisl xil'O odi. iud f^iii9V&% 2loxicf as &&liub il&di bemz.o'lioq, ba& 

"lo s^J^fii arf<t cJ^js fnsxid^ bt&q iad x^ '^^ SX$ lo 6:tan «xii d^js ««d;t xsq 

Bdi I0 dQS6'. „ .b leq S$ lo arsii;J bB-^liqob xd9i:6di ba& xsb b 0X$ 

fodi i^vlzsjloxix ^^i^l Q:^ ^£?X E^«ex edi gnJtii/b ba^iow x^^^ ax^^ 

^lisjb Bd^aom sails to feoXtcaq & stpl aCeew & e-^sb svXl fcei'jjow 8ioJ-«X9«i 

8io;tsXsi d'siiJ' 40S£^0H io msa edi al <^t?X <X£ iscfmeiioG no zioi&lsi. 
bl3Z io"! aoiifilsa XtrlwsX ^isxU aadi xs^. oJ .^d-XO adJ- bsj-esx/pei ^vsri 

XXj3 j-enXsgii e#28X, exnaaiinLBfii lo ilm ,i iadJ s^Biq floX,JXd-&q sxIT 

c*03 IXfi &as Yiis Ci'xolisq oJ' aa^j gnX^Jisfiaiiaoo aJ'flsJbmsls.f) edi Io 

,sz&di Qi i.ilrc aJiiwofits sxIJ e-ioiuXsa sfli o;f xjnq oct x^L-saEsodn 

ad'XailjB ^^£^1 <. „:t no JbsXxl ^a^asbnpqaei Io lewanc eifT 

9£i;J t'\C;tIo &dS Io xxpld^euoqiooni sssfd- ocJ- g^liislsn aaoliB^ella edi 

Io noX;tosX9 axfcf feoa ^aXXXd xjoiiijlnqoaqqjB Xflirnoa 6di Io sgjBsaBq 

fesd'BS'io esw isvaq afolTi; i^j noi:;t£2oq ari^t iadi zela&b taisoillo iMl;t 

^ riqaigarLsq nX fes3Sl_ . -„ t'^d'iO &di to seonanXbrio Xjaaansg sxtt xcJ 

zmu tf^&q 2loXicf Io aoi:;tJt2oq 9di isdi^ easvs Jwcf ^noX;tXd-9q edi Io 

Bdi ^d J&eaasq aXXlcf jnGX.:t«X'xqoiqqs Xamrnfi oiid^ X<f /JO'i iJsbJtvonq 

cfjsil^ eeXaoJo {©viawXoiiX ^^Z^l oi ££^X eifi«x »J^ tol lloamo xtlo 

Y-tXo f-'n:^ xo f^3> /"' ^r®'' levaq aiol'icf "io iiolilaQq erW 'lol asl-usXee edS 

-oiqqc Xfii/xine en- .1- ^ vlauXoni ^.<)£^X od' ££^X eissx °d:^ 10'i XXoruJoo 


priation bills passed for those respective years at the per diem 
amount of $12, but avers that the annual appropriation bills of 
those years appropriated for the position of brick pavers in a 
certain manner (as hereinafter appears). The appropriation bills 
and the respective Sections 8 of each appropriation bill for the 
years 1933 to 19 36, Inclusive, are set out verbatim in the answer. 
The answer avers that the relators that worked and performed their 
duties earned their salaries for the years 1933 to 193^ at the 
rate fixed by the city council of the City in the annual appro- 
priation bills for the respective years. The answer admits 
that the City paid t© the relatorsthat worked and performed 
their duties as brick pavers the sum of $10 per dayj denies 
that respondents deprived the relators of $2 a day for each of 
the days they worked during the said years; denies that there is 
any money owing to the relators or that the agents of the City 
have made promises to pay to relators moneys alleged to be due 
them from the City, The answer further denies that there are any 
moneys on hand with whichto pay to the relators any amounts 
alleged to be due them| avers that during the years 1933i> 1934-, 
1935 and 1936 the city council, in the annual appropriation bills 
for the respective years, provided for a reduction of all salaries 
and wages for all officers and employees at the rate of seventy- 
eight days for the years 1933, 1934 and 1935> and thirty-nine 
days for the year I936; that all officers and employees were 
paid on the basis of such reduced appropriation in accordance 
with the provisions of Sections 8 in the respective annual 
appropriation bills; that the relators, as brick pavers, were 
similarly paid on the basis- of the reduced appropriations as 
aforesaid} that each of said relators received a warrant drawn 
upon the city treasurer signed by the mayor and countersigned by 
the city comptroller for each semi-«ionthly period of his employw 

alXlcf jlO'±:Jfilrrq©'rqq^ siiT .(a^seqqfi isitantBioti 8«) isrniam nlei^so 

arid^ lol ^lld floid^si^qoiqqjs rioBS lo 8 acoilosa evi;tt>©q2»n ©rl;t bna 

^'iswercs 9ri.t ni flticfsrfTsv :fi8ra~ ;t«a sis ^-svlarrlonl t^E^I o;t ££<?! a*is©x 

sjrfd^ :^a ^£I?I oj- ii^Jt si&&% 3if-t lol ssiislBe li&d:} bBai&e eslctub 

— 05qqs Xsjomis @di at xitO enS lo Xioni/oo x^lo ©riS' ^cf bexll siAi 

eiimbR i^wsfiB silT ,aiB©x 9^tioeqsBi Bdi lol: elXlcf noicf-filiq 

fesflno^isq bns fcasi^row cf-arid-eio^sXs^ri aii;:^ o^ blaq x^^'^ ^dcf jJBxit 

aeineb jXBb isq 0X.'5 lo mcs arlct sievEq jJoirrrf es 8&±ixj5 ilsif^ 

1:0 flos® lot xab s S$ to sioJ-fiXei Qsii b^vltqeb ztn^bnoqz9>i i&d:i 

X^iO ejd;t "io sJ-asga MS ^sd:^ ic gio;tsXe>^ *itJ oJ- gxilwo ^^noa x^** 

9tr6 ©cf fl';t ^©^©IXs e^sijosr 8^©iaX9i oi -^eq oJ- g^alaoiq 9l>fiiH svjri 

vr-rn oTa ^iadc^ ;tsjdd' 8€>laefc lerid-iBfl; 'fdwena «?£fT ,x^i:0 S'lij' aorrt: in9rl;t 

^•^C^I t^€f-^ ais©x 9d& -gjiliub t&d:t aieTF. jsariJ »xrfc ecf o:f f)ss9XXis 

eXXM aolj'filiqo^qqjB Xisxrnns sd^ nl ^Xionuoo t^io ©ftt d£^X ferts ^£^X 

;oI*i^Xije IXxi lo noicfotfbei s rrol 6s5Xvoiq ^eiBf^Y »vi:l'09q80i edi lol 

-^cfcsveE lo ^d-si odi js aseico-^tj^as fens a»x«Di':lo XXs Tol a^gsw brus 

stntcr-^ j •iM;^ bi\& ,^£^X fens -^c?^ %££^I 8^8®-% erlJ- lol ff^sft ;trisJt» 

9im! a»©^oiqap> bar. aisolllo XXb fadJ <^£^X n^^x ^^Id' *i<rt syrsb 

9imBbi<3oor, nl tioli&lnqo'^.qqsi fe^fttrfcei done lo e.ttB(S srii no blBq 

XatrnfiB ?»v±.+3ftc.'"' ■ - '■' ' 8 Sitiotio^Q lo anolslvoiq silct rfo'lw 

»i9w ^aisvsq 3foXid .;j: ^c;-i<.;jBX?>i 9iii ctfixJi {sXXicf nolctsliqorrqqs 

EB aaojfcctsJnqoiqqii b&6ifj&s'i ©titf lo siEsd ©rfi no bX^q x-E^«J^i«l8 

rmcab i^asTjT - ' - ' 2rro;J-!?X?T fcl.68 lo iioso cfsxld- {fclBceiolB 

Y*"! f>fta3Xsi9d"flx/oo .ori;:. •xo-^(;'^.va 9f{:f ^ccf fe^nsie larmaRs^^t •^*lo »/ld' noqi; 

•-ijoXqaa airf lo fcoli'^q ■^©B rion« lol i9XXoi;Jqaiot» x^io -sriit 


ment in an amount equal to the salaries or wages of such position 
earned during that period by said relators; that each ©f said re- 
lators presented or caused to be presented to the city treasurer 
each of said warrants and received and accepted the amount thereof 
for the labor or service stated for such period; that prior to the 
issuance of said voucher each of said relators signed an identifica- 
tion slip and receipt in form as follows: 

"City of Chicago Pay Roll Line No, 

"Department of .____.__ 

"Bureau of lo, ____^ Days 

"Date 193 Amoxmt $ 

"Identification and Receipt 
"(Hot Transferable) 

"Name ____ 

"For period ending 

"Official in Charge » 
"Received the amount above named, for the labor or service 
as stated, which was performed for the benefit &s& account of th» 
City of Chicago, and has not heretofore been paid. 

"Employee's Signature, 

that by reason of the execution and presentation of said receipt 
the relators are estopped from making any further claim for the 
same servicesupon which that claim is based. The answer further 
avers that the relators are guilty of laches in failing to petition 
any court of competent ^jurisdiction immediately after the passage 
of the annual appropriation ordinance for each year to amirit the 
vo-it of mandamus to compel the city council to appropriate each 
year an amount sufficient to pay the full salaries claimed by 
relators during each year; that relators knew immediately after 
the passage of the appropriation ordinance for each such year 

-ai fejt^a "ia iiiiis^ J^iBrfd" {Bnoctalsn fclBS -^cf Jbol^eq j'^bcIj aalii/b teniae 

^si&Eijeiil' twxo 0^;t o;J 5®;tjaiE'«9iq «d oj- fieaxjBO no fc9;tnsa9iq sioial 

lo^isal^ d-ixjcioas add" fei>^<j9tJ0S bae. b»-vtsoBi bas 6:^a&iissw bl&B lo doB9 

edi Oij iai:««€|; $js4^ ij&ojtieq iJoxfe nol i)sd-aJ'2 ©olvisa lo iocTbX ©rid- aol 

•'£,sltlij^'Qbt (m Jbfrxiaie eioJ-sXo'i JbiBS lo liosa leilouov f)±B8 lo ooiisweei 

:awoIXol ss jctol ni iqlBo^T. brm qlXe nold' 

♦oil &aid 


Xlofi >ca^ 

$ irwosuk 

©S^oidO lo x^-tO" 
_________^ lo ilSSIBfl" 




„_ 9sJtbafi fx»ln»q lo*?" 

, s a'i«^ ii XAjt s>Hia»*" 

'dj lo d-£«fOoofi Mis C;J:l9asd' »jid- lol bsaio'fxoq esw xloXrIw ,fcs;t6Cf8 &£ 
,l)ifiq «®9cf siolod^9i«ii ioa aad JbnB ,0330x110 lo x^lO 

« ?''S0J'£n'"' ,^ '•"' ^ ' r\ r ^ 

^J-qij&osi fcJtA^E lo flOlJ-aiHeae^q JfeeuB jaolcfwoex© exl:f lo noasei \{J ;t«ri:t 

ftiW ttol ffJtfiXp -xM^'^' jELbLsffi laonl beqqocfaa sib eio^taXsn eri^ 

led^inl nwen . ii:t rioirfw noqirasolvasa sxaee 

aoi;tlJf?q ocf g^lXlfil flX aail; .tlliJs errs 8io;tsXe'r sili &adt insvfi 

=?Sfiaeaq ©41. sifceiafiil aoldoilJaiiiit tatnisqnsoo lo cf-moo ^b 

Slit fexc .j>fljsxilf)i0 nol;tBiiqo^qq8 Xsi/nns srf»+ lo 

xi©is9 sd"siiqoT:qq lo 9xi;f Xeqaroo od^ BvaiBbnem lo ^liw 

\;d £)©iclfiIo boXibXbb XXjjI eilcT X**? ©^ ctfleJtoXlliJE dTii/oiaB ii£ ibsx 

•xs^B XL3:isilb&!wal ffaxoi eiocJ^uXen c^ail;? Iiss^ dOB& sxxlix/fc enoJ-fiXai 

•i£©v dora dojEf TOl ©onsnlJbio iiol;tslirqoiqqB ©xiJ' lo diBaaaq oxU 


that in and by said appropriation ordinance insufficient sums of 
money were appropriated to pay the amounts which relators claim as 
their rightful salaries; that by reason of the delay of relators 
in asserting their claims the city will be unable to maka up the 
large deficit of $22,^00,000 which would occur if the writ of 
mandamus w^sre ordered to issues in this case; that the amount of 
taxes which the City is authorized to levy each year is limited by 
statute and the revenues of the City from all other sources, to- 
gether with the realizable revenue from taxes, are not more than 
sufficient to pay the expense of the essential functions of govern- 
ment each year J that if relators had been diligent in asserting their 
claims i^iiaediately, and if their claims were declared to be valid, 
the City might have been enabled to curtail the less essential func- 
tions of government so as to provide the necessary funds for the pay- 
ment of the claims of the relators during that year and the city 
council might have been warned to reduce, by appropriate ordinances, 
the salaries of all officers and employees of the City so that no 
question of its intention to reduce such salaries would arise; that 
if the City were now obligated by a liability to all officers and 
employees of the City amounting to more than $22,^00,000 brought 
about by the neglect and delay of relators and others in asserting 
their claims, respondents believe and so state the fact to be that 
the credit of the City would become seriously impaired and it would 
be unable to meet its ordinary and necessary expenses unless the 
salaries of all officers and employees serving the City in the 
future were reduced so radically that no one would be willing to 
serve the City, Respondents further aver that the issuance of 
the writ of mandamus will cause confusion, disorder and grare 
public inconvenience and will result in disarranging the public 
service in the City, 

Relators filed a reply to respondents* answer, in which 

&si^ qu ^jBm oi sLdBOju scf IIlw tfi» ^^^ 8«J:jbIo nlsfi^t sxutc^issefl ixi 

'io ^t-sw srl.t 11 •mcao BIi/ow rioixlw OOO^OO^^SS^ lo d'loilsi) »8ial 

to d-rttfOflis »rfc^ itisd:!' ?98b6 ilffct at «x;aei: o^ bsisb'io ©i»w Bsttabcum 

i fee^^imll si i^9"s: i£ofis ^i'l oi besjtioricttfs el x-^-tO s^^ rColdw asTcsi 

-oJ- ^spoij/oa i^ftrijo lis atoil "^cfJtO ©jrf^ to asx/nevsi ftrli fen£ siijjBC^a 

asd^f 9iom :)-o« »as ^aejosd" ato^l ©ttnev^i ©Id-BsllBarr sftt ricliw nexfcfea 

r±«rf^ gElitisaeB nl d-aegllif) nsad barf BtotBl&'i 11 ^adi ;nB©x rf^Js® itnem 

^bilwv 'jGf oj- 5eiBlo5>5 £i®w axrsJUlD 'iJtadjT 11 ftna ^y^lo&Btbe^arl zsiXbIq 

-otwl L&iia&Bss as©! odi ll&iico oA feelrff^ns n»«cf svscf J-dsxa x^-t^ siiJ 

•Xsq ojtli ^0*5 f'&ftr'^ -^Tnaesof^r -^rf;^ «»frlvoiq oi as oa driQEicisvos lA saold' 

X:i.' aiGcffile^ siid- lo zmtslo edi lo d-jctsfii 

^ESJSiiJGnxM tqoitqrB ttf ^eistrfeai od' teaisw nsf^ef ?>VBJcf itrlslai Iloxujoo 

ofl ciBild^ oa x^iS »i s^o-Cqins bris aiecl'^l© XIb ^ aeliBiBB ed^ 

d-:axltf (WliB Miro?r t'^i:*tslsit fforrr "orfai o.t aolitnevl-Hl zil lo nolcfeoirp 

ba:«5 31991110 i; , .'bed-sstldo won eisw x^-tS »ri^ "i-t 

.^ilgiforrfJ OOC^OO'^^S£$ r£sfi;J ettoai ocf gnlcTfaj'oraB xJ'iS »rf^ lo aes^o-tq^as 

■iffloT^nr ; .r:'-:rj ^^f., a'loj-xjlsi lo x&^-^ tss J-oelaen ©ricJ' x^ ox;ocf« 

. L . ., tma svsllsd s,in9baoq&Bi ^BtaXslo ttedi 

h'rovr cM ba^ bBiiaqml vI'&noi:nr^^ ■?faoo9cf £iIwow x^tlO Bdi lo (tllieic 9i(c^ 

«^ Hi \ — .. - ;,oIqiH© bnii eissltlo 11*3 lo aeliBl^e 

oi -^itliii Bd 'Jr;'> - ' r r:t xIXsd15si 08 feeoy&^i eiow STir^tirl 

lo Boa^uzzl w. ' ■ jfl adTJ©tnoqe©fl .x^l^ ®^ svisa 

svftiS bfiB letv.^^; ^^.^^^«.,xiwu aajyflo IIlw BWSBfcnacj lo itiw &dj 

otlci"^ --^'f^ r,«f"P,r^...^« .., ;- ,?• 4rr.->,.«- X-Qw jbnB ©oaslnsvnooal olXdxiq 

,X^1!3 sjciv nl eolvf-'g 
iioju ,. ' ajii-'.oiiouc:'. ■ / rlfl sioJ- bI©£ 


they allege that prior to the year 1932, relators worked sjjr. 
days per week, and that when salary reductions were made by- 
respondents relators were periGitted to work only five days per 
week} that they were discriminated against by respondents in 
that not only their hours of labor were reduced during the years 
mentioned, but their salaries, although fixed at $12 per day by 
the city council, were decreased to $10 by the department head 
without any authority froR the city council so to doj that 
employees working for respondents on a per diem basis were not 
included in the salary reduction ordirisnces passed by the city 
council of the City for the years 1933, 193^, 1935, 1936 and 1937, 
and that no lump sum appropriation was set up by the city council 
for the payment of the salaries of the relators or any other per 
diem men in the service of the City; that the salary reduction 
ordered by the city council applied only to employees working on 
an annual, monthly or weekly basis, and did not apply in any way 
to employees working on a per diam basis. 

The theory of relators is that in the case of per diem 
employees the reduction was brought about by respondents* reducing 
the number of days in each week relators ^jere permitted to work; ■ 
that the reduction ordinance included only employees working on 
an annual, monthly or weekly basis, and did not include employees 
working on a per diem basis; that their days of labor were reduced, 
and, in addition to being deprived of the right to work full time, 
their salaries were reduced from $12 per day to $10 per day. 

The theory of respondents is "that the sum of $12 per day 
specified for brick pavers in the respective annual appropriation 
bills were merely a base figure from which the actual salaries 
fixed in the annual appropriation bill were determined by compu- 
tation required by Section 8 of each annual appropriation ordi- 
nance pursuant to the terms of which all employees of the City 

* * * sustained reductions in salary as an economy measure of 

XiS 96«ffi Gis™' ajijioicl oj/iitvq: 'i'swlss aeriw itaiit Jbatfi ^sfesw neq zx&h 

TLsq 8igjBl> sv±'l yIuq 3I10W o;t foe;Jcfiapieq ©tsjit aio^elea edriebncKiaei 

nx acfnsbfloqa©T[ -^d" j-aiilxisa fjsifinifalioejti) 0i9w ysrW- isftt |3i9«w 

Bo^^X efH ^p.l'wb bBQiib'ai ©isw lotJijI to zttsod ^tedi -^Lao ioa ^Btii 

Xd x^t> iQq SX$ i& b&xl'i. d^tioH^iLA (issjuslse il9d& iud ^bmuiMOmm 

^'^£^1 bojs otV^ »^£9i t"f*'6?-C tCl^-t Bnisex ^^j" ^1 X^^i^ eilcJ- ^o Llorwoo 

lionxjoo xito ©ri^ x^ ^^ ^^e aaw noljsJL^qo-iqqjB jbejjb qfl«;I on usrij- fene 

^9Q iQii^o x^B 10 snocfslsa 9iij lo aslaslsa erl^ lo ^tneianjsq Bdi zol 

no gnl^rtour sQ«"%©X^a*» o;t "^cXao weJfcXciqje Xioriuoo ijtlo »di xd lJ»iefcio 
xsw ''{HB ill xlqq& Jon bib bos ^sliascf x^^^^ 10 xJjl*^K)m ^liUfnxuj aa 

«aiei&ef laei^ .isq £ jrio 3nl2£icw 88«-^coIqiB© oJ" 

ffcelb jil Jj?y3';t ai eioii^Xe'i 'lo xtoodi edl 

giilocbei *a.tn9biioqa©!i x^f ^x/ocfa cl"43Jyoicf ebw aol^tijybe'i 9xi.t ase'^oXquis 

\::iic iiiJM%eu eiew eiojjsXei jIssw j1o«s xil e^jsb lo i&davn 9di 

iio snlai'ro'w seexo-tQ^a© xXno b^bulzal QonLaalbio noWox/bsi adt :fs£tf 

aes^oXqcja efecrXc, t-lD ians jSlescf -^at^Qiff 10 xJJ'i^jci'^^ ^Xisiraaa na 

,b90Jjb9i 9 lew locfi?! lo s^jsb Ttleiid" J-jerid" islaBcf iselb leq a no aiLbfiow 

^siaicj XXjjI jIiot^ oj cfrlsli eiid- lo bsvliqob jfllsd oJ- aolJ-ibbfi ai. ^ba* 

.■\j;sb leq -:X$ ujo^l beoubei ©gie^w eeliBX^se itsdi 

Xflb ^©q SX' I ajnebctoqeerr lo xiosiict eflT 

aoWslnqoiaqE Xauxins svid-osqasi: sxi4" xil sisvsq 2iolicf 'lol bsllioaqa 

b^IibXbe Xsx;;J^ob :riw moil siirsll sasd jb x^Qisia e"xsw aXXlcf 

-jL/qwoo xcT bsalm'i&-jBb siaw Hid xiold'sliqoiqqs Xsjjnafi edi al b&zH 

~iLio aol;^slT[qoiQq!; iBismts doee lo 8 aol^oeS xd b©nlijp*)i noicfaJ- 

Xd"i:0 &ii;J 'jo 8?'«voI(T«?nn fje ffoMw lo zpii^S 9di oi JTUBi/aiuq soflsn 


the City * -^ *." 

Respondents contend that "the trial court erred in its 
construction of the annual appropriation bills for the years 
in question, perticularly Section 8 of each annual appropriation 
bill," and "erred in entering judgment against the respondents 
find in favor of the relators," 

The relators are employees of the City of Chicago in 
the classified service of the City and they were so employed 
during the years 1933 to August 1, 193?, inclusive. As hereto- 
fore stated, it was agreed by the parties upon the trial that 
the claims of the relators for the year 1933> even if valid, 
were barred by the Statute of Limitations, and the judgment of 
the court required pajrment for the years 1934-# 1935* 1936^ and 
for a certain part of the year 1937. 

The manner of appropriating for the salaries of relators 

for the years in question is shown by the following portions 

of the 1934 ordinance: 

"Bureau of Streets 


»* * * 

"Pavement Improvements and Repairs Division, 

"For labor, material, truck hire, equipment and miscel- 
laneous expenses in connection with repairing permanent pavements, 
oiling, screening and repairing macadam pavement, whether by coi>- 
tract or by employes of the City, In case the Commissioner of 
Streets and Electricity decides that such work or any part thereof 
shall be performed by contract, it shall be done in accordance 
with a plan to be submitted by him and approved by the City 

Council, Kxpenditures^are to be made In accordance with the 
general policy established by the City Council in connection 

z&tiebnoqaBi siii isnlsss *H®JE8^t ^lieia& nl beiie" ba& '\in(i 

". 210.1 bIsI 9£iJ lo 10VJ51 at bOA 

bs^oXqc!© 08 ©1SW -^©ff^ nsjs x^i- 9^^ 1° •'OivnsE bslHeEsIo ©xi:^ 

^follEv Ij: xiev© ^££(?I ib^X ©^^ '^o^ 8io;tBl9i ed;f lo aadtalo 9xl;t 

l!ni5 ^^£?I t^£?-C ^-^^^-f S1B91C 9fW lol cfn^fincBq bs-clupei :^iuo3 «iW 

eio^tslsi lo aalTsIse srict lol aaxv*sliqorsqqfi lo t^mim srfT 

acolj-ioq sHlwoXIol «ri;J yd iiwo/ie 8i nol^tasup nJt bis&x »d^ wl 

seoiisfai-^io -^£^1 &^ lo 
eJ'^ei^^S lo jjseroja" 


v_ j;. -?'. 1 1 

^Einssev^q c^aen&ffiisq snliisqsi Aitcf ncijo ai^oo nx seaiisqxe si^.-viiiil 

«->oi -;5 isjiieilT!? ^j-n?^n»vsq EUsfesoBta gniiiaqsn &ne snxneeioa ^snilio 

lo •lexioisaxJHnoO fwl:; •" .^:tiO Qri;^ lo a&xolqsuB ^rf io ito£i:f 

lo9iBdi iiaq xfiA TO i^ "■ ' '^-toii^toolf^ ' • "^aitfS 

»aflii£)ioo«« Ki snob au ll^w j^ ,i ii;i.+rios xcf I>oiHiol-i;-*q ^'O llBdz 

Vi- ?^^i^ Ycf i&9Voi4qfi &fls mln x<:f b»*:ti:ccfjje scf o:^ nBlq fi rl^lw 


with street repairs and maintenance as follows: 
«■«• * *f 

'•(5) Expenditures for the above purposes to be as 
follows I 

"For the employment of the following for such period ©p 
periods as needed at rates designated (se e Se ction 8 of this 

"Brick Pavers at $12,00per day 
«* * * 

"Total for Pavement Improvement and Repairs. ♦,$-1',54'5>Q00. 00" 
(Italics ours,) 

Section 8 of said anmial appropriation bill of the City of 
Chicago for the year 1934- provided as follows ; 

"Section 8. In all cases where salary and wage items are 
separately appropriated for individus.l officers or employes in 
this ordinance, the amount appropriated for each such separate 
salary anft wage item is the amount extended under the heading 
'Amounts Appropriated,' ?/here appropriations under which any 
of the officers or employes authorized to be paid or compensated 
at an annual, monthly or weeltly rate appear in tliJ.s ordinance 
without extension of the several salary or wage items under the 
heading 'Amounts /Appropriated, ' the amount authorized by this 
ordinance for each such office or position as the appropriation 
therefor shall be the rate named less SLti amount equal to the 
proportionate compensation at such rate for the number of days 
to be deducted for each month ®r proportionately for each wees, 
as provided in this section. 

"Where appropriations are made for groups of officers 
or employes working on an annual or monthly or weekly basis the 
total amount appropriated for the entire group is the amount 

iswollol z& 90n.ans:triiaH has enljsqei iB»t:fn diin 

SJB sd Qi E9Boq^jq «vocf£ sdf 'SOl ESiintlbjtieqxa (^)" 

10 feol's^q ilsirs ^o"? gislTi^oilol «^ to itnsiaxolqats edi 10%'' 

Btdi tQ $ flotctoaS »»ff) 6»d-aitaie<jf) e»cfi5*t ^6 befcssii 8fi cfcoiieq 

t (©Ofiantfcio 
* * •«'■ 

(.e-rjjo soilscfl) 
i "^;tiCi 5iS;? *:o 1LI(S aoMBinqeiqqe XsJunns IjIbb to 8 aolio^S, 

: ewollol 8fi fcefelvG'rq ^f'^l isex oxii 10I os-soxrfS 

ry-w ^f^ , vo ■.l.t; u'-fsrfw asaso lis nl .8 noicfosc*' 

, . - - .■ifcJLvlbxiJfc tol l>»d'«liqoiqqB xXe^JBiBqea 

©;tB^eqe8 f^swa rioa© 10I j^^sl^qoicqe :}msoBta 9jiS ^eoixsnifcio Eltfi 

-; i-x^d ©d;t 'lefim/ fcefenstx* ^tfltroiOB diii al aiftd^l sjbw ;inB xi^-t^s 

„-- ilsiifff i©£nflif anol.tsiiqoiqqs sied.f * ,b9SQtiqoiqqA acfnifoeA* 

fiPi;t«3fl0qfi£OO ^o fclsq sd oct /.'ssl^ori.tiTB a©ij;oIqjS9 10 sisoi'll:© 9rii lo 

sftj- 'lobms zoBil ©gsw t:o x^bIbb Isisvob sxtt lo noieneix© ctxroxiJ'lw 

«l£y "jcT feefiJtiofCiwB d-neoas ©lid' ^ ^b^i&itqptqfiA a^xuaoaiA' anibBsil 

itoiJ;Blaqo'j:qqj3 '^'■- ■ ^ aoiJiaoq rto ssillo iiona dose Toot Boaanlbio 

9rii od- Issji... .xij...wid5 HB aaaX fesaaac eiB^ »fl.t ecf XlBria iol9*i9ri;J 

^■- ' 'lo lacfij '-""^ tol »;?■««£ ristra ^b xi®l^Baa©qBo9 9J'fiia)l;Jrtoqoiq 

.xaDJtiosa BlAi at £»bXvoiq sa 

orf:^ ■• ^ -^ - — ,..- ..- -. r.-., .-.,..._ . „^ .,_v.-.,... ;39-^oXqnje 10 

appearing at the end of the item under the heading 'Amounts 
Appropriated,* In the case of officers and employes so grouped, 
the item ©f appropriation has been determined on the basis of the 
authorized rate of compensation computed for the year for each 
office or position of such group less an amount equal to the pro- 
portionate compensation at such rate for the number of days t© 
be deducted for each month or proportionately for each week as 
provided in this section, notwithstanding that such item of 
appropriation is less than the aritlmetical total secured by 
adding together the net salaries or wages for al\ laembers of 
the group determined in the manner set forth (the difference 
between such arithmetical total and the item ©f appropriation 
being accounted for by the difference between the amount necessary 
for the employment of the maximum number of officers and employes 
authorized during the year 1934- and the amount available for the 
employment of the number of officers and employes needed froa 
time to time during such year), 

''In the case of officers and employes of the Police De- 
partment constituting the police force of the city, and of the 
Fire Department constituting the uniformed service thereof, and 
of the Municipal Court and of the Clerk of the Municipal Court 
and of the Bailiff of the Municipal Court, the item of appro- 
priation has been determined by taking the rate of compensation 
compnt®d for the year for each office or position and deducting 
therefrom an amount equal to the proportionate compensation at 
such rate for fifty-two days, distributed equally, as nearly 
as may be, to each month of the year 1934-. 

'*Jn the case of officers or employes whose authorized 
rate of compensation on an annual basis is $1,^00 or less, and 
on a monthly basis $125 or less, such items of appropriation 
have been determined by deducting from such authorized rates of 
compensation the amounts in accordance with the following table. 


eini/ociA' :snif>jB9fl' 9di isibaa meil. fnii lo bus »rid j-6 snliBsqqs 

^£K3qiK)ia oa ac^oXqjrrs bam zieotJ^o lo ®r.*o 9fI;J al ^ ,b9i&liqoiqqA 

V "j: ; -■; - '^ ' niiuasiefc ii9»cf 8bx1 noIJ-fliiqoiqq^ lo a©;ti 9riJ 

. %; .. ." ^oJ-irqEOO noWsexjeqaoo lo »:t&i bsztioAtaa 

' hij;. .ic!^ ns as si qwoig rioxjs lo no l^i acq no eoillo 

o:. ■ " ■: ' ^&ai dsjTg iz floicJ^Baneqmoo »;tsaol;Jioq 

as xcn^// ilo^; , j.iiaoxj'ioqo^ -lo riJxxoB doaa lol fefis^toubeb »cf 

xo msJr /ioi-c j.Jx:o 3nl£)n£jd2jcijiwcfon ^isoWoee sixli al b&blyo'iq 

Y<i osii/oae Ijs^oi Lsoi^etBdiiia edS a&dS aael si noi:faiiqoTqq« 

Ij a-isdoioffl /Is lol aegnw 10 aelislss ^sn sii;^ iddiQi^oi sxii^fi* 

saaaislllt 9jrs;t) iljiol ^ae ismisffl arid- fil Jboniartsd'sb qt'oig otii 

jA&i.iBl-*moiqci& lo sieii &di tasi l&ioi iBolieaditiB iloxra aesn^^d 

^^pLB«8©9sfl J^neofHB 0x{;t n&9Wof*cf soissnelllii) &di xd aol bodrujooaji siLt»d 

e0YorqiBE©;fea« 5'i:'?»±""lo lo -rf^dflisffit «Kinix«ia ©jcid- lo d^nefinfolqos afW v>\ 

.J .. , . 

sxi;^ 10I »Id.«Ixisv£ i!-ncoas 9dS bos ^i^l vi&€i-% 9tlt ^atiiib besliodiuu 
iBDil Jbebssa soxolqia© bn.s sieolllo lo a^^faiun 9ri.:t lo ia9SPiolqa9 

, L iBe\ dovit ^iliub sfiLtd" od- eml^ 

' ■ 'o 2ftx^-i^'l^ii» ^>«« «i9oillo lo saao ®fli ctl" 

Sidi " ; ") eoTol solloq 9dS 'idltttiliBcioo iassLii&q 

ba / .^olv^®e b9faio1tms ^d:^ gnlJXfixJ^arioo cfnsia^tEsqaa snl^ 

ioiiaiM 9jrf^ lo :;insIO ©£0 lo ba£ j-ijooO IsqloixiuM ©rid- lo 

-OTc • - .xsixujM ©rf:^ lo lllIiBfi edi lo fious 

SniJoJjfeeb baB isolSt&oq 10 ©oillo rfos« lol ib^\ adj tdoI i>ft;t.7qffloo 

t£5 n6jtd'saii©qffioo «d'snoicfioqoiq siicf oct l&upQ im!om& as jbdiIqistIc^ 

■^Iissn r.B ,yX.'" :fxJcrj:id-aJ:Jb ^eifsfi ow^-^dlll 10I »i&i dptsB 

,•(!•£ ^I issY ©if^ lo diaoa doas od ^scf \Bm a* 

besiioridifs saorfw aeito-Ccpsis 10 sisolllo lo 9sao erid^ nl" 

tiiQ ^easX to OO^^^Ii^ ai aisuacf Xbixtixisv ujb no nolisansqaoo lo 9^bi 

noi^Btiqo-r anecl-Jt riowe ^aef^I mo ^SI$ sIba^ •^Xrid^nois £ no 

lo Qfii&z b^-^tiodJssB dossB moil snidojufcsb ^^cf beatmi&S&b ae&d evBd 

^elcfsd sflX/oIXol exid jdilw 9t>a&biooo& ax zinsjotsus »dt soictsaneqxffoo 

such amounts deducted to be for days or p&rts of days comprise itig 
Sundays, Saturday afternoons and such holidays as are fixed by 
ordinance or by action of the City Council, distributed equally, 
as nearly as may be, to each month of the year 1934, 

Withovit Maintenance 

Amount Amount 
Deducted Appropriated 

$ 300,00 



1,200 »0C; 

"Authorized Maintenance Inclui 

Rate of 

Caapensatlon Amount 


(Annual) Deducted 

Ap propria 

$ 300,00 

$ 300,00 


500 . 00 








720 , 00 




^^ ^0,0Q 


900.00 i 




























1, 035.10 








$ 60 






1,200, CO 

[a] " In the c ase of all other officers and employes ^ the item 
of appropriation has been determined by taking the rate of com- 
pensation computed for the year for each office or position and 
deducting therefrom an amount equal to the proportionate coiapenp- 
sation at such rate for seventy-eight days, distributed equally, 
as nearly as laay be, t© each month of the year 1934- (the amounts 
thus deducted buing on account of Sundays, Saturday afternoons 
and such h.olidays as are fixed by ordinance or by action ©f the 
City OoiAncil). In the case of such officers and employes as work 
six days par week, of which one may be Sunday, such item has been 
determined by taking the rate of compensation computed for the year 
for each such office or position and deducting therefrom an amount 

equal to the proportionate compensation at such rate for seventy- 
eight days distributed equally, as nearly as may be, to each month 


@3«£ll0C|-nXfilu ifjyoflJx'- 

0C-, ■■'■ 




00, 080.1 

•":•■■■, ?.?■. r r 
♦ - ■ ■■■<■'■ 

betssloal 90Ki'in©d"Jil£iM 


to 5:f-' 

^ '. 'OF 

. ' 4*0 



00 . 00^. 
00. Oo^ 
00 . OG^ 


00, 04-1 ^ I 

00. 00s. I 





00. 0-^-?^^ I 

Si-;.;;- (1. • 

.,>..^ ...... .:..:.., ...; ...:; .,,. .. ^^ . i>sijaqatO0 noWsansq 

^XLLbsj^o h&&ssiSliiBlb ^-.\, -' vrl§±»-X^a»v98 "M)! e&ai dons ie, nol^tse 
a;fa&OiXtB arict) l^£^I is©-^ 9i5.;J "ito dinom do^B oJ- ^©cf ^jsci zs xXii^^n eB 

^r!-^ i« ,.,->^ + ^-. ,». , , .. . -x^blloii dosjt. bns 

"•■^u^£t?v&e 10* s;^ai doiv'K jjt; uoiJjjfi^tsqfflPO s^aflol.t'ioq.oiq ©rict .0^ Ifiirpe 


of the year 1934." (Italics ours.) 

For each of the years In question subsequent to 1934- the 
appropriation was made substantially in the same manner as it was 
made in the 1934- annual appropriation bill and in each of the said 
subsequent years the annual appropriation bill contained a Section 
8 which was substantially identical with the Section 8 of the 1934 
annual appropriation bill* 

In People ex rel. Mulvey y. Ghicago ,;i, 292 111* App. 589 
(leave to appeal denied by Supreme Court, 292 111. App. xvii), 
the ease was brought by many thousands of employees of the City 
of Chicago employed in various departments of the City, and the 
claims involved the annual appropriation bills for the years I932 
to 1935* inclusive. There we held that "the annual appropriation 
bills fixed the salaries of the plaintiffs employed by the City 
in its corporate capacity at the amounts actually appropriated," 
(p, 608) There the petitioners contended that their salaries 
were fixed in the said annual appropriations bills not at the 
amounts actually appropriated but at the base figures, which fig- 
ures, it appeared, were the same as the amounts of salaries appro- 
priated for the offices prior to 1932, We held that neither law, 
reason nor custom supported the contention and that the salaries 
of the petitioners v/ers fixed at the amounts actually appropriated^ 
that th'3 specified amounts for salaries and wages were not the 
amounts actually appropriated but that such figures were simply 
bas'5 figures from which the actual appropriation was arrived at 
by the method of computations set forth in Sections 8 of the 
ordinances. But relators in the instant case insist that the 
ruling in the Mulvey case is not applicable because "the reduction 
ordinance 5.ncluded only employees working on an annual, monthly 
or weekly basis, and did not include employees working on a per 
diem basisj" that relators were working on a per diem basis. We 
cannot agree with relators' contention that the reduction ordinance 


ijj2 su-W lo rlaijs iLi £>af- Illci isolj-sjtnqo'iqqis l&unasi -J^P^I srid" nl sfeaai 

^?I «i& lo 8 aot^vQ'c eifJ- ililvf Ii»si;^ii©l)i ^J^IbI^t nscfecfiia asw xlolxlw 8 

,XIld nold-Blnqonqqs Isimns 

^(i:l¥x ,qqA ,IU S^ ^ctii^O ws»iq»8 xc' fj^iinst Ifisqqa ocl svaeX) 

"a ^x^JlO sii:^ lo a^nsAKfisqaJb qssoIibv at Jbe-^oXqars os&.9l£lO lo 

.;9X edi lot slXicf noidrfii^s^oiqqs XiRiama C'xf;^ fcsvXoyal, aaimXo 

aoio\Biiqoiqqs Is/i/nna edd*" ;fM:f BX«xI ®ar fn^iiS! ««vleuXoni ,iJ£?X od" 

X^XO jsiid x«' Jbe^o-fq^e alliJllLtaXq ©fl^ lo s^tislsB •di bBjUt,t sXilcf 

".Jb©;tfii»qo'3;qqii xZXBViGs eiMSseoL^ sdd oS x^lt>«q«9 oianoqto^ aKfi ILt 

sslijoXas iJtsH^i^ d^srij b^iiae$aoo Bir^notit^eq Bii:^ si^rfT C80d .q) 

acid- d-£i ;jOfi aiXlcf anol.f£;^i:qo*2<iqij l&uarta fci.oa sxlj al fiexll atsir 

-..?;■ liolilw taeifif^ll »2ficf oH i& ti«f &od"3liqoiqqis x^-i*4*''^s^ ziaaomB 

^WisX 'xniicfian ;fad:t feXsil ©Vf ,2£^X oi lotiq aaoxl:!© «iU lol fcsifilnq 

seiiaXiSB pfid' d£rid" bn& aolSna^noo add- be^'ioqqjLf2 moj-exfo ion xiosfleT 

4slnqoiqq.3 xXXfiird-ojs sJ-nuoxr? It si»w eisnoid'ld'sq eiiv* lo 

©ii;t ioa eisw as^isw 5it« aslTsXi?. i&J z:^auoaLQ fiplllo&qa silJ^ d-sri:t 

XXqinlg ei9w acrrui^il ilai»8 d-sffd" :fircf bed'sliqonqqB YXXBi/d"Ojr. sd-iiuoBB 

.t.i b&vt'xic asvr tioli al'sqoiqqiz XsjLfd^ojs eri^ lioiriw jfioil a€>i03Xl eaxjcf 

9ftf 1o 8 saoijo'^^t: fli rijiol d-98 eaol.i-fid-jiKiatoo lo borfcfea 9il:t \cf 

sjcld" i^£/Ij d^sij^fll SBBO d-nj?:tanJ: sdd^ nl aiocffiXsi ;tx/fi ♦esoruBnlbtto 

aoid^ojufc(%i Sid*" ©ei^sd&d fsXdsoJtXqqB ioa tl @&bo ti&vXaiC ftEU" at sfllXui 

Tfld^flocr ^Xftworia na flo gaXM^ow aeex*'^<ia;(» x^no f>sfcjjXon.t »^a&ntbio 

neq ii flo siii3l*row 89f?xoXqia» ofiwXonl .ton bX& fin* ^elBstf x-C^isow lo 

, Jtascf ic^jife tpq is no gnMiow 9rr©w BW-teXsi i&di •'jelBfid aslfc 


dld not apply to tliem. Not© the langaage of the appropriation 

bill that we have italicized: 

"(5) Expenditures for the above purpoaeg to be as follows: 
"For the employment of the following for such period or 

periods as needed at rates designated ( see Sec tion 8 of this 

ordinance ) : 

"Brick Pavers at $12.00 per day 

•Total for Pavement Improvement and Repairs $4-,54-5f 000»00" 
(Italics ours.) 

It seems clear, in our judgaent, that the ordinance intended 
that Section 8 should apply to brick pavers, but relators contend 
that "the proper construction of Section 8 excludes per diem em- 
ployees from its provisions." We cannot agree with this conten- 
tion. The paragraph of Section 8 designated "[a]", supra ^ is, in 
our judgment, broad enough to include the position filled by the 
relators. The brick pavers were paid $12 per day prior to 1933* 
and we are satisfied that the words "'Brick Pavers at $12,00 per 

day" in the appropriation bills did not fix the salary for that 

position but $12 was merely a base/from which the salary was 

computed pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 of the appro- 
priation ordinance. 

Respondents contend that the Intention of the city council 
must be determined from the language of the ordinances and that 
the trial court erred in admitting and considering oral testimony 
in construing the appropriation bills. It appears that a witness 
who occupied the position of Chief of Staff of the Gommittee on 
Finance of the city council was allowed t« testify that in his 
opinion it was not the intention of the council in the appropria- 
tion ordinances to reduce the appropriation of per diem employees; 
that in his opinion the ordinance intended tiattt the brick pavers 

'.bBZitolliiti nirtui ffv iidS lltd 
jesroXiol aa «i^ o^ B'^Boqitjq f?vo<fs »if:t rrol t»*xxrf tbts*iqx^, C^)" 
•» ^li9q ilsi/tt ^ot ^^IwoXIdl erf;!- lo >i»»proI(|iK» »ltt 10'^ 

* •» «« 

* * *•" 

--.i'Sifx^o 8i£i;t d^t'Sf fS'J^^s-'i t«>«i(ib »f ''.eoolKl-voici 2^1 fflcil epa^tolq 

«£(:»• ttf &©IIi'5 aold^looq oti afculvnl oi ^scon© bst>id ^ta?iSB^hDl ujo 

*roi'iq "^iiJb iGq Sl^ i^le^ pi»w a^svsq jfolrtcT ©riT ♦«:to:ffil0<i 

'toq 00,?ili^ ^ts 8i«VB<I isJtiS*' ebiow srii *«i!:f Bellai^ss 91B 9m iaa 

jftcLf TiC-TE Tji-'^Iiia ©jrfJ' xil *oxi bJtfc stIKS notiRiiqo-viqs, »rii fli '*"^ttb 

^m X'^^'^'^^^ ^^ dst*.' Ei»"il\2ysrf i8 x-t«>'X»a nam &X$ Wrf aoiJJtaoq 

xn^JBlSz9$ Xa'io gjili^blBoo fcna jflJtj ;t tJBfc« «± ft»ii« ^ficoo Xslidt srid" 

in!8afi:tirf 13 tadcf ai:s©qqB .tl .sXXlcf nol.tisXTqo-iqq£ *rf;t SlULtJi^tsnoo al 

no s«.t.tifiaBo3 »ry- lo Yta^B It© l^JWO lo aoliiaoq ©rii fc^iqusoo oriw 

«lif Hi isati ^l^B9:i «f AentroXXfl a^w XtDcoBOO x^to 3ri;t I0 ssjifiCLt"? 

-«X"iq©itqqjsi eri;? ol Xlonuoo ©rfcT lo fl0.tJ^xrf..tKl: ©ri;)- ;toii smr ft coinlqo 

j8ijf9YaXqiB& »9i;b itNj to aot^BlifiiS'xqq& etif ootitf^i ot Bsooaalbico noli 

at»^aa ^Itd 9J&& Modi b^basiat oafi^nibio nAS nolntaa eM ol i£A& 


were to receive $12 per day. The relators agree that the evl*. 
dence in question was improper and incompetent, but they contend 
respondents are responsible for the introduction of the evidence; 
respondents contend that relators are responsible. 

In People V. Chi cago Rys. Co. y 270 111, 87, 105, I06, 
the court said: 

"We have held that the rules for the construction of an 
ordinance are the same as those applied in the construction of a 
statute. (Pe ople v. Kummely 215 HI. 4-3| People v. Mohr^ 252 
id, 160,) It is a primary rule in the interpretation and coi>- 
struction of a statute that the intention of the legislature is 
to be ascertained and given effect, ( People v, Price^ 257 HI* 
587.) This rule does not, however, permit the courts to consider 
statements made by the author of a bill or by those interested in 
its passage, or by members of the legislature adopting the bill, 
showing the meaning or effect of the language used in the bill as 
understood by the person or persons making suah statements. Thus, 
in Belle v ille and Illinoistown Rai lroad Co. v. GreeorVf 15 111* 20, 
it was said: 'Nor can the presumed or even well known views of all 
the members of the legislature be allowed to repeal an express 
provision of a law or to control its construction. The law, alone, 
can speak the legislative will, Mien the courts shall be driven to 
the lobbies of the legislature to learn the sentiments of the members, 
for the purpose of construing the laws, a new rule of construction 
will have been adopted,' Again, in Eddy v. Morgan, 2l6 111, 437, 
we said: 'While journals and proceedings of the legislature are 
sometimes looked to in an endeavor to ascertain a proper construction 
of the statute, so that the court may have before it what is authentic 
that surrounded the enactment of the law, we are aware of no authori- 
ty, and none has been pointed out, where the action of the lobby or 
the opinion of the legislators »s individuals have been taken into 
account. In fact, we understand the rule to be otherwise and that 

Iscio^'Jioo xvi... ,.;,v, ^Jasd^aqaioojil feme ^©qoiqial bbw Jiol;t890p Hi ©onsf) 
jeonr*^'".'- -f- 't/^ noiitosrfconctui: arid- nol slo'lenoqas^ »ns sd-nefinoqasi 

tbt&e J^ixroo 9xl;J 
iirt Au t-.. J.. o>.> i. Giiwt. -iij iGl. esljt/i arid S&Ai bisri 9V£ii »W*' 

i-^j^jjioji^; ' ■' ^'isvewori ^d-ofl «eol> bIssi st" '-v3^ 

^y J ^B£s:^aAl sxJ: ' : "iis 1:0 sxilnssffl erlcf snlworie 

*G' ^ -I ja3£>a^5gLi.X-j^2Q. .^Q.?X,^i^i ffig^iUog|X£.JLM% sJIlYgX^ag nl 

X/ .'-')iv aworti XX«w issve ^o fisoiraaiq esi^f nats 10/!' tfeJtBa asw it 

.;fcvi;.'£Q3j£> flij Xso'; •:?9WoXXs sd ©lu^JsXeiia®"^ »^^ ^o E'lscfEsin sdi 

J ^ ^sX 9ilT ♦JioXo'aii'iJ£rt03 SiiX XoiJ-rioo oj WJ weX & to nolsivoiq 

£i&vi'ifc sd XXfide ad-iffoo 9ii;f iisjjr/ «XXiw svi^tfiXaXgaX «xW 2tB9qe hbo 

iie-Qiasia sxW lo Hia&mUa&B odi sn&stl oJ 9 'ltrc^ jeXais^X eiif lo asXcfdoX 9il;f 

:oi4'oif^d'a££oo lo on 3 ^v^wsl Bsii i^aivriaaoo lo 98oq'U}q erli nol 

^'?£: . Il; ,,.i:t4; ^-iu^i .v Yl'fit ax ^nliSsA '.fce^qoJba neecf 9vari XXXw 

01U !f*'ii/j^Xai3®X ««W lo 8sail>&90o'iq iaas aX&arurot «Xld** tbl&e »w 

loldoirrdsooo leqo^q e at&iiB^Qis. oi lovaoiaie £i£- ni oi b^Aool zeati^mo^ 

t:ta9tUii& si 4^3^ ^1 ®ix>l©cf »v;ari TjjGir -di iatU oa ^9d-jyit«;l^e ad* to 

>lrrod;fuxi an lo ©•s^wb ^ir &w ^weX 9sfi[;l' Ito ^neaiio^asi ©xtt f)©£>nuonw;a J-ari^ 

•10 \cdoX ©xl;t lo £IoX;Jojs 9xl;t Bn&dx ^j*fo f)9jflioq xt©9cf sari anon bas ^xi 

at a&^si n99cf evari aXfiUfeXvxu SJ* Efio;JsX«Jtse-C ^^ touointqo ariJ- 


such matters are inadmissible^ ' In United States v> Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass'n . l66 U, S, 290, the United States Supreme Court, in 
considering this subject, said: * There is, too, a general acquies- 
cence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropriate 
sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the 
language of a statute passed by that body, * ■^- * The reason is, 
that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction 
was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that passed 
it, by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. 
Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did, 
and those who spoke might differ from each other, the result being 
that the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the 
language used in the act, and, upon occasion, by a resort to the 
history of the times when it was passed," 

It would be a dangerous practice to permit a trial Judge to 
consider such evidence in a case like the instant one. 

Respondents contend that "the petitioners have been guilty 
of such laches as bars their claims even if they were valid}" that 
"the plaintiffs in the case at bar have been guilty of precisely 
the same inactivity of which the plaintiffs in the Mulvey case were 
guilty only to a greater extent in that the plaintiffs in the case 
at bar did not demand payment of their supposed claims until more 
than two years later than the first of the suits filed in the 
Mulvey case. There the first suit was filed on October 11, 1935 
(see page 594 of Volume 292 111, app,). In the case at bar demand 
was made on January 2, 1938, and suit was not commenced until 
December 31> 1938." The relators contend that they should not be 
held to be guilty of laches because they waited until it was evident 
that the respondents ?fere abundantly able to pay them the balance due 
on their salaries, and that the record does not show that the respond- 
ents "have been undtiQy prejudiced or damaged in any way by any delay 


•J: ,:tiifoO eiB©iqi;a Z9&&SS, hsSlaX] ed:} ^0^ ,B ,U b6l .g^ssA j-xialsa^ 

ftii:}^ 1o gnlnsea s^d' levosalft oiS ilolrfw iaoil floicfBSTrolnl "io eeooifoa 

^si fioassi exfT * " -^ .y^<^' *«ri^ X<^ Beeasq eSeS&iz b lo «j|Bi;gn£l 

«Glcfojficfe/ioo i'sjriw Y^nla^tieo .cld-Jiw »jaJtia^e;t9b o* ©IcfleEoqiel aJt ;tl ;fjaild' 

beeasq ^Md& -sjtod f^TWeXsigsI a to aiacffflsaf ©f{:t ^tf jss a& aoqu ijjq 8«w 

^ii6 oift; seofW fi:tiw fiseagB svsfl ioa x^^ ijaieqa ;to« filfc orfw saoxIT 
salecf ;tJ[if8©'i erid^ ^lerid-o d&ze morJ. leTtib id^tm safoqe oi!w aaoricf fins 

*',Jb©8 2sq Bsw it n»iiw e©aiW axid^ lo %io:}&td 
oS ssi/J!?t I-si' " -ipq o^ st>l.toB'iq BiroissfLsb b sef bXiJow :^I 

.!*no jitBo^siii sif^ 9?I1I eBBo B fll sonefilv© rioua isBlenoo 

■\jj-Ii;;/S need svsri aTtsfloid-jfc^Jsq ©rfcT" :ffiriJ- feascfnoo sJrtsfinoqaeH 

.# ^'jJ&JtXav ^rtew t^rfi li isevs sctJisXo nlRrfd- aiscf as sedo&l dotsz to 

XlQQlooiq lo vtXlua nead avsri ttad i« oaso 9r{:t nl BlllinlBXq eriJ^"" 

©Tsw seBt) i^&yl.^ '^■■^ i'^-t el^itnieXq fsiij rioJtdw 1o tJ'ivi^DBfli r^m^z Bd:f 

iXq sffef ^sri^ jdl d-fleixs i^^b^t^ b o:t x-Cno "^^Xltfs 

9iom Llimj affilsXo bsaoqqwe icleijlf 1o in^atx^q baatssb :tofl filB rtscf ;ts 

f^rW nl bolt*^ 8;ttU8 Pii^ lo isill r^rfd- HisdJ^ leisX bibbx o'*'* nBxid^ 

^rr , tto b9llt em StUB Ssntl -^di ftiailT .safio Y9vXx;tf 

S-ncffisfc iBd t: -rij nl ♦(.qqA ,XXI fi^ 9«roXoY "io A^^ ©S«q 9©a) 

XlJosr fceocs.moo J-on esw j-lx'S fcna tSf^X ^S ^"eiinja^ no efiBO Bfiw 

ocf d^on blvodv. -^arid- j-sdJ' feasJnoo aioitfiXsn siIT ".SC^X ^X£ rrscteooeO 

:*rt«'blv« gfiw J-l XlJ^xit' 5e;f±«v; x»rf^ ©aifsoerf asrlosX lo x^Iii^ »tf o^ ^-tail 

an.cXjed' arid" o»x(;J -^.cq od- sXdB "^X^jaatmrdfl eisw zidobaoq&s'i »xl;t J-sriJ- 

moqeei »ilcf f&iiS woda d^on soob fotoosT 9di S&di bas ,a©li.sXBB il9dS no 


on the part of the plaintiffs in instituting this suit," 

How dilatory the relators were in asserting their claims 
is forcibly illustrated by the fact that their claims for the 
year 1933 were barred by the Statute of Limitations, The instant 
suit was not filed until December 3I, 1938# The argument of the 
relators that the City was not damaged by the delay in asserting 
their claims is without merit. If relators had made the claim, 
now urged^ when the 1933 appropriation bill was passed, the city 
council could have exercised its power to so reduce the salaries 
of its employees, including rv^lators, in 1934, 1935 and I936, as 
to fully protect the City against any loss it might sustain if 
the relators* claims uhder the 1933 appropriation bill were held 
valid. The relators in the instant case were guilty of greater 
laches than were the relators in the Mulvey case. If the relators 
in the Mulveg case were not entitled to a writ of mandamus we know 
of no good reason why the relators in the instant case are entitled 
to one. In the Mulvey case we stated (p. 6II); "While it is 
regrettable that the extremely bad financial condition of the City, 
due to the great depression, necessitated reductions in the salaries 
of the plaintiffs, it is a matter of common knowledge that during 
the same period practically all employees in the United States sus*« 
tained reductions in their salaries or wages. Millions of employees 
lost their positions, and a very great number of these were forced 
to go upon relief to obtain support for their families and them- 
selves. Millions are still unemployed and on relief. Despite the 
adverse conditions that confronted the City it retained in its 
employ all of the plaintiffs and those engaged in like employment, 
and it asserts its willingness and hope to restore the former 
salaries as soon as its financial condition will permit it to do so. 
We are constrained to believe that the instant claims were the 

result of an afterthought," What we there said applies with equal 
force to the instant case. 

aml&lo •rJ:sjd:t :inJtja»aei5 xtl 09sw aioJ- slfi 9/!;t X'ocffilli) woH 

ia&izal &d'jl ,zaot:i&i£SilJ. lo e;tififi^c ©dJ x«^ Jbe^iiitf si»w ££^I t£s»x 

sel;fi»eas al x^^-'^ ®^^ "^c^ f>s§^fiij-?,£) .ton esw -^d^lO srid- ^6ii:t snoi&lti 

^filBlo ©ritf sfefiffi feari aio;ti»Ifci "il .cMisis :Mirori;tiw bJ: wslsls ^laxi^f 

'^j-jto exU ,f>9eaflq ajsw Hid aoio'jslrcqoiqqs ££^X »rld^ csxfw ^b^^ni; woa 

aeiislae ©ilct" POBl>»rt 02 oi 'sswoq a;ti i)©8ioisx» ©vaii fcliroo Ilomroo 

as »^£?I -&is£ 5t^J^ «-^£^- ^^-i ^&^©^fel9t axxli>x;Ioxi± ^e&exolqae s;fl lo 

1JL al&itua Sd^lm it egol v^^ J-exilssB x^iO edd^ ^o»d"oiq i^SmI o^ 

JbXati ^tier 1X14 aolctaiiqoiqqs ££^X ©xld- ^sbdir amlfiXo ^aioialei srfd^ 

led- 69^8 lo ijd^Xi:i;rs aisw ©e*o dttaJ-a/il arid' fl.t B'xoisil9i 9d1 ,btL&v 

Bioi&lQi 9ti& 11 «93£.5 Y^Vfjii^ »iid ill ^1oiBl^1 &di B19W flsffcf e«ji&«X 

woiq£ ©w aifBUslfflfiffi lo cMt* & oi fcolcridxio d^©fl siaw ©as© ^evXiM erii HJt 

fasXd-xdflo 91B 9BS0 d-xtfiJ^anJ: a^d" ni aaodEX»i ©ild lylw noaasi feoos on lo 

8t it ©Xlrift" :(IXd .q) feed^Kti •w »aBO j^vj.v'1 sxld cI .©no od 

^XJ■XO 9fld lo ixoidlfenoo Isiofij&cLtl b&<5 %l^s[9iix» »£it J-sxtd 9l€f«;td-&i8ST 

asXiJaIss sfio al anoi:5o£T£>s'5t fc8;fsd'i8«90»n ^coleesiqsL d-ssig sri;t oj »«!> 

S«iiijf; ;rijri;t ©slJsXwonif HOiamoo lo leddsai 4 el ^1 ^alllcJ-iilBXq 9di lo 

-£03 Es;tBd-£ feed-lKU »rld ni ©©^"^oXqfflo XXe •'jXXseld^Ofiiq fcol^sq ease wtt 

aosxcXqcia lo eaolXXlM .asssw 10 eeliBXaa x£«?d:f at eaotirsubei b»alsi 

f>eoiol oi»w 9zs>di lo iscfRrun d'jsens x^^v b bas ^anoldJtaoq alsrid^ daoX 

«flB»xld £ifLB aslXlotsl 'xlsrid^ 'lol d-ioqoxie al&tefo od lelXsi noqu 03 od 

•dd ©d-lq2?3C .IsllGi no baB be^olqcif'm/ XXlds »is aooXXXlM •89tX«8 

8^1 nl fxi^alsdt^T: Jl x^lO s^ bsd^uoilxioo d'arid' anold-lfinoo eaisvLa 

^dnrffisxoXqai© silX ril basssn© eaoiid' baus allWnljsXq 94* lo XXs xolqas 

•s»Bno1 odi ©TLOdeei od' sqod tM& aasnanilXiw adl BSieeae it ba& 

oL od *1 d-lisieq XXlw noldlfenoo Xsloflsnll sJl es nooe es istisl&z 

9xld eisw eciislo d^nadanl sxld d-jarid^ svelXed od^ ftenlsidanoo 91a «iff 

Xeupo ildlw BfilXqqs btst Qisdi sw d-sdW " , dfjElsi»aiiJi»dlB fl« lo ^Xi/es^ 

«»8ss ctissd^aal edi oi sortol 


Him judgment order of the Superior court of Cook county 

is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss 

the petition, 


Sullivan, ?♦ J., and Friend, J., concur^ 

,-:i.sf?c5> ^,T. ^hrmti% ban ^. . . ^xiBvlXIua 

31 6 I. A. 448^ 



a corporation. ) / i 

Appellee, ) APP^ raOM CSfiWJUIT 


PERSONAL HOIE MORTGAOrijeMP^f?^ ) 4''" / j.^v ^^ 

a corporation, ' ■"■^"■■■^--».^.^ > f /' / /\ 

Appellant, '^^^^'^.^^J^ /l J 


Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the 
ground that it failed to state a valid cause of action was over- 
ruled by the trial court upon plaintiff's motion. Defendant 
elected to stand upon the motion and ;judgment was entered in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $1,447,42, 
Defendant appeals. 

The sole question before us is whether the complaint states 

a cause of action. It alleges: 

"2. That on or about May 19, 1931# it/purchased from the 

Chicago Trust Company a certain mortgage note in the sum of Twelre 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars, together with the trust deed securing 
same, signed by Otte Westergaard and Elsie Westergaard, his wife, 

"3« That at the time of the purchase of said mortgage note 
and trust deed, the premises conveyed by the trust deed known as 
917 Fair Oaks Avenue, Oak Park, Illinois, were subject to certain 
unpaid taxes for the years I928 and I929 and prior to the consum- 
mation of the purchase of said loan by plaintiff, the owner of 
said premises, Otte Westergaard, had arranged far a second mortgage 
loan to be made by the defendant. Personal Home Mortgage Company, 
a corporation, in the sum of Three Thousand Dollars; that a part 
of the proceeds of said Three Thousand Dollar mortgage were to be 
used for the payment of the unpaid taxes on said premises above 

set forth. 

»YTteO - t,HD©0 ( ,v...- 

( ^Y>tA3MaO -SOAOTHOM ESilOH JAHOfiflaq 

( ^noW.sioq^oo jb 

( ,;JnsIl9qqA 

ins&flslea ,ftoJ::!oitr s'llljclislq fioqx; d'luoo IjsIic^ 5^fli ^d J3»Xx;i 
ui Jb9'i©in ;. ir.'^bxfj; bfis noicfoci ©xid" rtoqjj fciusd'a ocf bed-osi© 

,i-.-^,'\'-^-^^I$ ':,;. ... .;,.■ c^ns&rf^.''-r! :tRrt?::?^rt baa lllcfnisXq lo loval 

,8X3oqqfi d-jOfifcaslsa 

cp rr . o £5 

'''"Tfioaa iiseb d-airxj «nicf riiJrw i0£i;fego^ ^bibIIoCT l>9!if)flj/H ®vi'5 fcnsaijoiiT 

-KiuaHoo ©liJ- Oj ioiu_ jjiio <>S^I baa 8S^I eibsy orfj lol asxjsi f)J:Bqi:ijj 

lo i®i2Wo sxld- ^llWnlsXq x<^ a&ol bt^s lo ©aMoiuq exlo lo noJuCfjam 

sasscfTPCt ftxiaose s -bsI f)®s«^TiB fijBd ^fiasissiscfaev? ei*0 ^aoaiixasriq filss 

^V'tJS^ffioO ©gsgd'toM sfiroH Xaaosi9*5 ^cJ^nsfciislef) arid- -^d" sbam ed oi nsoX 

Si&q B $Rii3 ^eaeXXoCi fca.saxjorlT eeiriT lo ffiira aiiJ- xil ^noldfiioqioo £ 

©€f o^ ©"sew 03BS*^<Jffi isXXoQ bnsEJUoxfT seiriT jbi^a lo a^esooiq erld' lo 

»vod.v5 asaiiESiq Jbi/^a no aexsct felsqnjj- Bdi lo JnsfinjBq sdi 10I bBZU 


"4. That the Chicago Trust Company inquired of the 
defendant. Personal Home Mortgage Company whether or not said 
Otte Westergaard had oade provisions for the payment of the 
unpaid taxes above set forth in connection vdth said property; 
that on or about May I9, 1931# the Chicago Trust Company was 
advised by defendant that part of the proceeds of said second 
mortgage loan were to remain with the defendant to cover taxes 
for the years I928, I929 and I93OJ that the defendant. Personal 
HcHse Mortgage Company, wrote to tiie Chicago Trust Company on May 
20, 1931 with reference to the payment of said taxes, a certain 
letter in words and figures as follows, *o-witt 



"•May 20, 1931 

•'♦Chicago Trust Company 
"«8l West Monroe Street 
"•Chicago, 111, 

"'Attention* Mr, Leon G. V/olfe 
"»In re: Otte Westergaard et al« 

111917 Pair Oak Avenue 

«*Oak Park, Illinois 

" » Gentlemen: 

"«In accordance with your request, we hereby wish to inform 
you that we are holding a deposit of $966.18 toward payment of the 
1928, 1929 and 1930 general taxes in connection with a second mort- 
gage loan which we made on the Westergaard property. In addition 
to this deposit we hold Mr, Westergaard »s check in amount of 
I235.00 dated June 6, 1931, the proceeds of which will also be 
held as a reserve for taxes. 

' "'Very truly yours, 
"•Freda Rockenhauser • » 

'♦5» That thereafter Otte "estergaard was unable to keep 
up the payment on the first mortgage owned by plaintiff and on the 

. i£f{j*sriw T£xisgffioJ) esiss^J'"!"':*'*^ ■ ; • j.,.i!08i©*I ^J-fUEfiaielsb 
rv^'i®^?©^ ^■i^fi M4"i:»- aot^^OBonov al fiS*£0J J-sa ovorfB sexAit ftlaqnu 

l&soQVXi^ ^tnsMftli&fe »«f5 ;r«rf;t t^€^-^ ^os ?SfX ,8S?J: «nE«33t sri* 10^ 

tri®firt«<| 8d* <>'»* eoairrsl©! liiJtw X£^X ^OS 

:.^.i e:«.^lr^ 


*( . J H 

9^ I0 d-js«>«rtP.q b*t&vot %l,bh^&. Jo itBofi^b & gulfeloif ©is »«r ^taricT sjo^ 
-<hroi!i &feotj»a s riJlw iioJ:;fo©nn©o al 99xsi Ibic«i©s 0£^X fcns ^^X ,8s^X 

•«f osX© XXXW rfiS/jtfsr 16 3fc!<?J!soo«Bq ad^ t-^C^-t ^'^^ '"'^^ fe8^£f) 00, ^£.2$ 
^s-Ji/o-^ \Xnti Yie'?*'' 

Q*>«{ Oct sXt-'fiixw aaw biaii^if>t&&'' ©^^0 n®;flssi9xJ:f c^ac^^ »12" 

second mortgage owned by defendant, that he was unable to pay the 
taxes as required under the terms of the mortgage^ and that he was 
unable to comply with the other provisions of said mortgages j that 
he was pressed for payment of his second mortgage by the defendant 
and that thereafter on August 7, 1933> sai^^^ Otte Westergaard wrote 
the defendant, Personal HcMie Mortgage Company a certain letter in 
words and figures as follows: 

HI* * * However, I can see no reason why you should be so 
worried about this, as you hare enough money in escrow to take care 
of the balance and while I had hoped this money should be in your 
possession, ready to pay the taxes, I am now getting to believe 
that it would be better to apply this money on the balance ctf the 
mortgage and take a chance with the taxes, as I hardly believe 
there will be any tax sales under the present conditions. Kindly 
apply the escrow money on my note, so that I may be relieved from 
this worry, 

" * Yours very truly, 

'"Otte Westergaard,' 

"6« That thereafter on November 24, I936 pursuant to in- 
structions and direction from Otte Westergaard, the defendant. 
Personal Home Mortgage Company applied the sum of Twelve Sundred 
One Dollars and Eighteen Gents which it then and there had in its 
possession and custody for the payment of taxes for the years I928, 
1929 and 19 30* 031 account of the amount due from Westergaard to 
Personal Home Mortgage Company under the second mortgage hereitt- 
above referred toj that the amount actually in possession of the 
defendant on November 24, I936, the date of said application of 
said funds, amount to $1,319, 51^ computed as follows: the sum of 
Nine Hundred Sixty-Six Dollars and Eighteen Cents withheld from 

the second mortgage at the time of its execution as aforesaid, 
plus the sum of Two Hundred Thirty Five Dollars which had there- 


cjbw »i{ ^«£i;t BxiB 6.®gsgcl-'XGBi ©fid- lo Qsno^ itM is&xu; fisilup©*! sa zvxMi 

dj iaesBs:tioiS Jjlsa to eaolaivonq leiU-o ari^ xlci-xw xXqaido oi ©IdBxiu 

tasiaielels tj^ ^ »SJ33iiGxs Moose aid ^o ^a©E\CBq io\ beeasiq a£W sd 

©cfo^w fciBS5i^9;t8e^\^ 9*d-?J felsa ^££^1 ^^ J-Si/s^/A ao isJ^lssisxld' cfadct bos 

^issd'ioiJ •hdH XiEknoai9<? ^drLsJbnsleb 9£l:f 
:svroIIol z& so'Wall: fen« ebiow 

•mo^ nJt 9Cf blxfoxie ^©nom aJtfl;t fcaqori bed I sliilw txia 90H«Ibq' «rl;t lo 

evsllscf oj- ■galii^'^ won m^s I ^eirxsi' wld" x«c[ ocf x£»«si ^xiolaasseoq 

edi %) sjwxslBcf 9x1^ no x^noffl «Mt "^IfT"^ o^J ied^;t9cf ©cf fclxjow d-1 itaxii" 

vlihnlS «anoi:Jif;fiOo c^nsae-jq ©ifcf nabim aeXss xjbJ' i^b ©if XXJtw siBdi 
isoil bsvsXIei eo' igsic I itsfl^ on ^sd^on ipi no x^^oe: woaose sil:f X-t'als 

^■^XJ^fi;f X'J®"^ BXjyoY ♦" 

-Hit Qi irmxfBiijq ^£^X ^*S iscfitt^voli ao is^f-^tseteri^ J^isriT ,^" 

h^'i^AUi^ 'vl'-^v:-? lo ALT.a - ■■:;t ^Jf-H-iO': vnr:CiSoO egasJ-ioM 900E XfifioBie^ 
s. _ _._ ..... „^^®d■Ii;8.Jt^I bus stibIXoG »nO 

oi 5ih6,:;,-x3jc,d sjot^ ^ab ^tmosiB ©c!o ... .......... ...:. ^0£^X bns ^S^l 

•ri^ Ip aeiaga. :.r„i . .- .-^r"- +«£[;}• j©^ benTslst «vocfs 

to iSGl';tsoJ:Xq . : . ^ _ ... ■..,.. ^v- „.>; , •^^dm-ovoM no ^tasbnelsb 

lo OK/e »d:J- iewc-'II.' • ^^cj-juqittoo ,X^.^I(_t-'->- '^^z crrtwoma ^ebniA blse 

JflOTEl fiXsriff ■■■" ■ -^ r-,r-' r,.v..-, o^orn-./; - /• - --^jxiS bfelbcuE SXLtH 

tofore been deposited with the defendant by the said Westergaard 
for the same purpose, together with interest on said amount to 
November 24, 1936. 

"7« Plaintiff avers that by reason of the foregoing, said 
sum of Twelve Hundred One Dollars and Eighteen Cents was impressed 
with a trust for the benefit of plaintiff, that defendant well 
knew the specific purpose for which said funds were being held 
by it, that said defendant had no right to apply said funds in 
payment of any indebtedness owing from Westergaard to defendant 
even though requested so to do by said Westergaard; that the action 
of said defendant in making said application of funds as above set 
forth was in violation of the terms of the trust arrangement under 
which said funds were being held by the defendant and in violation 
of the rights of the plaintiff. 

"MEEEPORE, plaintiff asks judgment against the defendant 
In the sum of Twelve Hundred One Dollars and Eighteen Cents, to- 
gether with interest thereon from November 24, I936 to date,'* 

Defendant's theory of the case is: 

"That the complaint discloses merely a contractual arrange- 
ment between Westergaard and the defendant mad^ for the protection 
of the defendant alone j that the transaction did not constitute 
a trust} that if there w a s any trust it was solely for the benefit 
of defendant and Westergaard, and plaintiff had no interest in itj 
that there is nothing in the complaint to indicate that defendant 
is estopped to deny the existence of such a trust; that plaintiff 
had no right in the monies held by defendant; that the conditions 
under which defendant held the monies were subject to modification 
by agreement between Westergaard and defendant; and that defendant 
acted within its rights and within those of Westergaard in comply- 
ing with Westergaard »s instructions to apply the money on the 

second mortgage note," 

Plaintiff's theory is: 

oi c^miGfltB Jbxisa no ;teeT:©;tni: dc^iw isilcfeaoj ^seoqiuq essss »rW io1 

^^aesiqr. . ba& aisIIoQ »isO b»«tJbnflH *?I©wT lo atuz 

Jbl©ri s^ied ei9Vf ebitift blss rfolrfw wl Moqiuq olllosqe »ii^ voix^f 
fli atmfi "^XqqB .^d" d-ri^ii on h&d iasbaBlBt bJtsa ifiricf ^il x^ 

noi^ofi &d^ ,^££ii j&'Sasjieci^ssW blsg "^cf 06 o;:t 08 bfiie9sjpei riguoxict nsvs 
;tsa ©vot: Iqqa Ms« anlaCjBia al j-flcbnelsft fclae lo 

ieZ)ii«^ii9flf»3ajBT:T[s d^aj/i, led' »riJ lo nolitsLoiv at ebw li^iol 

aot:t&Lolv jUl j^aus ioj&baBl&b aaJ- xcf Msrl anlscf ©isw ebrufl blse rioldw 

."tli^fllislq 0tli lo 8:fflaii exW lo 

, iasO n&9:iil^t:'i hn& eisIIoG exiO ba^bruyH «vXerT lo flu/s »ri;t xil 
**,o&sb oi bi^l ^■f'-S isctaevoH raorrl ao<9iQiii :fa»ieia.t dirvt isrl^sg 

:3i ©SB© ©i^^ IbD flioerl^ & ' cfxisbaal oQ 

«93I1j31^b XBj;f;JojB*r;txjoo f. \;Isi©k nib ini.&Xqmov> eri:t ^sriT" 

aolJ-osiciq Bti^ tol sIi>«ih (fiiisbaelsfc si^il' fins fen:j5S§'T«:te»W noowi-scf :tja©Hi 

aixrild-gnoD ioa bib sici^D&za&ni «»rf^ ^tAcfd* ^snolf in»i^t9lBb 9Ai lo 

d--tl®fled sit}- 10I -^cXsXoE ?ff;t 11 SsA& {SBVii b 

isisd-al on bod lli.tiilalq bas ^feicsgiaifeaV? fena ia&basleb lo 

llJtJ-riXsXq ^Kiij- jd-ei/i;}- g rfoue lo ssmetsix© ©jfJ t^^fc o^ bsqqo^ss eJb 

aiiox;^i:feiiosr ȣii JvLnbaelQb x<^ blBd. Betaom sri;t at :fd:iti on bad 

£iO tt BO lllboi. y&lxsoa bA:} blsd SaBbasleb rioiilw i&bar 

v''flJBbnsl9b ififsci- boB ;:lnsba©l©l> bn« MiJiiSis^es*? £id»w,tdcf JnsttseijB x<S 

-vXqiEoo al bi>6^^is: ibiilv bstB utd^t't ac^l aldiiw be&OB 

9di no TtsfioiE fif!;t xXqq« o^ ftnoi^aicid-snJ: s»£>ij&«3"s9^a9'.? rid'lw gitl 

'*,®cfon ©sjss^tioe Moose 
isl Tnoeffcf 8«lli:?nifiXl 

"That the tax deposit made by Westergaard with defendant 
was for the sole purpose of paying taxes and not as additional 
security for the payment of defendant's second mortgage; from 
the facts as stated in the complaint it appears that the holder 
of the first mortgage on the Westergaard property had a primary 
interest in removing the prior lien of the unpaid taxes for the 
years 19 28, I929 and I930 and therefore had a direct and sub- 
stantial interest in the fund deposited for that purpose; that 
the defendant could not legally use the tax money for any purpose 
other than that for which it was originally deposited with 
defendant, particularly after defendant had notified the holder 
of the first mortgage that It held said moneys for the express 
purpose of paying said taxes and not as additional security for 
the payment of the second mortgage. 

"Plaintiff had a right to rely on defendant's representa- 
tions in this regard and did so by purchasing the first mortgage 
at the time said representations were made, v^estergaard and 
defendant by themselves could not modify or alter this tax pay- 
ment arrangement. Plaintiff further contends that the application 
of the tax moneys to defendant's second mortgage was in effect 
a fraud upon the plaintiff who had a right to rely on defendant's 
representations that this money was held by defendant for the 
sole purpose of payment of I928, I929 and I930 taxes; that the 
defendant is estopped in equity to deny that the tax deposit was 
held for the benefit of the plaintiff; that the defendant is a 
constructive trustee of the tax deposit for the behefit of plain- 
tiff and is accountable to the plaintiff to the same extent as 
any other trustee would be, who violates his trust; and that the 
complaint is sufficient to apprise the defendant of the nature 
of the transaction, alleges the ultiniate facts and gives the 
defendant full information of the case it is called upon to 
answer • " 

iJsaoWlfeBfi zs J-on bne, B9X&i axil^eq "io seoqiirq aloe siicf rrol Bern 

isblod ibtl^ isni ai^p.qqrA it :fxii:sIqaToo 9ii;f jxl fie^sJ-2 as eJoal eil^ 

©ii;r lol BBx&S btsqtw &A& to ftsll totiq ©ri;t s«lvoffi©n «1 ;ts©'i«iflJ: 

-cfifs fe£E£ :fo6»ii:b fi £»sxi stotsierii Imib 0£9X bn.s ^^I ^8S^I 8^«9X 

;t6i£f {aaoqitfq isx!;t lol fee^jtsoqeb fecial sxlcl ni Sz9tw>ial L&tia&in 

©aoqiJ^ •^es* lol iceiioffl x&i ©ifif qiru -^LsgoX ;^ofl fcliroo ;tnsbfl©leJ!> ©iJi^ 

livtiw fcfjJ-iaoqsB \XIsfil3Jt10 asw d^i iloJbchr nol iadt neiii isiito 

i&blod Bdi bnt'^fjon bm iiiatiislsfc leila '^jlnsIxrolJ-Tsq ^ioBbaelsb 

ess^qx® 2X®nos[ fe±BC blsd il i&dS cgsjcl-aofl! ^8i±t t>di to 

•sol ^inusosg lanoiJ'lfjfc* as ^oft fcns ««xe;J filss saixsq lo ©eoqojjq 

,93figd-iOH feixooQs ©itj to itnecncsq »ri:f 

©SfigiTOta (tsitl ®ii* gnlsjedo-riq y^ oe Mft fens M«8f)'i sliicT nl 8iiol;t 

Bus fiisBgiaiasW .©JbjBts ?i«w ejHol:t soneeeiqei blBS akIJ sriJ- cfa 

-XBq XBCJ- aldi ie>il& 10 x'itbom ioti blssoti Z9vl9zm®di xd ^nefccelsi 

tiOl^BOllqqjz *>f':t :)<:dS 7^.bnp,:fnco -r.^rff-n.-J. Vit:fat&lH. ♦;tas«osn«irc6 iasm 

^taeTi' _ ' iijRneleb oi e:x©nojB XBCf ©il;t lo 

a^iasfmBlBb .no x-^^'^ oi d-xl^i- u >-dr llx;Jnifii.q ©xi^ iioqx/ fci;«il b 

9iS^ "SBl ;tJHi:;&n*l9fe -^rf M©ri aaw ■^©xioai aiifct ctiSffct anol^sd'nsesiqsi 

©rf;t J-iidit , \f v*I .btiB P!^PI ^8?PI lo .tneiFCfiq ^o •■oq^ifq ©I08 

ej') .JlcoqsL ... _ \, :„,. aJ; fesqqod-*© 8jt ;tnsfcfl9l©£« 

as ia9ixe ©frra^ ...... .,. ntjotBl^ )^,.j ^^ i»IcfBd^aW30ojs al baa llti 

9di 'j&ili biiB ;ta«ijj- alii s&:tBlolv orfw ©cf fcXuoTT s^d-ajyi;}^ lericTo xn« 

9ii/;tfin ' r:-> 'yr. -« .. F,.,. •> ,. .. ,.^-t „ , ^ „ . . „ .,.. ^„.,...^^..5 g^ cffliBlqsioo 

©d;^ :,f-v.i.^ I'j.;:^ K.Tc., i f j,c xj-u; ' ao- icgfui/.. ^iiolcrofianitad' ©rfo lo 
o^ aoqis bell&o at it &e&o 9itJ lo ao li ssirLoTial llul in&basldb 

After a careful consideration of th© allegations of the 

complaint we are satisfied that defendant's theory is sotmd and 
that the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that it failed to state a cause of action should have been granted 
by the trial court, ^''!e will review, however, the points raised by 
plaintiff in support of its contention that the judgment should be 

Plaintiff contends that "the deposit by Westergaard idth 
defendant of moneys for taxes was a contractual relationship bet-ween 
Westergaard and defendant under which plaintiff was a third party 
beneficiary," The leading case cited by plaintiff in support of 
its contention is Carson P lrie Scott & Co> v. Pa rretbj 34-6 111. 
252, There the court (pp. 257, 258) laid down the rule that governs 
us in passing upon the instant contention: 

"There is but one question in the case, and that is whether 
appellee has a right to sue on the contract between Harrison and 
Wolford and Caldwell & Co, The rule is settled in this State that 
if a contract be entered into for a direct benefit of a third person 
not a party thereto, such third person may sue for breach thereof o 
The test is whether the benefit t© the third person is direct to 
him or is but an incidental benefit to him arising from the con- 
tract. If direct he miay sue on the contract} if incidental he 
has no right ©f recovery thereon. This rule has been announced 
without variation in numerous cases decided by this court, ^npafi 
y, Harst Co,f 317 111. 251j Vial v. Ilorwich Union F ir e Ins. Society. 
257 id» 355} Sea rles v. City of Flora ^ 225 id, I675 Harts v . Emery ^ 
184 id, 56O; Webster v. Fleming. I78 id. 140; Lawrence v. QglesbVj. 
id, 122j Crandall v. Payne. 154 id. 627j Bay v. Williams^ 112 id, 
91j Dean v. Walker ^ IO7 id, 540; Snell v. Ives^ 85 id. 279j Br is tow 
V. Lane^ 21 id. 194| Brown v. Strait^ 19 id. SB; Bddy v, Roberts. 
17 id. 505. 

"It is not seriously argued that such is not the rule in 

«y to ■'-;.'•- rr »5xt>- io now file i)laiioo IjjIoiso b i9;tlA 
lias .feoL- '^nsfeastsfe +--<;t ?)«l"tal;tiiE ©is ew cfnislqcioo 

It.) .;'i:;.:.ii)c; a.; -^0 ^xi±ujs9l ©iff '* ."^riBlollaisd 
in^evog ' ■: " ■ " ' .' ""■': ' ..{q) vtixroo erfJ si'.r" /""'" 

[Oi;ieq b%Xii lol qSjiI iDaieJ-iio scf Sosi:faoo ft 11 

, uoE'i^q fciid^ iiioxfe ,o;j9iDgdd^ "^itrLeq a cfoa 

-xioo .:.ii,y iiioi'i i^al- " : . ^.ii-d Ij«>Ja9bloiil £M ititi 8l 10 alri 

sii lutiiBblor.' 'jii%iaQi.: ■ i^ '9ii &oeilb tl t&oeii 

bsfifijjofmjs xi©© Ii/rt aliil .liis&'isjiij yievoosi lo d'xisli oxi eari 

■J,UP9fi ,^,^&L^3M.j ^M i^ 49pfi :^£...,:LMiJ;d a^S ♦III ^I£ ,^^9 ;rei|;g, ,y. 

,61 £.Ll jM;hUM^.jt:L.XMM IS^^ .^1 -f^^X ^snV£<! .V XXg fea^TD jSSX .61 

iiiOsS t^V- .^^1 <!3 .SSV.I .V IlBflc. jG'^^^ .61 vex . -le^JIfiW .▼ naftQ ?Xe 

jugi:M£^t.-«v_S' ,.t lj3i;^c' .viproig j-^^X ,51 IS ^ermJ .y 

."50^ .61 vx 
at 9Smi e>si:i ioa. «J: riow2 &B£iS b&u^iB '\£Xairoii©e J-oa si il^ 

Illinois, but the argument turns rather on the application of the 
pule to the construction of the contract. In such a case no 
opinion in an adjudicated case, even of this court, is controlling 
unless the language of the contract or the circumstances surround- 
ing the parties are substantially the same, since each case must 
depend upon the intention of the parties as that intention is to 
be gleaned frcm a consideration of all of the contract and the 
circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of its execution, 
(Cal^e V. Paisijey^ 296 111. 6l8j Street v. Chicago ^Jharfing Co,^ 
157 id. 605j gull V. City of Quincy, 155 id* 566j Chicago^, Sfedison 
and Northern Railroad Co. y> National Elevator Co^j 153 Id, 70,) 
The rule is, that the right ©f a third party benefited by a contract 
to sue thereon rests upon the liability of the promisor, and this 
liability must affirmatively appear from the language of the instru- 
ment when properly interpreted and construed. The liability so 
appearing can not be extended ot enlarged on the ground, alone, that 
the situation and circumstances of the parties Justify or demand 
further or other liability. Hageman v. Holmes. 179 111* 275." 

In the foregoing case John H, Harrison and I. J, Wolford 
entered into a contract with Caldwell & Company, by which the 
latter was to underwrite and dispose of certain bonds, the funds 
t© be used in the construction and furnishing of the Hotel Wolford, 
in Danville, Illinois, To quote from the opinion (p. 254): "The 
hotel company had issued its bonds in the sum of $700,000 under 
date of February 13, I926, and had entered int© an agreement with 
Caldwell & Co, by which the latter was to underwrite and dispose 
of the bonds, the funds to be used in the construction and fur- 
nishing of the hotel. To secure these bonds the hotel company 
executed and delivered a real estate mortgage on the property and 
also its chattel mortgage on all furnishings and chattels installed 
in the hotel. This mortgage and the trust deed ran to the Liberty 

on ©aso ju liojje «I .v/OBid'flos arlcf lo fioJ;ioi/i;j2aoo &di oi bIjji 

^ajtJBJ 98fio rlosa esonic ^m.iB» ©rlj- Y-t-tfi-t-tas^acfira ©rtjs esld'iBq srLt gxil 

ocf si:'fleJ'xil ;^arW s... ssliiaq sdi 'lo aoiiasijil &dS aoqv baeqeb 

odi bns^ iOBiiaoo !s>d^ lo llxi, lo a.oli&i@bl5aoo & taoil f>»xifi®Is ©ef 

^aold'.Koex® 2^1 lo sKlJ- Hdj i& zBliiBq edi guifcaju'oi'ii/a a&oiia^eaujonlo 

(*0V .M £^I ^.oO TOCTjavsI^'f l££io2;taH .v . qO b&otllAR affiiion h as 

ojs^noo & i<S Bsdxlan&cf x^^xsq ^lid^ e '1.0 dilgli orij J-^iJ ^ei sLvi ttdT 

'::ii brm ^laalmoiii arfcT lo ■sc^llldalX @di aoqu BJ-aei ao^i^di ex/a oi 

irrtc^KisJ: ^cf lo e^BSJ:gii&l edi moil iBeqq& \l9Vl::^iimij:'\ta 3&um xitLtdull 

oa x&lltii&ll Qdl ,b&ii%iQiioi) bua bi^^^^iiqieiat \liBqoiq aedv iam 

:^sdi ^iuicl& ^i^ciiGi basTusIns •so b&bcieixf> erf j'-on hbo gnliBaqqa 

bnBia&5 10 -^"ili^aiix 2»xd-isq sdi Jo .'dQoa&s&msioiio baa xioi^Birc^ia ©jrf:f 

'V.^VS •Hi ^VI tae^Ioii .v xigge^sli .■'cc^llidsil leriio 10 leilJrml 

b'soJlos , . , DiiB iioziriaM. ,H nriol. 92/5 s axLtogeiol Bdi clI 

©iil" :(-^^S? ,q). xsoifllqo ojio (soi'i sd'owp o'i .aJtoiilIII ^gIIIvhsQ xii 
isbnjj 000^0(3^$ io aiwe ©dw al aMocf c^l fisuaeJ: bxkl \aBqmos latod 

-aoqstfc bm-} scMriwiefjflXi o:; . .titsl 9il;t ifoMw xcf ,oO A Il®wbie0 

^.iiil haii fioW®r/'ic)-anoo exiJ' ni i)S2U ©tf oJ- aljnx/*^ srii ,2J!)iiocr sxlJ- lo 

XaBctaciO Xej-ofi Dr'o' 3f>ftod ©a«»rict eivo&B oT ,I©ioxl sxlJ' lo sulrialn 

;ca x^ieqoiq 5>i; ^ ,; ■ 9J rjcta- I -fit b beioylLeb fias f»9;tx/09X9 

bslIsiartJ: zlsiirsdo agrflrisinii/l __.. ... o-^s-g^iom Isiiodo sik osIb 

TV. ^'t.f:^'■ c,rr\ .y\ •,-t ?,, -t..rf'rt c,-;-; {jjfje e§fi§;J-iOBi elilT .leioil odi al 

Central Trust Company and one l/Illler as trustees. In the trust 
deed the hotel company agreed that it would promptly furnish all 
moneys necessary to furnish the hotel and would have the same 
promptly completed and fiirnished. On November 24, I926, the 
hotel company not having sufficient funds to furnish the hotel 
in accordance with the requirements of the trust deed and Caldwell 
& Co, having in its custody certain of the proceeds of the sale of 
the bonds and refusing to make further disbursement of such proceeds 
until the hotel company had in its possession sufficient funds to 
furnish the hotel, or until assurances should be given that the 
furnishings would be installed free of lien or incumbrance, Harrison 
and Wolford on that day entered into a contract with Caldwell & Co," 
The contract provided, inter allay that Harrison and Wolford agreed 
to promptly pay for certain furnishings of the hotel that were 
specified in the contract^ t o be pu r chased from certain parties 
named in the co ntract, "if the ho tel company does ngt do so." 
(Italics ours.) One of the items of furnishings specified is, 
"Linens - Carson Pirie Seott & Company, Marshall Field Company 
$6,763.25." Carson Pirie Scott & Company furnished goods to the 
hotel company to the amount of $3,266.20, and larshall Field & 
Company furnished linens to the amount of $1,321, The articles 
were delivered to the hotel company and installed in the hotel 
building and were accepted by the hotel company on December I5f 
1926, The terms of the sale were thirty days net, so that payment 
for the goods became due on January Ip, 1927, The hotel company 
did not pay for the goods and suit was brought by Carson Pirie 
Scott & Company on the contract. The Supreme court held (p« 26I) 
that "this was an agreement to purchase certain goods from appellee 
[Carson Pirie Scott & Company] and to pay for them if the hotel 
company did not}" that (p. 265) appellee "is a donee beneficiary 
under this contract. It is dirr^ctly, and not incidentally. 

lis ilaJtaiffl ■^Id^qiao'5:q hlsmw it JsJi^ f)e«iSB Vfltfi^ffloo le^oti ed^ fcaefi 
©fflge eja,J- ^V6£i £»Ib^w fens lei-od 9ri:^ rUixiiifl o^- -sj-xfieeeasn e^srrcw 

XeJoji silc^ A&lti'Ufi oS afenel ctnclsHtli/a sfllvsri ioa TtOBqaros X9;torf 

j 'dfrnsil :^££©iDil:l«s xsoia^easqq 3^1 al had 1|ftafBi»s Ie#«£( ®xi^ iJt^tm/ 

iQEtiisU jS-oii-eicfiJiwoai ^o aaiX lo ©eTl ImXIacJ-ani 9cf 5Xyow egnlrieinnxrl 

J.XswfcXiSv livtiw dosicfxioo s o;J-nl beteSae x^fc ^Br{.t co biotXo*' bus 

i>©©TraB teio'iXoW ibas noa.ti-XBK d'jifld- ^^IXg I'^-.t^.i ^ftsfclvoaq *Oiort;tnoo sriT 

",08 0& j^ea aaofc •^gflqiBCg Xe^oii s»rii 11:" ^j-qbiJ-iioo eriJ £tl feaausn 

^zsX 5»ili:D5*qa agjaJtCLainxtfl lo cia©;}-! ei1:f to 9nO (.eim-o aollaSl) 

Xtm'li\^' bl: T'- IXsfls'XJsK ^XiUSKiaoO £> ;:^;fooB »liM hobibO - enonlJ" 

aficf oJ^ e^ooa ^sdBimtfi'i xasqjaoO * Sio9^ «i?sl«? ao8i»0 '\l?S.£d^^^$ 

3& MsX'? IXsriSTAil fins ^Ofi,^dS^£$ lo iimoam wd& o^ x^sffmoo l9iod 

BeXoxd-'xfi sdl ,X£iv,X45 lo c^H»oao efii o^ anssiX fcsiislnTi/l xnsqnio© 

X^s^ori ©ri;J ni feeXXaiafix bas x«s<I^"k>s Xsd-ori «^jf od^ fcreievlXftb ©t«w 

^'5X nscfiasasGno ^i^sqiaoo X8*h)ri erf^t ycf fe«;tq«soB »it9w btm ^nibllisd 

tci$^st%Mq i&iii 08 ^.Jsxi c^al) xd-'iifW ©law «Xb3 9d.S lo earns J- sriT ,dS^I 

XGBqaioo Xacfoii ©rfT ,VS^I ^"s^X x'J^JS^^'^sL no ©1/6 aaiijoecf aBoog ©rfcf nol 

aiii'I jKoaiBO x®* ^d^iioid aaw cMife tos afiooa 9di 10I y^Bq ^on fcifc 

(X(JS •q) Mari ;J«foo •aeiqiiS affT .cfo/rxifiioo si!;^ no xnaqffloO i> Siodti 

selXeqqiS laoal cfeoog iil8,ii®o Gai3xIoi«q oi d'ii0flp.©'£3s ns 8fiw sld:^** &Bdi 

l9iQd 9di li nsfW 10I x . -'s [x«i6<TcioO ab ^;too£ 9XiX«I noaiaOj 

■^i3i:oll^ii©cJ 99iio5r> i3 ai*' ssIXeqqtB ("^tiS ,q) ;t«iJ^ "|ton 5iJb x^Jsqwo^ 

^vIXi?d'fl' blonx .tofl Mi; ,Yld'or"cio ax J"! .iDsiinasi atrfd- tsbiu; 

benefited thereby. By the contract It was given not only the right 
to be paid for the goods, but the right, in the first instance, to 
ftirnlsh them," and that it had the right to sue under the contract. 
It woulc'seea^ecessary to state that that case, under the facts, 
bear- no analogy to the case alleged in the instant complaint. 
Neither plaintiff nor Chicago Trust Company nor the first mortgage 
is mentioned in the agreement between ?/estergaard and defendant and 
the second mortgage loan had been executed and the deposit made 
before Chicago Trust Company made the inquiries of defendant and 
before plaintiff had purchased the first mortgage note. The only 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the allegations is that 
the agreement was not made for the benefit of Chicago Trust Company 
hor plaintiff. There is no allegation in the complaint that Chicago 
Trust Company stated to defendant that it was making the inquiries 
because it was about to make a sale of the first mortgage to plaintiff 
or anybody else, but it does appear from the allegations that that 
Company did not even know that an agreement had been entered into 
between Westergaard and defendant in reference to the payment of 
taxes until it made the inquiries of defendant. The argument of 
plaintiff that it appears from the allegations of the complaint that 
the "deposit agreement contemplated a third party to it" and that 
plaintiff was the third party, hardly merits serious consideration. 
Indeed, there is force in defendant's argument that plaintiff's 
contention that it is a "third party beneficiary" under the deposit 
agreement is an afterthoughtj that no such theory was asserted in 
the complaint; that the claim of plaintiff set up in the complaint 
was based upon the theory that the deposit "was impressed with 
a trust for the benefit of plaintiff," Defendant»s letter of Kay 
20, 1931, states that it was holding the deposit "toward payment 
of the 1928, 1929 and I930 general taxes in connection with a 
second mortgage loan which we made on the Westergaard property." 

^ onBisni J sill sili iil »:txlali ^>di isjd ^aboos arii ttol blsq &d oi 
,ioB'i:fn.OD exlvt I'trixr '^rn o:' cfxlsii oxld" fefiri ;:^i cfisrict fens "^rasrC^ Ahimil'Tl 

^actosl Of!;'- ■ > i , ■ .::-dd" cfrjl.t s^scfs o;t ■s:T:s88909i^©»an>Ixx>w il 
.inlBl' i.o;: u.:xi;:?sn:i: sr':? ;'; r- ■. I-:' '-^'^ -rf^ Oj x^oIsnE on ci^sscf 
_-^. -,:;-, v.: .:.:,■: 2,. -IOC lllJ^niBlq I9xid-1»?! 

r>'^< i c; 

!r)4'TOffr 4 ) 


^«;.- K-.-r/T had lliJ'nlalq ©lolscf 
-'"^••xelnl •Icfanoeasi 

-'^fisqinor' -—"'-" 

jiLiij vYOjccfi nf'V€ ioa. hlb xnsqmoO 

foaelsB fins hisfigisd-eeVv' asswj^sd 

ili/pnl ©rid- sbBfli tl 11^ an &9X£j- 

i.ij aicil 8is»qqs il is/io ' ' ' «Iq 

■c^alqaisd-noo ^neias^i^B cMaoqefi" sxlct 

^txil^Iquic ■ Brief ;tjBri;t {cfnlfllqaioo srl^t 

rl^±w tetae-iqiaj: &bw" jiaoqefe ©dJ ottiio xioeiW arid- floqu becBCf asw 

XbM lo •is;t;t9l a'^nsfcr ' . '-^.taJtsIq lo d-Jileaotf ©ifr 

d-fioflerxBq b^fiwoJ^*' itieoqci) erij s^i-'^Iorf asw :tJ: j-ijifiJ asisie »i<?I. t^S 

^ lid-jw gQ.t^ . gg'.rarioo n j; Sf->x6>t XjBi»n»s 0£^X fins ^S^I t®^^-''^ ®^ ^° 

;ti3ri^ - -^.^ -..;;. ; .-, 
♦rfoic^s'xeiJlaixcc uroi 

... .1, 

^ ours.) Ko case has been cited by plaintiff that supports its 

contention that under the allegations of the complaint it was a 
third party beneficiary under the deposit agreement. The instant 
contention of plaintiff is without merit. 

In support of plaintiff's next contention, that '*the defend- 
ant is estopped to deny that the tax deposit if/as held for the bene- 
fit of the plaintiff," counsel for plaintiff are forced to assume 
facts not alleged in the complaint. To cite a few of the important 
unwarranted assumptions: Plaintiff assumes that defendant's response 
to the inquiry of Chicago Trust Company was made on the day of the 
purchase of the first mortgage by plaintiff. The complaint alleges 
that on or about Kay 19> 1931# plaintiff purchased the first mort- 
gage; that on or about that day Chicago Trust Company was advised 
by defendant respecting the deposit and that on the following day 
defendant wrote the letter dated May 20, 1931» There is no direct 
averment that plaintiff purchased the mortgage after defendant had 
answered the inquiries of Chicago Trust Company | a fortiori, there 
is no averment that plaintiff knew of the inquiries and the answers 
thereto before he purchased the mortgage and that he relied upon 
defendant's representations in purchasing the mortgage. The further 
assumption by plaintiff that "the arrangements made by ?festergaard 
for the procuring of the first mortgage * v- * and the junior mortgage 
* «- « were part of a single transaction," is not warranted by the 
allegations of the complaint. The only reasonable inference from 
the allegations is that the first and second mortgages resulted 
from separate transactions. The complaint does not allege who made 
the first mortgage, but it does allege that plaintiff purchased from 
Chicago Trust Company the first mortgage note and trust deed, and 
that the second mortgage was made by defendant. That the transac- 
tions were separate is indicated by the allegations that Chicago 
Trust Company made the Inquiries of defendant after the latter had 

eo\t :99cf aarf daao olil (.jsixjo >^ 

QsmzRn Qi b'^f. Illial&lq tot Isenuoo '^IttialBlq ©ri^ lo ill 

:^ioqfiil. mii I-j .-InlBlqiaco srii r1 fessolls ;Jon aJ-oal 

9d& to TC^fi 9ficf flo ©fesEi a/3W TjaBgr.^ .teifiT ogaoiriO lo xT-ti^pni ©rid" o;t 

.Eti:Blq;nios o/lT .ILWrjlfilq Y<^ ©^is-g^tiois d-aiil silct' lo eesdoii/q 

~.;J-^om iaxtl f^i^ Jb©8s4oii.»q llicfa.t.elq ,I£^I ^C-T T**i d"irocfB 10 no J-firid' 

feaeliff)^ ajaw ^njsqsjoO d^eifiT ogaoiufO xsb ;t6rfJ cfirocfs 10 no itotH (93^9 

■v;s5 s«;iwoIJto1: 9^^ ho isiicf- JbRs ;tisoq©Jb ed:^ 3JCLt*oeqesT: J-nsMelsb -^tf 

uoeil.;j oa e,x o-2&£xI: ,X£^I ,0S x^ 5©cfsf) ■I©c^d■sX sriJ- ©d-oiw iasbneleb 

b&d :}iiBba@'iQb i&i'is e^^'^i^iom Qd'i b^SBfioiUd, llld-nlslq itsrld" ine/nrtsvs 

t'T'^d:^ ,i:iQi;t'Xo?. ^ ^•^x:£BqssoO d-EiU^T ©gBoirfO lo solixxjpnl 9^1C^ Bsi^wanB 

'fid- fins sal'Jlfipxil ©ri:f lo wemf lllj-nlslq d«5di d-jx^raisys on el 

xtoqu fjsils'j. »if .tsrf.t brsr& 9gss;3--iofl! eri^ bsaadoiuq sri siolecf od'sasrld' 

•ssd;t'x«l sxiT ,93^30'. -^ailamo'sv-- ni- enoWBd-nsasiq©-! E^^txifibnslsb 

£)"ii5S3ied"es?i? X'd 9^«nr ad-afi.ii&siiJB'ii.^v .^ -.r';l "^It^alBlq x^ aoiiqmjzzB 

&:^is:^:fiom 'mlmjl edi Ir- '<■ ^sfigd-ioEi : 1' ifi lo gnlTusoaq erfi 10I 

•'xiu v^d" Md'flLS's^rsw Jon ^ >ldosanfi^d- elanla s lo :tisq 9i9w * * * 

BKsil ooxisislni sXcfiaaoefliei xXiio orlT .d-alelqgioo ©dd^ lo aixold-BSsIIs 

fesctlfiasi yes*'58;^icaa feflooes fcrif? .;■;>' r*^ '^rft Ssrl:} si anolJ-BssIIs ©rid- 

eli^ii odvr 'vu;,'! • 70f^ ;;r;orT .tflisIqiiTo • . siiold'9fi2nfi'r;t ecfsrfiaqse morrl 

licijB ^bssi) d^ei/icT biiB sd-ofl sgBgd-ioc; :>eill s^rfj- TjnrtqiiroD cJ-airnT osaolriO 

Q«^i,i:£iv ;^«4;^ aftoiJis;. ^juoiibiil si 9d"«xsc;9B sisw eaold' 

f)ijd is^d-jBl ©xfcJ.ia^ljj i»&imel&b 1© aslrtlxjpiii: arid- &b&K -^^sqiaoO itairiT 

made the second mortgage loan and after the agreement between 
defendant and Westergaard had been consummated. Plaintiff ^s 
further assumption that "there can be no question that in purchasing 
the first mortgage the plaintiff relied on the representations of 
defendant as to the existence of this tax deposit," is not warranted 
by the allegations of the complaint. To repeat what we have already 
stated, there is no allegation that plaintiff in purchasing the first 
mortgage relied on the said representations; indeed, thi^re is no 
allegation that plaintiff was informed of the representations; nor 
is there even an allegation that Chicago Trust Company relied upon 
the said representations. There is no allegation as to the purpose 
of Chicago Trust Company in making the inquiries of defendant and 

no allegation as to what the Trust Company stated to defendant when 

it made the inquiries. In support of the instant contention plain- 
tiff argues that "the representation was made as an inducement to 
act and with the expectat5.on that it would be acted upon by the 
Chicago Trust Company, which fact is evidenced by the subsequent 
sending of the letter. There would have been no purpose in sending 
such a letter to Chicago Trust Company if the previous representa- 
tion was not intended to be acted uponj that Chicago Trust Company 
al3d plaintiff relied and acted upon the representations and "the 
subsequent diversion of the fund by defendant resulted in a fraud 
being perpetrated upon plaintiff." We hare heretofore stated that 
there were no allegations that either Chicago Trust Company op 
plaintiff relied upon the representations and acted upon them, and 
so far as can be reasonably inferred from the allegations Chicago 
Trust Company, engaged in the mortgage business, inquired of defend- 
ant, also engaged in that business, "whether or not said Otte 
Westergaard had made provisions for the payment of the unpaid taxes 
above set forth in connection with said property," and defendant, 
apparently as a matter of courtesy, answered the inquiry and gave 

fje^nsirraw Jof ^ tsogsJb xjs^ ejtdi lo e««9^gJ:x0 and- oi as (tftsbnsTisJb 

isilt ftElo guisf^iisawQ al 'ttZiaJtalq ^.jwii^ aoJtJAgsIIja on aJ: eisiW ,b9;tfl;ta 

noqi; fisiXei •^jsqisoC: jeuiT ogsolxlO{j- nGid-sj^alljij as a©v9 ©lorW el 

■£ £[Dii;tB3©IIs oxi e.t Bisdl ,zn.oli&iass,&iq€>i bljsa arid' 

fcfix JxiBfi!ael9£> aO asliiupxii act;? gaJbfsfii slI y^iaqsioO ^ai;iT ogsolrfO lo 

■fiw ijO^nel©!) oi feaitacf-a -^HBcjeroO jJ'ejuiT ©da- ifsdw oj 2£ aold-BselXs oxt 

ov jn©msox/&ixl \ aol;taJnf>8eT[q©i »rl:f" iBdd 691/3x6 111;^ 

■ tbaBB nl ■38®qrtj:fq on ita^tf 9VBd fcXxww 9i®riT ,Tcs»^d-9X ©net lo jiLttnea 

-xi^tr^as'iqii sroivsiq er(;t Jl x^sqipoc j-gjjTT ogBoXflO oct 'leiial s dous 

•^niigjEoO ^axjtl ossoxii':' i&di jaogu f>8;toB ©cf oi fistescfjtxi: ion 86w xiold" 

sd^" I'CB artoid-fec)'a€»8et€[©T: sil^ floqif bsio/i bmi l^LLsi llldruLaXq £ict« 

liht^iZ ;i £[1 Lf. jlrr.r-y; jfff',KfT'^'?-e.o vii bfwJ. sxl;)" lo coleieviL ;fxi©x;pe8cfx;'8 

i&di £)©d'£i-8 s'io1o:fcifr. . "::ljal&lq aoqss Bs^snJsqisq sniscf 

^fo xf^<W^O c^sifiT o§ai;: -vti® d'asf;? BjaoXisss-CXfi oa eiew snexi;*- 

r4a£i ^siMi aoq^v b^:fof:, bsis zaoliBin&ZBiq^'i &di aoqa bBll&i tlUalzlq 

o^&oldO exioiJ . di motl b^rz^lni. YX^AmoBBan wf nao e^ ibI oa 

-oxislsfe to f)©iijiri;^.t (.aasnieiJef e^^s^irom s/i:^ nx bsgagns^-^BqittoO ^axzaT 

s^d'O £)J:be d^oft ao a:efi:t»it?'" ,^.3p.al8x;cf ^tad^f nl bsssans oaXs ^ia» 


the exact facts as to the agreement between it and Westergaard* 
The complaint does not allege that defendajiit made any representation 
that was not consistent with the facts, "l^hat would it profit defend* 
ant to induce Chicago Trust Company to sell the first mortgage to 
plaintiff? Plaintiff's case, as made out in the complaint, is not 
based upon the theory now advanced, but is based upon the theory 
that defendant, because of the alleged statements made to Chicago 
Trust Company, had no right to thereafter use the fund save for the 
payment of the taxes, Uo case has been cited to us that supports 
plaintiff's contention that under the allegations of the complaint 
"the defendant Is estopped to deny that the tax deposit was held 
for the benefit of the plaintiff," Such cases as Dodd v. Rotteraianf 
330 111. 3625 Catherwood v. KorrlSj 36O 111. 473, and Mallov v. City 
of Chicago. 369 Ill» 97, cited by plaintiff, have no application, 
under the facts, to plaintiff's case as alleged in its complaint. 
We conclude that the allegations of the complaint afford no basis 
for estoppel* 

Plaintiff contends that under the allegations of its complaint 
a constructive trust existed in favor of plaintiff, 

"Constructive trusts are declared and established in two 
general classes of cases, namely, (1) those cases in which actual 
fraud is considered as an equitable ground for raising such trust, 
and (2) those cases in which the existence of a conf id ntial and 
fiduciary relation, and the subsequent abuse of the confidence 
reposed, are considered sufficient ground to establish such trust, 
( Miller V . Miller f 266 111. 522,)" ( Catherwood v. Morris ^ 34? lU. 
617, 632, 633* ) 

"* ^ * Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the pur- 
pose of working out right and justice where there was no intention 

of the party to create such a relation and often directly contrary 
to the intention of the one holding the legal title. All instances 

bnslsf) d-jtloiq ji Mwow &aifr' »aJoB*i 3ii:t rLflw dneJ-slaaoo 5-on esw (Jaxld- 

oct s8^§''^ic'-'a ^sitl sjriJ- Ilea o^ -^fiBqsioO d'SJWiT ogBolriD aawfcnl o:f ;tnB 

ion g± 5>t/i±sI.q"S2O0 erict nl isjo sbajc es ^seeo a'llid'jMlsI*! TUlcfnlalq 

X'nosrit srid^ noqjj beestf ax ii/cf ,f>90ft«vbs won -^no&rl^ 9di aoqu fieescf 

ogsoJtriC od" »b£im uia^mBiBiB bQ^&llB ©rW" lo sexiaoeo' ^inafcnolef) ^fcild' 

fafiJ- rcol f)vs2 ijniil offd" sax? iscJ-lseieri;* oS irisi'i on fDar^ ^XnBqiooO d-eiriT 

ajioqqjjs jiiri^t aw o^ bectio ncf^cf afiri seso oK .aexat sxlj- lo ;tft9«x«q 

oCLtisIqsToo B£ii to anolJBS©IIj.5 oilj- lebxiu :f&d& aolin&iaoo e^VHiatBlq 

Merl ar.w d-iBocf'- f> --^-^ '^'rf+ ^ ,-'■'■ --^ ■' ^ oi be<jqo;t8e al tmjJbnol©6 BJii" 

^Hflmiej-cfo H .v bJboC .-c ^III ^ , :i.liat&lq ©di lo J-iloascf srfcf lol 

U0^v„js©ilj^ toB , . II Od£ ;^el3302L^vJbo2SSe^i£2 JS^E .1X1 0££ 

^aoiiBQilqqsi oi,. : v..,, ^ llxcTnlsIq ^cf bsitio ,^^ ,XXI ?^£ ^oaBOltfD lo 

^d-nlsXqsioo ed"! nl fcsgellB se oect m— -;...,..■, t . qj. ^n^os-j gxiJ- isbrixr 

cJxaBt' r— ;,-^'--i-. '-" /""moo »if:^ Ic c;ji^x.. . ■;: j 'r' :+jsif;t •;£)jLrX:)GO0 9W 

.XeqqoJ-EQ rtol 
.•Jo... ijijoo ad"! lo 8r£o,i:d-«s©II>- «i>* I'^bivj i%d;i 3fcit04"noo llioxiliaX*! 

,"■■'"- "^ ^ lov&t ni btt^ixB &^vi:f ^vJtlsuid'anoo a 

X^'j;j:;n iiijiir'';'. Hi ogo!".' ' '" ' ^'^Xe.asn ^c^akjo lo essesXo Xsisiisig 

fjas Xalitn bXlno::- .^ lo sonoJ-elxe sri-J- xloldw al ssafio saoilJ- (S) Ems 

aonsWifioo orid^ to seifcfB d-nsi/peadira &dt has ^noi.i&lei xisXox/Ml 

,;t2i/i:i' AuiB rfelXds^ta© oc)^ fiiufoii cfiselol'^lue bsnsbifinoo ©na \fi«8oq9i 

• --5^1 ^>£ ^yaESflL-LSL-^fifijOSiJ^.^) "(.SS^ .III ^as ^igXIiM .V TsXXXM ) 

(.IL^ tS£a ,^Xd 

-'ii/q 9xl:t lol ^.-tii/po xcf feeajfcsi »ifi E^tawid- ©vi::toxn:d-anoO * * *" 

tiol^nr<ink on 8bw 9•Iarl:^ fjiejrfw eojtd-fij^rt ^>fi^ •:^flsi'r :ti/o giiljiiow lo seoq 

^lij'id'noo A^Xd'osTib rted-lo bns nol:iBlQi r itows sd-seio oct t^ijsq sricJ" lo 

890iXB:^8nl XX A »el)ii Ib8«I ©riJ anidloxi ©no 9di 'io noJ::tn©;fni eri^t oi 


of constnictive trust m&y be referred to what equity denominates 
fraud, either actual or constructive, including acts or omissions 
in violation of fiduciary obligations," ( Roche v» Roche ^ 286 Ill<, 
336, 350, 351. See, also, Keagle v. Mcllullenf 334 111. 168, 175.) 

The allegations of the complaint do not show that any 
fiduciary relationship existed between Chicago Trust Company or 
plaintiff on the one hand and defendant upon the other, and as we 
understand plaintiff »s argument it does not contend that there was 
any such relationship. Its position is that under the principles 
of equitable estoppel and the special circumstances and conditions 
of the case made out in the complaint defendant is precluded from 
denying that a constructive trust existed. The leading case cited 
by plaintiff in support of the instant contention is Anglo-American 
Say. & Loan As s*n v. Campbell^ I3 App, D. C, 581. In that case 
one Lea, having vacant property, for the purpose of improving it 
entered into a contract with the defendant Association by which 
the Association agreed to lend money for paying the cost of the 
improvement, the loan to be secured by a first mortgage on the 
premises and improvements. The contract provided that the funds 
loaned should be paid out in the course of the construction of 
the improvement according to a prescribed schedule. Lea then 
entered into a number of contracts for materials, one of which 
was with the plaintiff. There was evidence that Lda told the 
plaintiff, prior to the execution of the contract between them, 
of the terms of the loan, and assured plaintiff that he would be 
paid from its proceeds, and plaintiff testified that he entered 
into the contract with Lea because of the said representations 
and assurance^ Before the improvement was completed and paid 
for the money ran short, but the defendant still had in its 

possession $3,000 of the proceeds of the loan. Plaintiff 
attempted to establish that this balance was held by defendant 

^i«,.«o .0 .*^ s«i6"X««>i ,.,«o«.*enoo .o I.,«.o« i«r«lo .t™,l 

.•,;.-- ,8dl .III ♦££ xSgfW^a_a-SJia^ .""J^^ .«•» •^'^ '°^^ '^'■^ 
■^nii ct«W v,c;». *oii oft iai«!l*«o= ei!J 10 «iati63»IX« •« 
« ,jn«qao.. . . -8«W5 »"«*^^ »^"*«^^^ <!Me«o«»lea ,iiit=«lbn 

..^ .«d. *^ 6-.„oo ion «06 Ji iae™a.« .•aiUal.Iq ba«.e«bn« 

.„U«6rK.= br- ...,,^>l3a.o,l=. Xaio.q. -« to. Xsqqoje. eId.*l.po lo 

.-c .--0 siiifcBsX rff .b^i-^t^B JKKT* «Yl*ot"xi8ao= s ierio' afltv^t 

98189 tsAi (i, .^-v . •■- .-,-. ■ ■« ■» ■ ""^ " ' 

• , „ , „ri4 ,01 .TjJiecoiq JoEOBv sniveri ,esJ soo 

eri* no .s;.s^.o« U.n B ,<J 6»ru.=.. .d o* ««oI «i* .*a«evo,q.i 

Sto.1 9d* *sriJ b«BlV0^q JOB^JBOO «<« .8*0^0.^70^111 '^ SO^taSlq 

to «o»=,»,.1Wos erf* lo «^= .« :tX *«o Wsq od tl^oria benaoX 
n=^ «ea .sX«b.ri08 b9cJi«eeiq b oi siU:I.-.c=os inBaevoaq.^ erii 

<IsM« to «ao ,.X«i..:l» .01 elo^^rtos lo ,odmm e o*«l be^oJno 
^t Uot rM *^^* »onetlv« e« si«dT .KtJnXaXq «IJ <I*x« zbv 

,BBriJ i«.«wlod *o«««ao »di lo ao«i.o9x6 MiJ ocf »iiq ,ntialBlxi 

ed bX«o« *d *«« llMalsIq SO-"-'" «'°^ »««°J: «» '""^'^ "" ^^ 
b3«*u6 ad iaU beXl±*eeJ «l*ni«Xq bri« ,ab«»ootq «il «cit bi«q 

aaoWa*fl«a,o.q«. b±.. .ri* lo eau.o.d »^ ri«'. *o«*n"= -'^ °*"^ 

bi«q btu becteX^o zev, Jnewvo^qiaJ: »ri* s^lsS ».!«««rB83 ba» 

aJi i.i- bad XIW8 Joiibneleb ad* *«<* .^orf^ '"-••' ^'""•^ "''^ '"^ 

«t*„i.xq .«^oX .riJ -SO =b.*oo-xq ed* lo -OOO.W noi«-«oq 

*m=fav.leb Yd bXeri a«w^»a8X«d aid* *«d* riaXXde*.^ o* bejqaei*. 


in trust, but the court held that there was no trust (p. ?99)» 
The court, however, finally concluded that under the special 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence the principle ©f equita- 
ble estoppel applied, and prevented defendant from denying that 
a constructive trust was "raised up by those special circumstances 
and conditions," The "special circumstances and conditions" that 
were present in that case are not present in the case made out in 
plaintiff's complaint. In support of its instant contention plain- 
tiff also cites the following cases: Live Stock Exch. v. Rose ville 
State Bankf 249 HI. App, 44:; Clemoier v. Drovers* Kat. Ban|{;^ 157 
111. 206 J State Nat. Bank v. Payne ^ 56 111. App. 14? j Weir v. 
Union Tru st Co. , 188 liich. 4^2 j Barnes v. Thuet^ II6 la. 3?9> 89 
N, W. 108?) Northwestern M utual Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kessler ^, 66 
N* I>, 737, 268 N, W, 6925 First Nat. Bank v. U. S. F idelity .<l^ 
Guaranty Co. . (Or.) 27I Pac, ^7, Each of the first three cases 
cited involves transactions with a bank, and the familiar principle 
of law was applied that a deposit made by a customer of the bank 
does not become the bank's property ?;hen the bank knows, or, from 
the course of dealings with the depositor, is bound to know, that 
a deposit is in reality the fund of another or is a trust fund in 
the hands of the depositor. In Weir v. Union Trust Go . the court 
held that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. In 
Barnes v. Thuet the court held that a course of business dealings 
between two parties constituted an agreement between them that 
certain funds should b« applied In a particular manner; that one 
of the parties, in the course of the said dealings, had in their 
possession a certain fund that should have been applied in accords- 
ance with the agreement, but they "seemed to think this an opportune 
time to balance accounts with Lindley [a third party] at the expense 

of the plaintiff," but the court held that they would not be per- 
mitted to thus violate the said agreement to the detriment of the 

,(^'*;- . , aj^w fiiBii:^ i&iii Mori *iboo mii :fud ^J'sifij- n.1 

I sic sq hasi S'^hcK- festoi s>ao o ■^^II an 11 , is vowori ^ :t •ju/o o tilT 

^js^;;!^ SfiiY-S'Si' aoil J-asJfjjQ&lyfc bed-nsveiq ta& ^b&tiqqe l^qqoizfi sXcf 

.ic eaofi^d-BiEJtr&iio lais^eqe" s£fT ".arfoxJ-lbftco fcria 

•^alBlq noid'iisJxsoo dri^^faiii: sd'l 1o d-ioqqi/a etl .cJ-nlsIqrao© e » mcf/iislq 

^^x ^&ijJw*.tfiI.. JAmYP5k ,«,y_5§a^XS ^^ .q^A .1X1 ^*s *^QgO»i«ie 

..j^XJO^i tV^- . . ^^< .i^uNiii'^ .Y jkias: .;faM a^a^S j^JOS ,111 

■A.Y:^iI?j^J^ .£ ..U .V J^ii^E .ixM ^311;'? ^S(^ ^W ,,m 8dS ,^£5i .« .H 
«»ss© ^^'zd^ -te.T:! , o fioiiS ,^^ ,Ofiq A'5^ C.^O) . .oC rtn^iatsQ 

:^fis«^ si . J ol)a»ff Jiaqqeft e d-sricf JbelXqqs asw waX "io 

R. . ' s, .jCfxaoq8£) edcf ri.j- fcw ssaiXflsfe lo seiifoo «f{;t 

•tt.'l lamcf £ ei 10 'isdc^orts 'lo bassl sdi x^+-tl«<3^ nl ax ^teoqeb b 

•itioo ©lid- .op, j-£^^'f jfff'.{;gV„^,.,,y S-(;M J^I ♦lod-lgoqsfi »ri:t lo etnari sn'^ 

8gni:iAei> ssBntsud to b&ivqo & y&tU bl9ii cT'iiJoo Bdi j-i?:Kril' . v esct gg 

»i2o , isXifcW xfisq £ ix^ iislXqq^ ed bSisosia ahaa'i nl£;Jiso 

itr . -..nlliif^D atsa <5(rii lo 98*1000 surfct ai ^aelcttaq suit lo 

•-*i'-- - --.-4- --'->■« ■■v;:;ri fcXjtfOfle ifari:? fecujl aleiieo & nolss'saaoq 

jK/f^ioq ■ :-'v --.rr.f.-;-! oj r, .-,... ..,...!. .^^^j j-jyi^f ^ij^flgnffef^-jsii &tii liitim ©onfi 

sane-.-TT^ »■ ■ r'-> f - • ,+ rixrct-3B aoiisXscf o:? *ci^ 

-• yO£E Mi/'ow '^ftili ;i>j*ii i4;a*L jofcigc' niL:^ iiid ** ^Yl Hal Blq e/it lo 

.:,.; "^^ . a«iai:id'®Jb f^; .!:'^att&ias bl&& odi ©c^sloiv toilet o^ b&Sftm 


plaintiff, and equity would impress the fund viith a constructive 
trust in favor of the plaintiff. In Northwestern li u tual Sav. & 
Loan Ass*n v, Kessley the Association made a direct representation 
to a lumber company that it was lending a certain sum of money to 
a customer of the lumber company and that if the lumber company 
would sell lumber to the customer there would "be plenty of money 
for their material." The lumber company, relying upon the 
representations of the Association, delivered two loads of lumber 
to the customer, and the lumber company for the same reason did not 
perfect a mechanic *s lien, which it otherwise would have perfected 
had it not been for the said representations. Later, the customer 
and the Association agreed to reduce the amount of the loan, with 
the result that the lumber company was not paid for some of the 
lumber, Tlieaflhaaac court held that by its representations the 
Association was estopped to deny that the lumber company had a lien 
paramount to the lien of the mortgage of the Association. In that 
case there was a direct transaction between the Association and the 
lumber company. In First. Nat . Bank v . U, S» Fideli t y & Guaranty 
Co, there was an agreement between the parties. 

After a careful and patient consideration of the points 
raised by plaintiff in support of the .judgment, \ve have reached 
the conclusion that the judgment of the Circuit court of Cook 
county must be reversed, and it is accordingly so ordered, 

Sullivan, P. J., and Friend, J,, concur. 


sif-+ lo ??faoa lol Mjsq .tofj rbw xt^^as^i^ lacfiml afij |«ri^ ^Xcreav siU' 
itoi:;fscJn0S€KiQ»*t ati x^ ;fc^*f fiiJ^-fii iim>t> jBBlAcsilT .isdiaul 

, :o±j-Jslso»gA ©fCsf lo sgfigd^'tftia , ©jdif lo iislX 9ii;t o;t iasjomBi&q 
.as iioitajtdoJsttA ©ii^ neswd^scf aQli&&ssiBii $Q&ilb b aisvr ©I'siicf ©a^o 

a^lnloq srl^ lo aoi^siefelsiioo d'ltsiJ'jBq: Ijsjs liflsijs© £ t»^1A 


ELLA, M. BLAND, ) . 

(Plaintiff) Appellant, ...-r'' 

V.""'""---... ..-'""" ) APPEAL PROjHSiRCUIT COURT 


( Defendant > Appellee , 

/? {/) 


Plaintiff sued at law on a bond executed by defendant 
Buchsbaum and others by the terms of which defendant guaranteed 
due performance by him of a contract concurrently entered into 
between defendant and plaintiff and one Quinn by the terms of 
which defendant agreed to sell to plaintiff, for $54,000, a 
certain six-flat building located at 4313-4315 South Parkway, 
Chicago » At the time of the execution of the two instruments 
the said premises, together with certain property adjacent thereto 
extending along Fouth Parkway, was subject to the lien of a blanket 
mortgage for $135*000, which mortgage was then of record. The 
blanket mortgage was payable in semi-annual instalLments of $3,250 
and interest, with a final payment of $92,750 on April 14, 1932. 
The articles of agreement between plaintiff and Quinn and defendant 
provided that plaintiff and Quinn should pay the $54,000 in the 
following manner? $10,000 in cash at the time of making the con- 
tract, $250 on October 1, I925, $250 on the first day of each and 
every month thereafter to and including March 1, 1932, and a final 
payment of $24,500 on April 14, 1932. A rider was attached to 
the articles of agreement which provided that defendant would 
promptly pay the interest and principal on the blanket mortgage 
when the same became due and would keep tr:© purchasers free and 

harmless from any loss or damage arising frcai the nonpayment 


\ ^ , ■■■-■ ■-! a 


TO mmi%Q SH'i ClSHMYIJSa iajhaob soitb: . 
5&©d^fiB'i6«8 ;f^iiBl«i9l»6 iioiilw 'to ssL^eS ©ili" '^fcf 8isii;fo fens au&dSitlosjQ 

B ^000 ^-i^^,, ^ .tiialsulq oi ll&» cS bR<ii'^B :jtizb£i&l9b iloldw 

^Xm^^&H Missoe. ^X£-^-£X£^% *©iBSoX arilblind c^jsXVstjtE fi±B;fieo 

edrtaato's^siij: ow:f e/icf lo jasiJuosxa arid- lo eal;? sx£;J j-A ,ossol£lO 

oSBi&£i& iff^OBlbe ^^:*'*'^qc"zq alBineo ttiJbf te£l3e'^oJ ^aseJiasiq bl&& Bdi 

^■ri' . lO xtsiij ssw sssa^TOffl jdoMw ,000, ^£X$ nol sgss^^noBi 

0^^t£ :i3icJlB:f3nl X£.t;nii£«©a ni «*X«fB\;sq asw ©gss^ioia J-sjInsXcf 

.2£^I ^-^l liiiqA no 0"c:\\ . j ij-iteis^.sq X«nl*S: © itJ-lw ^izeteial has 

mij ^ . , . . fiii , £)ft'3 7'll;lni:>3Xq ^Bri;t fceLlvoiq 

-riio© «£i SfUMism lo ':a.i:^t f^rl:;- Jb ria-c «^ 000, OX^ {■xsoojuEl guiivoIXol 
IJUB HOB© lo ^al> ,. ^ ^, ,^ ,^ ^.[ '£ec{oc^oO no 0"^S$ ^ctoAi:? 

o:^ bfsdoazin a^w *X9&J:.: .. _„ ^., LiA no 00^^■^S| to :}a9ts%2q 

blmovi J-nfifejiistl'-'b oBrli b^^blvoio; ">>: f--- .tasmss'iaB lo a»Xol;tTfl ©rid' 

tsia '>*■':">■ .'"T^-j> ■rf..'rf;r' '■,,'■ ^c.f 'i.rrtn-r r-r.- .- ,: rjf, sffjiisacf GffijQS 9ri^ nsffw 


thereof and would "cauwe said tmist deed to be released at the 
maturity thereof and at the time of the final payment of the 
balance due under this contract,*' in order to protect plaintiff 
against damages that might arise if the blanket mortgage was 
foreclosed. The rider further provided that defendant should 
give a bond in the penal sum of $88,000 conditioned on defendant »s 
performance of his agreeiE3nt» At the time of the execution and 
delivery of the articles of agreement defendant also executed and 
delivered the bond, which provides for a conveyance, free and clear 
of all mortgage incumbrance, conditioned upon plaintiff's per- 
formance of the covenants undertaken by her under the articles of 
agreement, and full payment of the purchase price. The initial 
payment of $10,000 was paid, and the next day, August 8, 1935, 
William Quinn assigned his interest In the contract to plaintiff^ 
She made her monthly payments to defendant until March, 1932, At 
that time she had paid defendant, under the agreement, in principal 
and interest, more than $33*000, Defendant made all of the pay- 
ments that were due under the blanket mortgage until October 14, 
1931« His testimony that at that time he arranged with the holder 
of the blanket mortgage to extend the time for payment of the 
October installment to April 14, 1932, is not disputed in the 
evidence, but plaintiff argues that the testimony is not crediblep 
But it is clear that some time prior to April 14, 1932, the owner 
of the blanket mortgage accepted from defendant $1,7?4,37 on 
account of the October 14, 1931, instalment. There is practically 
no material dispute as to the facts so far stated. There is a 
sharp conflict in the testimony as to what occurred thereafter. 
It would be impossible for us to give in detail the entire 
testimony of the parties as to wh&t occurred thereafter. It is 
sufficient to say that plaintiff claimed that in March, 1932, 

bloods ^a&bneleb ctsrii jfesbivo'iq i-^fl^iiit ^©fcli eri'X ,£>98oXo9*2o'i 

' ^asiifis'Jefc no baaolilbncii 000^88^ lo sunt L&a&(i «>ri* al haod & eirls 

Jtes ££0i;ufi-09X9 eili lo 9E!i ,d'ne-aie©^gfi aJil to ©onisiaiol'isq 

%e^£o tan ©s!rt ^ ©oar5^f->vr; ;i3i:voiq rjoidw ^fjnod srW f)®ievll9f> 

lo 8»Iojttia 9M iBbmi I'^d x^ aB::iBii&bm! EJnsnevoo sdi lo sonsmiol 

^•{;f I ^'i *ai»SJj.A ^ 9dJ i>xij» i^blati a«w 000 ^01^ lo ^faextncBq 

^iliJ-flli. -'■os'i&iwo Bt9^al Btd bBa^lzuB aaluQ a&tlltfi 

. <. .bn-BleJi) oJ 8;Jiieffixsq x-tilctnoa taxi sbam adS 

iBqioal ,f^&a®m&3i-$ii ^is lobna ^iaaJbaeleb felsq bad oils aeJti ;tfifld' 

i^blQd 90 js^t^f fos^nBi'i. 'j xmiBitinei elH .I£?X 

sii^t lo ia«?ffl[^jsq ajBgd-iofflt itsaLnfiXtf 9ri;t lo 

9tii ffi; t>9^j:fqai" ^ : ^ .tjiefiiXXs.> cnl i&doioO 

^»Mtb9%o iv: xld-nifiXq cfi/d ,9j>a»I)iv9 

:>nwo Biii ,^S..i:l''^S . si;+ ataoa JfiflJ- 'X«9l9 8i it cflffl 

ao ^C-f'^S'^Xil; cl-|i«I iotl l)©;fvreoos ©Si^sd-iofii iaalnjaXd exW lo 

TjXXsoWofi^ 8i »TtsxIT .cJ-aecsBEed-aiix ^M ietfo:?oO sifi lo ^acoooB 

a ei ei&i'i; »i>0j-B:tfe cu; fiissqBlb iBlisiBm on 

,iBi1iiBis>d^ 5»ii«fiso ctfidw o^ 8« "^nonWesct ©i!;t al d-olXlnoo qtaria 

«»^ict,. ol sXdiseoqflLt ©d fcXwow :fl 

ai . ' ilBfiisx{.t ^«*'f"r .0 ssliasq srfd- lo •^oinid'Bect 

^S£^X ^doij^ It >'*atJ:sIo "^^WnljaXq cffiiii -^ee o^ *iioXo±lljJ8 


defendant refused to take any more money from her on the contract 
and told her he had lost everyttilng, more than $300,000; that he 
had nothing more to do with the property and she would have to 
deal with Mr, Hefferan, who represented the owner of the blanket 
mortgage, or she would haTe to raise $135,000 to save her property; 
that she was ready, able and willing to make the payments due under 
her contract for the months of March and April, 1932, "if defendant 
would free the premises from the blanket mortgage and convey same 

to her according to his covenants," In support of her claim that 

payment and the 
she was ready, able and willing to meet the Marcl^payment of $24,500 

in April, she testified that she and her sisters "among them" had 

about $10,000 in cash in three banks, and that Dan Gaines, an 

automobile dealer, had promised to furnish the balance needed and 

take a mortgage for security, if plaintiff by the payment of the 

balance due on her contract could get clear title to the property. 

Defendant testified that plaintiff never tendered to him the March 

payment nor the $24,500 payment due in 'vpril} that in February, 

1932, in his office, plaintiff stated that she would be unable to 

pay the $24,500 in April and was having difficulty in meeting the 

monthly payments of $250, Plaintiff denied making this statement. 

Defendant further testified that in March, 1932, plaintiff came to 

defendant's office for advicej that she stated that she could not 

I>ay the $24,500; that he told her that if she eoald not raise the 

money the only thing that he could do was to call Mr, Hefferan, 

the attorney fop the mortgage holder, and arrange a conference with 

Hefferan and plaintiff's attorney; that he then called Mr. Hefferan 

and arranged for a conference; that the conference was held at the 

office of Hefferan, at which time plaintiff was represented lay 

her attorney, Mr, Basse; that Hefferan then and there agreed to 

continue to take the monthly payments of $250 from plaintiff if 

©H &m- ^ dit ©lOfli 4§nJjri:l"Xis'V» ;t8oI bad ed isxi l)Iod- 6aB 

v&ri fclwow »ri8 baa -vicfieqoiq arid' xlilw of) oi eioai gnldion fcari 

iY^'seqo'iq *iQii BVae oi 000^^^;^£;I| eeJtBi oi evari Miiow 9xl8 lo ^^^B^giroa 

isboju 9Sib e^aem^Bq »il^ ®:isa o# ajHilllw has ©Ids ^x-^^®^ Sfiw siie d-jsrid 

d'ft£&a»l9fc 11" »S£^I uXi;*ii/ 5ns doiJsM lo Bsitaom 9tli lot doBidnoo t9d 

©msE "\;svnoo lifts *?^fl^vt'j:offl dsitoBlcf erid' ecoiI seaiasiq eil^ esil fcljjow 

j.iiiJj £iJ;i3J[o rrari ' ;qifs nl ".adnaissvoo aid oj- gnUbioooB a©d od 

add- fens inetsriBa 

i3;3d "fitarid- sftoffis" sTsj-ivrs TGrf fifis 9f{g i&d^ feftil jt^ 80^ erle ,IliqA nl 

fiji t29fii:iB{) arHi. ■:- ^r.^lnscf &^idi al xJsao nl 000,01$ ivoda 

bus bob^-en. r;f.:L;I.C!:' s: v I).«^2 2Fioiq bsii ^ttslfiob ©Xldoiaod-irB 

mj -■ - .1 ^ ;Jirrijoee lol egssd^iOM s saUsd 

.v.ttscQ'. ,_. ,..:_. Jflg felirc, h'MTjnoo "i&il no sub sonalBd 

--r:,f<r;:v -v^v^fr^li;, ;3-add fecillcfasd dafiJ!ttislf»G 


nsBPi^ 00^ ^.^S^ sxW ion Jneai^sq 

art* axii::^'--^ .„.^.. ...... liiqA at 00^,>S$ »rijf ^ 

, toMW^Jjiv o .:5riii«l<» .Ci^S^ lo adx3:^axBq Tjirfdnoc 

Joxi JiXi" i:iO£rb£ 101 (sci lo 8*dn«Jbn9l95 

©fid ©si^i ..^;.i . .■,; uj -isr ; •' xi d«xii ;00^^-^S$ add x«<5 

^fiBisllfeM .-' r' \f- -aldi yXxig arid xenoai 

iw oaae^elxsoL - -v^. ::.;'i-;ji .njz ^-i^iuo/: egiiST'iotu grii rrol xsnio^'d'fl arid 

naia^-isn ,iM feallso narid er.' " ^'■'t:fatBlq bajs nciallaH 

lisialflc: ;ocai::i^inoo b aol fce-Siieiie bne 

';c; .;tK- :to a c-irr^i aaw llJ:Jii2;i.i,, siuld- riolriw djs ^naisllsK lo eolllo 

od &a©i?,;>. fisrid £)0i^ -.ststlsE darid jaeeafi ,iM jXanioddB lari 

11 llldflliilq fiioil O^i^ lo adnear^Hq ijXridnocj arid 93f*d od evaliaoo 


she would assign the rents. Plaintiff denies making the said 
statement in defendant's office. She admitted that there was a 
meeting in Hefferan's office between defendant, Hefferan and her 
attorney, Mr. Basse, but denied, at first, that she was present. 
She testified that Hefferan promised her that if she let her 
property go into temporary receivership all the money collected 
from the rents would go to Hefferanj that she expected that the 
temporary receivership would last ninety days and that the 
property would then go to her; that "I turned over my property 
in a conversation with Mr, Basse, Kr. Buchsbaum and Mr, Hefferan," 
She f\irther testified that she brought suit against Hefferan because 
of his statement? in reference to the receivership and that she 
testified in the trial of that suit. Questioned by defendant's 
attorney, the following then occurred: "Q. And do you recall 
this question being asked of you: 'Mr, Cohen: ?fill you state 
to the court the conversation? A, Tfhen I entered Mr, Hefferan' s 
office he asked me was I Mrs, Slla Bland, I told him yes, he said, 
"I understand you are Interested in that property or part of the 
property, 4313 South Parkway," I said, "Yes," He said, "I am 
the trustee and sole agent for the beneficiary, Kipley,"' Do you 
remember making that statement? A, Yes, Q, Do you wish to ciiange 
your testimony to the effect you never talked to Mr, Hefferan? A, 
You asked did I make any negotiations with Mr, Hefferan, Q, Your 
answer is you did not? A, No, not figures or anything of that 
kind, Q, Do you remember this further answer: 'He said, "I am 
sorry, you bought it, you should have bought it from me" he said, 
after looking over the contract, "I will tell you what you do, if 
you keep up that contract and make your payments as you have given 
them — •«•** keep up your contract, insurance and improvements 
on the property and I will assure you ?t that time when the deed 
is due you will not lose the property," and I accepted it and was 

^i i^oMma ssthi®b 'iJ.l:^alal% ^actxiei (arid- xsglaas bXjuow siiz 
,;!■•:„ s-T. -j.-.v or'. i^^'stll ;^jfe ^bpjjci©!) ^jj'cf ^eeasS .iM ,-^9xn;o.t;fB 

lt^i;©qoiq yb"- t»vo b^niwd^ I'' :ia£l'- \a n©rfi fclx/ow •^d'i»qonq 

. .^i9ll£>li .-iJ.M^na isHyMtrisij' .• ,. . »'iM ridl'^ noJ:d-£Ei9vaoo & at 

5f;£0®cf ojEisll^'H d'aci:sa& ^Jttra iti^iaQ': zdi b^llliz^i i^di-u/t 9/18 

9dz ^sx Ms'g[®vi«©9i: 9x:{^ o:r &an©isl9t ai a^nsffl»ifjB;J8 aJtri to 

f>iQei&inl ©ijs won; bfls^faisbmi I" 
t®g.Q sloe l)rtfi 8»;J'ai;nd' exij- 

vox .tOS'il© 9[i^ Oi ^^OElti^9i iiiox 

ii;f Jtw 8«QJ6it8l^©8©« ^ixfi aataai I fcjfcb b9:&ejg xw^Y 

vJ^ofl felfc XK)"^ el lewanjB 

^io«i^noo sxfd" tievo giLWooX is;?!* 

ejflfe'jK&vo'iqiffJ: Ms aoiUBti. ^ . -i:moo two-? qij qsai •«• » * - ii»il;f 

f)0»5 edd- xrorfw eufi^t .trrf.+ +-! irnv f»irr'^?.*-^ II Iw I fcnB xd-neqonq erW no 

aciw £ni^ cJ-i bB&qBtiHi:; <_ :. .. yiid' ©eoX ;:^on XlJts? wo-^ enb al 







« ' 

/xr^ 0', 







' • 




, . dStv si£ 




50 aftTwgl*!: 


ciB j; 




11 ^Ofc JJOTt ;tfi«iv7 




very glad,' Do you remember making that answer? A. Yes," It 
is clear that Hefferan desired to avoid foreclosure proceedings 
and to allow plaintiff and defendant time in which to meet their 
obligations, but it is equally clear that neither defendant nor 
plaintiff, at the time, desired to save their property if saving 
it required meeting their obligations. The owner of the blanket 
mortgage could not get her money back, nor any considerable part 
of it, by foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff further testified 
that on several occasions, particularly in December, 1931^ she 
was notified by Mr. Hefferan that defendant was not making payments 
of principal and Interest on the blanket mortgage j that every time 
she received such notice she called defendant and he told her not 
to worry, to just make her payments on her contract with him and 
that she was fully protected by her bond. Defendant denied making 
these statements. Plaintiff did. not ses fit to call Attorney Basse 
as a witness. 

Judge Prystalskl, who tried the case, gave a great deal of 
time to the hearing and consideration of the evidence. In his 
opinion deciding the case he called attention to the fact that 
the depth of the great depression was in I932 and that $24,500, 
in April, 1932, "was an awful lot of money," He also called atten- 
tion to the fact that plaintiff's complaint did not allege that she 
was ready, able and willing to pay $24,500 in April, 1932, After 
the court decided the case plaintiff was allowed to file an amend- 
ment, in which she alleged that she was able to pay the sum of $2^0 
due in Ilarch, and also the sum of $24,500 due on April 14, 1932, 
"and that the non-performance of the contract on her part in not 
paying the sum of $250 and interest due in March, 1932, and tho 
additional sum of $24,500 and interest due on april 14, If 32, was 
due to the fact that she was prevented by the defendant, Herbert 
J, Buchsbaum, from making the said payments in accordance with the 

B^lbeasoiq a^ifBoIseio^ felovs bd' bstxeefc na^ellsH iarU lasla si 

Tiefid" J^siji oj ^oirf?/ ni: ?iraid^ in&badlob baB lllJ-nlBlq wollfi oJ- 5nc 

•»atix j^naBn^tsife •psilrfien ;tBriG*- i&elo xll&isp^ el ;J1 iiicf janollBSilcTo 

SKivsa 11 xd-isqo'iq Tlaxt;} © o;t fjeiiaefc ^®£il;j 9ri;t ia ^Itliatslq 

*9^£lcr ei(;t lo 'tcicmo 9dT .finolJ-egiXdo ilerfd- gnlJ-eoai beiiiipei it 

t^aq alcfsieble/ioo •\g.«B Ida ^:floacf Y®iioffi isri #©8 ioa blnoo a^B^iiom 

f)'?i:'^xtp*-:t T«x!;tirf1 '^ti.tfiljsl^ ♦ssxilfcssooTq srafeolosiol x<^ ^^tl lo 

5^ ,. nl Y-tisIjJOiij'iijq 4 2noi8aooo Ibisv^s no ieAi 

z'f^ afiSSuxBq ^at^:Aim ion ssw ia&baeiBb tmii fi8it»ll©H .^ \ci betllioa iBw 

Id^ i:isvfe clsrij- j!:^3ssd''i:offi j-^jIftBlcf ©rlJ- no d'esie^nl Jbns l£qlonliq lo 

oi:^ ifirl tlo$ ed bns ^iOBbnQlBb fesIXso ©rfa e^iJ-oxi rfojjE bflviPooi arie 

iiEt«- mid iiiht ioBiinot) isrl iib 2:fxi&iinjsq i9ii eilmi itul o'^ ^xi^cow ocf 

^^Msm'tmri'tj :^^x.■>r'- Is* ..ofrntf asif Tjcf Jb9*o©;foiq xZLut g^-jw axle iiiri^ 

. .eesncflw s 8« 

slxi fli .esnsbivo ©rij lo HOlJ-sisblanoa fins gHlissri ©xlJ- oJ' Sfctld^ 

^■arff ^oslt i'£l:f o:- r.r. r-!- ;'^,c,+ ,- iSfaiijBo srf ©sjio 9ri;t §nlMs©fe aolnlqo 

^00$^*S$ iscii bn^ -C.V- -' > -• notzaBixreb d-asig erfj^ lo xld-qaf) 9ri;t 

»ii©^if/3 i!)0llfio obIjS SK '".■\jGxioia lo iol Xirlwjs UiS ej?w" ,Sc?I ^Il1qA nl 

•^''-'t cfarU B-gslls .ton fjlb .tnlslqaroo s'lliialAlq itniii ioBl e£i& oJ aoli 

■m&IA .S£^X ^XliqA nl 00^ ^-^S?^ ^sq ocf snllllw ibns sXcfij ^xbaei ssw 

•-»bii«aiB rts eXll oif bswoXIi^ saw lllj/iisXq oaao sdi bsJbloofi d-iuoo eri^ 

''■•'$ lo £aL'8 edi ^aq o:f ©Xq's asw sda cfAricJ^ y^s-geXis sds riolrhv xii ^^naia 

^S£^X ^4^1 XlriqA no ftCffe G^O^^"^Sv$ lo ffljja »ri:f oeXs bns ,xi9r[/aM nl eab 

ioa. at ftsq lorf r?" ■" — -^-loo sjrf;^ lo 9onB«iolieq-non ©rid^ d-firict £>ns" 

eri* bjHB ^S^^X ,f;: --' •'- -:^-' ban 0^S$ lo aure grl:^ gnlxsq 

■ ^S£tX t-f^-^ liiq- iio '•; , .'R^vj .. n:; ins 00^^.^S$ lo sujs Xsnol^lbbfi 

JiecfisE ^cfu.t-.&aslefc ©rid- y^ bed'nersiq aew oria iBtii Sc&l eili o& BUb 

etii ifcflw eonabioooB nl £;tfl?9MXAq felae ©dj- gnlslBa croil ^aouflcferiowa ,"C 

terms of the contract," The court held that under the evidence he 
was compelled to find that plaintiff never offered to pay the 
$24,500* sjid that the evidence failed to show that she was ready, 
able and 7;illlng to pay It . The court expressed sorrow that hs 
was obliged, under the evidence, to decide fehe case against 

In a late case. Hall v. Pitteneer ;. 365» 111. 135* the Supreme 
court said (pp. 135* I36): "The chancellor who tried the case re- 
ceived the evidence in open court, saw the witnesses and heard them 
testify. Under these circumstances we will not disturb the findings 
of the chancellor unless manifestly and palpably vn?ong) and this is 
true even though we might be inclined to find otherwise had we been 
placed in his stead upon the trial of the suit, ( Schrader v^ 
SaisaiiMU-298 111. 4691 Brown v. Stewart , 159 id. 212,) We wiU 
therefore limit our review to determining whether or not the 
elmnceller was raanifestly or palpably wrong or his conclusion mani- 
festly erroneous," Many cases to the same effect might be cited. 
After a careful examination of the record we are satisfied that 
Judge Prystalski's finding that the evidence failed to show that 
plaintiff was reedy and able to make the $24,500 payment was fully 
warranted by the evidence. Both plaintiff and defendant were victims 
of the great depression. Plaintiff's testimony shows how the rents 
from her apartment building went down; that people were losing their 
jobs and there were laa^y vacancies in her building, and she was 
compelled to use her salary of $175 a month to make up the monthly 
payments, 'Ve take judicial notice of the fact that at the time in 
question it was practically impossible to raise money to save real 
property from foreclosure, regardless of its past value, and the 
courts of this county were overburdened with foreclosure suits. In 
April, 1932, it would have been folly for plaintiff to meet the pay- 
ments then due under the contract. 

siii 9©fi»ftJrv^ aiy- ^9&cu i!i£ii hl&d j-ijdoo eiiT " t:^os'xin.Q'j 9rii to 8SV»^ 
©fl;^ "t^ od ieielto iftvsn lll^nlslq ^iidd- ball oi LsIX&qBoo 3sir 

mLQ-squQ aci^- 4<I£I .1X1 ^d£ n XfiansJ'J'Jj'i .y XX^H ^eeao ecffil £ nl 
-9'! easa sjlri" fcetii oriw ioXX©©iSBflo axiT** i(c>£X tl££X .qq) i)l62 :tiL'Oo 

?,gK.t&xill 9ri^ <mj^»i& ^©n XXlw 9W asfjxijscj-aautftjiii} seetU" asbnU .'^tll.+a©^ 

aMcf bflB j^ns-Rv "sjXcfeqX^q ba& "^X-fss-llojaia aeoXjOi/ loXXoon^ds ©iic* lo 

flsscf 9W £«ad eai»;'»? bal'l o^ boatlocit f)(i cfrfaXai ow risjyodJ^ rtevsi ei/i:t 

*X_3P,e//: ♦d'lifa srlcl' to Xsi-x^ oxi^ noqtr f)B9;fR airf nl bPo.?'-Xq 

XXiw sW (,eXS .f)X Pt^X t^^0S£i8_„^XJIK£Sg l«?^^ .XXI 8^£_at£BT^ 

©ry d'OG 'xo isrfd-oiivf snxxiiJBfnc»;t*b o;t wei^ei "ujo ^JbcXX 9iol.9Tsri;t 

-in -ai? aoiBXiXL'Ctoo eixl 'lo gxioiw xXcfnqXaq io xXis^^Xnsct azjw T:oXX90iir.rfci 

,!/€>:}• xo ecf JTl^.ini J-oel^s sciAiS eiid" oS b&qbd ^fasM ".ex/osnoii?) "^jXcJ-ael 

i8£ij worie 0:1 £)»Xi«l ©oxie&Xvs ©rf^ j^j- siLtball a* Jt^iaX/icfa'ifil ejftFX 
X-tlJ^t R&v{ .tflfJiB^.'^q 00^ ^-^S^ 6>ii:f ©:Hj&m Qd ©XcfiS baa ■'cljijsi esw 11t:^al&lq 

8ita0'x sxi^ won awoxie '^^aosLtJae^? E'l^WfiieX'^ .actaasnqsb .tasiQ ©xt^ lo 

x^:rI;J S«isoX »*i»w sXfOfeq J-sifcf iJHWob J-new salbXiwcf ^tneta^ixjqs t&d dtoiI 

E&iiv srifi £'Go ^sitiJbXictf 19x1 nl aelofisoiiv ^iaw ei»w sieifJ- iSxis edof 

x;Xf{.taoin ariJ- Qir dai^ai oo- rt^noia 6 ^VX<^ lo X"i«X«a ^©^ »8W o^ feeXXscixaoo 

ni ©ffiXd" Bdi jfi i^ari.;' :?€»®t ex2:t lo ooXi+oxi Itiiolhal s^fs^ sW , a;tfl«tffr^j3q 

Ijssi avaa oj x-^tnoin eal^i cd »Xcf xe soqiai leXXasljOjsiq sx-w *i i3[oXd-a»x;f 

»ffiy toa 5axfXfiv ia&q a:tl lo aafeX^'i^Sf^'x ,&iiraoXo€'iol aoit ■(j:^i9qoiq 

fli .aJiJie s^xeoXoeaol ricttw fcsjsofe'xift^ievo ©'xsw Y^xauoa e±ri;J- lo 8;tiD©o 

-YJ^q Sii^ ^9f'iJ^ o«^ "-IXicXcXq lol ^XXol a»©cf ©vaxi M^ow :fi tS£^X ^XliqA 


Counsel for plalDtiff contend that the evidence shows 
that defendant repudiatsd the contract in I.arch;, 1932, and that 
plaintiff was therefore under no obligation to pay or tender the 
payments due in Karch, 1932, and April, 1932, If we assume the 
correctness of this contention, 4n toto, nevertheless, in order 
to recover plaintiff would be obliged to show that she was ready, 
able and willing t© meet the said payments at the times in question. 
Counsel for plaintiff practically concedes that plaintiff would be 
so obligated, but insists that the trial court would have been 
Justified in finding that there was sufficient evidence toshow 
"the ability of the plaintiff to pay." As wg iiave heretofore 
stated, we are in accord with the finding of the trial court in 
respect to this question of fact. Indeed, after the owner of the 
blanket mortgage had given plaintiff an opportunity to save the H: 
property and she had agreed to a receivership, the arrangement 
fell through and plaintiff sued Hefferan, If plaintiff were ready, 
able and willing to meet th® March and April payments, why did sbs 
consent, in April, 1932, to let the property go into temporary 

Dhe judgment of th® Circuit court of Cook county is affirmed, 


Sullivan, P. J,, and Friend, J., concur , 

KoiijBeifp al asaii^ ©yftt ^& ej-iisjar^^q Mjsa ed* d-ssc: ©:^ ^aJtlllK bn& ©Ids 
flsj!9d ©v«rf blM^w i'moc i«i:rr . rfc; eJ-aiaaX JfitJ ^&e.?sSlItfo os 

sdJ- ©v^a oc Y^^iniJ'J'iOQqo an- 'i1t:itilBlq, isevlg acrf •lB§:*ioa ;^»3Cfl«itf, 

;t«9SisaiUTia ©ilii* <|qMai©"ffi:eo®"x s o:^ bti&*z^j^ bod siia 6nB x*rj©qoiq 

^Tgbsei ©'iw 1:14:^iii:sXq tl .iSJB^®lt»E b9VB HtXiaJt^lq baa A^midi Hel 

©lis fell) lyiiw »s;tia;f?ffi%aq Xi^A bn& AoisM 9siS ^«s« oi ^alllJyr bojs, ©Xdis 


41874 31 6 I. A. 449 


(Plaintiff) Appellee, ) 



HAROLD B. WE SS et a^3^, .^" / 

— Difendahta, y^^ ) COURT OF CfipK COimTT/ 

) ^■' 

\ ) 


appeal' prom s 



martin L. STRAUS, BARTOH H. X, 


and ADOLPH mSY, ) 

(Defendants) Appellants, ) ^-^ 


Stella Fellheimer, plaintiff, the assignee of a judgiaent 
creditor of a corporation, sued all of the directors of the 
eorporation to hold them liable to the judgment creditor for 
the amount of the judgment* Pour of the directors, Martin L« 
Straus, Barton !« Sackett, i/illiam H, Yates and Adolph Drey 
(hereinafter called defendants), were served with summonses. 
An amended complaint was filed on October 23, 1935* to which 
defendants filed an answer. On October 7, 194-0, plaintiff 
filed a motion, supported by affidavits, for su^arxjud^isnt. 
Defendants filed counter-affidavits to the motion and on April 
18, 1941, the trial court entered a summary judgment for 
$29,645«45i on the affidavits and counter-affidavits. Defend- 
ants appeal from this judgment* 

The amended complaint contained three counts, but plain- 
tiff states in her brief that she relies upon count II, alone, 
in support of the summary judgment. Count II realleges para- 
graphs (1) to (19), inclusive, of count I« These paragraphs 

"(1) That on May 15, I93I Harry Fellheimer filed suit 
for breach of contract in the United States District Court in 
Omaha, Nebraska against the Hartman Furniture and Carpet Companyp 
a Nebraska Corporation, which after trial resulted in a judgment 


nommm Uom '^aih^a 

( .V 


i.o J-' ce aw ,a GJoaAH 

^i'. • . bOA 

( .sJ-flsIIsqqA (8/ Q) 

•jCLJ- lo aTo:fo®T[l£i silct lo lis bsi/a ^/loij^ioqioo a lo natib©-!© 
^Dol toJ'iJb©^© vtnsffisbift BdS oi ©Xtfsll iBfviij bioA oS noljartoqioo 

dohiw oi ^^£^1 ^1^ tBiSoi&O tuo boltl aaw vtiXlBlqmoo b9ba9m» uA 
I'ii^rfll&Iq ^O^i^X ^^ isirfbctoti iiCJ .tswaej hb &»X11 zioMbae'iBb 

XirtqA ao jbna noi;iO£i sjtld^ od" a;tXvBJ&ilt*-i9dijxfoo bsXXl s^nubnalsQ 

t:o1 :tn9fEafwt TCii5ffiffi«e & b^imiafi i*xijot> XsliJ eii;t ^X-^^X ^8X 

"mbu&leQ. ,Qiiyrisbt'^.1&»i&imsoo ba^ ^ilv&blJ.1& 9dJ ao ^K^^%^^ 

^iaannbul alrii moil Xjsoqqo eSnE, 

^enoXiJ ^11 ;i£woo aoqsj esllai eda :^&d:j l&tnd leri at BeiBiB lli;f 

-srtsq BsseXX.sei II ^xmoD ,i^a»fflsbi/t T^JSHKI/b sxfi lo :^ioqqjje ni 

axlqisis^isq 989j1T *I d^auoo lo ,©v±ai:;XorrX t(^X) o:^ (X) eiiqsTa 

:^JUfa belli tSici:exUX»'9 x'-i^Ji X£^X ,^X ^sML ao isdl (X)" 
Bil iiuoO ;tol'iiBtCl se4B^& b«d-JbaC 9tii at io&tiaoo lo rCojjsid lol 

Aaejngbwt ^ fl-t b?;d-Xj:;s9'i Xol'id i&ils riolxlv? ,noJ:;ts'ioqioO fialeaicfsH a 

In his favor on January 7, 1932 in the sum of $18,015 an4 costs 
amounting to $66,75 with interest thereon at 7% per annum from 
January 7, 1932* 

"(2) That on April 6, 1932 an execution was issued and 
delivered to the United States Marshal at Omaha and returned 
unsatisfied on April 7, 1932. 

"(3) That on April 7, 1932 Harry Fellheimer assigned all 
his interest in said Judgment to his wife Stella Fellheimer the 
plaintiff. That said assignment was duly filed with the Clerk 
of the United States District Court at Omaha, Nebraska and 

"(4-) Due notice thereof given to Hartman Furniture and 
Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, and 

"(5) That plaintiff is the present holder of said assign- 
ment and Judgment* 

"(6) That defendants Harold B. Wess, Barton H, Sackett, 
Adolph Drey, William H. Yates, Martin L, Straus, Meyer Kuit, 
Edward G, Pelsenthal and Joseph M. Strauch were at all times 
set forth in the complaint officers and directors of the Hartman 
Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation« 

H7) That in May, 19 31 the defendant officers and direc- 
tors of the Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Cor- 
poration, fraudulently connived together and entered into and 
engaged in a course of conduct designed and contemplated to 
dispose of the assets of the Hartman Furnlt\ire and Carpet Company, 
a Nebraska Corporation, and to remove said assets from Nebraska 
and put said assets beyond the reach of creditors of said corpor- 
ation, and that these directors caused said Company to beccaae 
insolvent in that the action of said directors and officers 
"resulted in the inability of said Nebraska Corporation to pay 
its debts as they matured, and in that after the actions of the 
officers and directors the assets of said Hartman Furniture 

a^iCfo mir ^^LO^^l^ to mi& &d.i at ££^Jt ,T fi^i^^J^ «c. lovsl eiii nj: 

.S£^^V Xltq.' no J&ollalcrjBBruj 
adJ •t«KieilIX9'? sll»;t8 ©^Jfcw bItI od- :fn€M:^biJ' fit iz(^*i^:mi aiii 

ima ^xtoid-BioqioO ^zaid'9Vi s, \^BqmoO ;f»qi60^ 

*;^£xeffisJbxft b^^ &a9b 

^;tXi/2[ if/^^M ^atf.3i^. ,J ali'UBU ^bbSbJ .H aeiXXlW ^^eta riqXobA 
aeml -'lox.'SlC^B ,35 iigaeoT. " ri;tn9aX©^ .0 biswfea 

,nol:tj5^oq^oO ^^[sB^cfsiH s ^Y^ss^Jflio^ ;tsqi^6 fins Bivitsiixfi 
-oQilb baa ziBonJo :^a&bn»'lsb »di X^^X ^%isM as 

oc^ iijsd'BXqBisd'fioo fiaa bsnsissi) ioitbr a'liioo a al bsgcsna 

^XP£,qmoO d-sqiisO 6hjb »*mc)-iinjj^ n^iKl'i.gH sifv' aes arid" lo eaogall) 

B7iaGi<Sel/L ttoil a^tsaajs blsa svoktst: <xt 6ni; ^noiifsioqioO BafsBnrfoH s 

"•■ ' aio:fl.b ' fioosi oxic.^ b£ioxe<S ad-seas bisa J-j^q fwis 

©foooscf o:t- ■^.equioO 1>1bc bssuso Rioiooitb eesift ;tsri:f fjjis ^nol;tB 

KTEeoXllo baB aioitosil?) Msa lo noXc^os ©il;t ;tsri:t ni insvXoanl 

•^Bq oJ floic^cioq-ioO ssfesticfsH Mfia to irctXXXcfsiiX 9ii;t nX f)»^Xj;i89t 

sdi Ic anoXdos ©iSd- n©;^!^ ctodct fll fcHs ^fesiwd-sc! x©rf^ as zideb ed^X 

aiJJ^tXfl-m^ £iBci;tiJBH bise lo sdeaae nrfd aioc^osiXb ba» siboUIo 


and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, at a fair valuation, 

were less than the liabilities of said Corporation, all contrary 

to the laws of Nebrasli^ and in fraud of the creditors ©f said 


"(8) That on or about June 30, 1931* Joseph M, Strauch as 
Vice President and Meyer Kuit as Assistant Secretary of the Hartman 
Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, without prior 
authority or any authority from the board of directors or stock- 
holders of said Corporation, entered into an agreement with the 
Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company an Illinois Corporation, 
whereby the Nebraska Corporation transferred or agreed to transfer 
its accounts and contracts receivable to the Hartman Furniture 
and Carpet Company, an Illinois Corporation, which said receivables 
were in turn to be pledged by Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, 
an Illinois Corporation, as security for a debt of said Corporation, 
and that the sale of said receivables of Hartman Company, a Nebraska 
Corporation, to Hartman Company, an Illinois Corporation, was made 
without consideration! that thereafter the action of said officers 
and directors was confirmed and approved by a special board of dir- 
ectors ^ meeting of the Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, a 
Nebraska Corporation, held et Chicago, Illinois, on August 27, 1931> 
at which meeting were present the following directors: Martin L* 
Straus, Edward G, Felsenthal, Adolph Drey, Charles A, Frank and 
Joseph Urn Strauch, all of whcaa waived f onaal notice of the meeting 
and ratified and approved the execution of said agreement and 
authorized the officers of said Hartman Furniture and Carpet Craapany, 
a Nebraska Corporation, to take all such further action as might be 
necessary in their opinion to carry out the agreement so entered 
into, and to make any change's which might be deemed advisable. 

"(9) That pursuant to said agreement all of the existing 

receivables of the Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska 
Corporation, were assigned to the Hartman Furniture and Carpet 

VijB^ioo© lis ^aeld^fiioqioO fel«a 1o zelitllciBil pdi tiBtH ea»I ei»w 
ftlsa "io s^od-lBs'io srict lo buail ni bar. ssfsfcitf©?! lo 2w«I eiW oj- 

.riolJ eiOQ-ioO 

esldfevlsoei Mbe xioirfw ^i :.i.-s'iQq^O 8ionlIJ;i iss ^trrajflfaO tfeqaeO ixia 

^noidiiTKxjnoO blBv, "^ • "■ -^ ' • lol x^-t'S'i^o^e *J8 ^jioJtcfsnoqioO alonllll na 
^t&id^Vi B ^x^Bc " - .'■^ vlao©5 t'-f;-- '^- alae .firi^ Isit^ fuxfi 

-'vJtB 1o l^it^ou 1.31:: cqa ,^ v.; i^tvo'ig::^^; uGUi i>afflraxlxK)» sew sio^setclJb fea« 
n-i£^X ^^S i-sjjgwA ito ^iilo .till ^o:isi>lriD is bl^ti ,xx©J:-t£ioqrroO £3te8«fe1I 

Sflijesffi Bd^ ^ soJt^Ofl Isffiitol fcsvisw aodw lo lis ^riDcai;fa ^M Jiqaaot 

^y^&qssoO ^fsqtaO Jixus 9^i?ilaatJ^ nsKti^H IjIbb lo aisolllo ojit £iesiieri;tx/B 

b9t9i£iB oe ;tiieffi£)sicsB oii;^ ^jbd -^iiij© oi jcBOjLolqo it^iii at tcibbbsosc 

SHicfajtxs &di lo lis ^neflse-ijB bjUit oi iBASSzivq Ss^tfH i^)** 
&-AaB'idolil & ^YnjsqflcoO ^©qia.^ £aB ©•m:Maii;^ aBisttsR &Ai lo a©XrffiV±so»"i 

Compaay, an Illinois Corporation, and from said time up to the 
cessation of ousiness by said Hartman Furniture and Carpet 
Company, a Nebraska Corporation, on December 31> 1931# the 
receivables of said Nebraska Corporation were likewise from 
time to time assigned to said Hartman Furniture and Carpet 
Company, an Illinois Corporation, all without consideration to 
said Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, 
and ia fraud of the creditors of said Corporation* 

"(10) Ihat at a special meeting of the board of directors 
of Hartman Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, 
held at Chicago, Illinois, on September I9, 1931* "the resignation 
of Edward G, Felsenthal as Vice President, Treasurer and Director 
was accepted and William H« Yates was elected as director for the 
unexpired term of Mr. Felsenthal* That on said date Barton H* 
Sackett who also had been a director on said August 27, 1931# 
and was at all times thereafter mentioned a director of said 
Nebraska Corporation, was elected as Second Vice-President of 
said Hartaian Furniture and Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation* 

"(11) That on November 9, 19 3I and subsequent thereto 
until the dissolution of said Corporation, the officers of said 
HartBMin Furniture and Carpet Ccmpany, a Nebraska Corporation, 
were Martin L, Straus, President, Harold B, v/ess. First Vice- 
Prasident, Barton H# Sackett, Second Vice-President, Seeretarjj 
and Meyer Kuit, Assistant Secretary} that the board of directors 
were the same persons excepting Meyer Kuit, and in addition there- 
to, Adolph Drey, Charles A. Frank and William H, Yates| that said 
persons were acting as said officers and directors and participating 
in the disposition of the assets of said corporation, and of the 
declaration and paying of a certain dividend as hereinafter set 
forth, and of winding up the business of said Corporation, all 
to plaintiff's damage^ 

"(12) That on November 9^ I93I a special meeting of the 

^dS o.t qjj ©mlj biss moit baa ^aoiS&toq'soO aJtdnlXII an ^xa&qmoO 

aii^ tI£^X ^lE •n^cfiassaQ no ^noWsnoqioO jufaBicTeK £ ^xnJ85"o^ 
iflOTcl »e±»/«i^2lil ©isw aoi^.aioqrroO saiesritfsW J&Ibb lo eeXtlsvlsa©^ 

od^^ up]JBieb£za,oi3i tux>t^jtlv 11& ^irolc^s'SfiqioO BloallLl a& ^x^sqicoC 
^aoWsToqioO si^esnd'sK & ^XnJsqffioD ;fsqiflO JbcB snjfiJtn'Ji/'l fl«td^a:*H fiiise 
.nold^B'xoqio!:) fei«« lo 8io;fJ:bsn© »£» lo biBBlH ui feaa 
giod'osiil* lo fei^o^ edi lo gxtid'©©© Ijiljxjqa a ^a isifr (CI)" 

^iiolcfsioqioO ^Bfiidall & ^-^naqiaoO *9qi«0 bus 9UJ:tiflixrt! aexSiRE 'io 

aolis^l&ei ©rid' ^-^C^-^ ^^X i^deiBineB ao ^aloflllXI ^oa^aJtriO ie Med 

tUKtooxtd £tfs« "laiXfeissiT ,;fiicbia$iS[ aslT cb X«fcfa©8Xe^ ,0 blinrfiS lo 

■>Ui'j 101 '•oitssxtfe as i>9;^osXs asw 89;tsY ,H ioeIIXJS^ baz fesc^qodOB isw 

jiH ao^iM ©tab filBS jxo ^Bifr ,XfiriJ'tt98X9^ ,iM 1© firist bertlqxsriB 

j(^^X t|?S ;ts^S^^ ^^''^s ^o io;fs>eil£» & ix99€f b&A obXb oiiw ;t;td3{9B& 

fcXise lo lod : IxyvOoiJ-nBir ite^ljssiarii awHli XXb ^ts 2bw btiM 

lo d'fl;si3l3»i*i»-s»iV bfloosfi aB bistoBis asw ^no±;t3io<fioO akaBitTsi! 

♦ao£i^Bi:oq^aC) jajfaisiiJal s ^XH^flK>3 ;j9q-ri,0 fcixB Biisiltnif^ asaiiBE 6iBS 

oj-sits^;? ^a©x;p©gdjr« baa I^fX ^f isdasvoH no isj^ ill)" 

rj:.:a lo 3Tt»oillo sjd* ^o.otiB'ioqioO bt&z lo floilxrXoaalfc 9il;t XlcTmf 

^xioXd-/.3'io<j;ioO siepicfeff a ^^naqiEoC t&qisO ba& ^ivilaiss^ a&m&tJsS 

~6CiT isiX^ ,88»;7 ,fi MoibH ^^ffs&iaei*! ^BtssiiZ ,J Ai;tr[£ll »r[»w 

aio^o&iife lo bi&od 9jAi ^stdS ixi&i9ro@ci ia&^i&XszA ^ilsJt ibx^^ ba* 

-aieiiJ aot;}tbbB al has ^(tJtwS ne-^eM gaXd-qsox© ecoeneq dims 9il:f eT«w 

JbJUa :tatl* (a9^aY ,H aiBlIXi/^ fcno atoBi*? ,A asXiiSiIO ^x^iQ dqlobA\oi 

^.liisqtoli'i&q ba& eioioeiJtb ba& eisolllo blse as scIIob siew Bflosiaq 

adJ lo iJiXQ ^xiold-^ioqioo bljua lo 8;t82aB axtf lo nolctlaoqaXft eri;f jtxl 

i9B •if'ilBtil^iBd Q& terbXvlfc iiXj3*i«o 8 lo jnl^Bq bos floWsisIoeb 

XXb ^aaii&ioqioD bt£.z lo Easnlsucf bA) qx/ sifil£)ff.lw lo bus ^liiioTi 

,?.3.j>ff' ■ ' ■ ■■ t:' nlfiXq o;t 

board ©f directors of said Hartman Forniture and Carpet Coiapany, 
a Nebraska Corporation, was held in Chicago, at which were present: 
Harold B, Wess, Barton H» Sackett, Adolph Drey, Charles A, Prank 
and William H, Yates, 

"(13^ That at said meeting it was reported t* said directors 
that piirsuant to the action of the meeting of the board ©f directors 
held August 27, 1931* said corporation had sold to the Hartman Pur- 
niture & Sarpet Coapany, an Illinois Corporation, all accounts re- 
ceivable at that time owned by said corporation, and all accounts 
receivable thereafter to be acquired by said corporation, and that 
pursuant to said action there was then due and owing to said Hartman 
Furniture & Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, fvem said Hart»» 
man Furniture & Carpet Company, an Illinois Corporation, the sum 
of $384,736,015 it was further reported to the directors at said 
meeting that said corporation had a surplus upon its books of 
$540,434,85 and that Included among its assets was the above men- 
tioned obligation of the Hartman Furniture and Cs.rpet CGanpany, an 
Illinois corporation, and that in addition thereto there was owing 
froa said Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company, an Illinois corpor- 
ation, the additional sum of $103,011,05 for moneys advanced; that 
the said directors thereupon passed a resolution distributing to 
its stockholders the sum of $487,747.06 as a property dividend 
to be paid out of the accumulated surplus of said corporation by 
an assignment and transfer of the debt due said corporation froa 
the Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company, an Illinois corporation, 
said dividend being the aggregate of the debts owed by said Hartman 
Furniture & Carpet Company, an Illinois corporation, to said Hartman 
Furniture & Carpet Compare, a Nebraska corporation, 

"(14) That the Hartman Corporation of Virginia, with the 
exception of qualifying stock held by the directors, was the sole 

stockholder of said Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company, a Nebraska 
Corporation, and of Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company, an Illinois 

iia'^si&iq e%fm Hoirfw ujs ^osspifiO nl bled eaw ^aolJ-sioq'roO jaiajsacfeli! b 

ifiBT'i «A 2e-Xisff!j ^x-'^'* f^C'IoM ^^iasI&i^S «K aoc]t' isQ ^88 ©Iff ,3 bloiBK 

io:it>9i±b Jo feiBocf srid" lo ^aii^Ba wiS 5© fio^9£ ©tilt oi ia&uB'wq iEsU 
-•iir^ G^BitisH GSiS ocf i>Iog 5afi uoliiirroqioo bisiB ^li'^1 i^<J d'ai^xrA fclsri 

e^iuifOGOfi lie ijnjs ^aoiv^e'axi^ri©© feJtee ^cf feejwo eal;J ;^firid- ^a eld&yl^o 

ag3;t'L3H blRz ocf gniwo {>cs &yb a&di asw ©«©ii>^ uolJ-oa btatt oi JaaKe-mq 

isfc-a 9dcf ^nol.Uioq*ioC ai;oiilXII ns ^-^josqisoO d-eqisO * ©arJln^j/? neiit 

Ms2 .tu zioio'-iilb od^ oi 5e:ttoq»^ isjltiJt;! aaw .ti iX0,^£\'^-*8£^ lo 

lo e:Soocf acfl noqi; ei/Xqiue s bsd uoljBioqrtoo Mas :^Bitf- -8«l-:t»«ia 

ns ^^sqjsoO #©qi,'3D iitij® BiuilMitf^ fljaantiBE arict lo noiiJsgllcfo leaoti 

Sii±s?o - rfit oJ^eisriJ- £iolil'i}b& li'l isnii ba& ^nfflicJBioq^oo alonllll 

-•ioqioo EioriXiXl s» ^■'^sqffioO itaqieO i2> 9'xi/oiiiai/9 afiCKi-iBH f>isE noil 

iy^Ai (feeaflt^vftfi a'^amdfR '•' ~ . /" i:c ^£0X5^ lo aajg XAOoi^iiiJba ad^ ^noXJii 

cxt 8ni.f;jtfiiuei5 jaoi^xfic a .. -i ^ iy^easq noqiraisrio eioctosiXI) fclse srii 

bSLBbtflk -^cd-ieqoTcq a 8<e ^,^>^,^8-Mi ^o mi^ 9Ai aisMoiWoocfa e;^l 

Yd" iioXd^iiioqioo 0l*ia lo ejyXq-zife kBiRlusmtoz adct I.0 ,:ffio bXaq ecf o;t 

«oil itcXd^sioqioo ftXjuB ejjb ucfsl) emlct lo -i&laaB'x:^ ba.& d'usfiBiglEeB hb 

^iioji.tBioqioo alonlXXI txe, ^-taa^^o^ ^taqieO A ©iintiaiff! hmk^ibH «ri;f 

n^g^d^iaH 6Xaa ^cf bswo a^(J«& ftri^ lo »^js3et£38J8 «ii;J salscf ba»f)Xv±f) fclse 

aM5rf'i.>:^K bifiB oi ^aoliQ'w<itoT> BloaiXXI as ^xn^^noO ieqisO ib ©ixr^flaii/? 

,fioX:tB^oqioo flaiBfiicfoH & ^x«2iiqjHoO cfsqifiO A ©^x/:tJtniiJ^ 

©rid- /fd-Xw ^BifllsilV lo aoiJsToqaoO asjoii&B. esii dariT (M)" 

Joe esii aew ^eictooilfc edd ijrf blsd jfooda scXt^lXsup lo rroijqsox© 

£3[3J3tcfc»lTl Ji ^xjEisqaroO dsqnsO A eitsitais/i AJSOtfrtBH fiJUe lo lefeXortioodE 
eionlXXI ub ^xnjsqxaoO d^qnsO ab eTJsiJLaiv^ naadiBR lo feu ^noX;f€rroqnoO 

Corporation, and that the declaration of the said dividend trans- 
ferred from the Hartman Corporation of Nebraska to the Hartman 
Corporation of Virginia, the said obligation of the Hartaaan Cor- 
poration of Illinois, and was a fraud on creditors of the Hartnan 
Corporation of Nebraska ♦ ■> 

"(15) That the action of the board of directors at the 
meeting of Rovember 9# 1931# "ws.s subsequently ratified by Martin 
L» Straus, President and a director of the said Hartman Furniture 
& Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, 

"(16) That after the declaration of said dividend, the 
remaining assets of the Hartman Company of Nebraska were by the 
defendants diverted in some manner, not known t© plaintiff, from 
the corporation so that when the Hartman Company ©f Nebraska ceased 
business on December 3I, 1931, it did not have sufficient assets 
to pay its creditors, 

"(17) Alleges on information and belief that the actions 
of said officers and directors in selling the accounts receivable 
of the Hartman Company of Nebraska and declaring said dividend, 
was for the purpose of removing assets of said Hartman Company of 
Nebraska beyond the reach of creditors and was a fraud on the 
creditors of said corporation, and contrary to the laws of Neb-* 
raska, and was a breach of the duty owed by the officers and dir- 
ectors of said corporation to creditors thereof, and that plaintiff 
was damaged by reason thereof, in that there wtre no assets of 
said corporation which could be applied on plaintiff's judgment^ 
but said judgment was made worthless and uncollectible* 

"(18) That at all times mentioned said officers and dir» 
ectors of Hartman Furniture A Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corpor- 
ation, were also directors and officers of Hartman Furniture & 
Carpet Company, an Illinois Corporation, and in part, of Hartman 
Corporation, a Virginia Corporation, to whom and for whose benefit 
they transferred the said assets of the Hartman Company of Nebraska 

fiaff^f'XisH ©r': '- ■— 'x-^ .';'-'• o go bURil » zeir baa ^sionilll to aoliaioq 

^siuBtdeTi 1© aoliBioqioO 

sA:^ X<S eiaw aalBfiidia^ 1© TgCjsqmoG /i/s&tiBK exto'- to sd-seeB jj^nxnliuiiieT 
jOOTcl ^lllJ-xtisIg[ oJ f£v-rof£2f ion ^«£<5>r3iflai «aoa at hG:^iBvtb Btti&bt»l9b 

^S9^^B ^tnsiolilira svsii d-cn felft ;t± ^It^l <I£ tedaaoaa flo easniei/cf 

3XioJ:io^3 9di i&tli Islled f>fi6 aoi^BJErrolnl no ee^^llA C?!)" 

9leffiVl9D&i a^iSi/oooB ©lit snlilsf nl B'ioJ-3<>ilf) £ias aiftfii'ilo feise lo 

^fiiasblvi:!) blsa aniisXosl) fcsB fMseitd^ lo ^eqaoO asmixsB. edct lo 

lo \;ai5qfflo0 nBer:tisH bisa lo 83'S8«b gflivociei lo »8oqi0q fixLt lol aaiv 

edo no fexjsil £ aaw tms sioJ-lbsio lo doR«i aili faioxpd fiatae^cfsH 

•*(fsi! lo awcl &di o& x*isiSaoo im£ ^noWsT^orj^os bt&B lo e^ocftJbsio 

— T[jt£i bn^ s^ssillo oricf ^^ b©wo x^^fe wf^ 1® rfosoid j& ssv ta& ^sAqqi 

lllial&lq d^arfJ bns ^109T®fI;t E^ocMbsio oJ- noWB'ioqioo blsa lo aioio9 

1© Eiseajs on ^law si?ri;J d^iarld ai ^lo«i©ii^ aoe&si xcf bsaaosb bbw 

^d-nomsbjjt 3 ' lli:J"«lBlq no bsllqqa «cf folifoo doM^n aotisnoqioQ bt&B 

M^l^lSOBllQoau biiB s£sXri:tiow 9baa bsw iixensbrt J&^^a :*ij(i 

*»itb ban aisolllo fclsa b«flolJ-n©H asirl^ IIjb ja ;facfT <SI)" 

-aoqioO i52f3Brrd«>H jr ^^^ncqiaoO ;t9qrrjB3 A 9iifaJ:n"2iJ^ iiJBffld'iflfi lo ercod-Qs 

A sowilriitjE^ nsmd-ieE lo aieolHo btiB eioitocilf) eeli. ©isw ^nol:tB 

iiea^rsE lo ^:t'SBq nl ba& ^nolis^oqTtoO alonilll ne ^xfltB<5«oO ieqneO 

d^llsnsd SBoilw 'xol bna moi&r o:J ^noiJ^cioqioO isinisolV £ ^aoiisioqioO 

iTjtasicfeK lo TjnaqisoO naazfitaH 9di lo ad-sase i&lse srid^ b»ii9l?siB%i "^sili 


without consideration, 

"(19) That the said officers and directors of said Harlanan 
Furniture & Carpet Company, a Nebraska Corporation, knew of the 
claim ©f plaintiff's assignor against said corporation at the tiae 
of the transfer of the property mentioned above and at the time of 
the declaration of the dividend to the stockholders of said cor- 
poration, and wrongfully and unlawfully made no provision for pay- 
ment of said claim, " 

Count II further alleges: 

"(2) That beginning about December 1, 19 31* the Hartman 
Company of Nebraska conducted a sale of all it.? remaining assets, 
which sale lasted until December 3I* 1931> ^^ which day the Cor- 
poration closed its store and ceased doing business in Nebraska, 
and removed any remaining assets from said State and from then up 
to now^ said corporation has conducted no business and maintained no 
business [office] in Nebraska, nor has it had any officers, direc- 
tors or agents or assets in said State, 

"(3) That the cessation of business, sale or other disposal 
of all assets, and the removal of all officers and directors from 
the State of Nebraska on said 31st day of December, 1931, constituted 
a dissolution of said corporation* 

"(4) That pursuant to Section 24-107 of the compiled Statutes 
of the State of Nebraska for 1929, ©n the dissolution ©f said corpor- 
ation, the defendant directors of said corporation became trustees 
for the benefit of creditors, and became personally, Jointly and 
severally, liable to the creditors of said corporation^ that said 
defendant directors are therefore personally, jointly and severally ^^ 
liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $18,081,75, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 7% P®r annum froa and after the 
7th day of January, 19 32," 

Briefly stated, defendants, in their answer, deny that they 
conspired to or in any way disposed of the assets of the Hartman 

,aolia^oJbiafloo itsodiht 
amiiisM Mbq Jo aioiosilb bn& ^tBolJJo bias arii JiariT (?X)" 

-lOO ^^38 lo sii^feloffsCoo od bcLBblvlb ©jdi lo iso2;ta'XflX©9b ©ctt 

-•^rgq Tol jnolalvo^q on ©feaa xJLlvt^Silav btiB xilth^ino'V^ ba& ^noldfioq 

^ad^saEB ^ijsldiwr i lo ejtaa b fiad^atffiaoo .sifesicfeW lo x^BqiaoO 

C^b ri&Mw x«o ^It^l ^X£ i?^dfi!S03Cr Xi;tm; £>«^sfiX ©Ibb ifoliiir 

^aafeaidsM isl aseaJtsM guXob h&uBQO has ertod^a eji 5saoXo floXd^sioq 

q& &^ti^ mill itns e^sd-8 ftlsa 1£R5i1 ads^as •galalaasi xob £>9yoo©i ftfia 

Oii feafilsd-xiJta® faifi SBeaiewd Oii bsd^ouMoo asri aoii&ioqioo blsB ^yioa oi 

-ofilfe ^siest'lo ^& bad 51 ZBd ion ^BiIasicfsK ni [som©] aasxxlaircf 

, ©It Site"; I>Xb8 si 8i«ia3B no scfnesfi to aio^ 
XB3oq«16 ipdSo io 9Xi?2 ^aastfiXaxfd 10 iioXdjsea©* »dS i&s^ {£)" 
ffloi^ Eiodoeilb i>xi.e etsoXHo XXb Io Xsvofirai siJd fcrus ^adsaac XXs lo 
bB&ssil&sMOo ^li^l ^i&dmBo^d to \&b JaX£ 61sa no JsaiefiicfsH lo BtMiQ Bd& 

♦HOXd snoqrroo blse lo aold-jjXoaaXb £ 

Z9iu^iiS& b9S.tqesoo ®di 'to ^OX->S noidoGS oi iaiw&ivq iBd'x (-f-)" 

-'SoqTotj JbJtBS lo aoliulosistb 9>d^ a& ^^^^1 lol aS[aaicf»H lo 9isiZ 9£» lo 

t&&ia,S3*ii ©ffijRo©^ aoLl-fiioq^oo felsa lo B.ioio&nib $ttabaBlBb arid" ^floXis 

feas xXdfsloJ, ,^IXsno8i©q ©eaoscT tiflis ^siod-ifeois lo dXlenscf add lol 

J&Jbaa d^arid tnold-anoqioo Jblee lo aiodl£»'''io srfd^ od sXtfslX ,'^XXBn9V9a 

^Yi'XBtsvsa fctts xXdiiiol; ,\XXi5fioaioq eiol&iS)xld' ei& uio^ooilb ia&baeteb 

ifcMw isffd-eso^ ^^^,X80^8X$ lo nutt srid ni TlldnXfiXq 9di od aXtfeXX 

firid' ladls ijcs laonl iKj»tiii5 -req 85^ lo »:ffin arid djs nosisrfi d^asisioX 

".S£^X ^^ifiiruBt lo Xfit* ^^ 
'C^ferfd- dsrfd xn»fc ^i9wafia lisiid «i ,8d'nsJl.fle»le& ^J^ed-sda xXlftXiS 

UftfirffAH "^dd lo aif»REfi <»rfd^ to ^e»aofrJ»^^ vsw vns ^f^ to od bfliTfcrartoo 


Company of Nebraska so as to make it unable to pay its creditors} 
deE^ that the property dividend of November 9# 1931^ '^as improper 
or left or reiadered the corporation insfclventj deny that they 
dissolved or caused the corporation to be dissolved| deny that 
any of their acts constituted a dissolution of the corporationj 
deny that they or any of them diverted the assets remaining after 
the property dividend on November 9> 1931* so that the corporation 
did not have sufficient assets to pay creditors when it ceased 
business on December 31# 19311 <ieny that the Nebraska corporation 
removed any assets from the State} deny that tbsy coiamitted any 
fraud on the plaintiff ©r any creditor or that they were liable to 
plaintiff under any statute of Nebraska or otherwise. 

Plaintiff, in support of her motion for suiamary judgment, 
filed ten affidavits, which establish the following facts, all of 
which are admitted by defendants: That liarry Fellheimer obtained 
a Judgment for $18,015 against the Nebraska corporation on a con- 
tested pension claim at a time \?hen he was over seventy years of 
age} that this claim was assigned to Stella Fellhelmer, plaintiff} 
that on April 6, 1932, a writ of execution against the Nebraska 
corporation was returned unsatisfied hj the marshal of the United 
States District Court, Omaha, lebraska} that it appears from a 
certificate of the Secretary of State of Nebraska that the Nebraska 
corporation was dissolved on tarch 23, 193'^> for "nonpayment of 
occupation taxes," and "that no notice of dissolution by action 
of stockholders of Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company was received 
and filed in the office of the Secretary of State}" that on 
October 31* 1931* the corporation, according to its balance sheet 
of that date, copies of which were attached to the affidavits of 
Joseph Kane and Anna Reardon, had a surplus of $54-0, 434. 85} that 
the following took place: The assignment of JUne 30* 1931* and 

the board meeting of August 27, 1931* as well as the assignment 
of the receivables of the Hartman Company of Nebraska and the 

leqoiq&l ebw ^Li^l ^^' i»etei9voH lo ba-s^bivtb ■^.'isqotq Bdi isuii xa^jb 

X^dJ d"££l3" yfi^^b jj-usvl^exil fioicffcioqioo &di Dsisbaoi 10 ,tlel 10 

Sssti ^ob jbsirXoaaife c ;. Icfsioqios ©xl^ b9Ba&ti 10 bevIoBElfi 

IXioi^ts^oqioo eia lo nolj^uloeeifi £ £)ecfxf;tl:^Bnco 2;toe ileric)- lo -^caB 

isils ^alxiissiBi ed'eaas erf^ f>9:J-i»vii) lusxli lo xtiB 10 Tjexld" ofidJ xP^Bb 

aolcJ-Bioqrtoo sxIJ- d-£/:. . ^j.£^I t? ladmevoH no fecsibivif) -^cfieqoiq ©ild- 

beaseo cti: nsxiw eioitb^'xo x^^ o^ e^^seas c)-ne±t>±llj/a sviiri ^Ofl Jalfc 

fioWsaoqioo Birfedicfell &£ii ohdi xjsa&b iX£^I »!£ •rscfiaeoea ao asenleird 

"^fi &s:tj-.t-nncrj t^ci.t c^srfo tch&I) jej-^d-c arii aioil aieaza xfl^ bevoaei 

oj sXcfjBi- ' o 'loitbi^to \fi& rs© llld^nlfilq atLt ao £ixrBil 

, ■: ■ ..oi'jo 'TO i2leji'id:->TI lo Sji/d/QjG "^3 iBbtut lli^nifilq 

^iasi^u-^^;. ... •-— ^-^ - - ^-- --' -'ii'..; -^- ^lll:fnlBl*I 

lo ll£, ,ai-c:",t ^oIwoIIk. jielXdjsd-eo dohhi ^^ilv^blTls a9i beLtl 

h<'>rf}-ixido •TPBLt^iilXQ'ff x'l'iaf^ -^JBifT lUia&haH'if'^r: v,-f n-jj-^Maba »ne iloXxtw 
-;..;, ...: .... ..ioXv1 Jiioqioo iiilaiJTicfGVI 9£li iealB^i. -.- ^ 1$ lol JtnsjnafcjJt « 

lo attB9X x^asvea levo sisw sxi nsdw acilcf s Jjs laXijIo nolaaeq b©J"esJ^ 

illXctnifiXq 4iSBisjdXX9''i £,lleio oi fiaaalaes asw aisXo aidJ^ ;tfirii jsga 

jsifasidsM sil^ icniJi^B aoX.+JUoex© lo d"iiw 6 tS£^X <^ XliqA no ^adJ- 

!' '' ■ -' 'o .'; !:'.': vdi x^ k^ilsiiBensj bBaiyisi s.svt aoicJaioqioo 

i^ricT i^i issiaeir' ■ " '^•^'•■^ '•'•^ riad^enosE aiii lo e;}-aolll:fi90 

iw v,xi%.jHx;sqn-r-^' --' t.-_v- tc^ iia-iii ao ijovXoealb £;v;w col:}aioq!ioo 

aoxJoi? '^cf aoi.'.^ct.ib lo eoXd-Qii oa ctjwiJ" bas **^eQXBi aoliaq^vooo 

*"•'."': •■— "' Xfi&qEioZ' teqi . " ;n;tXKiJ/5 rusantiJsH lo a^ebXoiMoOvte lo 

uj J.:' '■ - • -' '^- L198 «dJ " rf=,lo 9di al £>»XX1 ba& 

i^Biiii 'ifiai=x^:..< ^uiiVio'i.-'Oo 5noljBn:o^-iu:j KiiJ ,X£?X ,X£ iscfoJ-oO 

lo aJ-XvAblliB 0117 Ow'- bsda^^a ©nsw doldw lo neiqoo ^Q;}&b t&di lo 

*££U i^!8.^■i^^C■^^$ lo ei/Xqii/e & bad ^oobi&eR eaoA fsos en&Ji riq&EoL 

£sai> ^X£^X ^0£ sfiJ/X lo J-xisatagXesB sriT ;90£Xq ioo;t jnJnroXXol «At 

itaeMttgXaea exl^ e« XX»w 8js tX£?X ^VS ^WfjiiA lo sH-t^sao JbTiaoif •<* 
exit bOB iala^icfsH lo x^JsqmoD aimii&kl odi lo aaXtfiJvXsosi aiS? lo 


dividend meeting of November 9* 1931# with subsequent ratification 
of the action of that meeting by Martin L, Straus, 

The affidavit of Joseph M, Kane, an employee of Hasklns & 
Sells, accountants and auditors, offered by plaintiff, states 
that from his examination of the ciinute books and records of the 
Nebraska corporation it appeared that by reason of losses in 
operation from December 31, 1930, to October 31» 1931> the surplus 
of the company was reduced from $621,742»21 to $540,434. 85| that 
by December 31> 1931* this had been eliminated and a deficit of 
$37>94-3.95 appeared, not including the instant judgment and a 
possible rent claimj that the principal reasons for the elimination 
of surplus were the property dividend of $487,747.06, the loss of 
$18,188*63 on the sale of equipment, and $17,576.68 for writing 
off the unamortiZiSd portion of leasehold improvaments, and, in 
addition, an opei*ating loss of the Nebraska corporation for 
November and December, 1933# of $120,122«47« 

Th© affidavit of Anna Heardon, former bookkeeper of Hartman»s 
of Nebraska, offered by plaintiff, states that in addition to the 
fact tliat the receivables and the proceeds thereof had been assigned 
to the C.I.T,, beginning November 6, 1931? all merchandise of the 

Nebraska corporation was sold at a liquidation sale at ten, twenty, 

thirty and fort^on the dollar, which sale was completed fey December 

31, 1931* ®nd at that time the lebraska corporation had no assets 

in the State, 

The affidavit of Fred W, Meis, former credit and eollection 

manager, introduced by plaintiff, states that the receivables were 

assigned t© the C. I. T, Corporation and the amount of the sane 

added to the debt due the Nebraska corporation from the Illinois 

corporation in lieu of the accounts themselves; that the Nebraska 

corporation commenced a liquidation sale on November 7> 1931* and 

its merchandise was sold at ten, twenty, thirty and forty cents 
on the dollar and later advertised and sold at half wholesale 

sdj" lo sfei©3$n feiiB Biood ».ifrnJ:a sriJ lo nol.tattlaax© eld coil tBdS 

lo cfiallefi i-. bnB beS&RtmllB ae^tS bed aJbdt <X£^1 »I£ iscfKSoeS "^cf 

«oxia«±frJtie ©rfi lol exioeae^ laqioaliiq trfi ^ikW imt&lo iaei eldlseoq 

lo aeoX Bdd ^dt^,^4^^^^B^ ' ""- ^rtsfcJtirlJb t^iBUjfrrriq: sxW ©icew exfXcptcs lo 

gclittrrar TG'^ '^' ■, '^"'/'Lv i^nw ^ :*-fiftffiqltrpe lo sXbe «*d:f no £S,88X,8X$ 

ai \hflB ^ajfivf/i'vo'T/- ■ ^'■ 'oe^eX lo noi-tnoq fcfcslctionaiur 9i£;t llo 

^S'^^.SSXtOSXJj lo ^£^X ^-radsrsosa fcnB tecteevoli 

»fiJScc)"TsH lo ^-?5q«9:^oocf •x¥?raiol ^nofcii2®H jas-mA lo d-ivjB&llljs eri"* 
©itt o;t llolc^ififiB ni *Bii:^ nsisis ^lli.+jalaXq y^ fo*^©llo ,.a^si5ndsil lo 

>9xsala8B ii©©«f bM losisrfd^ a&seooiq 9xi;J feas R9ldsttK0fii 9^ itaricf ;tOJflt 
sflj lo BzJ:h£iM£iotBm 11b , ' 'rrjcfraevoW giiiKflls *<^ ^.T.I.O ©rf:f o^ 

C9cfe«»oeiQ Xd' be^sXqjBtoo s&w sisa rloxiiw ^-leXXof) srid' £io\^iiol fcna Y*ii^^ 

a^scejB oit bssd K®l,;Bioqioo eaiaBicfsT! ©Met ©ELt* d'«ri:^ ;tj£5 bis« ^X£fX 4!^ 

noJt^JosIXoo bnB ftb^i.o ipihioI ^sXsM ,\? festt^ lo itlvBbilla ©ifT 

eiflw ssXcfsvleDr-'i fiil& Jari^ 8s:tBta ^llJrdtilsXq "sjcl fcesff.boi.tni ^iJ'! 

MfiBS 9if;f lo Srwomc &fiJ- bus nold-Bioq-jor , . , J^rli o;* bengXa^s 

aioaiXII osJJ moil nold-s'roijrioo E^satEcfsH sii:*^ Qnb cJcfeb »rtt o:}- ftsbbs 

i;5iIa,6tdoK sriu J^sri:t ijaftvXeefflSiid^ actonooos oAi lo jjsXX ai noicfatoqioo 

iM£' ,^.^£x'X ^'T '£»«fisevoK no sXse aoX^sdlBpXX js booteffimoo nolcfeioqioae" 

aJueo ^d-*!©^. fsns x^iJt/it ^-^c^nswd ^aei dr. feXoe saw ©eXbrrBilot^m ed-X 
ftlaEsXorfw lXi3xI d'fl Moa bnn Jbse.Wt»vJ)s isJ'aX Nxs laXXob ©ii:t no 

price, and that for the last three days of 1931 it sold its mer- 
chandise at a small part of cost; that after the close of 1931 the 
Nebraska corporation did no business whatever; that after December 
20, 1931# I» & L Company was organized by affiant, Caton and two 
members of the Nebraska corporation's firm of attorneys; that L 
& L corporation purchased the office furniture of the Nebraska 
corporation about the close of 193I for $1,100 and collected the 
accounts receivable of the Nebraska corporation which had been 
assigned to C , I, T, Corporation, 

The affidavit of Harley A. Caton, offered by plaintiff, 
states he was a salesman for the Nebraska corporation and had 
charge of bad accounts and was one of the incorporators of L & 
L Company; that L & L Company received the accounts receivable 
ledgers of the Nebrasha corporation when it closed its store 
December 31* 1931* at which time the receivables amounted to over 
$200,000; that between January 1, 1932, and July 28, 1933, affiant 
and the L & L Company collected over $1^0,000 and remitted same to 
C, I, T*; that between July 28, 1933, and February 26, 1934-, he 
collected $12,000 on receivables and remitted same to Barton H, 
Sackett, trustee, who was also treasurer of Hartman's Inc.; that 
between February 26, 1934, and karch 3, 1936, he collected $6,000 
on receivables and remitted to Hartman»s, Inc., which later 
changed its name to the Advance Corporation. 

The affidavit of John Potter Webster, one of the owners ©f 
the premises occupied by Hartman's of Nebraska, offered by plain- 
tiff, states that Hartman's had a lease demising the preid-ses for 
$4,000 a month from I93I to the end of the term on February 29, 
1936, and that the owners had agreed to defer $1,000 a month for 
a year beginning pril, 1931, vip to which time all rent reserved 
in the lease had been paid. 

The affidavit of Clifford W. Calkins, offered by plaintiff, 
states that he was a real estate expert and had made a detailed 

■^•x&m z:it fcloe Si ll^X 'to a^sfc &9idi i&&l ot^ nol S&tLi bxss t®o^^fl[ 

esfct J^ed^o^IXoo l?HB 00X^1$ 1&1 X£^X lo »aoI© &^S iuod& notSBioqioo 

f)sil &IB aoiitjB^pqioo s^Ie r.i'^e,^ sxiJ lol iiUB«E©Xsa b sjsw eri Ee^sc^a 

^ J lo a-ro^Js-aoqioorix ba ao aew £)«ifi a^xu/oosii b&d lo ssijexlo 

«XcfaTi»9©*r e^toBoosjs eii^ bBTlBo&i TcaaqapO J £ J d^&tli jvifiqjnol^ •! 

©loJ-e e;Ji fcseolo ii aaxfw jiGi;Jje'xoqipo i?jC3«'xtre* crfd- lo ETcegbsI 

•rsvo od- l)©^^^!i:i ri-jdrvv: -.'^-^.T ;/;-'.-; ©isi^- daJLefw d'fe ^_.,,- ^X£ lacfffleoeG 

cfriBllls t££?I ^.:: ,.- .. - t-...^- %I '%tBSsa&l aeswifsd ;tiid;} lOOO^0OS$ 

o.j effl-38 bed-jlffl©*! feas 000^0^1$ nevo b«^osIXoo xn&qmoi J 3& J 9ili ba& 

ft^-^ t-f't^i «^S •^tswx<l©'? bti& ^c£^X ^8S iXj;fX. xx^swisrf itsrfi (.T .1.0 

.n noc^ijBa oj sffijgg 5eJ-;tXiC8a Jbas esXcfiB-^leooi xio OOO^SX$ bB;}oslloo 

t;^U i»s>xsi fc'nars^tiBli lo a^rttjajBsi^ osXa saw oxlw ^^BSmjii ^ii&^o&Z 

'xe;J-3X iiolpv ^.'\'L ^s'nsHti^ieH o;t fcsd'd-Xa©'! I«iiS 8«Xcfsviso»i no 
.aoXJ^B^oqioO ©onavJbA &siS Ou 0B«a 8;tX beyxsflo 

"...J o .vii.. , ..v..; .., ;u; ^'ift^acfe*? lod-c^o^. ndol. lo cfXvsbilla «iiT 
-.•i^.Iq XcJ l)sa«llo ^saiasiccfr'' "^ ?'£Lsfli;faaE ^cf bsXqxiooo csajtaeaq •di 

^^ X*^£i*^'*i<^-^ iso mips Qdi lo fee- --' ' 'PI aoit dSnom b 000^>$ 

l»9VToaei ^^ce'j XXjb e«X.t rioJbclw o^ qx? ^X£^X ^XX-xqi ariXanlsscT laex m 

-. "ii^ali^lq, \di bQ'ieVlo ^exiXiiX.oO .V, bio "^z ■ 

study of the premises and was of the opinion that they were not 
worth over $34,000 a year for the period 1932 to February 29, 
1936, that their fair rental value would have been about $26,712 
per year, and that Hartman»s would have lost on the lease $58*333«34- 
during that period. 

Each of the defendants filed a separate affidavit* Their 
affidavits tend to show that the Nebraska corporation was solvent 
both before and after the property dividend of November 9^ 1931; 
that the dividend was declared by them only after they had consulted 
the balance sheet of the company as of October 31* 1931 (a copy of 
which was attached to the affidavit of defendant Straus), and upon 
the advice of legal counsel from three States} that the dividend 
was perfectly proper, legal and advisable? that the balance sheet 
shows as free assets over and above the amount of the property 
dividend the following items; capital, $6o,000, and surplus of 
$52,687.79, a total of $112,687.79* The affidavits further state 
that defendants were aware of plaintiff's claim but reasonably 
believed that it and all possible claims were more than amply 
provided forj that it was the uniform practice of the directors 
of the various Hartman corporations to determine what creditors 
there were before declaring a large dividend or closing a store; 
that the determination of the existence of creditors and the 
amounts of their claims was made by talking to the local accountants, 
searching the books, checking with the insurance companies, and ^y 
inquiry of local counsel as to the existence of unsettled claims or 
suits J that the purpose of the dividend was not to dispose of the 
corporate assets and injure creditors but to bolster the entire 
Hartman structure; that the directors did not dissolve the Hartman 
Company of Nebraska, nor had they any intention of doing so at 
any time during 1931; that the cause of the corporation's inability 
to pay creditors after December 3I, 1931, was the totally unforeseen 
operating loss of $120,122,47, which occurred In November and 

ion 0tBis x^f^i J&flJ xioixiiqo mii 1o aew ftxis asaimsiq »rii to xbuiz 

^^ XiBVi^m oi S£^I f>oJii[sq 9di 'tot ibbx « 000 ^-f^^ navo ricT-xow 

SI'?^^S$ iijocf^ aoecf ©v-sxl bltiov ealsv l&inst rtlel tleri;^ :}Bdi <^£9I 

^^♦£££tS<;<1i 9BB»I »il(t no izol ©VBri blirav/ 2»iisaGftcBH iBdi bas ^i&ex i^Q 

.bolioq isdi anliufc 

jed-lwanoo £>®ti -^©il^ is^Jls xlt^ ffisxld' yd 6eisIo»f) esw fcmebjtvib exl^ d^jBXld^ 
YQOo ^) -C£^'X tl£ ascJo;jDO Ito Si3 •^&qmoo ed:^ lo J-ssxle »onsIfld ori;t 

;}-©9i^a sonBlBd odcf d'edcJ' jelrfaaivfiB bns IbssI ^isqoiq xI^o®^i®q 8£W 

•^J"i9qoiq siicf lo tmsomR sdi svods fcns isvo ecfssea ssn:! e« ewoils 

lo axrXqnjja bns ,0004©^ ^Ijsd-lqBO zam^il snJtwoIIol arid- Jbnsblvli) 

©^Bcta iBd:iTi/l acfivabillB ©xlT ^e\»V8o^SIIg lo IbSo:^ b ^^V.^nS^^S^^ 

XlcfBnoei59i d-ird" Eit&lv a • lli^tnlfilq lo (=>16wb eisw ecfnaftnelaJb Jadd- 

■^Iqiaa nadcf srioiB simr aaialo elcfiaeoq IIb bn* il t&di bsreilacf 

BiocJDBilb srid^ \o solo'osnq faTollm/ siid- bbw il &sidi {10I bQblfoiq 

ztoilbsio iadff ealsnisteb oi saotiBioqioo nemSiiM bsjoIisj 9di to 

|©ioic B gnleolo 10 bnefclvib sgijsl b 3iiliJ2lo9b Qiolscf ©i9w ©"teild- 

«jild^ bfls &ioilbo'iii to etaeizlxs ed) to aol&Baim%9SQb odi &edi 

iiasimsoooa IbooI 5xlcf oi '^tMl&i Xcf ebBoi bbw aalBlo iJtsrid' lo scfmroBi* 

■^<f tofi ^asJLasqiffco &oiis'Ujani: eiii rid In gxtfalserio ^Bsfoocf sxl^t jalxioissa 

10 aaiiBlo a^Id'J&afliif lo sousd-aixs ©rlJ- o;}- as Issntrao IbooI lo xntupfll 

©ild' lo oaoqaxb oJ- :}oa sbw basblvJtb edi lo ©eoqijjq ©rid^ ^Bild^ {uilsiz 

•xt^no ©il;f ii>d^sIocf o;t ie^ ertod-lbeio emtni boji bc^sbbs s^fBaoqnoo 

■WttTiTT eAf 9vXo88ib d'on bib s'lo^o^ilb odi cTariJ le^ECc^oxncfa aamii&R 

gjB OS gjQiob lo nolineiitl xj^b -^©xl.t btijd 'ion ^BJ[eB^:cf©l£ lo -^i^ajscyBoP 

■^C^JtXicfisal 8*iiol;tsioqioo 9di lo sexfBO 9ri;t :tBri:t ilE,^l sttliirb 9flLt;t -^b 

ttsMeriolittf yXIb^o^ 9fl. ^ii^I tl£ nedteeoefl iBits ztoSib^io x>^ ©^ 

!iC8 tecteevoW ni benrofcao xloM-jr .V*.£SI.0SI* lo bsoI %ai:}ai9Qo 


December, 1931. The affiants further stated that in their 
opinion the lease of the Hartman Company in Nebraska was an 
asset and not a liability. Defendant Sackett stated in his 
affidavit that he had negotiated leases for the Hartanan organi- 
zation covering stores in thirty-five mid-western cities, that 
the store in question had the best location in Omaha for a fur- 
niture store and that in his opinion it was a valuable lease. 
Defendant Yates, also a director, stated in his affidavit that 
the sale in December, 1931* proceeded in an orderly manner until 
the last week of that monthj that advertisements prior to that time 
were mainly of a puffing character and indicated a greater discount 
from retail prices than was actually the case; that during the said 
last week a considerable quantity of furniture was sold at less than 
cost, which drastic cuts neither he nor the other directors had 
anticipated in November or the early part of December would ^e 
necessary. Each of the defendants stated in his affidavit that 
he and all of the other directors acted in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and that none of the directors ccMimitted or 
intended to commit any fraud on Pellheimer or his assignee or 
anyone else, and that neither he nor any of the other directors 
anticipated or had any reason to anticipate the operating loss 
i^ch occurred in November and December, 1931, 

"The procedure [summary judgment] may not be used to impair 
right of trial by jury, Diversey Liquidating Corn, v. KennkJT'p he^j 
370 111* 523* The purpose of the procedure is not to try an issue 
of fact as that term is used in law but rather to try whether there 
is an issue of fact between the parties within the legal meanings 
The method is necessarily inquisitorial. The pleadings (important) 
are not controlling. If it appears from facts stated in affidavits 
or documents that the answer pleaded is sham ©r false or frivolous 
it will be disregarded. If there is a materiel issue of fact it 
must be submitted to a jury. In Berick v. Curran. 55 R. !• 19 3> 

«s asw s:^EeTKfsM at xnsqflioO asBiit'XBB. ^ilt lo sbbsI eri;^ noinlqo 

"-•ui^ 3 lol sdBfiiO 111 i!toX;Js$oX ^Bscf ©flcJ- 5j8i1 rto±;tae»«fp «Jt ^loi^ eri^f 
,»esel sltfax/lBV e sbw :ti nolrtlqo eiii nl Ssii:f baa »to&si Bzvila 

«ELtt isxf;^ c;j- loiiq 8:fn9iassl,tis>vfe6 f^d^ id&tsom Ssd:f to afosw it&l 9Ai 

*xo h^ibmoQ siod"9?-iflb sji^ lo snoa ;t3rij' fens ^91b» fcn« POflssJtIib 

:to ©snsxaea eJtfl 10 ised&dXI^'^ m bv&t'i y^t^ itsmoo od- bsbasSat 

ifc'tc^^fi'^th li^dJQ tdS ^o y^G iojH 9if i©i(d-l9fi :tsil^ baa ^eels anoiyiB 

.X£^I ^lodiaeooQ bctB TBdm^rvoVl al beiiuooo xloirlw 
•slijqffiJ: ocf fc$»aif ©tf ;tafl x**fii i^n^m^bttl ^samif^] ensbBoaiq eriT" 

dinscl S1& X"^^ o^ ^<>n si etirbfiooiq ©ifct "io «»2CW3rmq ari? ,^2^ ••fi^^ 0^£ 

sTejS:^ 'jt«rf;tsrtw "^*ct od^ isjrid'fii itirrf wbI ai betis si griect tsrf^t ea :foj3l lo 

» jKln-ssic Isg©! Qdi itirid'iw asiWiisq sx!d- noewd-ed ioRl lo sirael ab si 

(tOB&toesBLt) astiifcsalq oilT ,lBliod-J:aij:/pai: Yii'^«28»3-n «i 5ori;t9f3 eriT 

a^iv.sfelllB ni Bc^sita a^toBl jboi:! ai/^©qqB J"! II .gnllloij-noo ;tofl 9i« 

etrolovi'il TO salel 10 moete si ftsbsslq lawens sitJ^ :t.*5iivf Bi-coDiiroofc 10 

ti ;J-oi3l lo "i/eai iBliPCfsai b si ^isiW' II ,b9Syr.'i^»tetb ecf IXiw :ti 

179 J^tl* 708, 710, this procedure is well described as, ♦a two- 
edged weapon - useful if it precludes the interposition of 
defenses for delay, but dangerous if it deprives a defendant of 
the opportunity to have a trial of seriously contested questions 
of fact or law, » 

"The authorities say affidavits for plaintiff should be 
construed strictly, those for defendants liberally. Shientag, 4 
Fordham L» R. 186; Gleason v. Hoeke^ 5 APP» Dist, of Col, 1, 4-^5 
Fidelity <S: Deposit Co. v. United States for use of Smoot^ I87 U, 
S. 315, 320 J Wells V. Alropa Constr u ction Corp>y 82 Fed. (2d) 887, 
889j are cited, 

"Plaintiff's right to judgment should be free from doubt. 
Lord Esher in Shepp ar ds & Co. v. Vvilkins on & Jar vis » 6 T. L. R, 
13, and many other cases, ^ 

"Even if defense papers are found insufficient, judgment 
should not be ordered unless plaintiff's affidavit (strictly 
construed) leaves no question of defendant's liability. People 
for use of Dyer v. Sanculius . 284 111, App, 463, 474-475 j Weiss 
V. Goldberger. 209 App, Div, 6l5, 205 N, Y, S« 1, 3j 4 Fordham L, 
R. 186, 2l6j Ma ■H.t.,..^rear.A-Co,tAJfec,, v, Baile^ju 127 ^ISQ, 79, 
214 N. Y, S. 675, (>774 

"If the defense is 'arguable,' 'apparent,' Hade in 'good 
faith* it should be submitted to a jury. Fidelity & Deposit Co, 
v^ Uni ted States for use of Smoot, I87 U, 3, 315, 320. The court 
is bound to accept statenaent of facts as true when alleged in 
defendant's affidavits. The whole record must be considered." 
( Gliwa V. Washington P olish Loan & Bide. Ass'n^ 3IO 111, App, 
465, ) 470, 471.) 

Plaintiff states that "the count on which plaintiff relies 
for her [summary] judgment is count two of the amended complaint, 

The basis of count two is that the defendants, who were directors 

-owJ- ii' ^Es feftci'xoat- :.! siwbeooiq aiyrfit ,01^ ^80^ mi^k ^\L 

'"■■o floliisoqiocfii : -'.'■■losiq il 11 Ivl^zsj - noqsev/ fisgfce 

e££oi:."f^ •^■'•- f>•-■-^••"^.:l■'■^o•- v-r-,.fro :-.^.-p -.o IrIio & ©vsii oJ- ij^lmjd'ioqqo sdi 

*,w«I no -^o'*^ 1o 

' ^_3iid-fl©JLrIE .vXIaiscfilttjaBlJxi&isX) ID'S 98ori;t ^t;i^_SlJtacf8 fcecijanoo 

A, ' 

•.,,-:• ^I ,IoC 'io .j-elC .qqA ^ ^&3 ^-eo H.._ ^v, goggeli? j^8l .H iJ nadb'io'ii 

.>i .>-i . . ..^vi.:a. 2.:. liQcviL^ilS^ , .y .oO .:& e;-)i-:V'Q::>ric' xit lexleil bioJ 

,Ef>sjso isriJ-o ■^am ikflB ^£X 

YX^oi'iiJa) ,jlvsf)ill£ e'llid'alaXq aeeXm; bsisfiio ed J-oa feXuoria 

eJcTQg^I ,Y^iXlQr£iX a » d'iiBl>a©l€'fe Io aol^aei/p on astrcsX (f)sj:fid-8fioo 

eaxe^ t^^-f^-t^V-*^ xt^^ •W^ *^^^ *^^ t^Jt.Tl.[;f ;ogfl8 .v rtgrG Ic eajj lol 

,J. aarfJbWiI 4^ jt A-C * ^ ^- Ct>S ^';^Id .via ,3qA ^OS . iy:j^ir(JbXoCi .v 

^ , ; .DeXi'I ^SX t^^g'-^^"^ ^^ "^^^ t,*o^ ^ ifiei^ .H .ctf {^XS ^68X .H 

^o§' Hi •ftfifll ' ^cfiteiiBqqs' \sX(iai!;aTi5' ai 9an9l9l> oiid- 11" 

.oO ^tleogoC. & X v^-^^fc-^? .X*^ :. osj-d-licdi/s sd .bXxroris cM ^iIcHjbI 

^ijLfoo ©xJl' ,0£;£ ^ii . . ■; . ,. -uui^^ 1p..8.g.i/ -xoX so^s^g l>9;fXnU .v 

al fcegsXIfi neiiw wi/^j aa ajoisl '):o j'n-iSBns.itsd'a . j^qoror oi banod zl 

"«fi0n»I)i8Xjoo .BctiVfiJblllB a«insJbnet9£> 

,qqA ,1,1 .va'.iFi^A iiaM<^. ?^ <»r'^oa^^.ljL^l.a9iafl|j^g iv...^w,j:ig) 

'.1X91 lliJniaXq riolilw no ^xii/oo eric^" ^sitt B.^i&iz lllc^niBXI 
.cfnl-sXqraoo bsbasiBB »dJ- lo ow^ .liOfoo ai J-jaeBiaiJiJt Cx^aaiK'wa] leri lol 

.oJ^aeiXf) eiew oriw ^a^nefeae'io.b arid" c^fsric^ «1 owcf ;tmfoo lo aiasd sdT 


of the Hartman Furniture & Carpet Company, a Nebraska corporation, 
decided to cause their corporation to be dissolved and that, 
having decided to cause the dissolution of the corporation, they 
came within the provisions of Section I07, Article I, of Chapter 
24 of the Statutes of the State of Nebraska, relating to corpor- 
ations, which provides that upon dissolution of a corporation by 
expiration of its charter or otherwise, the directors are trustees 
of the creditors and stockholders of the corporation, and it then 
becomes their duty to collect and pay ths outstanding debts and 
divide among the stockholders the money and property that shall 
r.tP?aln after the payment of debts and necessary expenses; that 
under this Nebraska statute the directors are liable to the credi- 
tors to the extent of the corporate property and effects which come 
into the directors* hands (statute set out in full * * '^) [post] 
that the defendant directors failed to carry out their contractual 
obligation to the creditors, and particularly to plaintiff, in 
dissolving the corporation, and that they ignored the mandate of 
the statute to pay creditors and necessary expenses first and stock- 
holders afterwards but in effect reversed the process and paid stock- 
holders first and did not have enough left over to pay creditors 
and necessary expense sj that by reason of the failure of the defend** 
ants faithfully to carry out their contract implied by the Nebraska 
law, plaintiff was damaged aM defendants are liable to her. In 
other words, the action is not simply one involving the duties 
and obligations of directors who Improperly pay out a dividend, 
but it Involves the obligations and liabilities of directors where 
they cause a corporation to be dissolved, and their liability is a 
statutory liability and n©t limited to the common law liability 
for improper dlvidendSo" 

Plaintiff further states that "this is not an action against 
defendants based upon either their lack of good faith or any negli- 
gence on their part. It is an action to hold thea liable for their 

^Sedi fens 6©vl088lD e^ o^ aotSzioqvK>o iieri:t eewBO oJ fe©Jb±o»b 

•f«c*qailO lo ^T sIsWiA ^^01 aol&o^ to »jEto±R±voirq e/1* fllrf^jtw dsLBO 
-loqnoo oJ- §aiJ-£iIei ^esfesicfsM lo ^BiQ edi to eec^wctACf'S edi lo *S 
Tjcf xiol:jf£T:oq'ioo & lo notiulosatb ikxJd ;J'jirid^ z9blvoi& ridiaw ^enoiis 

aen'j J-I btiB ^noliBtcqioo ©riJ" lo 8i«felorf>foo.l8 fcaa eiod'Jtfes'ia »/CJ^ lo 

J5ri.s aJ'cfeb ^IboRiz^tao taSJ %siq bsm ^jWvXXoa oi x^^^ tledi 89«©09cf 

llfifie c^jSftt xit»q&^ bsU x&ftc® Oi^ eisSXajdaioo^e ttiicf snoaus 9bJ:vlf) 

d'BTi;?" iasaasqxs ^isaasoan briB aJ'cfeb lo ^trisantfiq arfct- isdla fllapre'i 

-.?:f.5'xo ©r(;t oj- fildiiilL ais eto.-tosijib ©xW ©d-fi^sc^e a?f3flid:-?I eiri;f isbm/ 

eroo liold® actosll© ba& xiieqoiq ©cfaioqioo ©jrfj^ Ic d"ns;j-X9 •rii o:t aiocf 

[cJeoq] ' ilul nl ix^o ^ee »;ti'd-js.ta) 8l«md »efro;Joo«tlb arfd- Qial 

fil ^llWxxlBlq ocf ^jlisluoi^tifiq bn^ ^Bioilbettt s?ri;J oJ- noi+«3il€fo 
lo st3bn&a »di boion.:gl x^^ :Sf&iii btss ^.nol:^sroqiot> sxiJ" s^lvloeelb 

jloocfa £)i:sq bna aaeaoiq sjslct bsaieve^ ^»e*ile n.t ^twd 8b^swTi>;J'la a^sMoxJ 

eioJl»!5io -^isq od^ ^fevo ;fl©I fCsjfon* 9vsm ^on bib I^els d"aill sisblori 

-bnslsb exlJ- lo fiiijIlBl edi lo xioaiei Ycf disild^ {a»8ja®c[x» x^secsosn ba« 

isaCasicff'H sdJ- t<f Jbollqai d-oe^iiioo lisricf cJro "\j'xieo oj "^jllt)lif:f±fil a^JiiB 

/tl .neri o^ ©Icfail ^la a^asbneleb bojg bsg-i-iffiiib ejsw lllonlslq ^waI 

Bul'jLb ftjdcf aalvlovax s^no xXQtcKJta ioa ei xioicfou ©lU- ^ebnow leslio 

^bnebivtb u cfxro ^sq xliBq^o^iqml oiiw 8iod'o«iib lo anolJfiSildo bna 

»ieriw srtoJ-o^i'cib lo eslJ'ilidBlX baB enold^BgiXdo srlj^ eeyXo^nl dPl &ssd 

& si x^i-tic^fi-cX lieii;^ ba& ^bsvXoasib ©cf o^ noi^sioqtcoa js »fti/jK9 x®^ 

•\£ctlXicfBlX wiiX norjioo edi oi beilsitl faa ba& x^XXi^faiXt xio;tinti8;te 

".aMfbivib isqoiqai tol 
cfeniBse coi;to£} ns ion ax aiiiit" ^.oftt ee:fiB;ta ^©xiitiirl llic^oisX^ 
-iXaPi?. x^fi 10 rliiisl f5c08 lo jfoBl TisJiIo' nedcJi© floqc besacf »^nafifl«l8b 
•tt^£^:^ rtol GXcf^il imdi ^Xori oct- nolvtos ns Ei l<^I ♦itiisq liarf^ no soaei 


breach of the implied contract imposed 137 the Nebraska statute, j 
and the good faith or bad faith of the defendants is not the 
real issue," 

Section IO7, Article I, of Chapter 24, Statutes of 
Nebraska I929, upon which plaintiff relies, reads as follows*. 

"Upon the dissolution, by the expiration of the term of 
its charter, or otherwise, of any corporation now existing, or 
hereafter created, and unless other persons be appointed by the 
legislature, or by some court of competent authority, the di- 
rectors or managers of the affairs of such corporations, acting 
last before the tiae of its dissolution by whatever name they 
may be known in law, and the survivors of them, shall be the 
trustees of the creditors and stockholders of the corporation 
dissolved, and shall have full power to settle the affairs of 
the same, collect and pay the outstanding debts, and divide 
among the stockholders the moneys and property that shall remain, 
in proportion to the stock of each stockholder paid up, after the 
payment of debts and necessary expenses; and the persons so con- 
stituted trustees shall have authority to sue for and recover the 
debts and property of the dissolved corporation, by the name of 
the trustees of such corporation, describing it oy its corporate 
name, and shall be jointly and severally responsible to the 
creditors and stockholders of such corporation, to the extent 
of its property and effects that shall con© into their bauds j 
and no suit against any such corporation shall abate in conse- 
quence of such dissolution, and said trustees may be made parties 
by scire facias ; and all liens of Judgements and decrees of any 
courts of equity, existing at the time of such dissolution, either 
in favor of or against sueH corporation, shall continue in force in 
the same manner as if such dissolution had not taken place: Pro- 
vided, in case of the death, resignation, inability or refusal 
to act, of the directors or managers aforesaid, or the survivors 

^o&is^B^B BsLeMiii&yL ed* x^ fetesoqiai i^o^%iaoo be^Hqml «ri.t lo doaeid 
0ii^ -^ • -'" d,&imbae1^b s>tiS to d.tla'!: feed lo dft&l boo-^ arid" fcni3 

tewoXIol: es 8f)fi®'T ^aallart lll^filalq doisva noqu ^^(^1 BAz&tdisllL 
xO f5ree;f swi^ "io ftold^jsilqss ©itt y^' ^nol^irloeeiS oil;? rtoqU" 
no ^afll^alx® worn aoid-srroqioo ^cns lo jaajw^Ml^o 10 ^iBiinrio a&i. 
seU xiS fc«.tn±oqqa ©d aaoaieq rc®rfcto aeolxm baa ^fcs^tssto lod-laaisrl 

§ttXd't)fl ^ajRoiJrsqioq'aoo iioijc lo siIbIIs and' lo aiegBHsrii 10 aiodooi 

^©iid e-fitsn •reved■^^fiw x^ Hoidi/Ioaaif) sd"! lo smli sdi ©lo'toa deel 

sfid sd II>ifi8 ^0!3iiJ lo «'BovJ:viif8 ©lit &1XJ8 ^wbI ni rwoiu/ ecf -^ftiH 

aoid-Bioqisoo arfd' lo siefclofiyiood-a Mb giodlfcsio arid lo aeed-exncf 

lo etIsUb sfld ©X*d92 Ost *iewoq IXifl avad Ilaris fccB ^bsvXoselb 

»£>irvib jbflis (JBiddfsfc Sflxbnsdedx/o ©rU' XJS^I J^^fC^ i^oelXoo ^&bab etU 

^at£m&*ji limit d^isxld x^ieqo^ tos ac©iio Ji, ©rid' e^afcXorJbiood^a ©dd sjaoais 

::i5'' "sedls ,qc fcioq lefcXojljioode lioae lo :ioodE sffd od^ noXdioqoiq al 

"€100 oe Ziiosiieq ©ifd bfiu jeeEnsqars ^iseasosn baa a^rfsfc "lo dnsicYfiq 

^Id ifVooeiL hifus, toI sj/« od \diiodd^^u« evsrf XXsiie 8eed£i/id iodrdide 

10 ^m&n ^d:jr, x^'i fToldrioqioo feevXoaeib »rfd lo x**^®<Ioiq fens adcfsb 

sd-K»ioqToo adi y*^ di §fIldX^^8^i) ^nojrdsaoqioo xIsite lo ss-sdex/id srid 

©lid oj eXcflaisoq2S"i,xXIs^9v»e Ma x-f-'Hlot ^d XXisife ftfis «sfflBa 

iasi^fX'B ®d& o:i ,xjolJB'ioqio& dotsc lo zisblodjlooit bxue fiT:od"lbeio 

{al>aAi 'it~'iii od'iil »iao© XXade d-fcil;t adoolls ba& -^disqoiq ad^l lo 

-98noo fii sdBc's XXade nwXdsio^ico risxre yrus danLs^ij dl^e on bn& 

8sld!iBq sJbaai erf t-sw estd^txrad J&xxjb J)na ^noJtdi/XoeslJb risjirc lo saiiajup 

XPM lo afrsiojit) Jto/i adne^faiut lo axiojfcX XXr> bos i e^sloc l s>ilos. x^ 

lexidjts ,xioXdii;Xofi2j.b xloxf* lo smid «£W d« ajoideixe ^^dlx/pc lo ad-ixfoo 

iij: 90101 ai scnidnoo XXferia ^nold^Bioqioo ilsiia dsiilfigi; 10 lo lovsX at 

-01^ jsofiXq a^TlBi dofl bad «oidfrlo88±b jfou^ ?.£ es idisficd>a : 8iS£8 add 

Iftzsilen ic YJ^iXicffixU ^aoidiinsJts®^ ^ddis?^ extd lo saBO nl ^bobXv 

EOTvivufa 9ii;f 10 ,bX£2e«ol« eiftgtiiiaki 10 snodoe^ib sdd lo ^Jo£ od 

thereof , the district court of the proper county may, on the 
application of any persons interested, appoint trustees to fill 
the vacancy, with full power to perform the duties aforesaid «" 

Defendants state that "we are not contending that plaintiff 
cannot recover under Count I ©f her complaint if she proves fraud 
as alleged therein upon a trial of the case or even negligence 
(if she amends her complaint) but we say that a smmriary judgment 
is improper under the complaint and there can be no recovery under 
Count II thereof," In Shaw v. Robinson. 50 Neb, 403, ^l^j ^15* 
the court made the following interpretation of Section 107: "lie 
are of the opinion that the dissolution contemplated in the abore 
statute is the voluntary dissolution provided for by the two-tbi.rds 
vote of the members of the corporation under section 134, chapter 
l6. Compiled Statutes, or the expiration of limitation of charter, 
the loss ©f membership, the surrender cf its franchise as a cor- 
poration, or forfeiture by nonMiser or misuser described in 2 
Morawetz, Private Corporations, p* 1005> 2 Beach, Private Corpor- 
ations, sees, 780, 782," Defendants have made a strong argument 
in support of their contention that Section I07 would not apply 
even if this appeal were to be determined upon plaintiff's plead- 
ing and proof. Defendants state that the sole purpose of the 
Nebraska statute is to provide for the transfer of title of the 
corporation's assets upon its de ^ure . dissolution^ that the section 
did not Intend to create a trust relationship between the cor- 
poration's creditors and its directors v/hereby the former could 
compel the latter to account for alleged wrongs committed by the 
directors during their terms ©f office at a time prior to dissolutioni 
that Section 107 does not intend to establish a standard of conduct 
fixing the duties of the directors while managing the corporation's 
affairs; that plaintiff's pleading, count II, alleges "that the 
cessation of business, sale or other disposal of all assets, and 
the removal of all officers and directors from the State of Nebraska 

"iiJaisXq d^jfidcJ ^ibaed-noo :tofl eiB ©*r« ;tsftf ©:^a:^8 a^tnafcnsloC 

fcxjBil aovo'iq erfa iJt J"jEii5XqflioD iBd 1© I cffliAoO 'isfimy isroo&t (tomiBo 

zebiw x'jsvo®®^ on scf riso QiBtU has j^ixljslqraoa ©riJ isbmj rreqoiqrai: Ei 

^^I<^ ^-M-^ ^£0-{i> ttH&n 0^ ^.go e/tlcfoH .y Wi;xfe nl " .loftifiri^t II ;tmjoO 

:"'JOI 0ol;t»®B lo fl©l;fB;fsiq 16:^X11: siii:«AoIIol ari* sbsm fiuot sri;t 

»vodB sjd;t nl fte^jBlqcre^noo 0ol;JifIO8ell) sii;)- j-jarid' nolalqo »d& lo ♦tib 

■Urfcf-Qw* 9di -^df Tol fcftfelvoaq noldxiIosElfc i£;ifl;tfiuIov sdi ei ©^totscfa 

lad' . {X m>X:ti)s« i^fexit' nol^sioqioo sil:f lo siscfjsi«»«T srW lo scfov 

^i^it^silrs lo jaoX:f B^fXiKlX lo noX:f.s'3:lqx9 Bdt lo ^39:)sj:}&iB *©XlqmoO ^6L 

-' 'idtaail ztl lo ^abneiTifE 9r!:t ^qttiutB^Boa t« bboX ftxlcf 

*:; iiJ: Msflisiasfc isewsim io TsexMrton -^^ 9iii*X©liol io ^floX:tfiioq 

^loqicD ife^sYX-iT t^OfidS £ ^^OOX ,q ^8noX;fx5rroqioO ed-BVli*? ,sd-9WBnoM 

cJ-jiejiKjagx: sflO"£i-E s ohjsm evaxl scfflfiibnel^d ",S&'^ ^08^ , bose \ eiiolcf js 

vX -q X.rjow t'QX iiojtifosS tBJiS iioi;tn»;tnGO iXecU- lo ^tioqqjjs al 

*-bij©Xq ci'lliJ-HlsXq uoqi; f>exiiff[i!?t:teJb ed of sisw Xfisqqs alrii li a»v» 

s^xid' lo eeoqii/q sXoa srii dari^t scfEj-R aitnsJQneleG .looiq baB sal 

9d;J' lo i^ntS lo ir.lBxi£i;t firl:+ lol ©feivoTq ocf al ©^xr^tsd-s ealasiffeH 

noijr j^fiflJ- ifioid-ifXoBBXb sn^fi sfc &il ttoqv ECfseas 8»flol:|-.sioqioo 

-rtoo 9flcf nesw^stf qi:r{aiioi;J«Xs"i d'8ir1d^ £ 9ji-B0i» od- bns;^!!! d^on bXJb 

bSjx>o iGffiiol of{.+ -^{fsisriw aio^J-ooiXfi e;?X Mb 8io;fXfc'5io s»aoX^Btroq 

f^J' ^cf 5^d-;tXniHroo E^itotw ftessXX/: lol lixuoooB o;f isct^sX ©if;f Xsqtfo© 

aoX:ruXo33it o.-^ loliq sisti:., olllo 1© &mi^:} Tteri^ snitiffe aioj^enlfi 

toutmo lo t^sfcoiij-a s xialXdaitse o^ fenstfll ion aeof) ^OX aolJ^oeB ;tarfi 

'IIoi.t^J'Ioq1oo ©c;* snlssflBic olld^ zitStKnttb ed^ lo asl^irb ©rii S'Lbcll 

edi &Bdt'' e^aeXXa ^II inmo ^sfiiJbjBsXq s^Tilinl&iq tBd& jsrtlflllB 

£«£ ^s^toaes XXs lb Xxj«oq8lf) i^iM^ io ©Ire (,^2e(5nXsx;cf lo noX:fs82eo 


on said 31st day of December, 1931^ constituted a dissolution of 
said corporation," within the meaning of Section 107, but tbitt 
even if this theory of plaintiff could be sustained, neverihelesJ, 
she has not shown that the diractors on December 31, 1931> or at 
any time subsequent thereto, came into possession of any assets 
belonging to the Kebraska corporation. Plaintiff has not made a 
very satisfactory answer to defendant's argument. Her counsel 
state that "it would be difficult to duplicate a more careful 
plan of systemgtic looting of a corporation v/ith complete dis- 
regard of the claims of creditors and of the rights of this plain- 
tiff than was perpetrated by defendants." Defendants answer this 
statement by saying that if they, as directors, were guilty ©f 
mismanagement and fraud, they v/ould be liable for such conduct, 
but not under Section 107, and that in any event the charge inp- 
volves a disputed question of fact. Plaintiff contends that 
defendants performed such acts as brought them within the scope 
of Section lG7j that the facts show "a calculated plan to cause 
dissolution and the winding up of the corporation, and the 
Nebraska statute is therefore applicable," Defendants answer 
this contention by stating that the said section does not 
apply even under plaintiff's theory of fact, but that in any 
event the charge involves disputed questions of fact. We have 
concluded, however, that it is not necessary for us to now pass 
upon the question as to m^hether or not Section I07 applies to 
plaintiff's case as alleged in count II, and that it may not be 
necessary for us t© pass upon that question should this case 
come before us again* 

In our judgment the contention of defendants that in any 
view of the question as to the application of Section IO7 there 
are material issues of fact that must be submitted to a ^xxrj is 
a meritorious one. Both parties agree that the corporation was 
solvent at the time the dividend was declared. Plaintiff charges 


.' -' ■ :"^' ^S'OI iioiuOfjS ?o galxtsoiB «>ili nliUlw '\nol;t3ioq'TOo bl&z 

^'ciii^izusi sdi bluoo 'iltiRlBiq lo X'ioqlU zidi 11 asvn 

. • GfffioseG 00 siocfoe'ilf) exij d^sdd' jiwojcjE ion aari ©ria 

uuieas845oq otful ©mad ^oi^^i^Ai ;tii»*rp©2crif2 ©lai;^ "v^b 

laaixtT'^ - :" .:"r\=ism%ie, z^ia&btiel^b oi lowacw x^o^ 3^*318 -t^-ss -^isv 

Xplsi^a j'iQ£:i ii yjl-ftoIIqLffc o,t J 1 1; oil life stf tluow ctl" c^isxi^ sosJ-a 

- *' iQlqsRoo jdilw xioi,;,«Toqrioo s lo gxiWooX o±:fsflie»t8-^a 1o ajslq 

' :„-, aixlj "Ito Soiigii s/Lt lo &ns s-rodlijoio lo aiaJtslD erid- Ito fenassi 

aJLa:)' lewanB a;tiiJBl)n«lsa ".a^ja^iwsltsb xcf fceJ-Bi^Jsqioq asw aaiit YlLi 

'ha^'%ilXss'g 91SW ^aioj-oealJ^ es ^x»^ It i^i -^'rxaz -^rf ia^mei&iz 

^tjsasbaoo iitas^ lol sldsil ecf Jblxrow YS-ri-^ ifijusi^ jbias ia9a»^utMis&tm. 

-Ill 9gi£xIo ofij J-nsv5 Yos nl ^sx{^ .bnjs ^^01 noicrose leiua:/ joh cfircf 

j-sjrfd- S5fl9d-itoo 'll±JfliuiX*J .i'Ofil;. lo noiJaeup bQinii^lb s esvlov 

sqo^s sjrfd^ uJuld-Jiw flrsit? ^rigi/oicf as a Job riojja bectiolisq aJ-rxsiuielofi 

©aj; •-il^ &0j-«X0oIso s" worle aJ-osl sri:^ J-firiJ {^01 nojtioea lo 

©itij L'fii; ^nol-tGioqT-oo sdJ- 1© qtr Bf-£^^^'^' 91^ baa aoliuLozzlb 

iswSns adriGfeaslrCI " .elcfsollqqs siolsnatiJ' ai,©;fx;d'j*ta j^isfi^dsMtjf? 

:lofi aeoD noxJ-ose £)i;;^E ejctt dsxlct gnxd-ficfa ^^ nolJ-xxoJ-noo exil:J" 

XQJR ^i. uBfL- L'ti ^oo;:;! lo xiosrU e'lliJnliilq lebno nj?v9 xlqqjB 

9Vad o" .003?. lo anoi^sewp £»o:fjj-qaii> eevlovnl ©sofiilo silj cinevs 

«asq won oj axf lol -^ivusasoon ioa ax J'l cfjsxij ^asTSwoii ^^bobisLoaoo 

oi aeilqqs VOI rioldoaS ion -xo 'lerij-axiw oJ- as nojtd s©up BtH fioqi; 

9cf j-ofi \sm J-± d'MJ- Ji>iis nil itwoo at b's-g^li^ as easo a » llJtlxiiBlq 

s2-eo elflu iilxroria noltfaeup '^nkii aoqu asiiq oJ au lol xissaeoan 

.niass ex; oiolsd scioo 
■\Cafi ni j-arlJ- ac^nebfiolojb lo noiJ-necfnoo sjdcT d-ijscslJirt iiJ<^ nl 
eaexlJ \Qi. noid^oeB lo noiijfioiilqqs »ii;t oi as aolvJasxfp eii;f lo wsxv 
al Y'ii^t ^> "* boJJliadxja ©d :tei:ffl J-jsricf ^obI lo aex/aci Isiisd-ioai s^a* 
eew jxoiia^oqnoo PdJ- J-^d;^ »®^« eoijijsq jdd^oa ..ano auolio:tli©ffl a 
Be8^a£to lll;tHliij:<I .fieuslosi) saw licisbjivi:!) ©ilJ &siXi 9Ai i& isi^vlo^ 


in count II that defendants "fraudulently connived together and 
entered into and engaged In a coots© of conduct designed and con- 
templated to dispose of the assets of the Hartman Furniture and 
Carpet Company, a !Jebre.ska Corporation, and to remove said assets 
from Nebraska and put said assets beyond the reach of creditors 
of said corporation, and that these diresctors caused said GcKapany 
to become insolvent in that the action of said directcars and 
officers resulted in the inability of said lebraslca Corporation 
to pay its debts as they matured," ete« Defendants de^ that they 
entered into or engaged in any such conspiracy. An important \ 
question of fact is. Was the corporation made insolvent by the 
action of the directors in declaring the dividend. Still another 
question of fact is. Did defendants act with due care and in good 1 

faith In declaring the dividead, vhether or not df»fendants decided 

or intended to dissolve the corporation, as claliaed by plaintiff^ i 

also involves a controverted question of fact. Other material -^ 

questions of fact will likely develop upon a trial of the cause. 

Plaintiff contends that "the application of any rule of "horse 

sense* and eofimon understanding demonstrates clearly that not only 

was tha corporation :3ade insolvent by the action of the Board on 

November 9» b^t also that it was intended to be insolvent," and 

plaintiff insists that "defendants cannot now be permitted to tax 

the credulity of the court by their assertions to the contrary and 

to surround the natural consequences of their conduct with a cloak 

of good faith." It is not our province upon this appeal to express 

any opinion as to ths4 weight of the evidence or the cr'^dibility of 

the affiants. If, as plaintiff contends, "it would be difficult to 

duplicate a more careful plan of systematic lootij^ of a corporation 

with complete disregard of the claims of creditors and of the rights 

of this plaintiff than was perit>etrated by defendants," plaintiff 

will undoubtedly prevail upon a trial of the cause before a jury 
if she proves the said plan of looting, aad in this connection 


nan I'-rij'Pia''- s-i-'Vi. : -u::: xl^ia'^^JUsbaAiV ziajtba^l^b isd^ 11 :ttwoo at 

«<i^o baa bsufi'srSj teaftrroro "i© »e«rao £ xtl itesisafi^ Jbaw oJaJ; ti^iBifio 

Sob siiKfiit^u/^i a^cKtisH «jiu lo ac^ftass oifcf 1© eBoqtli) oi be^alqjB»i 

raold'B'Soq'iaO Erf^e^di?*^! hl&B lo '(j-^illdafli «ri;f at b9iSJ}9«^•i eieoltlo 
'Srerli isri:? x^^^ atn&bn^t-?^ .ajs "^ fasiwJ .ecj xsfi- ee aJ-cfsfi a*! %aq Ou^ 

srfd" Y*f c^fls^Ioasl ©fes^f! HelJ'^ieq'ioo sAt mW ^al ^©sl lo aolittBup 
%if£l:^ocs IXt^8 .Msfeiviib ©£i:^ ^i^alo-b ai aiioi09rlb ssii lo aolioa 

l&ltf^ifsm 'i^dxfO .j-^fil lo flot^ae*^ b©^T:«voi^«Boo & aevloviii oala 

««8iLJso 5d:> lo XjBlTvf « noejii qolovafc xl^^lL lliM tfoisl lo afroJ^asjjp 

saiod* 1© ©Ixn Y^«5 ^ a!&±tu9tl(tq& ©iCi" ^eifir sborc^coo lliJniifiX^ 

Igo .ton isM xlij&9lQ E&i isi^ sa^tBob -^aUiRsiui&bms aosmoo kOiB '©anea 

no fc»iJ80S ©iiJ lo no i^ 0X5 ©ilJf x<^ .Juftvloanl ©tafi: «o±#«ioqioo adit esw 

l«a ",.txrsvIo8nl 9cf oct bi^haBini zm Si. :imii oaX* ctxfd ^^ i&cioisvo?! 

xfid" orf jbe^a-iflPi!^ ©d w©fl vfonnao a;taa£«»lRfi" ^^sid'^ eiaiarLi llldlxiljftlq 

:aolo & dit^ ioisbntov il^Jr lo zemteop»9aoo l&iss^sa 94^ fiauoiiifa o;t 

-S'Siqx® ojf X«»qqfi 8l:^:f noqjtf ©sfilvo^ ijsfo ^oe cl d"! ".xfcHsl fwoa lo 

lo x^iJ^efi*^ie ^^ if^ 54sn'i3iv» »x!Ei lo tiJjl^w «jijr oj' as aoXxiJuio x^ia 

oi Jluof^llb f^6 blmr^ ^l** ^sbn&fmo lli^nlsXq ajs ^11 .ac^Jiailla sdt 

aottBv:>q%OD .^ lo gjsljooX oli^«i»^er^a lo oaXq Xuls^iflO »9©« m 9i&ollqvb 

aJ-ifgli exJ:t lo has sio^Xb^Trs to eisisX* ad* lo M:i^«7BiJt> 9S9lqmo dttv 

lllfnlRlq ",8in»fcH«lefe x^^ h^:^^s'iS^q'f»^ Bam aadi lli;^aiaiq eldcf lo 

yrsssi a aiol&cf eaxriso s^d^ 1© Xjeli^f a iK)q« Xl^vdiq Xifc»^«**^o^^s0 XXlw 

aolio^mioo elri.'t nl fcijjs -istfii^ocX to a&La bi&t erf* E9V©to sdM 11 


it will be remssibered that defendants concede that plaintiff 
can recover if she proves the allegations of count I« 

Defendants have raised and argued a number of other 
contentions, but it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the 

The summary judgment of the Superior court of Oook 

county is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions 

that defendants be allowed a t-rial by ;Jury. 



Sullivan, P. J., and Friend, J», concur. 


• 9CIS8 

4-1989 ' ...-'^^' 

mkm'KQS, a minor, by EYE^IS ) 

KOS, his Mother and next ) . / / 

friend, '^ ----... ^ ) APPEAL FRQII-^P^OR 

Appellant^. ) " X ^-^ 


V. /■ ) '•^^, 


TRAM. LlWOm,/ ) 

,/ Appellee, ) "'--...^^ 


Pl&intiff, a minor, sued to recover damages for injuries 
alleged to hrive been sustained by him when he was struck by a 
motor vehicle owned and driven by defendant. A jury returned 
a verdict of not guilty and plaintiff appeals from a judgment 
entered upon the verdict. 

Ho point is made as to the pleadings. Plaintiff's theory 
of fact is, tliat "1, The plaintiff, a 15^-year-old pedestrian, 
was crossing a public highway (Western Avenue) in th?; City of 
Chicago, from east to west, at, or near, the south crosswalk of 
25th Sti'oet, In daylight (about 91 30 A.M.) on a rainy day, 2, 
After safely reaching the raised platform of the * safety island », 
and seeing no auto within the north-bound street car track, upon 
looking to the south before leaving the so-called »safety island', 
plaintiff proceeded on until in between the norxh-bcund and south- 
bound street car tracks, where he looked to the north to ascertain 
if there was any south-bound traffic, 3» 'i'here being no south- 
bound traffic plaintiff resuiaed his crossing and x?as struck by 
defendant's automobile going north in the south-bound track - no 
previous warning of bell or horn of any kind having been given, 
at a speed of 40 lailes per hour - with the resultant injuries 
complained of, and the incidsntal expenses claimed." Defendant's 
theory is that before and at the time of the accident he was pro«- 

ceeding northward on the northbound street car track} that he 

' 'xati baa «4iiio» aid ,302 

•'fffirf/'.r -.T 

» i 1 /ivu, V,' yi- 


6s»m^'j'- ,:tn£iJbn9"i9l) x^ a^-vlib ba& bemro sJCoIjcIsv loioa 

:^ne!i^ltvl .c laoil El.G^qqfi J.Jt-JatBiq. baa ^iJliiJs cton *o ^oibiyv s 

X^O'idi Q^lll'JatsSI ,e8JiJ:DB0lq sriJ- o^ as ebjsa el ;JfiJtoq oH 

1Q x:i'lZ< «riJ- nl (sirns-vA meci-ssW) Tj^^^iiS-t^i ollcfuq- a ajrUaeoic saw 

lo :;L£.iV.'c;a ;•■:; r''X'os or.':]- f'l/ion "O ^J-s ^^tasw o,J JaBS moil ^ogjsoJtdO 

^'JbaBlP.i Y^i'-': •.?. ' '-'fid- Ip ai.iol;tBXq besJtai 9iiS ^nislo&ei xXbI&s lOilX 

noqjj ^jio£'i. V ^9©%:f8 6i!«fod"«jrf^ion 9di ald:tlii oSss& on anlsae baa 

, 'iJii-cXai: -^^J slips' I>olIi3s>-08 srlJ axilviiftl ©lolsd ricfiroa 9iIJ- oj 3iil3iooI 
-nd-«oa ib£ts fcmrod-rlj ibsxs sricf nt*^'-'- <' -.i; IiJf.iX' no fciob?)i5ooiq VilJ-nJiBlq 

-ricf-wos on gai'^'-' "^""^ ' . ^olJIsf^ fem/od-xL'iJoa Tjn.G sew sioii^ 11 

■:;-.r -isij.x;j3 £,,,, ,i^,i ^^,.,.^.^^..0 alii ijeisxraei llli'nlBlq olll&'ii bmjod 

V..1 - ^uiijij Umo^dtimz ©4i «1 riJ-ion gnlos ©Ilcforao^us e * iJnsiinslsb 

c^uiiafiflelsG ",f)©ffilnIo p.®8n©cpce Ifc^njbitiril ^;rfd" kaz ^io tienlalqiaoo 
•-o'k: saw eji d"a9£iir>oe £ilu 'io earl:^ sfiJ- :tii fins PTOl&cf ^BflJ" si: xioodi 

eti im:i i^iofirid- lui; .tso'i^a £icxfodrIJ'ion oriJ- ao tiBVUfV^ion a^lbeso 


first saw plaintiff when his ear was about 200 feet south of 
plaintiff; that plaintiff vv'as then standing upon tha safety Island 
and was facing north; that he had an uiahrella under his armj that 
when defendant first saw plaln-clff he sounded his horn as a warning; 
that when defendant's car was about ten feet south of plaintiff, the 
latter turned to the west and started walking across the street in 
front of defendant's carj that defendant applied Ms brakes and 
swerved the car slightly to the left but that the right front fender 
and lamp came in contact with plaintiff j that defendant stopped the 
cs.r in not more than 20 feet after the impact; that as defendant 
was approaching 25th street and before he reached the safety island 
the car was going 2^ or 30 miles an hour, iftsr the accident de- 
fendant picked up the boy, put him in defendant's car and took him 
to the hospital. - '". 

fhe follovsdng are the contentions i^de by plaintiff: "I, 
The Court erred in its rulings upon the admission of evidence, II, 
The Court coBBJiitted prejudicially reversible error in the instructing 
of the jury. Ill, Counsel for the defendant, in the trial of the 
case, was guilty of improper conduct, calculated to arouse the 
passion and prejudice of the jury, to the prejudice of the plainr- 

It will be noticed that the able and experienced counsel 
for plaintiff do not contend that the verdict is against the mani- 
fest weight of the evidence. Indeed, they make no contention that 
the verdict was not fully justified by the evidence. However, 
before passing upon the points raised by plaintiff we have seen 
fit to read carefully the entire evidence and as a result of our 
consideration of the same we have reached the conclusion that any 
honest, intelligent Jury would have been obliged to return a ver- 
dict of not guilty under the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
While we are not required, on this appeal, to consider what damages 

^o rioXjoa cfea"^ OOS d'lfocfs eaw leo Gjtd asriw 11i:5n±Blq wsa ;f8'rl'i 

cf.Qtld' jiL. i^i^ fill&iaffiif nis Jbfixi »fi ^jsrft; {d&ioci ■gnlo&l Cjsw Jbac 

g-iid- ^Ixid-nlfilq lo ii^iioa ^os'x ne^ ;tx»di3 8bw iso a^d-asbne'jsb neyljlf ixaiS 

Hi ie&iis. ef{<3 asoioa 3fiJ:iLIi'.w be;tis:?e Me ^J^sew silct oi' t6aiii:i '•Q^i&l 

fcxis a&3{«'Xd Bill b^Hqqa 3n&brt:j^^h. i&ili ^ifi»->a*i£ubn&le5 1o d-coi'l 

T^Msl taoit j-rigli srij- d'sdJ- d^ircf ^tlel^fciiJ- od^ '^I^fiair« ilo Biii bevimm 

fcfifilai: Y^sl^a sflj- Lerioeti eri siolecf fen;s j^ssi^a rtt^.Q gnlriofiOTqqB 8«w 
-'Sb ;i-iisbicoB sricj- lecMii .luoxl as aeilM 0£ lo ^S: grtlos ecw z£0 sdi 
,::i 3(oo:j- 5ii;5 ^£0 e ' j-f£26nf;'tsb fll oJtri :fj:rq <"^otf »jci" q^f beilDJtq itnB&nsl 

.iHiiqzod. otii oi 

. "I ,©0ii55.tve lo noieajbafe.o srii aoqjj esnllx/i ad"! nl bei'i-?* jouo^ ?riJ 

Gsid- lo JJeliJ- actct al r^in&bnBleb mi^i rot leaiiuoD ,111 .■^uft ©rid 'lo 

-^rljslq 9ii;t 'io soifcirtoiq ©xi*? oj ^x'^^'l ®ri^ "io aoibji/t oiq fcfifl aoietsq 

" . m* 

Xoci'iL'Oo bsanoiiQqxB baa ©Icf*r> oiid" jstIJ- bsolioa ed Iliv; :tl 

- jism &di oanl^^B aJ: joIdiov fjfi^ ii^S fens^ncD :ton of) HiJ-nisIo: io"]: 

J^fid^"^ noi:d-n&;tiioo on 93{affl '^exfcf ^beaSxiI .sonafciva 9rl.t lo cfriglsw :ise1 

^'isT-rA^oii ,9£as£)±v© silit ycf feslllosx/t yXXx/I :ton sjbw itclbrsv sri^f 

«®8a *.vfi£l aw lllcfnlBlq x^ l>9Sisi eJ-nloq ad:?- noqir snleesq siolscf 

Tj;fo to j-IiraoT « ea fyne ©oxt©51vo e^lcfne eri:^ ijllij'i'^iso bssi oJ- ctJtl 

vjus ;jgrf+ floieirlcnoo 9rl;t be/lo^fti Qv&d »w SKsa ©rio 'to aoliL.nebl&aoo 

«-"Tsv H niJi';te'i o:t bf^gilcfo n©9d evari fcXuow xii^t c^negille^tiil titeenorf 

asa&ra/ib jjEixlw 'lebisnoo o:f ^Xeoqqs 8lfl:t xio ^bs-iXj/poi :ton sac ew sliifV 

were sustained by plaintiff as a result of the accident, we have no 
doubt that certain evidence that bore solely upon plaintiff *s alleged 
injuries tended strongly to injure his case. It appears that while 
plaintiff was in the court room during ths trial he used a crutch, 
and that he used it in taking the witness stand; that he also used 
the crutch in going about the court building. Plaintiff testified 
that he had used one crutch "just about two weeks. Before that I 
used two crutchesj" that he used a crutch whenever he walkedj "my 
leg doesn't exactly give way but it isn*t very strong, so that I 
couldnH walk without it, I couldnH run or anything of that sort," 
Defendant offered evidence that proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
plaintiff returned to his home on the evening of the day that he 
testified; that five iainutes after his return he left his home and 
walked, without a crutch, seven blocks to a moving picture theatre. 
Neither plaintiff nor any other witness attempted to rebut this 
evidence and plaintiff's counsel was forced to take the position 
before the trial court that this evidence should not be admitted . 
because it merely impeached plaintiff upon an immaterial matter. 
In support of the contention that the court erred in its ruling upon 
the admission of evidence plaintiff argues that the ^rial court erred 
in admitting this evidence, as it merely impeached plaintiff upon an 
imaaterial collateral matter. The following answer of defendant to 
plaintiff's argument meets with our approval: "This boy came before 
the jury using a crutch. He said he couldn't walk without a crutch. 
He said he used it to help both legs. He said he did not know whether 
he could walk on his left leg without a crutch because he had never 
tried. In any event he wanted the jury to believe that he was so 
crippled that he could not get along without a crutch. He did that 
to gain their sympathy and fool thegi and defraud the defendant, * « * 
He could walk without it. He knew that he could but swore that he 

... at^itx-tni^q; Jioqj/ vXalos ©g:G<i itatrii' nonrblv© riisd-iso d'arid JcfiroJ 
ellivvr ^i5i?»^ eic«wcj3 clJ. ..^2i30 alxl ®^a/tni: o^ YX;8noi.t8 l)&bn»d" ES.txa{;nJ 

i>si:ll;l£5;t lll;txiJ:Bl^l .gitJtMii/cf tnxto ^d:t :laodiii 3nJys--aJ: iio;tuis «di 

1 *aii(^ sio'lcr . ajisow owt nj»jftii46 -tsif^" ifaiJxno oao bseir fofirf ad vtjsxt: 

-J i&dS ■o^ ,3xiO'i^s -^t-sv j'»j»a>L.^.t ;fi;cl XJS"?? ©vis ^-^j-oaxs ;t»n3©oZ/ gaJ 

d^afi,-t dsf^rofe ©Idi-jxiOEi-ei c fcuo-^Qcf Jbevoiq :tJMivl oonsJbxva b'jisl'to d'fuLia9l9< 

sd CJ-SE{.1 x^L siij lo gxiiri'sva eiiJ no sioofi eld oj- bentvi^i lllialzlt 

fci-ifi oraod ain cileX s>d jaiL':)'©i eJW •isJ'liJ 8e;Jj5fniia evil issii- \ ball i.:fz9: 

iSio-GsriJ- 9'mooiq anivom jb oi eaToald ne-vre ^i(o;ti;rf.o e ^uod&lv- ^beilm 

itoldxaoq aild" eal£;t oj- i>asiol &sw X®Biii;oi> 8'71Jt^nljBXq ^6 soasibivi 
i)9ocl-ifliji>B od.Soa Mi'0*Ib eonewiv© aJtiiJ" ;t*.xl:l J^'Ut/ooXfiiiit ^t f»io1m 

noicTt; ^n±X/Ji gifx ex fj»xu3 c^xuoo 9xfj ;^&ii^ notiti^inoo arlJ- lo J-iaqqi/s nl 

fj«ii9 d^^iiyoo XsxMCf ©i:fj :tistld- eqjcjs'ib ?tilJni;sXq daa^foivs 'io noJ:Ealaf:ii3 9it: 

fijB aoqsj tllJrtlBiQi beMOBsqhil x^^'i^^ ^-t 2b ,?>on9i)iv9 aijcf^ galc^^j-imbs n. 

od- ixisfeftslefe to lowaxjKi ^ai'srollot sdT «x9dw|-iiffi XiS'i^J^sIXoo Xsl'ied-SiiUQ. 

9?:r/iecl ©iSi^o y^c/ aixIT" tXsvo'iqqs ^icjo &^iw eJ^ma iaeaiu'gna a'llxinXsXc 

,iia>:J-x;ifS .s ^ssotUlif IXsw J-'n&Xxios eri &!»& ^H ,iit^ivio » anXajJ xau{, ^^^ 

ie£id-eriw wofd ion £>if) ©rl bl&a ?'K ,es»X il^oct qX»fi oj j'X bseu orl blsa-*! 

'«»vo« bail exi e&M&o^d lisdvn) s iuotiiXti geX i'Xsl sM no aiXsw i)Xxioo"Ju 

02 a.fjw pjrf d'iadd' 9V®lXficf oct x'^J^t ®JfJ'-^ fccdrisw ^eii drtevo '^ns nl .bail. 
&M;it btii ®H .riOvtuio s iJcoil^iw artoXjs ^^93 ioxi bluoo ©jrf ;fsri:f bfiXqql^t 

«■ ^''^ * ^inabaolQb erij- bxfBilsb bns igfirio"- Xool bns -^ri^sqcixa iXsri^ nXag 
^iv ^tjiicio .: ft'towe ;wi hjMoo.&ti ;J jsriJ- v/smi OR .cii" ijjoil;tlv? :CX«w bXijoo 9] 

couldn't. His counsel says this was iiamatGrial and the defendant 

had no right to show that he was deliberately deceiving the Jury in 

an effort to defraud the defendant." Plaintiff further contends 

that the error of tha trial court in admitting defendant's evidenise 

was aggravated by the fact that "after defendant closed his case in 

chief, plaintiff then attempted to introduce, in rebuttal of the 

defendant's motion pictures of the functioning of the right leg, 

a group of X-ray photographs of the bony structure of the same right 

leg taken from the accident thereto clear up to the time of trial," 

and that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's objection 

to gck&imlli r .8-aAa. evidence. There is no merit in this contention. The 

trial court properly ruled that "the only question on rebuttal in 
regard to this evidence, as I take it, is a question of whether he 
did or didn't walk without a crutch. And not the condition" of the 

As to plaintiff's point II, that the court committed rever- 
sible error in instructing the Jury, plaintiff first contends that 
the court erred in giving to the ;Jury at the instance of defendant 
seven instructions bearing upon the subject of plaintiff»s contribu- 
tory negligence, ?;hen only one iTistructlon was given upon behalf 
of plaintiff upon the same subject. We find, upon examination of 
the record, that plaintiff asked the court to give fifteen instruc- 
tions to the jury and that the court gave all of them. The court 
gave, at the instance of defendant, fourteen instructions. We 
have seldom, if ever, had before us a record in a personal injury 
case where the plaintiff's given instructions outnumbered the 
defendctnt's given instructions. Some of plaintiff's instructions 
were long, and there is no point made that they did not fully and 
fairly present to the jury plaintiff's theory of law. Plaintiff 
does not complain that the seven instructions do not correctly state 
the law, but it is argued that there was needless repetition that 

fii fust '^rf* jiRTivisicsfc xX^^^fi^^cfi-'^fe eew ȣi f&d) wojrta od" ^ifgli on b 

^Sel d-rfgli siii to -grttrib t^^^tKUJ^. erif 1o cs-rud-oiq rroli-ofii E';tQsba©'S 

",Ijs.?:Tt 1o '^tnii ofij oj- qsj Td»lD otsasrfit *ar-M&oB Grid- taoil nsiLsd' s 
noWDfttrf<> 8*cf'/t;'3f>iW};f?5 ijxxiiTiGdT.irc fii Sf^iis Six/oo Islid- qA& Ssdi b 

&d^ \aoMn's^uo6 bM^ til ilitsm on ei ©leriT « •sorts* fclvfi jejUftJutMu bofe 
ni I6d-d"xrd0i no n&itesffp Y-Cno erld-" ;tfiri;t fceXx/i -^Iiwoiq ctiifoo Isi 
arf •t9ii:^srfw to nof:fs©f/p a t5l ^ctl et^sJ- I 86 ^oonsfeive a±d;f oj- fciBa 

oii^ "io "ntjWifcnoo ©jrft d-ofi £»n.^ ,doiint> k ^trorid--^ 2£X.ew ct'ixfcif) no 15 


dr^dd- abrrsdttoa'iN'xJtt- I'iXJ'fTlBXq tY^^t ^rf^"*^ inldctT^d-sni: at tcoits ©Id 
dffBMslol) 10 9^n«f&Hl ©rf;t d^e "v:^wt ®-'^^ od^ gnlvl:?; nl b^itd &tnoo g 

^Xafl9<J aoqjET ai^vX^ as^^ ftoXdoimjaj^jf srro t^o rt*riT7 ,sonfe3lXg9fl t* 

lo no ti QnlmBX^ etaqv ^bnl'i s"" .dos^cfifa s-irf-e erid ctoqfr llicfiiXsXq 

-SJJTd-Efii a&0d'>11: ©vi3 ot'd-'iwoo ed^- boiTsg ^"iXinXsXq d'Brid' ^bioo?-'i c 

• c^tuoo ferf}' .Gisrid 1o XXb evsg d-iitio ©rfd" ctsd;'- fena ^nu^ ejtfd od- siici 

<>v; .aaotd-oiiiuSnX flS©d7j;ot ^c^/usftn^lsft lo 9onfi.tanX erid^ c^b ^sv 

XnJ/; X.t;no8ioq s fl.t bioo'^i s bu QioJod b&d ^isvs IX ^cidM38 st 

PTid f)«"i:ocfi!riJf*ijyo BHGld^oxrrcfaitt nrvis 8 » llld^itXflXq add' sieilw »a 

ajiioidWiidaflX B'llij-nXsXq 1o ^Eo? .anoXd-^mdaiiX rtsvXs e'dnsBnal 

£tt!B Xllif'i- ion bib x^^^ ^^dS ©bata dflXoq on 3i sisrid bas ^gnoX ai 

llXdnXfiX^ .W5X 10 -^lOBm a'mdfiXaXq YiJ^'t »rf^ od :fiie89tq xltl 

^iBie. vlfs'^itoo dofl ofc ajKdldoifi^tanX n&yee »ifd derii nXAX<pi69 '^f^n a* 

^£rid noXd-rdoqsi ea9X6»ea sbw siorid- darid fceasis al d"! d^ja^cf ,w«Jt • 


brought the question of the exercise of care by plaintiff too 

prominently before the jury. Six of the seven instructions 

presented different aspects of the question of plaintiff's 

contributory negligence and one of the seven instructions was 

a repetition of another. In Carsonf Pirle^ Scott & Co« v. Chicago 

Rys> Co., 309 Ill» 346, 352, the court states: 

"There were five instructions given stating the rule of law 
that required Martin to exercise ordinary care for his own safety 
and advising the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if 
Martin failed to exercise such care. The instructions correctly 
stated the law, and the objection made is that there was needless 
repetition, bringing the question of the exercise of care by 
Martin to6 prominently before the jury. That was one of the 
material Issues in the case, and while needless repetition may 
give undue prominence to some matter to which the instructions 
relate, these instructions presented different aspects of the 
question. The elaboration ©f the rule in different instructions 
did not add anything material to the defense, but as there was 
nothing incorrect in them they are not ground for reversal," 

We find no substantial merit in plaintiff's contention that 
the court erred in giving to the jury, at the instance ©f defend- 
ant, instructions Kos, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16, 

Plaintiff contends that counsel for defendant was guilty 
of improper conduct calculated to arouse the passion and prejudice 
of the jury to the injury ©f plaintiff, 've have carefully con- 
sidered the argument of plaintiff's counsel in support of this 
contention and we are satisfied that there was nothing in the 
conduct of defendant's counsel that had any effect in bringing 
about the verdict retmrned by the jury. This case was tried by 
an able and careful judge. Plaintiff lost the verdict because it 
clearly appeared from the evidence that his claim lacked merit* 

afiol^Oii^^d-anj: nsvse sriJ' lo xici ,xi^t »J^^ ©lOlocf xSJaonimoTLq 

B^tlliniAlq lo £K)i^cU&x/p eri;t lo a^09qRs J-xisiellife fesd^nsasaq 

8j5W B^aQl&'QiJti sat nsvea ©lict 'lo 9jHo ba& ^sax^^il'^ea X'lo^-t/cfi'xd'aoo 

3 8«;t4;Ja ivisott 9di ^£^£ ^o^ ,111 ^£ , »oO ^syH 
WisI lo sdi?^: arfd- §iiiijfi;tc £t»vXa aaol^Si/i.teax svil e'lsw ©nexlT'^ 
XcJ'elss nwo airf lol ©lao X'^ts^^i^^'^ seioiaxs o^ niJiclS fisaiupsa d-jsdd^ 
11 'I9V0091 ^o£t filifos 'ili^Jitlal^j ©£ii c^ari^ ^int 9rl;t acxelvbs boa 

Xd 91B0 iQ 8si3i9x© •rfJ" lo fitolJ^c^up »ri^ gxslsn^id ^aoim9<i*l 
9ds lo 91X0 SB'^ imVl tXitii srid^ stol^cf x^^J^^^-tatoo^q oo;t rHimM 

Bao.tioiJi:!'zat Bdi riolrlw o^ iBiism esioa o^ sonsaliaoiq axifenu 9x1^ 

9di lo a#©«qfia ^tjieiellli) b&ia^&B'iq iaolSouiSzaX e«9ild" ^sd^islsi 

siioWat'idanJ: iite^sllifc ci aXxri sri:^ lo fl©l;t.sio<JaX» sKT .aolcteeup 

«aw s-xsidcJ^ ea cl^ifc^ ^$«nele£i ©xlJ- oj I»2i©;*iaai guMd'XflB £»£>« ^©a Wi^ 

".Xeeisv'^^i lol feoeoig d^oa ©i« xedi a&di al j-oe^iooxU jniittcr: 

^&iiS nQlSaeSeiJoo 8»13:i:^al«Iq al ^li&m XfiJt^ix3;fadi/e »n fcoJtl ©w 

-.&«»lff>b lo ©oetiiitsiii ®£ict .Jj3 tY<i»(; &di o^ ^alvl^ Oil i>siis *aDoo ©iW 

»^X fefis C-C ^XX ^OX ^^ ,GoM eiiol^9i/i[;fenJ: ^ias 

"^IXsj:^ &6W tasJbaelftfe ^lol Xaanj/oo cTjexid" £i>s«cl-noo lULtnlBX^ 

9®lI)Gt»"fC[ ^hjb isioiaajsq »ji;t 6>e»oiB ocf boisltsQlBO isvbaco isqoiqjBl Ic 

-«oo xlUilfiiB^ erud s ^llld^jaifiXq lo xiulal adj o;^ \ixj^ srid Iw 

El£f:t lo ;ti«qqjjs ni iBaauoo e * lll^ixJLelq lo ;^n«cu;8is eiii bsi9bl-- 

anil' fii si^iLfiloii bsw ©i^riJ- ctsri;* i>eJtl3i;5ise »a« «w has £LOlia&:^a<)o 

saisnlicf Hi: 4o©ll« ^fiii &«il cJaeti^ Xoeni/oo £';^««l>n©le& lo ioBbm)Q 

Xd bslij- asw &Sf?o slfiT .Tc^iut wl^ X<f b^nrujisi Solbisv »di ^uoda 

iJL «a«jBoetf iolbi&y b£U cTaoX ll.l;tal6X^i ,»Sl«/t XjjIsibo 60fi »XrfB .as 

^ti%&aL b&io&l mlklo elrf ^ad;! sonsiiivs sxf.t moil fjsiasqqs xXibsXo 

The Judgment of the Superior court of Cook county should 
be and it is affirmed, 


Sullivan, Pe J«, and Friend, J», concur. 

ptBifSnoo ^,T. ,feK«l^ bm ^,t. «1 ^niivillxj'. 





Defendant in l^ef, ) mWR TO CRIMpAL GpURT 

▼, y^ "-^-.J OF COQI^OUKIY 

j,^' ; '""■■■"1,- '^V /..'^i 

EOSA WEDGl, / ) '"""""' 

Plafntlff in Error. ) 


On July 23, 1941, defendant was arrested "by the ^.llage 
aarshal of the Village of Westchester, Cook county, Illinois, 
for failure to stop at a stop sign as required by the statute 
of the State, TiTtien the case was called for trial before a police 
laa.gistrate of said Village defendant requested a change of venue, 
which was granted, and the case was sent to a police magistrate 
of Broadview. ?ihen the case was there called for trial, defend- 
ant requested a trial by a jury; a Jury was called, the evidence 
heard, and a verdict was returned finding defendant guilty as 
charged and a fine of five dollars was assessed. Defendant 
prayed an appeal to the Criminal court of Cook county from a 
judgment entered on the verdict, and thereafter the case came on 
for trial in that court before Judge Dunne, at v/hich time defend- 
ant requested that the case be submitted to the court without a 
jury, whick was done. The trial court, after hearing the evidence 
submitted by both sides, "found the defendant guilty as charged. 
Pine of $5.00 and all costs imposed by the Village of Westchester 
affirmed," Defendant sues out this writ of error to review the 
ji^idgment of the Criminal court. 

Defendant contends tliat "the evidence in this case taken 
as a whole does not establish the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The main argument in support of this conten- 
tion is tliat the village marshal arrested her "not because she 

failed to stop at a stop sign, but merely out of spite and out 
of an unfriendly feeling that he for some time harbored against 



■^0 aTATa SET. ■=;■ T 

■ - ^ • 

,:-rimToc?j^o ^0 





.aooM Aaoa 

riloc; £ eiolscf IbIiJ- tol bsIlBO a^w osso ©ri^ nsrf.^/ .ec^sd'a eiii to 

^ ; nov 'io ogasrls-'U'" bsjgsfjpoi wxis&ns'^'^f) Q-s,BlltY fclsa lo 9iB'r;t8l3.9« 

sd'siiS'aiSjtim soiloq b od" (tnsa sbw ssso ©xlcf fine ,£)»;tnai3 esw riolrfw 

B a[ot'> Yjn^oo 2I00O lo ;:tij;oo IsfilfliiiO Bdi oi lei^qqs aa 6&X'5i<I 

to QisiBO OS so eiW TScf'iBS'^criit fcns ,d'otf)rr9v pifld- no f)©r£©;tjj© *a®agfcjjt 

-SnolaJb sgtivt rfolriw cfs ^ennuQ B^bssX sibl@cf :t'moo d-fijdtf nl lei^* 10I 

B J'x«>ij[J'l\v :Jixfoo ©r'J- ocJ- b®j-:tlracfjcj8 ©cT 0260 sjrfc^ d'sri;? f>9:t8«i;pei Jua 

:*0ixs£>±v9 Slid- 8£ilT.s«ft lod'TEiS .^d-'moo I^iTd- eriT ' ,Qfio5 8bw iloldw ^x^xj(; 

,lj9giado p.s t^IiJ/^ d-ffsfenslteb srlj bxii^-ol^ ^«®f>fs ii:tocf \:cf 59^;tirccfira 

^ed-Bsxio^TE©:^ lo 93sIIJl? sj^J x^ feoaoqmi etaoo IIb hah 00.^$ lo enl^ 

»fld' ffeiVQT oj- TO'i'i© lo d^liw ziriS d-£fo aoue d-fljefenslsd ♦'.fcsffl^illB 

,-fiuoo LoaXmliO exfi ^o d-iioflisi)f;|i 
xiS34Bd- ©afibi slrfd n.': ?»Dn»f)ivo sffd-*' d-srid- abnsd'fioo d-n-BbneleQ 

fi baox&d 4i]m^, a'dnsferislell) orfa- iiellcfBd-afl dofi s.Bob eloriw b && 

-^■'S&aoo atiii 'lo Jioqqifs ni d'neffli/s'^^s nlfiia s>iiT ".^cfifofe ©IcfaaoEesn 

erls oeu^o&cf J-on" lerl bod-ss'iis iBrfsisra eajslliv erii d-^;f al nold' 

d-jco bfus ed-jtqa lo d-jjo vlsneia d'lfcf jfigla cjola s d-s qocts od" fiells'^ 
d'eJKl«»i*> beiodiBd aaiid- ©moe 10I srf :f siid- siUIsdl vlfensi^liiii rrs lo 


her," It is sufficient to state in answer to this argument that 
if the finding of guilty was bas>ad upon the testimony of the 
village marshal alone there might be some force in the argument, 
but the record shows that the testimony of the village marshal 
that defendant failed to stop her automobile at the stop sign 
located at Westchester Boulevard and Roosevelt Road, a Staijie 
highway , is fully corroborated by the testimony of T, J, Bullock 
and John Parker, two disinterested witnesses, neither was a friend 
nor an acquaintance of the village marshal at the time in question 
and both v;ere subpoenaed to testify in the case. ?^hlle defendant 
bitterly attacks the testimony of the village marshal she makes 
little reference to the testimony of Bullock and Parker. Defendant 
had conducted a tavern in Hill&ide for about six years and she 
closed it on the morning in question at 3 o'clock. The alleged 
offense took place about 3*30 a»m,, when she and one Ted Bowden 
were riding in her automobile. She testified that "we were just 
riding." She had known Bowden for years. He was a guitar player 
who entertained defendant's customers on Saturday nights. Defendant 
did not pay him for the entertainment but he made "money by passing 
the hatj" defendant allowed him to keep whatever money be obtained 
in that waj» Defendant testified that when she arrlred at Roosevelt 
Road, where there was a stop sign, she came to a complete stop^ 
Bowden, alone, corroborated this testimony, 

"Where a cause is tried without a jury the law has committed 
to the trial judge the determination of the credibility of the vdt- 
nesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony, and 
where the evidence is merely conflicting this court will not substi- 
tute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v. Overbey. 

362 111. 4885 People V. Sclales , 353 id. I69." t Peonle v. Ristau. 

363 111. 583, 589.) 

Defendant has had two trials upon the instant charge. In 

^>txi&i5}JSS"is «^ oi: eoie*^ eisof. so' J-iT^lia s'lerf;}- ©noXs lisrisiam ©ssIIIt 

aJ^Ad^B a ^^BoH JZnvQj^QQH bam bnavBluoE -i^izBdoiHB^^ cfj6 bsS^sooX 
3iooIX»a ,L ,1' lo '■{j[iom±is.&^ axfcf x«f f)©d bio cfo 1100 yXIul zl . Tgwrialxi 

uol^feoi/r: isx ©KlJ- sdi ih larisisa aasiliv arid' lo Bune:) at&sspos ae, ion 

cfCEfeaslftfo eXJtif J .32S0 ©xld Hi TClld-aed od fessaooqcfifz 9i©w 4do< itas 

e©2iwi enii rirlf::-2iiifj (5;|,slXxv 5»iii lo x^o^-tdeui odi toLoBtis -^liQSifld 

'aafejK»l _ ....... ..._i lisoXXf/a lo x^omXi&^i oxi^ od sons^ele^ »IddlX 

©fis &n/' nT f\' xxs dwoefc "iol sblaXXiH nl niavsd a bftoubaoo bad 
^oaeXXi.; ... ..-JxkjXs'o £ cte «o2weexfp xjl aGlnttoa srid ao *i beaoXo 

aefewog l>9? en© fcxijs ejae aoxfw t,o»a 0.£:£ iuodB ^oalq ifood saiiello 

jai/t 5'3:9w ©T"^" ■•-'■' i"^ I" •■•+Ead edS » dXld'offlodjJ4 ^sil nl saXbii »i9w 

is-^-eXq ^£sdXii-; „ 0-=,. •;, .ci'ieeij 'iol nef)Woa iwroni bsd 9do ".^rtlbtt 

^SLBba^tsQ ,Qid-ghi x^hiv^Bc «o &-i<^mo;i&isc a»diSB£»n®l»b D«aij&di©dxx9 oriw 

aaxessq x^ "^^kgs:" sfoisci 91I dud disafljniad -xednc 9/{j 10I mtd xsq^ don felfc 

fianlsd^o ©d "^s^oai isvedsaw qesi od mM feswoXX^ dn&Jbnslafe "jdarf sxld 

dXevsBcofI d^ J&fjvli^a j^fle neilw d*ifid fcaXlidzsd dja3Jbn«»l»<T ,Tfsw dfixid nX 

,qo:?a sdelqieoe fi od smao odB ^na^a qode b s;5w sT^iid cisriw ^5boH 

.^noisidasd^ aXiid fcsdsTodoiioo ^snoXs ^a^fcreS 

«)t?doi'!i£::oo v^aff waX si/o Y'iAft « djaoxldtw beXid ai: ©ai/B;^ b »n»rfW" 

-dlsr sxid lo Y^€)io srid lo noXdaxiifflieJfi^b »xld osfcirt Xctid erid od 

Dits jY^iOEldesd ilsuii od &©i>iooss acf od drial^w edd lo bas eeccen 

-tiadssz do« XXiW dixroD aiild ialdoxXlii«s Y-^siaoi sX soaefcive ©rid ensriw 

i^ X^cf^g>^K: . V g lae^'i .diwoo l&t^ ©dd lo d'srid 10I diieffisbwt adi adird 

^fefdaXH ,.y g|,gpf5» "♦^t^J^ .fci £^£ . ,v eXgoeq i88-f> .XXI S^e 

(.e8^ »£8^ .111 £^£ 
ril .es'Xiixio dfu&dEni sdd noqjj aX^X'id oisrd fcari eiul dasfeoeloQ 

the justice court she demanded a jury and the jury found her 
guilty of the charge. In the Griailnal court she requested that 
the case be tried by the court without a jury and the trial judge 
found her guilty of the charge. After a careful consideration of 
the record we hare reached the conclusion that the finding of 
the trial court was fully justified under the evidence. 

Defendant contends that the only charge against her in 
the Criminal court was that she failed to stop at a stop sign; 
that the rate of speed she was traveling at the time was not 
material in th6 prosecution of the sole charge against her and 
that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to 
introduce evidence as to the rate of speed she was traveling at 
the time in question. There is not the slightest merit in the 
contention. The rate of speed at which she was traveling was 
clearly a part of the res gestae . The evidence for the prosecution 
tended to show that defendant, prior to the time that she reacted 
the point in question, was driving her automobile at a high rate 
©f speed and that the village marshal, v/ho was following her ear 
in a squad car, "opened the siren upon the squad car," but tBftat 
defendant failed to stop and failed to reduce the speed of her car 
and passed through the stop sign at a high rate of speed. The evi- 
dence bearing upon the question of speed was also material as it 
tended to show an intent by defendant t© disregard the warning sign. 
She was familiar with the stop sign at the intersection. 

We find no merit in the instant writ of error and the judg«-^ 
aent of the Criminal court of Cook county is affirmed, 

Sullivan, P, J,, and Friend, J,, concur. 

itfi idwo' JEW X'UJl 3 b9iJEiMi&b sria iicoQ »oitBtsl bsU 

.a«Si£ifio add 1o vj-Iiirg ned fimfol 
sUL'o&so'iq 3di ^(BJtii'ifflioq ni f)sii9 iiuoo Istti srLf iBxId- 

.Idosmi: ■■.alvlib &sw ^notiaenp nt Jnloq Bdi 

^Iflfla-ijaffi sajBllJcv arW i&iii bnA bseqa I© 

•ocifj jHsiJta ©rid- J&9fi€>qo" ,^6s l)*f;pa s ni 

•Xlfil fiaauu qod"s oj fcellal ^fiUBbnsl^b 

qod-g 9x1^ tl^voiti& fceegsq fens 

>€» Kol^8©ifp Bdi tioqu sflJtisscf eoneb 

,:;iE qoJ-a s-iicf r[;tiw islLlmB.1 ear BdQ 

^orieli'? £ifia ^.t »'l ^aavlllnZ 




^'"^ Appellant, 


) ""©R^igOOK COUlfeY. 

On November 6, 194-lf plaintiff obtained a decree of \ 
divorce in the above entitled cause. On January 19, 194-2, de-» 
defendant filed a "Petition for Vacation of Decree," On January 
19> 194-2, an order was entered denying the prayer of the peti- 
tion* Defendant appeals from that order* 

We have seldom had before us an appeal that was so lacking 
in merit. The present counsel for defendant, who did not repre- 
sent him upon the trial of the cause, ask that the decree of 
divorce be reversed and the cause remanded, although the appeal 
was taken from the order of January 19, 194-2, Two points are 
raised in support of their contention that the decree of November 
6, 194-1, be reversed: one^ "The testimony of the plaintiff and 
her two witnesses was insufficient as a matter of law to authorize 
the trial court to make a finding in the decree that defendant 
was guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty as alleged," and the 
said testimony was "false and untrue;" and, two, "The court lacked 
Jurisdiction to pass on the property rights of the litigants 
herein, " 

On November J, 1941, plaintiff filed her amended complaint 
for divorce, in which she alleged that the defendant had been guilty 
of extreme and repeated cruelty toward her, in that: On Augustl5^ 
1941, he, without cause, struck her about the body violently, in- 
juring her and bruising herj that on September 23^ 1941, defendant, 
without cause, struck her about the body violently, injuring her 
and bruising her| that on September 24, 1941, he threatened her 
with physical violence; that on October 27, 1941, he, without 



;o w£^mz nam im<i . : 

\ V > *v 

: /i'miao sHt^^ip iioiKi^o miT 0SiH!svijaa ^lAJsaoa aoiTsu^ ;^®i 

^'.■;:. ; ; rf^ fiioil eXssqqjs JnaJbneleG tjiol3 
■$ss.Mfi&S. o exld' Xi»»qq<s .ixs QV ©lo'iocf bari taofcXoa ©vsri o. 

Xjaeqqjo ©lit iisJyox!d-I:a ^i)9^nBffi©i «eiJBO srii Ijns 6eai9V9*t^»cf ©u^ovjt^ 

JHioq owT .S-^^X ^?X y'^'Q^'^^'^' ^o ^6f>io eric? mot:! waUi ewr 

■ ,>,. ■ :. iflo* ^isjSc? nolcfn&cffloo -i-tsrfcf lo iioqqsji: ni bealai 

ficji:-. Y.wopriJ-KO^t eifT" ^ono jljeei6V3*i ©cf ^X-^C..: ^ 

asXioil ^i aa ^xjsXoillueaJt toaaenitlv onri i9d 

cfflsfea&^fi d-isffci" i^eTSof) arid- fli anihni't b o^fsru oj- ^ii;oo. XBiicf sxlct- 

&di ba& "^bB^' v-^Xej^io bs^tseqen: fcnii ecisid'xs lo x^Xlx/g 2.yw 

basfi&isX i^iiK)D ST??'' .^ ^ i , ■ I'.yii'iims bn& seXiil" bsw x'i<^tRX^89d' bl&t 

a^CiSSij 1. ^-J-isqoiq ond" no eai;q o:f noWoifealii;t 

o'jiiiiXqmoo b&ba&OL^ i&d telil ^'ii^nlaXq ^X•^^X ^cl i9<Sm&v6% nO 

tlli/^ j6l©0cf fefii-l :)-n'^bnelf>b esflJ- cJ-sri^- feejeXXjj exle xioXiiw nX ^sonovlb lol 

^\;Xj-2j^i;/v . ;. liict nx ^i&ii bi&vroS x^Xoi;io b9;tBsq»« fixis ameii'xs lo 

~ ^'rl:^a.elQt-7 Y-'O^ nj\i-.;iwwfg -rwri jlaxfi^a ^eexrao ctworid^Xw ^exi ^X-^^X 

^■jdr.tn9l9b ^X-r-,. ^.. iscfjneiqsS iio i»ti:f {'xerl SJiXoXi/icJ biauj isxi gniixit 

■},nli!ila): ^xX-'i^xt?. Xoiv xhod srW Jxrocfa t&d iDxriic ^oaiiBO ;tiroxi;f±fr 

ief{ bsiio^t ^-.©'idu '->f! ,.^^^I 4-^:.", iPCfro:J:if n rto -J^l:} ii»d gfliejtwid biw 

j-ijorictl-.-' ,9x: ... .. . , -^f \'-, -^.r'^jofv IsolsYdq riiXir 


cause, struck her about the arm and thrust her roughly aside, Ieb- 
Jurlng and bruising her. On the same day that the amended com-, 
plaint was filed defendant filed his answer, in which he denied 
that he had been guilty of the acts of cruelty charged in the 
complaint, and at the same time the parties filed a written 
stipulation that the cause be set down for an immediate hearingj 
aisd still upon the same day, the cause came on for hearing before 
Judge Sabath, Defendant was represented by Attorney Bryant, who 
has taken no part in this appeal. Plaintiff testified that she 
separated from defendant; that he struck her on September 23, 194-1, 
and struck her again on October 27* 194-1, and that on each of these 
occasions she gave him no cause to strike her. She also testified 
that he was cruel to her at other times. Her testimony as to the 
said acts of cruelty was corroborated by two witnesses. Defend- 
ant's counsel did not cross— examine plaintiff nor either of her 
witnesses. Defendant offered no evidence in rebuttal, ^Ihlle 
plaintiff was upon the stand the following occurred: "Q, You 
have entered into an agreement with your husband vdiereby the real 
estate at 7530 Kedvale Avenue, Skokie, is to be awarded to him, 
subject to all liens and incumbrances, and you are to quit-claim 
all right, title and interest in and to that property and he Is 
to pay you the sum of One Thousand dollars in settlement of your 
interest} three hundred dollars in cash, which you acknowledge 
receiving in open court, and the remaining Seven Hundred dollars 
payable at the rate of Fifty dollars a month? A, Yes, Q. The 
household furniture is to be awarded to you also? A, Yes, Q* 
You are waiving all claims for alimony, attorney's fees and court 
costs? A, Yes, Q. You understand if you waive your claims now, 
you cannot change yotir mind- later? A, Yes, Q, You are waiving 
all claims against him except the Seven hundred dollars balance 

of the Thousand dollars? A. Right*" Defendant's counsel did not 

"Maioo &'fe£inefi!s ©xJd' ;Jafii ^Bh '^9ff,?t qM oD ^n&d ^l&JtMid baa 'gatitsl 

i©.te©£» Mi rioJixiW ci- ^iS'W? ':>9lll d-nssnelsl) fcelll g&w itnlslq 

tsfJl^ssii ©ctBifcewjtei ■'■-'" TT^Qh Jo8 ©d ssjLfflo ed^ :isidi noiislsitiliz 
'.QlBd 'gaiiErri TO**: '-C F.iyet. --x-L^ 4"S;sb bsobb biH aoqs lll:tz baa 

^ds ,-J >!:}• JbeMir^SF.t 'lllj&hmSi ♦iij^qcj^s 8 Mi Hi #asq on n3:iB:t sari 
ti*'-; t- i-ccfrxjr: •d jloc'iis ^r! ctsrl;^ {iaj3£)ns'ls& coil fcsiBTCsqse 

■-;•.'::<• lo r': ' :6£lJ "Dna- ^Ih^l ^ . i;."50 jho aIssb i?id jCocrriB bns 

, ::? «!^*lr'«^^ oz .; _ on xffiif svflg eriS' ftHoJtasotxD 

v,vn:.-;.i.uv. ..«,i„,u :.:'■' •--••<, i®mQexi& an oirtt bQT,9ia@ &9sd 

II ov , -r- - .r.tiUOd'X. ©flO lO BiJJ8 odi vo\ x&q oi 

s""' , , ■— ^' "i-floffi s a'Xsilot --'■".r 'to e^B^ sifi ^b eldsxsq 

■'■-'- bsMfiwe -u oj sJt eiuoiriiirt 5Ioil©exJod 

' f^Xi^.omllB ic1 aalfilo Xla ^nlvlBw 9ts iroY 

(...:. "■ 5na^si9£)£U!- jsoY »p ,e&Y ,A vcieoo 

i:Oi£ii;JLsd ;:i£iIj.j„; .e'ii>ranri nevo® sjid" iqeoxs ittjCii ietflssB awislc IIb 


examine plaintiff in reference to her statement as to the agree- 
ment between the parties, nor did he intimate to the court in any 
way that the statement of plaintiff as to the agreement was not 
correct. Upon the following day the following decree was entered: 

"This cause coming on to be heard upon the plaintiff «s 
amended complaint, and the answer thereto of the defendant, and 
upon the stipulation of the parties hereto, by their respective 
attorneys, that this cause might come on for an immediate hearing, 
and the plaintiff appearing in her own proper person and by Harry 
X, Cole, her attorney, and the defendant appearing by James R, 
Bryant, his attorney, and the court having heard the testimony 
of the witnesses duly sworn and examined in open court, and upon 
other evidence offered by plaintiff in support of her complaint 
(a certificate of which evidence having been duly signed and sealed 
is filed herein and made a part hereof), and the court having heard 
the arguments of counsel for the respective parties, and being fullj 
advised in the premises. Doth Finds 

"That it has jurisdiction of the parties hereto and the sub- 
ject matter hereof j that the plaintiff is and since prior to the 
filing of said complaint has been an actual resident of Cook County, 
and has been a residsnt of the State of Illinois for over one whole 
year next before the filing of the complaint herein j that the par- 
ties hereto were lawfully joined in marriage on or about tbs 30th 
day of November, 1935* at Chicago, Illinois; that no children were 
born of the said marriage; that subsequent to their intermarriage 
the defendant had been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty toward 
plaintiff, on to-wits the 23rd day of September, 1941, and on 
to-wlt: the 27th day of October, 1941, as alleged in plaintiff's 
amended complaint, 

"The court further finds that the parties hereto are the 

holders of title in Joint tenancy to the home formerly occupied by 
the parties hereto at 7530 Kedvale, Skokie, Illinois, subject to 

ib4ii!>ia® asm ©®"i»sb sElwoXXol ©j^ ^sfe gntwoIXol edj- aoqU »;tos^ioo 
a^'iliuJ-fflisIvi f?il? iio<|j/ fex?and ed pi no sjolaroo sewso aidT" 
Im^ ^:iiisiHJiil9b ed;t to o;t9«ed^ Tceweas 9il;f ba& ^^txilslqiao© fieficems 

. ■. SDM»^/^ s^i'lsoqcis ^n«bfr©"J»& ecj^: 64* ^'^aa'JEoi.te "Sad ^'eioS \;X 
•\sa!Q«il^g=»^,js»Xitv? Ai&sri goitsil .^"luoff ••i^ -JbnB ,Y3in[o^,tfl eidl ^cfflS^H 

-dug .&iiw /.a.. Jv . .. 0.. ....J... ^„.-. s>xtt lo flOxuglbaiitf^ e«rf :M d'srif" 

'*xl* o;f lol-fci ©aaie bnB 2I lli^Hlalq arid- d-erf- {losuaji idc^^Bx:! ^ost 

»Xoiiv? esui iQvc •• 1 '■ .--//r ' -s^s^a eitt lo d-iicbi:8«a Ji aescf sjsii tna 
^'iBq &d^ iBxi; ■ ' "ri giUtXil ftiicJ' eiolecf -^fXMC i,3?nj 

T^'. -'■/ ii4»*il)XJL£io on dfyji.? ^exofxlIXI ^oi^soMO ia <^£^1 ^i»rfiB»voH lo'Y«b 

9:gal%im3i'iBiGl tl^di oi :fii&sp&B^ac i:M3 xei^aliitm Mfl8 edi lo aiocf 

SBWoct -^rc^Xowio bsJ-Bsqei jbus Mi&i^xo lo ■^^XJtirs Ji«acr l>«ri c^flaljii©lsb ariJ 

.ij f'n;3 ^I-;9I ^i»tfiii»;fq©o lo -x&b b^^ ftl(i t^Xw-o* no ,llltfalsXq 

^ ■ L-jr[i*.Uq ai ijagsiXii U£ ,X-^(?X ^i9cJb*oO lo ^sfi dJ-^S ©if;* j;ti-*-o:f 

X^ f>e'lqraoo xXioaiiol aaofi ^sU oi -^oaans;? ;tniot ai •liii lo strafcXori 


mortgage executed by the parties heretoj that plaintiff has posses- 
sion of the household furniture formerly used by the parti®s heretoj 
that defendant has possession of the Packard automobile j that plain- 
tiff has been employed during her married life and has contributed 
to the purchase of the aforementioned realty, 

"The court further finds that plaintiff is now employed and 
is selfsupporting, 

"The court further finds that the parties hereto have entered 
into a settlement of their respective property rights under the terms 
of which defendant will pay One Thousand ($1,000,00) Dollars to plains 
tiff for her interest in the said realty, to be paid $300,00 cash 
and Fifty ($50,00) Dollars per month in fourteen (14) consecutive 
monthly installments j that the realty at 7530 Kedvale, Skokie, 
Illinois, will be awarded to defendant, subject to all liens and 
encumbrances, plaintiff to execute quit claim deed to defendant of 
her interest in said realty, and defendant to indemnify plaintiff 
against any claims or demands on mortgage, notes, or other documents 
executed by her on said realty, or other indebtedness incurred by the 
parties hereto on said realtyj that the household furniture formerly 
used by the parties hereto will be awarded to plaintiff j and that the 
plaintiff will waive all claims against defendant for alimony, attor- 
ney's fees and court costs, 

"The court further finds that the said agreement is fair and 
reasonable and the court approves of the terms of said agreement* 

"On motion of said attorney for plaintiff, it is therefore 
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, and this court by virtue of the power 
and authority therein vested, and the Statute in such case made and 
provided, doth Order, Adjudge and Decree, that the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing between the plaintiff, Dorothy E. Thorne, and 
the defendant. Solve E, Thorne, be, and the same are hereby dissolved, 
and the same are dissolved accordingly, 

"It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that defendant 

\oisi^ii a^tiii^^q ;9di xdi besu xli§imit)J siwJiiiiifl blotl&zjjoii edS 1o aola 
-rijrslq .;*ari^ ?. 9litJieirioit«« frisiIOB^I slid' lo aoleaesaojq asxl jHj8fiit©l:©D ;tBxIJ^ 

.X^I^®i bf^fioiJ^xt&ffiOTto'is ©its' It) ©Rfirio'mq edi o;t 
fees irr^Itl^s won zl "IJiSRl&lq cf^cr ebisil nadd-ixrl cfni/oo exxT" 

^a^»#£t« Htm od-siegri es^irlisq erld' jsiit sMll ^ESXIitTorl ^«»o «I1:" 

lliJ-atsiq Tja^tflM^^'^-T'-i o* oJXsJbxifiyti^fc baa. ,v^X^«a /sixjc xxX *E3^«JilX lail 

-u-^sijaooi) I'irid-o 10 ^asd'oti ^,»a«3;ht&a m) sbti&aBb 10 amlisXo y^^ ttialK^B 

«^ ifd i>©i%£/oajt aBS«Mtt<Jet&nl '£«d^<s> %o ^Tfd-Xasi f>lBS no. igxI Tf^^ feo^tnoexs 

■^ii&s^rol »tu?v}-1h^.jj1 blQde&iiod &d^ iesli {X^l&st btaa no oiei^d Bel&iaq 

£i0'i»*rs>fi* a± ;JfX ^mi-ui&lq loJ xsaro^iSi Mbe lo aoiJ'oai uO* 

^svroq ^xfd" l:o airtniv iSEcf .1'ijiroo eiald" ferra ^t>©!n'i5©G bas be^bulbk ^b&tab'sO 

JcflAi ©foflM ©efio fi©iJ2 ttl &^jy^sd-S «5ricS- £«£ ^f)9*S9v aieis/l^ X^i^Oii;tj:;s baa 

^^ottLtictasj lo eJbaocf art;? Saiii ,9®iS9G £>«£, s^jfijtft^ifc ^ttsfc^K) diob ^bobtvovi 

rtts ^'iiioilT .S vdJo'ioQ ^llid-flXfiXq sitt iX9«w^©tf aaij^elx© diolod-sisri 

l>9vXoealfc Y<^9^®'«i ••!» ©flffia erij ban ^sd ^scsorfT ,Jt ff?Xoa ^JtnaJbnslsJb Qdi 


shall pay to plaintiff, for her interest in the aforementioned 
realty, the sum of One Thousand ($1,000,00) Dollars, to be paid 
Three Hundred ($300«00) Dollars immediately upon the entry of 
this decree, receipt of said $300,00 having been acknowledged in 
open court, and the balance of Seveh Hundred ($700,00) Dollars to 
be paid in fourteen (14) monthly installments of Fifty ($50.00) 
Dollars each, first payment to be due December 5th, 194'1« 

"It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that plaintiff 
be and she is hereby forever barred from asserting any claims against 
defendant for alimony, past present or future, 

"It Is further Ordered, Ad;Judged and Decreed, that plaintiff 
be and she is hereby barred from any claims against defendant for 
attorney's fees and court costs incurred up to the entry of this 

"It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that In the 
event plaintiff is compelled to seek 4he aid of this court In en- 
forcing the terms of this decree, the court shall reserve jurisdic- 
tion for the purpose of allowing to plaintiff a reasonable sua as 
and for her attorney's fees^ costs and suit moi^y* 

"It Is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that leaTe be 
and the same herelly is given to plaintiff to resume her maiden name 
of Johnson* 

"It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that defendant 
be and he hereby Is ai?arded the realty at 7530 Kedvale, Skokle, 
Illinois, otherwise described as follows: [Here follows legal 
description of the property] subject to all liens and encumbrances, 
and plaintiff is Ordered to execute quit claim deed to defendant of 
her interest in said realtyj and it is further Ordered that defend- 
ant shall indemnify plaintiff against any claims or demands on 
mortgage, notes, or other documents executed by her on said realty, 

or other indebtedness incurred by the parties hereto on said realty, 
"It Is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed tliat plaintiff 


hlMi ©tf oi ^^ft&llod (90,C0G^X$) bUfeiuao/li' e«e. to uafz edi ^xSIb&i 

C0<J,^^$) t*m "So ficMs©iSiXI«^aaJ: tjXiIJ-ikwb (l»i) ii€9:^i»ot nX tlsq ©rf 

1E;5i;J-£j:JUIq cffijrii fes(*^^>sa Ms fe«sl>irtM ^aa^afe'sO lacW-siylt Ri cl-p 
enl&SB B&xsl* ^iia ar£i::ti?Ess fiK>njl fc»,i!raif Tsvs'fol ■\:tf«'j9ri 8i ads £aiB scf 

t^iiiaJtfilq ^*iri^ ^.£99T0oe |?G6 b&^!mtbA ^^-j^fciO ^eitfij/l Bl^t*' 

Sl/IJ '^■O V"!.;-,*-^ ;VT.- . ' r^'Woal sir* tun i-riKir, ijctr, ft^ioT- *: » vpri«i0^d"i8 

sa^ xi.: - ^„. D36i!£>«>a £3iM£ i)9g&if^LA ^ta^iifiiQ ^sdiiifl &!■ il^* 

-a© ft£ ^.axfpp aJbrl^ to hl& &^& 2l©«je o^ ri^XIaqaioD ai TiiJalfiXq -^ridva 

- tBsJtfJui; sT^easi XX£i{8 ^w&S) sxfd'' ^-soaioab 8Jtri;j lo eflra-e-t ed^J" snlciol 

a: s}-'"^ r.rrt>.,.-.or,., -.- ""iii^xiiisXfi o;J gxiJbfroXXii lo saoqiirq cdcJ- lol cold" 

♦ ;,H.uvii^ ^^« fi!fi& aJ^aoo ^sesl a'xs'niocfd'fi ^©fi •sol baa 

- tr-v i ^;.9e'SSo<l f>fiB feegfejM^bl ^i>8rrebiO *i«d^iPl ai :tl" 

tSoznHoJ. lo 

i'.-sr-nsitij jijiij Doe"i09'v- i:5nii De3P/if,DA ^&f»*i©b«iO •jGdiirl ci ^I" 
r ^9i3fo?f.a ^elij-yJioS 0?^^ ;tfi ■\f;fXa©^ t^ifcf beL^swa nl Xcfeisii ©ri fen,* 9cf 
Xi'Titl '^'■?oIXol gJisK] t^woXXol- afi fie^diegob eaJtvri0rf,^o ^sloniXXI 

lo o^fiBiiLslafe oj &«0fc fiiljsXs :tii;p ®;tjyo«xe o* fjd-xsfctO ei llicJ-nXaXq fsis 

-»I>n«l«l» isiid- LatebrrO ^edcJij;;! el tl !«£- jSifa-Xcei J&iisa nl d'ssie.tni laii 

no sfcaaBef)- 10 afsXelo xiS'S-i^aiiliiaa lll-d'flJtssX<;r -^Imzebal. XXiSde ;:fnfl 

Xaoi £>Xfi2 060 T&il x^f f>»^£K)Sx» SiJ^iitdi'jKJQiof. 'i^rid-© no ^asd-ou ^osagiioiD 

,lj;tlii©'x feist fio od-j-iteri B^Xd^iBq «£■:?• xtf &9trjj?0Kl aaeitf*®:^^^^! *ieri:^o 10 
icfittjslq ctSi :i f)©sit»£!G i)i3fi fo»gbi;tM ^baiefe-iO isdS'Ufi zl &1^ 

be gtiiidi she hereby is awarded the household furniture formerly used 
by the parties hereto as husband and wife. 

"It is further Ordered Adjudged and Decreed, that, other than 
aforementioned, all and singular the rights of each of the parties 
hereto arising into and against the property of the other of eyeary 
kind, nature and description, real personal and mixed, wheresoever 
situated, both personally owned and in which each of them now has 
any beneficial interest or hereafter acquired by each of them, ia- 
cluding all household goods and furnishings now in the possession 
of either of the parties hereto shall cease and determine from and 
after the entry of this decree, and that neither of the parties 
hereto shall hereafter have any claim of right, title or interest 
of any kind, in, to and against the property of the other from and 
after the entry of the decree, including all inchoate rights of 
dower, curtesy, homestead or other interest of either party in and 
to the property of the other arising by virtue of the marriage of 
the parties hereto or otherwise, and including all contractual or 
property rights now existing between the parties hereto, either by 
virtue of the marriage or hy virtue of any contractual or other re*- 
lationship whatsoever," 

Counsel for defendant made no objection of any kind to the 
provisions in the decree, and it is perfectly clear from the record 
that defendant, at the time in question, was satisfied with the 
decree and the "hurry-up method" in which the cause was tried and 
determined. Ko appeal was taken from the decree^ 

For some reason, not disclosed by the record, defendant, 
sometime after the entry of the decree, became dissatisfied with 
it. In defendant's petition, filed January 19, 1942, and his 
affidavit in support of the same, he alleged that the evidence for 
plaintiff as to her charge of cruelty was insufficient under the 

law for a finding by the court that he had been guilty of extreme 
and repeated cruelty, and he further charged that the testimony of 

ttB^ts xXi^tnof ^ix/j^Jtis-ii'^ felodscuoff »d^ fc&fciflW* «lf "xda^sd arfe ba& stf 

R.ri^ io£C#o ^d^fjdJ^ ,6-?>©'xc»<I ftKii begfeytSiA heisbrO i^isHivl ei ;tl" 

-iti^ ©rfi "5:0 xfoHe lo sc^rialn 9fLt isXnsiils fens lis ^bsaottnsm.e^o'iB 

••sv©oad^&jdw ,6s>x±«r baa IjaBo^isq Ia®i ^nold^qlioedb fefiis eruKtan ^bcJbI 
oiid won atciij ^.o ftose rfoirfw ni bne b^tvno vIIsnosTsq xWocf ,6»:f,sjyj'le 

-ill ^tsBd^i to rfDBC* t^ 60ilup3B isilasieri 10 J8ei«;tfll Xal^Henaef xna 
aolHfr^aaoq »r?if rrl wort BsxLbisifiijil haa afcoo^ &XofJa8iforl 1X« snibxrlo 

haa iRO^l ^niitti&^sf} £>ctfl «8ftS3 il&ds: otri9ii esi^fiBq ©ricf lo i«ti&l& lo 

r^is moil tmi&o siif to ■? T's«fltdi(| 9ri;t c^eilissii fcna at ^n± ^6aJW xfl^ ^o 

lo e^risti 9iiAQdoni. Ll^. ^albsjiortl ^esiosb exld- 5o xi^ns 9d& isltl* 

"nfi «± Tfj-ifiq i9jtf;ti:^ to ;tes'r©;tHi isxl^o 10 frflsjaeaoii ^^es^fij/o ^limob 

iO »sei'5's«af Qif>t lo ^u^tiy ^ Sala Itb t^riio <wl^ Jo Tji-trsqoiq «itt o,t 

to Isij'd oBi^tffoy lis gnlfiirX&flJ: fviH ,98Jriiri»ff;to 10 od-s'iori aai^isq srf^ 

Xo T.Bd&3:& ^oi?>isti S9iv-i»q 9rf# nst9w:t9rf jnlizixs woit aWgli -^vi^inqoiq 

-01 'xsrld^o TO IsjjJ-o,6^:feos ijas to sftfiti'v xd 10 egslTiBS ari;^ lo sj^tIv 

" . levees^tariw qJtdeaoloBl 

ari:}- o* Isoiai xr:j3 lo jaoi;J03tcfo ok sJbsai d-ajbaalcf) •rol IseueoO 

btooQ'i erid tssoil -xselo xI;to; l^eq al ;tJ: l)na ^asiosJb ©rid' nl anolejtvoiq 

Slid- ri.t.fcw bs>jtle±*e8 8bw ,«K3i;fa«fp iii ael^ ©fl;:r is ^:tasbae1<^b i&d:f 

baa b^tii 3 •aw etwio onJ- dsht^ at "bt&fft9« qij-xi'^-wrf" ©ri;* £oc ?»^j>eb 

^oeiosb erij- fiio«rl a©il«d' ejgw Xsoqqs oil . bs^aieresd'sb 

^;)'crfibfi«>lefe ^bioo^i &sii ^frf baeoIsBlli ion ^noase^ snoa 10T 

ilctiw bollistj^.aeifc e>fflBo»cf ^sstosfe ©xf;t lo x*i*ne 9rf;t 'lojtle scjtrfeaoa 

aJtrl bns ,S4^^I ^^I tifii'«»X. biRXll ^«oJ::ticf0q e'.trtHfcaBlob al ,1fl 

10I essasbl-v© er{;t iadii b«s»XIfi'9ri ^.aftsa €>il5 lo ;t'soqque al *ivsblllfi 

9ff* Tisbmj ^ttslDilltrajsl e^w -^irX^BTii) 1» es^ad© T®rf oit as lli^tnlflXq 

»fcstd-X9 lo Xsfltv^ aoBc bed sri i&di :f*UBo» ©ri:t ^^ sci^^-t'i b ^ol wsX 
o ^ifioai:}eei Bsit Saat b^^it^o r^>{l&lMt ed bas .Y^Xs^rio b«d'fisqdi bn£ 


plaintiff and her witnesses as to the alleged acts of cruelty was 
"false and untrue," Plaintiff filed an answer to the petition, 
denying the charges of defendant. 

Plaintiff contends that at the time of the filing of the 
petition to vacate the decree more than thirty days had elapsed 
since the entry of the decree, and, therefore, the court no longer 
had jurisdiction to vacate the decree. This contention is a 
meritorious one. It has been repeatedly held ths^t after a term 
of court has expired, the court has no authority to vacate, amend 
or modify a decree except as to matters of form and after notice to 
the opposite party, and the Civil Practice Act of I933 substitutes 
a thirty-day period in place of a term of court, (See Sc hmahl v,. 
Aurora Nat»l Bankj 3II 111, App, 228, 233, Other cases to the 
same effect might be cited.) In an effort to evade the effect of 
this rule defendant alleged that the testimony of plaintiff and her 
witnesses as to the acts of cruelty ¥/as false and untrue. Even 
if the petition could be considered as a motion in the nature of 
a writ of error coram nobis . the allegations that the testimony as 
to cruelty was false and untrue would avail defendant nothing. In 
Conw ay v. Gill. 257 111, App, 606, we held that a writ in the iiature 
of a ivrit of error cor am nobis will not lie for the giving of alleged 
false testiiaony at the trialj that where a Judgment has been ob- 
tained through fraud such fact constitutes a sufficient reason for 
vacating the judgment after the term in v/hich it isras rendered, but 
that "the fraud, however, must be a fraud comnltted by one of the 
parties on the court and not the perjury of a witness," (p. 6l2,) 
Defendant states in his petition and in an affidavit in support of 

it that he was not present at the hearing of the cause before Judge 

Sabath, but he admits that Attorney Bryant represent him in the 

proceeding and upon that occasion. The certificate of evidence 

was made a part of the decree and filed in tha cause with the decree, 
and defendant had full opportunity to read the same. He does not 

_ .iol;t£j©;Jnoo sMf ,&&i9&b &d^ a^f^DBT oi noW»lbeii.ut bad 

z isd-ls isxi^ fefsii ^Xfeo;i»»^6i £ts»tf Bad cJI .sno aifoJtio;tJta8jB 

iiiOii^. ,3;j.fioi;v OCT x^-Jt^oiiorB oa ajEd itituos sii^ ^fcaiiqxs asri i'mo^ to 

•'7 ooijos T:©d-1;& fcxiR ffls^ol le eiectd^s© oi e« ctqeexs ©enoet £ xlibofii to 

*SLj^f5^§f. '■^"" , '-5'.'^ -^o m'lB^ - : -^ oocj/- est- j^ii&q "^alMCC^ liijU" « 
»rl3 o:? ee-. ;. ,;,.£S ,8£^ . ,h- •— **c t^^^^^J^ I*Jgg g^i»A 

-■-fl i'y^ tliiiilBiG Iv v..u^^i-j-v. :.;;v,j .riw or. -s--'--ftt ctas^e^eb elui sid^ 

lo »'wiBn ■ "'■' - •■ ;:-^ ••iuti.-a!j-j t>d fcXi/©© ttoj:J-l;tfeq ©rid' tJt 

ttl ,3x1!.; jo.i ..•nj3tesl9£) rifiv.'s feliiow earinu bim ot.lal zum x^louto oi 

ei£r;J-iiit erf,^ ni " loii aw ^^Oo ,qq'' .III ^$S ^IIIO .V Y# » irrioO 

i)©8»IXiJ "So selvj:;^ 0-.-U '10" ' .a -IlJtw c^Cioa psios ^*ri?< lo &It!? & lo 

lol Jioasot ;fKsi»l?tif£ iS ae:fiir:Ji;?«MK>c ;f«>sl /ioi/c feiaail xlai/oidc^ !)6isJta;t 

DxiJ- lo ??no x<^ be^itmoo hjs&'it s e<d atssm ^'isvswojd ^fiiTBil ©dcf" .t&ad- 
(.SX^ ,q) '♦,as«nd-±w o lo XTrr^ieq e>d& tim ta& oiifoo ailcf no aeio'isq 

©Sfcrl «^ol«<J GeeB» srfd" It) 3Ai:i«,o*i ©ii;^ i& iasz-eiq :io£i tsv &d i&dJ i± 

©sjKoi^lv? lo ^aotlli'ieo .aoiRnooo t^iii aoqtr bnB gnibseDOiq 

t98'i»e£) esi^ iliU'w fe^auBo criJ a$. belli ba& B»^o&b sdi lo i'x&^ b »*>^ «^ 
3oti zs>Qb «)E .©iBia Qild- |*»rx oJ i^jJ lixccfioqQO Iliirl fwui ia&bnolBb hOB 

— 8— 

state when he first saw the certificate nor doss he allege that 

he did not know that the decree was entered on November 6, 1941 » 

Fo charge is made that Attorney Bryant failed to protect defendant's 

rights in the cause, Sven if we had the right to consider point 

one, we would hold that there is no merit in it* 

As to point two: This would appear to be an afterthought, 
as the point was not made in the petition. However, in the proceed- 
ings before the chancellor it clearly appeared that a settlement 
had been made between the parties as to alimony, attorney's fees 
and property rights, and the decree specifically finds that the 
parties entered into a settlement of their respective property 
rights, and the provisions in the decree respecting said rights 
are all in accordance with the agreement that plaintiff testified 
had been made. The trial court had a right to assume from the 
testimony given as to the agreement and the attitude of defendant's 
attorney in respect thereto that the parties had agreed upon their 
rospective property rights, and the decree entered in regard there- 
to was, therefore, a decree hy consent, (See Cpnsaer v. vyisniewskij 
293 111* APP* ?29,) As stated in that case (p, 532): "* * * where 
an attorney is the counsel of record for a client, his agreement in 
the conduct and management of the litigation must be considered as 
the agreement of his client, aiid if any of his acts are without 
sufficient authority as betv/een him and his client the remedy of 
the client is against the counsel," We must not be understood, 
however, as intimating that we tliink there is the slightest ground 
for complaint by defendant against Attorney Bryant, Mr» Bryant, 
heard, without comment, the testimony in respect to the property 
agreement and made no statement to the court in reference to the 
same» If there had been no such agreement made between the parties 
it would have been the duty of Mr, Bryant to so inform the court. 
The trial court had a right to assume from Mr. Bryant's silence 
that the testimony in respect to the property agreement was true. 

♦X*^I t<^ isctaevov loefe fnii isdi ytotxA ;foa fc±fe »x{ 

' tiBGL on Bi eiwii' ^sxlj cloil Miiow »w ^©no 

»c09ooi:q ex: «fiol*±d'»q sdcl^ at ioa esw ;tixloq siLi zb 

es&' ^ aslcf'ijsq »iW" fl9«ir:ted »b«in need Jbari 

a;3-illl' ■ iilio&qzei »9ir:.9B''®iA:!t ul Ejaolalvoriq -srfc^ has ^8.tit3Jti 

lt&iXlB.i Sa&ei&BX^k ®di dit'K asuBbiotiOB al Lis »ib 

»dS Bioi"! oJ jiislT: & bod -^'jjsoo l&i%i €>rfT ,9bsa xxeacf bjcri 

usee®! .tj^i:ld"3 ©fid' bnfi jn^wnee^s &d.i oS zb flsvJts X«oalJe»d^ 

ite^i aoqa b&^iy^ isq »il;f &s^S o^fsieri* ^oeqaei hI teaio^:fs 

©'xoiii^i- . I'ffSiii'i bA (.^^ .qq^ .III £^ 

i-xi&fii©6iS£ Ei/i ^ifiHxio B ool £>'iEOS»i lo Ic»ax;oc &d:) tt X'^^'^^^^" ^^^ 

wblaao urn. uolS&'^liil ari^ ^c rfuftiaegBXifija bOB :^ot!biioo ^di 

^aosiil ^ ^.l©lIs Bid lo ;j£ie«&8i3JB sn'^t 

lo ■^I>OB2'i siiij d-fff»i:Js aiw f-ajs mM «&©v<:J9(i as •^JtTiOxWjafii d"Jioioillii8 

^bco;}aieb .leamioD eii^ j^eolBS* aJt tn^iJo 9tii 

ix/eig J'a«-:tfCs(J J: i£ji^ sLnliSvt !9w stadW jfll^BiaiJnx ^ vswoil 

^d-iii5Xi , .ip.B'^'Xif "^«~fT"K>.t5A ^8alss« ^-flBfefielsb "^cf iflifiiqiBOO TtOl 

•^^J-isqortq sdJ oJ .Icsqv (^o3!-t^a«c^ 9£iS ^insiataoo :fi«DriJ^l'.T ^AiB©ri 

i«iJ- oS ©anaif'tft'T at :j-ij»c:. .tsiss^a^a on ^fcaa: fine cJ-noffissagB 

esid-'iaq 3>i!^ asswd-f^cf f>5B.w ;trt?='c;f*'?'i«;S doj:;e on aeed b&d eiedi 11 .MJBe 

.tvj L.' sdd" flrao". .rdl lo x^nJb edi ao9d evAri bluow &1 

(See Joslyn v. Joslyn, 31? 111. App, IbO.) PurtheriF.ore, Mr, 
Bryant made no objection to any of the provisions in the decree. 
The defendant^ in his petition, did not deny that he paid the 
$300, the receipt of which was acknowledged by plaintiff in open 
court. It is significant that Mr. Bryant has telcen no part in 
this appeal. 

The decretal order of the Superior court of Cook county 
of January I9, 1942, is affirmed, 

mcw.TkL ord':r of January 

19, 1942, AFFIR^Dt 
Sullivan, P. J,, and Friend, J,, concur. 



October Term, A. D. 194-2 




Missouri Pacific Railroad 
Company, a Corporation, 


ston;b, j. 


/'Defendant-Appellant J'^N. 

Appeal from the 
City Court of the 
City of E4st St, 
[ia( 1 11 


Plaintiff-appellee brought this action for damages 
under the Federal Employers' Liability A.ct against the defendant- 
appellant, in the City Court of East St. Louis, Illinois. His 
complaint alleged damages for personal injuries sustained at 
Poplar Bluffs, Missouri. An issue was Joined on the complaint 
and answer. A trial was had and plaintiff was awarded damages 
in the sum of $E0,000, 

Defendant-appellant appealed from said Judgment to this 
court, filing its record on such appeal on the 17th day of July, 
1941, and was given leave by rule of this court to file its 
abstract and so forth by October 8th, 1941. On September 24, 1941, 
said defendant-appellant filed herein its motion to transfer said 
cause to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, alleging 
among other things that, as appears by the record in this case, 
this is a civil case at law and did not arise within the terri- 
torial limits of the City of East St. Louis, Illinois, but instead 
at Poplar Bluff, Missouri, and consequently the City Court of the 
City of East St. Louis, was wholly v/ithout Jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of said cause for the reason that the City Court 
of the City of East St. Louis has not had Jurisdiction of the 

subject matter of the litigation conferred upon it, either by the 
Constitution of the State of Illinois or by statute, where the 
said subject matter (i. e. happening of the tort) occurred outside 
of the territorial limits of said City; that if the statute of 
the State of Illinois ("An Act in Relation to Courts of Record in 
Cities," approved May 10, 1901, in force July 1, 1901, as amended 
- Illinois Revised Statutes 1939, Chapter 37, paragraphs 333 to 
355 (a) inclusive), which confers jurisdiction to City Courts be 
construed to confer such jurisdiction of the subject matter of 
litigation wh<-)re the cause of action did not arise in the terri- 
torial limits of the city, then such statute is unconstitutional 
and void. 

That there is now pending in the Supreme Court of Illi- 
nois the cas^ of Paul W. Werner v, Illinois Central Railroad 
Company, being niimbered 25,293 - September Term, A. D. 1941. That 
said cause has heretofore been determined by this Court (309 111. 
App. 292) , and petition for leave to appeal has been allowed by 
the Supreme Court of Illinois; that after petition for leave to 
appeal was allowed, the Supreme Court of Illinois did enter r.n 
order permitting the filing of an additional brief and assignment 
of errors covering the contention that the City Court of the City 
of East St. Louis was wiiolly without jurisdiction to try said con- 
troversy because the subject matter of the litigation occurred 
outside of the territorial limits of the City of East St. Louis, 
inasmuch as the injury which was the subject matter of the litiga- 
tion occurred in Pana, Illinois. That a decision in said Werner 
case on the merits of said contention vrauld be conclusive in this 

This motion was taken under advisement by the Court and 
the time for filing of the necessary briefs, records and so forth, 
for appeal to this Court, was extended from time to time av/aiting 
the decision of V/erner v. the Illinois Central, supra, by the 

_Jw:<.^^^* -T -r^ , 

state Supreme Court. 

Said case of Vv'erner v. the Illinois Central, supra, 
having in the neantine been decided by the Suprene Court (Werner 
V. Illinois Central Railroad Co, 379 111. 559), said defendant- 
appellant on July 7, 1942, filed in this court its notion for 
leave to withdraw notion to transfer said cause to the Suprene 
Court. An extensive statenent of the cause of action, pleadings, 
suggestions, argument and so forth, is set out in said motion for 
leave to withdraw the former motion. 

On September 10, 1942, plaintiff-appellee filed in this 
court by leave hereof, his motioii to deny the motion of defendant- 
appellant for leave to v/ithdraw its motion to transfer the cause, 
and further moves the court to transfer said cause to the Supreme 

It is held in People v. O'Connor, 378, 111. 249, and 
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Westchester, 310 111. App. 
498, that under a motion to transfer a cause from an appellate 
court to the Supreme Court, under the provisions of Rule 47, Chap. 
110, P. 259.47, Illinois Revlsod Statutes, 1941, on the ground 
that a litigant has raised a constitutional question, it is the 
duty of the Appellate Court conscientiously to determine whether 
such purported question is fairly involved, and whether the Supreme 
Court has settled such question. The Supreme Court has at least 
settled the question that at the time this appeal was filed in the 
Appellate Court there was a constitutional question involved, to 
wit, the jurisdiction of the City Court of East St. Louis to try 
issues resting on causes of action occurring extra-territorially 
(Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra.). That question is no 
longer debatable. Appellant now takes the position that the con- 
stitutional question decided in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad, 
supra, is decisive of all constitutional questions raised by the 
record before us. This may or may not be so. We cannot prejudge 

what other questions will be raised in the Supreme Court going to 
the question of the trial court's jurisdiction, and the denial of 
such jurisdiction. Neither can we foreclose plaintiff-appellee 
from further argument on this subject. We do not understand that 
to be the purport of V/erner v. Illinois Central Railroad, supra. 

As we viev; this record it is of little or no consequence 
whether we deny or allow defendant-appellant's motion to vathdraw 
his original motion to transfer the cause. With or without such a 
motion, if it is plain to us that a constitutional question is 
involved in the litigation, it is our duty to transfer it to the 
Supreme Court. Whether we do it on motion of a party litigant, or 
whether we do it of the court's own m.otion is of no consequence. 

V/e are not prepared to say that Werner v. Illinois Central 
Railroad, supra, decides all constitutional questions involved, or 
whether the litigants in this case purpose to show to the court 
other reasons which render it constitutional for the trial court 
to take jurisdiction of the case at bar. 

It follov/s that we are of the opinion that this motion 
to withdraw the original motion to transfer the cause should be 
denied, and that this cause should be, and it is hereby transferred 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, as prescribed by 
the Statute in such cases made and provided. 



NOV 19 1947 


-oMfTH District of iuunoiif 







■'^' SUPK:LI0R COURT i^^^"^ 






Plaintiff Laney sued Rosenberg in tort for assaiilt and 
battery^ The cause was tried by Jury, At the cloe of all the 
evidence defendant moved for an ineiruction in his favor, which 
wag denied. The Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff with 
damages assessed at ^10^000* Defendant made a motion for Judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which wt s deniedi and a motion for a 
new trial, which was also denied upon plaintiff ent'-ring a 
remittitur of #3,000, The court entered judgment for plaintiff in 
the sum of $7,000, and defendant appeals* 

It is contended for reversal the Judgment is manifestly 
against the evidence; the verdict the result of papsion and prej- 
udice caused by the hostile attitude of the trial court j the amount 
of the verdict excessive, and that the court erred in instructions 
to the Jury and in rulings on the evidence. 

Defendant was a dealer in second-hand automobiles, his place 
of business at 2525 South State Street in Chicago, where he had a 
used car lot. Plaintiff Lancy, with his partner, wiichael Rizzo, 
was in the business of raising chickens at 5248 South New 
England Avenue* About December 17, 1938, he purchased from 
defendant a 1931 Cadillac car at the price of $75,00, He had a 
1931 Auburn which he traded in and for which he was allow d Sl5. 
The balance of the purchase price was to be paid at the rate of 
|7,00 every two weeks and the payments ?7ere financed by the 
Universal Mortgage Corporation. Plaintiff for one reason or another 

W^moO XCCD ( •?ftAjy:©qqA 

Bdi Lift to aoXo erit -JA ^X'^^i "0 l)9i't* esw 98U«o sxlT ,x''f^***<^ 

iioidw ,107 si «i£! nx iicicfstr^iani a« rro^ b&voa iaBbmatsb 9oaeblv9 

d^iv Itlinl&lq lol ^olbivw a besrtvtB^ X^^l ^d1 mbelnsb saw 

iaem-gbul tol nol^om x. Bb»m d'na&nolsQ ^QOO^OL^ i& fcaaasaaB mv%fm&b 

a tot ticl'iois. b &«ft ^bslfisib e ^^w rioiriw ^jfoib^ev sriJ anlbnB^tarl^lwJon 

B anlTr>:ta9 l^ljnialq noqw feainafc oalji bbw rioiaw tlBii;^ wsfi 

ni ItiinisiLq^ id ^neffl§ft0f, bsisi-ne ituco sriT ♦000,5?? lo •xu;fi;t3-lffl9i 

«els«qqjs ;?n»f)nol:9b fina ,000e?!| to bu/b sriJ 

iCX3"8 9^ifla£n ai :fn?»H!sin/(, silJ^ Xj88"f9V9i lot iefiite^noo el JI 

-(,^iq .6116 nolQ'^Bq lo ;tlx/«!=!i eri^ *oX£»i^v exi;t ;8an'5l)Iye ari;^ inalae;^ 

JiTwomfl aricT jcTiuco Xjsit* Qiio 'to eSu^MJcJ-B oXld-aoil edd- \d Jbeauao soIJSui 

ancl^oi/ivTaiii ni Jbamo Jiuoo sd^T d'arid' fins ^svleaf^oxs 5oXi«©v f^rid" ^o 

♦ 9on9&lY9 Qxi^t no 8S-«-tXif'i ni fina \iisl 9x1? o;)' 

QOisXq aXxl ^^^LldcmoiUB 5iisrl-.&noo9a ni i9Xs»f) « b«w Jfl«6n9l9a 

« J&sri 9ri sieriw tOSSoXilO ni *s9i:r8 9.:^«cre A^uob 82SS *Ja aasfilawcf Ic 

toaaifl Xeariolisi ,iencfiiiq alri il^lw ^^o^^J ItlinlaLI .;toX ijso i>9au 

W9M xlJjJoa SJiSd *« ansiolrlo sfliaisi lo sasnlsucf 9d:r ni aaw 

ffloil JE)©BJ8rioiJiq 9fl ,8CGX cTX •if!Cfn!9oea ctuocfA •9j;/n9vA finaXjifla 

B i>JBii qH .00,3?^- lo 9oiiq end- da iJio oslIiJbisD XSSX & ia&i>aet9b 

,SX^ f> woXX« 8.9W 9ri rioirfw lol f>njs al b'ub&ti on rioixiw niifduA Xcex 

to Qizi sdi iB fiiaq »cf o:f a»w ©oiaq Qaadotuq edi to 9onAX*cf ariT 

9riJ xef fcsonanil ©i^v; 8Jn9ax*q ©^^ ^«* B3l(-9W owJ •^•i9V9 00 .Vl 

TMd*o«B to no8*ftTt »co 10^ «i;rniBX i .noiJMoqtoO asua^fioM X*n9ylnU 


was dissatisfied with the Cadillac and on March 18, 1939, took 

It back (defendant says) with the fenders hent In and the tires 
blown out, a condition It wag not In when dold to plaintiff* The 
parties agreed that the Gadlllae would be exchanged for a 1930 
LaSalle, the exchange to be even. There Is conflict In the evi- 
dence as to whether the license plates were furnished by- 
defendant with the automobiles. At any rate, shortly thereafter 
the plaintiff (while driving the 1930 LaSalle) was arrested on a 
charge of operating a motor vehicle with license olates belonging 
to another automobile. The cause was tried before Judge Schiller 
on April 11, 1939, Lancy was found guilty and fined $25 and costs* 
Apparently the defendant Rosenberg knew of the trial and took an 

interest in it. Plaintiff testifies that defendant suggested to 
him that he could escape conviction by testifying that the plates 
were not on the car when defendant delivered It to him* Plaintiff 
also says that defendant suggested to him that the matter could 
be fixed up through a court bailiff whom he knew, If plaintiff 
would so testify* He says he refused to do this, Tnis Is denied 
by defendant* 

After that trial plaintiff and his partn- r, Rlzso, dr^vs 
to defendant's place of business with a truck, which the?/ parked 
there, Defen ant then drove plaintiff and Rlzzo in defendant 's 
car to t|ur Universal Mortgage Company, where the LaSalle had been 
financed. The mortgage company gave plaintiff a check for ^36,00 
covering |21*00 in payments which plaintiff he,d made to the finance 
company and the #15,00 down payment made at the time the Cadillac 
was purchased. The LaSalle automobile was. In fact, a stolen car. 
Plaintiff at the office of the finance company signed a full satis- 
faction and complete release for all claims against the Unlv real 
Mortgage Company and the Rosenbe -g Motor Sales, oov ring the deposit 
and payments made on the LaSalle sedaa, Rizzo, plaintiff and de- 
fendant then rode back to defendant's place of business, where ua 


ioci^r ,Gsei ,81 dot.«M no bn» oAlXiJbJBO 9Xf;J iiJiw J&eil«l;fA3aiB a«v 

©ill ^Ill^tni^Xq o* Mcfe fi&aw nl ^ori kbw (Ti nolJlAaoo « t^wo flwold 
05GI xs loi fissnarfoxe »cf filwow o«IXJLJb«0 edit ;fsri;t j^qoisb BBliizq 

isjif?s'£erid' -yiXtfiofie tsitst ^rui SA ,aeXitfoflro*ua exlJ ri;tXw ^nabnslei 

« flo B»^aemji «jaw (eXX^jseaJ 0£QX ©rl* SjeiIvIt:^ eXi^w) l^ltnijsXq 9di 

ScXgfioXscf asc^iiXa danooiX xid-lw oLoMsrv ic^J^cm 3 gxil^Aiftqo ^o eg^aifo 

T5>XXljdoe ©gfijuL 9io^s<J JbeliJf 5 aw -t^UiiO sdT ♦eXIdoiBO^UB tariJona ot 

♦ad-soo brts dSf^ ^snl!: bne. ^ti^Xi«/s Anwol rsw xo«^ ♦GSeX »XX XiiqA flc 

a^J^iq sjrf* ?^3f S'^-CT^J^'^e^J^ "t^^ noliteivnoo oq/^oB© f>Xuoo ari ^JSri* alxf 

ttltai.&l'i. 4is±d 0**1 fc«»«T'^;vlX96 ;JfSi3i35nel9l» flsdw oao «d;f no cfon 9*1 aw 

bluoo i©iJJiiffi sil^ J>*rf* ffiXd ot .bfi;f s «ss^tf9 ^oabnslreC* *firi;t ax-ss oeXs 

m*fri«Xo ti <w*fl3i «»£[ ffloriw tlilXlAcf ^iwoo a dauood* qw fiwcit »<^ 

oaij!9^ .^1 ;!X ♦sMjf o£> Ow JE>oew%eT »ri ax^* »H ♦■^Iflias* os fiXxrow 

•^oa&flelsf) xo 
, i ^ utiaq aid M« "tlld'nisXq Ial*r* *isri^ tetlk 
bBiiimf i^n* doiriw ^Jlloirrt s tlilw assnlewcf to soAXq a • *^xi«bii©le6 ou 

B03d l)8d 9lX«8jaJ sdJt Qtfttiv ^■?WJaqmoO 9gJi§;JioM IjBa-jflvXflU «d? oS ibo 

eona/sll: ««dcr o^ «&jsk Bad ^liifnieXq rioidw a*fl«BXJ»q fli OO.XSt -gabtmoo 

o&LLlbi^O ad* ®al? tui^ *a ©feant *fl»ffiiiaq flwcfi 00, ax^ sd* Jbiis xfisqffloo 

♦Tjafi n^Xoa-s js ^i»At Kt iamr Blldiomo^Sus slim»J. ©dT »*^JBfiJ©'Xuq aAw 

-?J:J68 XXifl & J&«/73l5 Xn-*^'^'*'® dofij*fll1 ©dJ 1« «o±t1:o »d* jA "J^liffiifiX 

Xa^fVinU 9d;J ta«l»§s sEjiaXo XXjs tol ssBflXe^ etfeXqaco Jbflfi noiS'^ft^i^ 

iXacqaA »r{J gfiii-voo ,88l«R to^cM g'^*dff«>«oH 8d# iwaa xd^^oo^ »S«g;fioM 

-eb bn& Jlltalslq ^oxstn ^^Afcea sXXaSbJ «d;f Jio eJbfiffl 8*«»ari«q baM 

tr.i r-rrrfw ,fl?-f«.nJ'pircf '^o ?iry<s!.ri B^inAotiBt^b 0* iosd 9601 ti^d^ in.&baB\ 


the alleged assault took place* 

The plaintiff testified he had paid the sum of $15.00 for 
repairs to the LaSalle oar, which he asked Rosenberg to repay; that 
Rosenberg refused to pay it and called plaintiff a vile name, 
which plaintiff returned in kind, whereupon defendant pulled out 

a gun he Igiad in his pocket, fired a shot at plaintiff and chased 
him around the lot* In fact, he says that it was the third shot 
fired by defendant that struck plaintiff, severely injuring him. 
Plaintiff was taken to Mercy Hospital, where he remained three 
weeks,, and an operation was performed to remove the bullet » His 
doctor bill was $115,00, his hospital bill 11114 75* 

The defendant's testimony is to the effect that plaintiff 
demanded that he pay the amount of the fine and court costs that 
had been assessed against him; that defendant refused to do soj 
that plaintiff then called him vile names, opened a knife used by 
him in the chicken business and chased the defendant around the 
lot; that defendant then ran to the office to call the police; 
that plaintiff tried to force his way into the office; that defend- 
ant then ran to the diw-wer and got his gun and fired three shots, 
the first into the groimd, the second into the air, and the third 

directly at plaintiff* In short, the defense interposed is that 
at the time defendant shot plaintiff he reasonably feared for his 
life because of the attack made on him by plaintiff with the knife. 
Plaintiff admits that he had in his back pocket a knife which 
he used for dressing chickens, but he says he did not produce any 
knife before defendant fired the first or second shots. He admits 
he produced it before defendant fired the third shot. Plaintiff 
also says the.t the knife was never open; that defendant was about 
35 feet away from him when he fired the third shot; that his friend, 
RlEzo, called the police; that the police put plaintiff in the car 
and sent him to Mercy Hospital* 

io1 00«3X| to sasm ari^r Ijlsq bad ad l»siti;ta8* ^tlSalAlq arfT 

,alri gnlii/tf^-f X^«"''3^«v9a itti;ffii.alq Mowt^B d"ari* tf'nsbnslQi) tcT fca^ll 

9©^if* bcmtSiis.f^'i ori aianw ^IsjMqg-oR fO'^-M oi" n^^Cs^ aiaw ttltfHlal^ 

BlB. i, i'^LLuti ©riJ evofflsi o;J^ fescnotioq nssn noi^J^Jrreqo iia baB ,8^e«« 

.a?.XII!| XXid Xj&cTiqaoxf aJtrf »00,aXXt aMr XXld 10*006 

JOS o£) Qi bBBUle't *fi*.ufl©t9i> ;t«c£* jffiiil Jaaiasi* Jbeeasaaa fleacf Jbjui 

■^cf Jbasy aliiof s ^snsqo taeaa/i aXlv kXtC fisXXiio aari* lill^nlBXq i&iii 

Bdi bttisonA in&bastBb ^t b?iQ&si» bn» aasxiiaucf neloXdo 9d;f al alcf 

;©©iXoq eiW IlBo o;^ ©oll^c 9£ii ot a&n asdt taMba9'!L6b tadi itol 

•^nstsb iMii leoltlo 9iii o^nl tjjsw aid eoiol o^ beliu ItlialBlq tHdi 

tSJcifa ©®*xxlJ b&ilt bRM flug Bid io^ bn& ivmenb sriJ oi a»i aQdi toA 

b^Mi siiJj- bas& ^il& 9ri;J otnl ferroosa ariS^ t^nuoi^ siiJ otat ^9il1 sdt 

*axi* gi: £>saoqi3.:rni asnstsfi sdJ t;r'ic£i8 nl A'i±^aislq tA xLiostlb 
sld 10^ b&^sBl xld&aos&^i ©xi llXtfnijaXq Joxla ia&tnQlfib aaiX* axi* *a 
. ilxuf ari* ri^lw l!t:XJni«Xq t«J o-t^ "-^ ^^^^ it>BSt& sd^ Ic aatfeostf »11I 
ii' lilw sjlinal b d-eiocq iosa alii K.f bfixl sx£ Jsrftf aJXatbiJ lll;JnlaX*I 

^ns souboiq ton bib sd ax«B ed Sud tcneioXxio gxiic^aai^ lot fcaau ad 

aJlmJbB 9H <t,a*cxlB bzcom 10 d-aiXl siiiT .&si21 in&'m^tab rioted atifoC 

ttl^nisX^ ,*cria b%in? ari? 6eiil JnabnalaJb anot'^cf tt bBoubotq ari 

;ri;od:i,ss« ^fusfecsta* imt ;fieqo isven asw etliul ^di ;rariJ 8t»8 os-C* 

^iSHslit alii ;tAd* ^iJorfa £)ilr£;:r c>xi;r bentt sx£ nailw aJtrf acxt \sma iTaat 96 

lAo arfJ al fiURtmlq Suq aoiXoq ©iltf ituii ;»olXoq odt b&LlMo ^osslfl 


The defendant oontenda in the first place that the verdict 

is manifestly against the evidence* Defendaht admits that he 

shot plaintiff • The witnesses who saw the occurrence and t' stifled 

about it were plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff's partner Rizzo, 

and defendant's brother Solomon, Defendant and hie brother t-^stify 
that at the time of the shooting plaintiff was about to atta-k 
defenriant with the knife. Plaintiff denies this and hie testimony 
is corroborated by that of his partner Rizzo, There was a fifth 
witness, an employee of the defendant, who wae prr^sent at the time 
of the shooting* He was not produced as a witness* Defendant 
t'-stlfied that he looked for him but w s not able to find him. 
Defendant says he shot the plaintiff because he feared for hie life. 
As a matter of fact^ his plea is self-defense, and the sho ting 
being admitted it was for the defendant (as the court instructed the 
Jury) to prove this defense by a preponderance of the evidence, 
Harvey v, Aubrey . 53 Ariz, 210, 87 Pae.Rgp. 482; Hem York Life Ins. Go 
V, Rogers . 126 Fed. (2nd) 784, 

In view of the circumstances recited, apparently this court 
may not hold the verdict to be contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence* The jury and the trial judge saw and heaM t::e , 
witnesses and had every opportunity to determine the facts. The 
Jury not only found defendant guilty of the assault but also, in reply 
to a special interrogatory, said it was wilful, wanton and malicious* 
Reading the whole record we are inclined to the Igriew that the Jury 
was well warranted in returning the verdict. At any rate, we would 
not be Justified in overruling that verdict after it was approved 
by the trial Judge, 

It is urged that the verdict was the result of prejudice 
and passion on the part of the jury and that much of the evidence 
had no bearij^g on the issue of whether the defendant assaulted the 
plaintiff. The evidence concerned a long chain of circumstances 
beginning with the purchase of the Cadillac automobile. The greater 
part of this evidence, however, went in without objection, and we 

ioibf^v &di ^Mi ©o^Iq istti erfif ai. eJbnad'aco ^OAhn^tfib adT 

l5S)i;1:iii'a&* baa mstou'W&o^ mii wsa ociw Beiapna-iw sd'P .^tid'Aijalq Joiia 

XaoBLtSB^'J^ Bid t£t:s s-ld-T a»in&& tll^raijiiX'i .©llroC ed;}- ri^lr Jnaoxislsf) 

dtttt i-s as«r s^odT ,©aalfl fea^fiiM? Bill 1:o taiid^ t<^ Astfa^oGToiTtoo al 

«ffll#' ««!* ^B td3n-^*iq 8-sw oxfw »3'niJ6net9J& 9xfJ 1:0 «»xoIqflr» om ^aaontfiw 

itffcsanetsQ «ii8«iT.t ft9ojj£>o'xq Jon aor aiH »sniitocria «il;t lo 

gffliri JDni* 0^ «Xd.' w ;fircf oirf lol fieioci ad itarf* 69l!tl:f8''3^ 

»©1XX Bill -xcl J&eT:«90l: 9£i iQW^oe^ "iti^nl^Xq silt Joxla sif ex*e tfoa^fieted 

©xi? BaitoiTtS'ani ttUoo ^di b&) JasbaslsA ©dd lol saw ^-X Jiad'd'ifflfiB gniscf 

,9oa©feXV9 ac[;t lo son^jiafincqeiq « x^ sanslafi aXri^t sroiq c;r (v^ul 

DC .ani QlXJ al-xoY ^g>>^ t38^ .qgfl.o.s'-I ^8 <0i3 .xJt^A ZQ ^ y.'^tduA ,v ^evraK 

,*8V (6«S) *i:>9'i SSX « aT8aofl .▼ 

•:j89ii feflA wae ©g.birj,. X^iXi^ sa? Ana x^^t ®'*'f ..©onsJbXvs sil;t 
^rfT»i: »xii'* «»nlf«w:«^"»ft c.# x^-^f^^'Jtoqqo f^sve 6£ri bas asaasn^Xw 

^10?, '^/tt :faxljf w©X«f '. ^n/.XonX 9i« »w Aiooai aXodw ©xt:f gnlAAefl 

&IJJC' ^ -.r.e-f YH - * 'jci^r ^iiXcrtu^tei nX b^^nai^am XXsw 8«* 

l)9V0'rqqB . ta*tB JolMsv *Bjrl? gnXXimsvc nX &eXlX;taut scf *on 

• egfewt, XflXt* 9dif xd 

©on9l>Xv9 ©ricf lo riowi. oixe Y'li' -. '- '^i^q Q^i* no ncXsaaq 6flA 

eriff fea^^XuBasA ;f«af)n»*fc9B ©ricT i9il*»riw lo siraaX 9dtf no s^Xib^cT on bad 

Beoii^BmuonXQ to fiXjitio s^oX & f>«fnsonoo aons&Xva oxfT ^tllitilAlq 

. 'J>if^i8 ariT ,eXicrcfaoJ«« oAlXXImD -vW lo ©E^^oii/q ariif ri^Xw snlnnXjed 


do not regard it as wholly Immaterial^ On the contrary, we think 

it was admiFslble as tending to show the whole situation* It was 

undisputed that defendant old plaintiff a stolen car and that the 

controversy between them arose over a dispute arising out of that 

faot« Counsel for plaintiff in hie closing argument referred to 

the fact that defendant dealt in stolen cars. Defendant objected 

but the court pirerruledi saying^ "The Jury will consider whether 

or not the statement is true". We think there was no reversible 

error in this respect. That the car was stolen was an admitted 

fact in the case. It is probably true that the evidence as to 

defendant's dealings with plaintiff did not tend to impress the 

Jury in his favor, but the evidence was material and the Jury was 

entitled to know the facts. The cage was tried with some heat, all 

of which was not on one side. In view of the special finding the 

Jury had a right to impose punitive damage s^ and we are inclined to 

the view that it was/only their right but their duty to do so» 

For this and other reasons the further contention of the 
defendant that the Judgment is excessive cannot be sustained, Dr, 
Sawyer, the surgeon who attended plaintiff for his injuries, 
testified and hia evidence is hot contradicted. He said the bullet 
entered the left chest of plaintiff Just slightly to the left of the 
sternum, or breast bone, between the first and second or second 
and third ribs; that it v/ent through plaintiff's chest and lodged 
about opposite the fourth dorsal vertebrae; the patient 
expectorated blood and for ten days was treated with the view of 
avoiding an abscess of the lungs; his pulse ran up to 120; he 
received the usual treatment, including the administration of anti- 
tetanus s rum; the bullet was removed by the surgeon after a w ek 
or ten days, it having be^n previously located by X-ray at the point 
named. The plaintiff was in the hospital for two weeks and was 
under medical care for a long time thereafter* At the time of the 

saw *I .nci^fljsrtis ©iorfw »/f(f worfg 0* 3fji-6no;t sb ©Xtfis i 2:mf»j» 8«w #i 

^fiieJtiB »*i;qeiJS « ^«vo bboi& medt n9?twi@d! XBitnrotinco 
o;? hsniB^s^ taemkrgisi •galsolo Bid ni ttl^alMtq net XsBm/oO ,to«l 

alcflaiev , Btsst&tB acJ* ton to 

o* as 90fi"^*^ "li XldBcTciq si *I .saAO Sx^fJ ni J'OBt 

?^d? sseicTi; bib ttttnl&Zq ditv B'^allMQJb a^JnabnsTtsi) 

-'B-^ #©ixeBlv© erid" i^uCT ,*loVa^ Bid nl T^tsl 

lis \?-B©xJ 9mcH '0 -jiT ,8*o«l 9JS:f wcni o* b^L^l&aB 

- jiitbnlt iBio-'- ,*)f)ia snc no 3* on saw rioirfw to 

o:t fir^nlfMiil ^•' • ^'::ff-:sr..?..5 STitfinwq ©aoqini o:? ^fri^sit « isri Y^tJl 

» ::. , :.- -iisfflsfiirt 9rf;f tf&dt tnabti9\sb 

^, ...„;, .... ..,^..:...:. .1 ... r-iA5r--;;*:t,^ orfw xicesiue 9ri;r tis^wjae 

r»-:!-f«:,'f <^ii;)- .&!.« ,F-,...:?',?'f..^.f >;-^r-..ri :;■ ••■.^=.ftlV» gill'' Bn-fi JbsilitJ-SeS' 

• '^r --.f,' ,^,,.. .. ^ ..,.„:..:,. .,. d-esrfo tf'tal 9Xl3" bsieinB 

.^..>.«jor. XV. ......vjtj^s Sr*A> . . .- . ^.. flo9Wtf«>tf tsnocf ;l'8Aeitf to ,iaunrr3*8 

--^rr r ^.-- •!'r--rf« ■•'''•-'•-.ttaiBlq fi^wotif* JJs^w 3"i jjftif^ ' lacfit Mid* Mb 

viJi.iC, . :. ^©fitC':--^-^'-"- r-:^'^'-?. jffa^-tifol ©rft 9Ji8oqqo tuodA 

r:-*ry p... f o,x,-' X..- iGl 6fij6 .5coXd fesJjsiotosqx* 

, ;■:. U w.. wk.. i»..i .■.:... i ..Iri t«Sf«ri ©ri? to «?89oacrs tt& gfii^iora 

-X, ' id"si;fai«i(H6jB tdi •gaibulonl ^tasmSa^rt Ibvbu Bdi bsviooB^ 

■r.v -.., . -,,,^ «,^;j -^^ fetvofliBt Bisw ^»Xiocf erC* ;auLn: e BunBts^ 

/ua.. - .--.JriooX t-Tft'^t'i^'^Q lf*^«ef Sfflvsu ;fi ts^fib n«* to 

;:,.i» ou^ w/x .J* ovj tot XBJriqBorf dt^ f.> ' ^ ^^ tti*ni»Xq erfT ,69BiBn 


last examination - more than 2 1/2 years after the asp.ault 

(a little more than a month before the trial) there was no 

evidence of acute infection in the chest and the temperature was 

normal} hut Dr» Sawyer says, "There was a certain amount of 


permanent infiltration of the upper/lobe of the lung". He was 
asked by the court what he meant by this and replied, «With a 
gunshot wound there ie always a certain amount of Infiltration or 
germs and the germs that were in the upper lobe of the lung 
produced a certain effect on the adjoining tissues, and we may call 
that infiltration* As that infection subsided and when the 
healing takes place it results in the formation of scar tissue, 
the same as it does when you have a wound outside. The scar tissue 
in his lung naturally occupies a certain part of his lung 
tissue and to that extent int rferes with the function of that lobe 
of his lung". Asked for hia opinion the doctor stated that there 
was a certain degree of permanent disability; that the lung 
tissiie Trtien destroyed would never be replaced. Plaintiff testifies 
he had been earning |35»00 a week from his business, and that 
by this assault he was rendered incapable of doing his work« 

The court required a remittitur of |3,000 from the verdict 
of the jury, and we think the Judgment of 1:7,000 is not excessive 

under all oircumstancos, especially in view of the finding that 
the assault was wilful and malicious^ 

It is urged that the court at the trial assumed the dual 
role of trial Judge and counsel for plaintiff. We have 
carefully examined the record and think this statement is wholly 
tanjustified. On the contrary, we think the trial was conducted 
imder sometimes difficult circumstances with fairness* 

It is urged that the court erred in instructing the Jury 
and in particular in omitting to instruct that the burden of 
proof was upon the plaintiff in the case, Ae a matter of fact, the 


on sam &TBjri^ (liBJt-id- erii ^tettxi dtfaom & a&di s-xom 9miL &) 
saw ©TCJj^jrtegjBQ^ :rf;r Ma S^soiio QilJ nl aoliostal r^Jjjojs 1:o aonefelr* 

B rid-i.i" ^bQllq^t bn& aliU xd ^nH&m off d^jsxiw Jiwoo sricf ^cf fielsa 

no nol^aiifli'inl to d^m/oiBA alai't^o & eijswXs ai ©ns>rfc^ fcnucw Joriaxius 

gnwl 9fi;f to ecfol leqqw aclj nl eiew tasii amna^ Bdi bnB emnsj 

jswaaid- isoa to noid-&sJiot aaJ fiJt sJXwaei tfl »o«Iq asaU^- gniXaerf 

©i^'said^ i;&09 sriT »9l)l)»;twG fejiuow a »v«fl woy tisdw a soft *1 a a aauao adit 

gni/X r ■:rBq nX^.tioo b asXqL'ooo X-^-^JSiJjtfsn snuX oiil al 

©doX *jari;t to xjoi«OiJi/'i Qti^ dilv asiet'i *nl ;J"fl9;J'xs ^&di oi Jbna ewaal;^' 

siexi^ d"iafW l>©:raJB lod'oc-Jb ari^f noXftiqc sld ict J&aoCaA ."jxurX aiil to 

gauX erie' j'il^iXicf^alfe ^fnan^Eineq to 99Tii»& fliad'ieo « bbw 

aeltjt^JaW ttX^nlsxTi- •.beoisXqst sd •ssven bXuow iexoti'asf) asdv ^Heati 

t^. ^fsssniaud aid aroit jfssw a 00,35-^ aaimss nesd b&d ad 

,i*£ow airi aniob to ©XcfjsqAonl beinbnet ajsw ed ^XiraasB aXdJ' xd 

:iotbi'^ mi ffiott OCX) ^51 to isjil;f-tlmf?n. « iiaiXupdi iJiwoo sriT 

svlsss" yl OCO^.Vl to tst^as^bal sxlcf i^niriJ ow .5nfl ^itut axf* to 

3".arit 3fLif>nit ari* to «9iv rii xXXsiosqae t8^oxu83'eaii/0'xio XXb rcefiiiw 

#awololXjsffl &njs XiftXlw aBw JXuAsaa sd* 
Xijwl) arid" 6»aiwj3aA XBi'x3' ari^^ ;5"w ^'T.iroo ari? ^ad;}- Dsgiy ai il 

©VAjrf aV-i ^ttX^J'fiXsXq lot X-Jenwoo Ijhs asl>«t Xfiiid" to eXoi 

XXXcilw si :fnmi9i»ta alxicr :&altii J&fUB Jb^ofesi ©ri.t fjsnirajBxe x-CXi/t9T:Ao 

Jbeitoubnoo «&w X«li;f axi* iirlrft? ^- tTjiAiJnco exf;? jXti;?awt«*' 

^eaen'siiit ritfiw s90tti5;!i"amjuoiio rf^XwoIttiS eaiEld'Sflioa i9bnu 

Xtisl 3Xi;t sfiXd-owTtfafil nl Jba-i'is ;J'iiJoo sri:? ;J'Add" Jbogoif al JI 

Siwcf exi* *jad* tots^^stit oS gniJ^Jlinc isi ifiXi/olJiBq nl t>n& 
9ii:t ftos-l to tc^tim: »-38«o e«id' nl ttid"nisXq aricf aoqw a-sw too-xq 


shooting was admitted and the hurden of pro^f w&s upon the 
defendant to eetablish Justification. Plaintiff's brief says that 
the instructions were given by agreement. The record dof^s 
not bear out this statement. Upon the whole record we are 
satisfied substantial Justice has been done, and the Judgment 
will be affinaed. 


McSurely and O'Connor, JJ#, concur. 


itjBd^t Qx;ia Isi*:- ' ' ■ ' ' ♦ ■ -02li*syt A^lXcfaJaa o? *a«Afl9tel> 

s'l^ *w Mo©«^ olcrfw 9«:U noqU ,d'jr!;3fa9;J'jB3T» airfjf tfuo lascf ton 

.J&SfflllllA scf Xliw 





aEOHGE A. SCHUBERTH, '**^^'*^='« 


ol O ±t*A.9^^^.^/i 



"^"1S©Q|,. COUNT, 



Plaintiff brought suit seeking to recover damages for 

peraoBal injuries caused, as she claims* "by the negligent 

handling by defendant ©f his automobile* The Jury returned a 

verdict for the defendant and plaintiff appeals* 

The accident ooourred about 10 o'clock in the evening of 
April 7, 1939 on Harlem avenue, which is a four-lane highway, 
extending north and south; plaintiff's house is located on the east 
side of Harlem avenue opposite 58th place, which extends west 
but not east of Harlemj a driveway 8 feet wide runs east from 
Harlem along the north side of plaintiff's house » 

Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a truck driven north 
in Harlem by her husbandj they were returning homeward after 
attending a church service; the truck stopped in the inner lane at 
Harlem a few fe- t south of the driveway* The testimony tended to 
show that one intending to go into the driveway with a truck must 
start from the inner lane^ as the driveway is too narrow to permit 
the truck to be driven into it from the outer lane* f/hile standing 
there Mr* Delaoh,plaintiff 's husband, observed two automobiles about 
200 feet behind the truck coming north on Harlem in the outer 
lane; he remained standing there to permit these autoe to pass before 
making the right turn into the driveway. Mr, Delach testified that 
at this time there was a 3-inch tail light burning at the rear of 
the truck, also a white light on the oaok of the cab^ and the two 


mob HGiH.tiwe 



,HT.H:'auHoa .A asHoao 


. >n;or> mr -hg k:i«I'^o sht aaH37iJ2G ij:imisoM ^ciTsux.flM 

jfn»s-^J^®'*fi ®^^ V^ temlfilo exia ajs ^Beeuao Bstiulat Xiusosieq 

*aX«eqqis "tli;tr[Jt&Xq JbflA ^naJbcetQb edi lol JolMev 

to gnineve 9do iti iCocIo'o 01 .tfirocfs fcsiiwooo ia^btooB QiiT 

t^Bwfigljd finsX-^wcl ju si xlolriw «fttfxiATfi b^XoaH no ecex ,V XiiqA 

isBfi edi no SstiiooX si aawori e*ltl*ni«Xq ;if^j/c8 f>cs ri*ion gnXfine^xe 

^Bsw aJbxis^xs jElolrfw <»ojaXq diQQ 9^l9oqqo ©un«va oeXiBH lo ebls 

mo'it iB&B Rni/1 eJbiw ^tssl 8 x^wsyIiB a ;09XifiH to d^sss ?on ;fucf 

.aewc/i s'ltl^nifiXq to ©Big xi^^Ton sri;)" gnoXa Delt&H 

ditofi ftsviib 2fo«i:f s nl legnspsaq £ sa snlbit psw ttld'nljsX*5 

t3*t/5 jyijswemori ^^tilRtui&i €?^9is ^eri^' jJbruBdsirri isxi x^ esXibH aX 

;tB »iiisl t^nttl odi nl beqqotd ^.Qtni &di ;9oXvio8 donudo » •galbaBH^B 

ot bfibaQi -^nonjI^seiJ eriT »x«w®vXil) ®ri;t to £[*i;08 iJ'r-^et wet a asXiBH 

Jax/a ioxri;^ ,s fl3"Xw X''»w<5vXn.o ©xlc^ od^ni 03 ocf 3aif)ne;fni ©no ^arij woifa 

^iffiieq o* wo'jian cod" aX \m>^viib edi :a» ^wwaX ^sxmi »dS toont ^fi^ta 

sni&fmtfe sXiaT ^osibL t^:tuo sdi ooit *i oJni nsvitS sd o* :S.Qtni sdt 

tt/ocfe. a^Xlcfcitiojwe owcT fesvi-^ado «..e>n«cfai*ri a' ttitniaXq^doaXaa 41M a-xeri* 

isJi/o arit nX msXtsK no xlJion -^xitmoo losni arftf" toLflecf iJsst OOs 

«iot»<f aeaq ©3^ aod'w.e &&9di tXanaq o;f «*iarf^ gnXSfiis^tB beatsast sri (enaX 

-Jad;r J&6XtX*a©d- do&ltiG: »iftl .ijawftviiJEi exi? ©cfni amu^ ^rigii ai!* gnlMaa 

to i^f^f ariJ *j6 SfllfTiMcf JfislI lle.i doal-^ js saw aieriJ emit %ldi tM 

Qui 9iiJ bna ^cf£o aif^t t« lioacT '9Cii ao id'^lL 9^1dw a QaXa %^oini edi 


headlights were lighted. 

The most southerly of the tw© autos traveling In the outer 
lane was occupied by two police officers, jBoth of them testified 
that they saw the tall light burning on the truck as they approached 
and passed It, Mr» Delach testified that after these two care 
had passed he wag about to turn Into the driveway when he noticed 
another car coming north in the Inner lane about 150 feet to the 
rear; that he waited for this oar to pass. This car was driven 
by the defendant, and It ran Into the back end of the truck, 
knocking It to the north £0 to 40 feet. Anna Delach, plaintiff, 
was injured in the collision and after a few days' stay at hose 
was taken to a hospital where she remained for treatment, 

Plailntlff introduced a number of witnesses who testified 
that the stret was dry and the weather clear, and that the tall 
light on the back of the truck was burning. Defendant and his wife, 
who was riding with him, claimed It was snowing, that visibility 
waa poor and that there was no tail light on the back of the truck; 
that a car was preceding defendant's car, going northward in the 
inner lane, and when it got close to the truck it turned into the 
outer lane, passing the truck; that when defendant first saw the 
truck he was about 25 feet awayj that he attempted to pass it to 
the left and his right front fender struck the truck. Defendant 
testified that the tmiok did not move at all when he struck it and 
that no damage was done to it in the accident. 

There was conflicting evidence on Important points in the 
ease^ The presence, or otherwise, of a burning tail light on the 
truck was in sharp dispute - the greater niimber of witnesses 
testifying that it was burning. However, as there must be 
another trial, we do not comrient on the variant stories or the 
weight of the testimny^ It was a case where the rulings on evidence 

£ei1;IJ8€>* insri? to rid'od «ai80i^'io aoiloo ovi id b&lqvooo ««w saBl 

l>aoi*cfi i*si asxiw -^isf/aviiJb axiS ©Jjrti anui oi iuoiia asm sd fee-ieaq bad 
9di od" tf'sjet 061 S^iiotfjB on^I ignnl siiit nl ri^Tion gniaoo is© leritonfi 

^Vtt^aliijiC ^liv.M- .iTset 0^ otf Og isUion sd* o;r ^1 sniioooi 

©ifori ;ts ^jad'a '-'c - :^1:« licjs aoiailloo gjrf:^ al b9nulai. uzn 

^ineoii^:^^ J r.x .ruisi ads s-^silw XsJiqaoxl « o;f aeia^ ssm 

: '^ ^ o , .' "' 'iBdmua g bsouboi^aL t\Xia.lAl1 

ixjj ':;;i I. ■ ,aJ»9W Bdtt bn£ xtlD a«w ^^eida ©dJ *aif.1 

' ^ -.■. --.^ t>»i2ii»Xo ^jiaiii d^iv 's^nibli b&v odm 

;aoi' ,iJ. xistf on aaw ST©ri;^ t&dt ba& looq ww 

f?ii.:- ni iy.Aja^'ivL %iai:^ t^^ao ,a',^nAfiiS9"i9A ;|rfU&9©9Mq asnr ^a© js *JWi^ 

Si Dsanui il :iow ' . " ci ©ftoXo ^og 3^.i aedm boM ,.3itBl rrsnni 

d'nji^ric:'i'3v. .oiojj'fcr 9£i^ jioxriJ-s i^ba^t ici^il td^li Hid bcA JftsX an- 
.&n« *1 ioimi^s sxi cars "' . arvoat d"Oii i)iS ^oumi edi iadi h&lHiMLQi 

.cTixsiiiDos SifiJ ni ;^i o? flc©£> aew sgAflAb on i&dS 
9d3" nl a3-nXoq jrixs^rrtoqail xio sofisJblTe ^ffX^oiXlnoo sjbv s^arfT 
Bdi ao Sd^ll Jiti^i Sfiirrawd a ^o ^saXw^iexltfo io ^©oxtsasiq ad's .saA© 
BSesan^iw xo '■X9cfii!yn iscTAeris^ ejoL^T - 9;t«qaXi> qi^jrte al a;»r jtoin^f 

.•ajsltsv 9fl;J no tfnsffiffio© itoii oI> aw tX«it;t n^diaa^i 


and oommente by the trial court would hare & very potent influence 
on the conclusion of the Jttry# 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court conmiitted error in 
ruling on objections, in croei??-exatanatlon of plaintiff's 
witnesses and in reoarks and comments on the evidence. Without 
going into detail s# the record Justifies this oritioisn* By way 
of illustration, the court sustained all objections by defendant's 
counsel to questions put to a witness for the purpose of showing 
that it was impracticable to turn & vehicle of the size of this 
truck from Harlem avenue into the driveway alongside plaintiff's 
housv, except from the inner lane. All such testimony was proper 
as tending to explain why plaintiff had stopped his truck on the 
Innf^r lane and was waiting there for north bound traffic to ass 
before starting into the driveway. There were frequent comments by 
•ounsel for the defendant in the presence of the Jury which should 
not have been permitted, A typical instance was where oouns^^l remarked 
after cotmsel for plaintiff had questioned a witnee: "abvl usly 
the answer doesn't suit him, your honor,'* Also his r^mark^as 
to another witness, after h*^ had orose-examined herj, that he did not 
think the witness was feeling very well. Other similar remarks 
should not have been permitted, as they tended to produce prejudice 
ai^inst plaintiff in the minds of the Jurors* 

At the request of the defendant the court gave seven 
instructions which directed a verdict of not guilty. The giving 
of a lar^e number of such instructions has been held to be reversible 
error in many cases. Repeatedly telling the Jury to find the 
defendant not guilty has been held to have a tendency to mislead* 
Pillow V, Long . 299 111* App*. 542, 645; Villiama v, Stearns. 
286 111. App. 425, 434, In Nels >n v, Chicago City Hy. Co. . 163 
111, App, 98, it was held that the character and number of the 
repetitions of the same idea woiaid be "well calculated to impress 
the Jury with the thought that the court was against the plaintiff 
on the qu'^stion of fact and that they might readily be misled to 

BoaBjJllRl ifnetf^oq ijtov m »v«ri bLttom &tttco lAltf mAt \d a^ascuaoo ba£^ 

♦ \tiwt, ad* to aot9ts£t>aoo ^dt n 
tit 'tOT 33^ tfi'is^TB tlltal&l 

taGTi^lT* ,^»a' itB^mco baa ajfiAmei al basn UBBB^atlw 

Pi*iRAda9lr onliitjiun t^tssoo Bdi ^nolta^iBUlLl to 

aiil-' roifiev en ini;* c;r •Xcffiol^ojsiqfflJt «bw il imtit 

" ' tli^ffliaXcf aj&iagfiola y^^'svI'^ o:tnl 9ua9ra u^li^H mctt iotnt 

I'OCf dJ'Ji vt*yS:f ^HJtCfi«W SAW J&RJ4 »ff«I IfflfUli 

•-?fflO^«» feAii ''il lesTlft t»»©aJlw "xadtjOfla o* 

Qlhulmti fiQUh , ^tu-xfyq ««»tf ©YAri ;ton fiXwoxla 

''ffl«? «^t ni ttlintalq S&aia:^ 

*hM»L ..-imS ejad t^Xlu^ Joe tnsbnslsft 

S^!^ »*e" *^H Y^Jt?^ o^^JS^icO .V g.,8|X9J(: ^ , ..> ,$S4> ,q(jA *XXi 9£v 

*f)SToiri9 nrfS' *jwi;r Med ajaw ^l «d6 #<|qA .XXi 

R!R«^qral or 5®i^«X«oI Muronf »»ftl aawfj »dj "to aixoiJl^sq^i 

llitfulfifq 9d* :r^«ljis®ij SAW ^i«oo «ii;J *ad* tOii^uotbt «xi.i dttm x^ul Bdi 


believe that in the opinion of the court they should find for 

the defendant. No legitimate reason appears for the repetition 

of the direction to find the defendant 'not guilty* so frequently." 

We are of the opinion that instruction No. 22, given at 
the request of defendant, should not have been given. This contains 
the provisions of the state statute touching signals to be given by 
the operator of a vehicle to one "immediately to the rear. " Mr. Delaoh 
did not make such a signal, for when he stopped his truck defendant's 
oar was not "immediately to the rear. " There should be no point 
in making the signal of a right hand turn until the other north 
bound traffic had passed. There was no basis in the evidence for this 
instruction and it was error to ;^AWe it, especially as it ordered 
a finding for the defendant* 

It was not necessary to give so many instructions - 14 for 
plaintiff and 18 for the defendant. The case presented only a 
question of fact. The giving of so many instructions only tends to 
confuse the Jury. 

Plaintiff's brief says that the court erred in refusing to 
submit to the Jury as a question of fact the wilful and wanton 
conduct of the defendant* The record, however, shows that the count 
containing this charge was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff. She 
therefore cannot complain of this action by the court* 

For the reasons above indicated we hold that the Judgment 
should be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial. 


Matohett, P. J., and O'Connor, J., concur. 

iGl baJLt bLuodn x^^^ ifiifoo &dt !to aolniqo exljf al tarfd" erellscf 
fioiitld'aqs'X sxliT To'i 3iaeqqii noessi ©d-BCLtd-lgel oil ^dTiBLneteb eri* 

anl3*noo gixiT *n©vls need Bvad ion bluod& ^insbneteh lo testspsi orf* 

xcf ns-ri§ ed o? aliSfiLSls :snirlpi/o;J' ©;ttfjBJ"3 oJe^ta sdi J.o Enoiaivonq oritf 

do&l&Q. *iM " ,iii8i ad^ od •^Ie3'slJb6iJ3ffil'' ©no o;t elolrisv a lo loJBigqo 9fl:f 

a ' *fial>ndl©£> Slot/tJ sM Jbeqqo^s ©ri noilw not tlangia s rious siBin ton bib 

tsiloq on 9d blsod^ Bisd'2 « ."iBdi end- oj- •^Xed-alfjsijiffll" toa bbv tao 

fftiofi lexid'o siid' Lltnu Brttsi ba&d d^dgJii a to ijartglR sxid" ^nli&ttL nl 

Bld-t lot eoii9£>lva 9di nl sla&d oa saw snexlT .fieaaBq J&sxl oitljsi;)' fjflwotf 

ijeiabno d"x as \;IlBio9<|ar8 ^d^l s^Jjg od" lonia afiw tJt baa aoliouiianl 

mta&baetsb edi to\ ^albni^ a 
not -^1 ~ anoiJoui^tsni Ttrujic ob ^vlg o* xt»Ba9o&a ion saw ^I 

s xino Jrje;ffl©a3«iq sa^o exlT .itnafcnslei) odt lol 81 fina ItliJ'nlfllq 
o3 aSfisd" ^Ino anoljoyid-axi -^nBiE os Ic s-fi-f"^-tS ®riT ,*o«"l; to uol^fesirp 

.^lut, "Sii* eautfloo 
od- ^nlawts- ni .Pjstis *iwoo eilJ^ tiirit 8^<e tsiicf s ' xtld-clsISL 

floS'Xigw MiJ lutllw 9ii.^ ifoBt tc noi^taewp « sjs X'^wt, ^d* oi itmdUB 

^tmtest 9di i&dt ewoxia ,i9v8wofI ^.biooen sriT ♦tf'nabnstei) ©li^ to i^ouSnoo 

8i£B ,ttJt*iiisIq ©fiC;)' to noxitoui no £)9a8lfflali baw egijerio •liid- ^fllnls^Tcoo 

^t'isjot) ^d'J- vcT iioid-o^ Blrid" to nlslqaco ^OfioBo sioteiexld' 

*«*5fi':S^jtft, 9di issdt blod rw £is*^oi.&nI evotfjs auossei erl* lo*? 

♦I.3I1J isiiJoxie not Jao.b 11485! 91 eai/so ari^ bos bBsiarei sd blvodn 


.itfonoo t»u tionnoD'O Jbrus < *L ,^ ^J'S'srio^faM 


FRED HOVER, doing business as 
Fred Hover Company, 

Appellant and Cross-Appellee, 

'''-'^<,.., ,^*^^""!PPEAL FR( 

corporation, ,.-""' '"^ """" 

kp01A€'e and Gross-Appellant, 



Plaintiff brought svilt to r cover a balance due for the 
building and Installation of what Is called a "pasr. oven" for 
defendant. Defendant alleged a breach by plaintiff of the 
warranties accompanying the contract for this and pr sented a 
counterclaim for damages said to have been sustained by it on 
account of such breach. Upon trial the court without a jury fo\ind 
there was a balance due plaintiff of #903,50, There is no dispute 
as to this. Defendant wag allowed on its oounterolaim ^%4,329.59« 
The aMowcit due plaintiff on the contract price was deduojjed from 
this and Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant for the 
difference, 13,426.09, 

Plaintiff appeals from this judgment against it and defendant 
filed a cros '-appeal asserting that the Judgment in its favor wag 
too small. Uae court allowed defendant Judgment for damages 
sustained \xp to September 15, 1940, and defendant argues that it 
should also have b'^en allowed the damages suffered between that date 
and October 19, 1940, amounting to #1,867.55, 

Defendant for many years has been a manufacturer of table 
and floor lamps with metal bases and fittings, which before 1940 
had been covered with a lacquer which was air-dried, rarly in 1940 
Mr, Ghanock, defendant's president, l^^amed of an enamel finish 
called wpolymerlne," which was new to him; this is a synthetic 
enamel made by a manufacturer, Ault & Wiborg which licenses the 


'> ■ ■ . 1 


oa&lxid p levoo-1 o? ^iffe itiguoidi "ttiffffjtsi-. 

1 AdIi,iao 8l *^w to floltftlXja^Bifi £>m5 sni£>Iitfd 

♦§8,^S.%i'l fltiBlO'-t!-3-fiUGo a;Jl no b- vtoLIa s-^w }jRa£)«»1:»C ,ai:xfJ ot ba 
f:>®t6£/fep olic? tojs'sd'aoo etii nc *'ti;J'nl.5-Iq ©i;f) 3"ni;oitto etPt 

-iBv, •x^ a;ti ni Jnemai:'^ iJieae* IaeqqA-3 a'6n:o a bolll 

*iixb iMii ns'^w^su fe'Wc»**»WQ »e««yiijai:) arfd" ftewoIXa Ke"tf 3VBd oaXls fiXuarifi 

«d3,VSc^ -.iniiTnucni^ ^OI^QX ^QX tecfcJoO baA 

0->GX -iG^'PCf iioJLriiv ^ogniJ .til bmt af^QSiC! Lat^^ ASlys aqaiaX looll basi 

-••ei ni v;Xie .Oe-iTb-^iA saw ri©Xdw iswposX b n^iw i>e-ievo© noacf £«ri 

xialxril Xeff.«fi9 nr, "io fjenis -X t;J-ne&i«©'iq e • d'iL&fifl©le£> jioofiariD .ifc 

Dj'^^i-fTftt^e B si si^ixt ;iairi c;! r©n saw rioiriw ^sciisnncXoq" teXXso 

u©oiI rfoiiiw g^otfiW :« crXwA .le-iWcroBlurwai & \fS 9bMm X«««n© 



use of It only to those who have proper faollitlee for hardening 
It by the application of heat* The enamel Is more durable than a 
lacquer finish. The use^ of an enanel finish wae new to those 
employed in defendant's plant and none of them had had any exp ^^-lenoe 
in baking enamels or the use of ovena for this purpose. 

In iilarch 1940 defendant obtained a license to use polymerlne 
upon condition that defendant obtain facilities adequate to bake 
this enamel on the products, Chanock was told that it was essential 
that the enamel coating be baked Im an even ten^; rature of 300 
degreed for the minimum period of ten minutes and thst this 
required a special oven, and plaintiff wae recommended to defendant 
as a builder of such ovens. 

Plaintiff was in the business of designing and building ovens 
and had been in this bueinese since 1919 j on its letterhead were 
the words - "Industrial ovens a spealalty, for enameling, drying. " 
The parties met in the early part of 1940 and Chanock stated to 
plaintiff hie desire to use the polymerlne for enameling, and under 
the license he could use it only on a pass oven, which would 
adequately and properly bake the enamel j that he knew nothing about 
this type of oven and would have to depend upork plaintiff to 
manufact\ire and Install a properly designed oven; that one of the 
requisites was that it must maintain a temperature of 300 degrees 
for at least ten minutes. Plaintiff told Chanock that he knev? all 
about the polymerlne type of ehamel &nd could naake an oven that 
would meet all of the requirements and that defendant oou:d rest 
assured that he would give a satisfactory Job for baking polymerlne. 
This conversation was corroborated by J, H, Letchlnger, defendant's 
plant superintendent. There is no denial that this conversation took 

After some further discussion a written contract wag entered 
into whereby defendant agreed to pay 12^403, 50 for the building and 

:.-i0..i- Ini^ re.tBB© M" T:6 Wow edT .rielnll rrei/pos^ 

9©; ,£l «9riu to anon &mi iffijalcr a'^jisfinsl^ft ai itearfojEqm© 

..Qoqiwq slrf.t lot snevo Ito ?>««' *ri^ 10 8l?>fflAfl© S^ljted ni 

lo'd' fj"«?r 2[#oit«S0 ,afiijJB6*tq"arftf no IWBflfle miti-: 

♦artfTfo rf»0« to lablJtu^ « na 

IJbllifcT .tti& •sittlif^H^fi to »s4Hi»tfcf «c;t ni a aw ttl*nlBl1 

nt-- jr?xsi sociR 88r>nlsucf elii* ni treod f»jari Sum 

o;t ha.^^i^ afr>^.fT.srfO brffi G^ei to ivLoq itliBf. ftrid" isl Jam aeiJi.sq etil 

le-JCx-c ^ ^wf-T-snEloq '^'i «bu oiT eiisoJb aid ttid"ni«Iq 

hl»^m d&idvs ^■ no ';In:. il 9bsj bLuoo e^ ©ansoil «rf- 

fioqx/ Sneqofi oit svsxl bXyow &n« asvo to s>qTj;f alii ' 

BBBtT^eb 006 T. xsctnisffi ii^tm ;it &s£ii sa* aaS-lalupei 

11^ ^v^^rflf -rff t!?5r[^ 7!m ';ri;riii^5X'? .ae^uni-O! no;t c+aBisX tsi lot 

i't!r- :.?; XeffiJMfB to «qtJ •ifiIi'=>»tY-Cc>f[ *fl^ J^wocfa 

';.^»0^ Jaabnste^' gJneae'tli/ps's ad* tc XXa ^©©b ftXucw 

,9fiii(?ffiXloa sni^lKd" lot cT" * i^^o^n-tsitBs a ©vi^ *Xi/cw sd taritf feeiweea 

a ' Jna^jnets'l) ^I'^^nldotr , ^ ,. 6»d"JSfodoiio«> qaw n61i/aBif«'Vfloo alri- 

jloo* ffol;t58&'T'^vric.o ^lAi (ferf:!- I^sin^'-b off si "iifriT ,;fn'?5n»;tnl'«q«a *n®Xq 



Installation of the oven, Thle was Installed and operation 
ooramenced in June 1940, There was convincing evidence that the 
operation was not satisfactory in that it failed to maintain 
throughout the oyen a uniform heat of 300 degrees for ten minutes. 
When the required heat wag less than ten minutes the enamel became 
soft and was easily dented, and if the heat went above 300 degi^ees 
It became brittle and blistered. Plaintiff inspected the oven from 
day to day and undertook to make changes and adjustmentsi assiiring 
the defendant that these would cause the oven to work satisfactorily. 

There is a large amoxmt of evidence to the effect that 
plaintiff and his son. Hover, Jr., and other workmen of plaintiff 
examined the oven and attempted by various adjustments to make it 
Beet the requirements but the oven never attained uniformity of 
300 degrees of heat for a period of ten minutes throughout the 
oven. Apparently the trouble was that at the open ends of the 
©ven, which was about 20 feet long, the enamel was not prop ly 
baked on account of the cold air coming in through these ends; 
that when the increased heat was applied to overcome this the 
enamel on the lamps not so esqjosed to the cold air were overheated 
and became brittle, 

A number of what are called Bristol charts and tests were 
made which it is said accurately record the exact temperature 
at every minute of the time of the journey of the lamps on an 
endless conveyor through the oven. These tests* according to 
the testimony of Chanock, Letchinger and a Mr.Hath, representing 
the manufacturers of the process, showed a failure of the oven 
to maintain the required de^ee of heat for the required time. 
One witness testified that about one-third of the parts put 
through the oven failed to be baked so as to be commercially 

Plaintiff suggested that W, K^ Smith, an expert, be called 
in to examine the oven to ascertain the trouble, Smith had ten 
years of experience in applying various types of enamel and he 


s?/Ij iMdji eo£i9JE>iva artJtonivnoo ?*«» sioiiT ^OhQl 9aul tit J^soasuno* 

nife^fliiain o^ l)®Xl8l ^i i^^d^ jdi ^no3oiit«i?Be 3'on s«v fleiiTB^eqo 

. o3"wjsIffl a»S lot afisijgafi 0C£ lo tf««i{ arxotlmr £ arv'o sd? ttforfswonri;^ 

sc>&fgrb OOs svoGs ia't^ t»0d edi "it bn^i «J&9:ffl«)jQ x^^Bas ajaw baa i'los 

%llioi9MlstIts^ Mfgom c^ asvo ed^ sa«-e© bluov ©earf- d'eii* ifrtjBfcnetsfi arii' 

1^13-;: lain 1o rnecnl^io?; -^ifJiSa-c btiA ,,it t . /^oH ,floa aW bOM t^ltnl&lq 

9xf* ^wofl[5>Kcid* aB^fJuXm a^i Ic 6&1^3q b icl ;t«?>£f to a^sig^Jb 005 

:.B9 iiaqo edit ob iari;^ a ah sXtfuoT.? eri^ YXwii9T:Bq<|A. .n^vo 

Xl ino 9id;t tgcoX ^t^ol Os ^i/ccfB saw iiolntr ^nsTO 

;al)fis saai^d^ xf^jjcs:^^ ni gnlffioo lis f>Ico siin^ lo ^ni/oosB ao b^siS 

arfl- BiiiC' emoo'- c^sXXqq* 2 sir #i*siJ I)©6a0noci edd' aeriw *j&ri3" 

£>9^Br:jd[T®-;^ if oct 6!f»80(p:9 ofi tfoii sqsiBX 9£{;J no lsm&a& 

*eXJtfiid^ aasoccf iaa 
jssj- -Dfiia s;?'3:Aiio loJaiifi ^©XXbo bi& ii^drr to tecSassn A 
©^x/.j-BT qia?*: BAt Mceorc i5l9;Jaiwoo« fcXjse si: ^l doldv &b&a 

o:f -giiltnooo-':. ^aia-fti^ u;. -ri .n»vc eriJ rigMOiri^f noisivno© 889l£^» 

aniJflo.'? , Jb H,rx&l a bsiB legr.irioJejJ ,:ioa«adO tc xnoffiitega- srf# 

nsv t » fis^forf© ^aa900«iq ©xi;f lo ffXftiixJoBlxxflBia MCJ 

^fiitli !.:e'i.fu^<si ■•iii.' A~I to €MWS«Bs. bQilupoi sdi alaiaJUUBi o* 

tuq iti& bnttii'-f^ao ^tso<S& isoLi bettli^oi aesntlw »nO 

^C.rivii:.' -tf oi as oa f>©ifi<:f sd c* bellMt neve Bri;J risuoiri^f 


fl«a- feBff riitle--i .aXcTiioid- arijr nlB^tsosB :t navo odi anliBBX* oJ ni 
©xl bua L'm&n^ to ««q'iJ eucliBV g>«ix-Cqqja nl sonsl-x; qya Ic 81»9Y 


reported to plaintiff that the failure to meet the requirements 
was caused by the open ends of the oven which allowed the esca|)e 
of heated air and the entrance of cold air. Although Smith wag 
reoommended by plaintiff as an expert in ovens, when he reported 
to plaintiff the cause of the failure and what could be done 
to remedy this, plaintiff emphatically told Bmith he didn't know 
what he was talking about. 

In September 1940 plaintiff refused to make any more attempts 
to improve the operation of the oven. Thereupon defendant employed 
another concern- Drying System, Inc., i^iiich made alterations 
and reconstructions. This was completed about October 19, 1940, 
and thereafter the required uniform temperature was maintainable 
and the oven worked in a satisfactory manner. 

Plaintiff argues that all the agreements and warranties 
are contained in the written contract; that the only issue is 
whether the plaintiff has installed the kind of an oven described. 
therein and that there was no express or implied warranty that the 
oven would p rform or function in a satisfactory way. To tiiis 
defendant replies that the positive assertion of a matter of fact 
made by a seller at the time of a sale for the purpose of 
assuring the buyer and inducing^him to make the purchase, which 
assertion Is relied on by the purchaser, constitutes a warranty. 
This is in substance the holding in MacAndrews & Forbes Co.^ v. 
Mechanical i^ifg, Co. . 367 111. 288, 297, This case fvirther holds 
that the intention of the parties, read in the light of the 
surroimding circumstances, will aid the court in arriving at the 
true meaning of the contract. That opinion cites many cases to 
the gam© effect. Applying this rule to the evidence that 
defendant knew nothing about this enameling method and would rely 
upon plaintiff to install a satisfactory oven, and plaintiff's 
assertion that he was amply qualified by exp rience to do this, 
clearly supports the position of the defenda-nt* Moreover, there 
was a definite warranty in the written contract, namely that 



>orv.^'-i;*f3p arid" Ibflii lis fee>;tB6jt( to 


^Cf £>9£>n8fiIfB00«*E 

el «i/e-^ " 

.Juodfi ^al^lRi aim ari ^ariw 

r^^oBlQJt^aa & nl beinow ««vo ari* ban 

" llA^isal 8^ lllJnlBlq 9ri* i<vxf3"8riw 
sisciqxa on 3j5w siari;t *3ri;t beta ale^9dS 

, ,ow -^-iic-CiCijAalvi.-' ' nolionu'i lo oraoti q Jblucw novo 

1^, saoq-ijjq .KiO "lol alse :1* 5>rii iA isllsa a \d ©1>^« 

,v ^oU BMto% A .3WS'x.t)ftri.CiaM £tl sniI>Io£t ariiT sojift^facfj/a ni nl sJtriT 

ablQil 'js<i;f'Xii;'i S3«0 aijc£T .?€2 t;863 ,1X1 ?85 . ^oO .^ti^ l aoiitJ&doftM 

sa'd ^o id^ll. Bd^ ai Ij^a-i ,8eJtJ*ii3q act* ^o aoUaBinl Bdi *ai« 

9dt S;^ axiivi'riB fli (J'xwoo a- -iw ,s90xxs*BU!i;oii© ijcl&xufoiitf^ 

o;? aseuo ^fi^yc rio^lo coiniqc^ Jl#^T' .ro^iitaoo »rirf ^o aniajsaB ainiJ 

ynd$ ©0£i&S>ivs ads' oJ sXt"! aJLrij gnixlciq^ ^i'oatt^ «m«a axid' 

B^lttinlslq bn» tflsvo TEi&*OJe*3i3'B£ b Xl-e^anl od ^"ilJ-fllaXq floqu 

jairiiJ^ Ob oJ ©oxieii qx'^ Y^f fcallll.wp xiq«r. b«w sri ;farf* noltf^aaaa 

ei9ri-J- t^jVoeiioM „irna6a®1ie£> ad^ ^o aol;ti8oq ©rl* aJioqciUB "iXia-sIo 


"Heated air will be provided by a Hover direct type, gas-fired, 
recirculating air heater, and will be circulated In the oven 
by means of a blower and motion* Suitable duct work will be 
provided to Insure an ^ven distribution ^ heat throughout the 
oven. " There was ample evidence that the o-vBn did not give an 
even distribution of heat throughout^ so that there we^s a failure 
in this respect. 

It is also pointed out that the contract provided that 
"workmanship entering Into the construction of the oven is 
guaranteed to be of the best quality, •• "Workmanship" includes 
the designing and arrangement of the oven for distributing and 
maintaining the required heat* CJuaranteee of good workmanship 
have been held to be the equivalent of a warranty of fitness for 
the purpose designed. , Salt Lake Hardware Go , v» Gojoell, 47 »vyo. 
145; American Spiral Pipe Works v. Universal Oil Prod.Gp, . £20 
111* App« 583; Day Pulv^^rizer Go .v, Rutledge , 238 Ky. 817; 
Economy Fuse a? Mfg. Go. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Go. t 111 F. (2d) 
875> 880. The contract also contained certain provisions for the 
capacity of the oven, which would necessarily ref»r to the 
number of lamp parts to be baked, 

(section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act (111, Rev, Stats. 
ch, 121 1/2 provides that "(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by 
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for 
which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer r lies 
on the seller's skill or Judgment (whether he be the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that. the goods 
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose," And sub-par. (6) 
provides that "An express wasranty or condition do s not negative 
a warranty or condition implied xinder this act vinless inconsistent 
therwlfeh, •• We are of the opinion that the implied warranty of fitnesi 


."cow *OLf-.' '^ r«r«tfJ:s;f:! ♦J«Oi*0*t fiOA IfiWOXtf A to SfLASB \<f 

fls Sfvl^ ?ofl l)iB neve eric? ^Mdi ©ons&ivfl olqma bbw siorfT " «n»vo 
aTtiriiiit s saw ««««f i-jart^^ o :, ^:!i 'josi^ts oidi *«eri to ftol:rudli;f8lf> a©T9 

♦ Josqa©^ alri^f Hi 

al jEov i:r6Jir!:;tanoo oxl^t od-fli giil^etas q-triBfl-fc/jufiow" 

aafiwXofii "qlrfsflJSiETliOVf" " .\;^-t-f«J&P *K"d f«4* to «>d 0J^ Jb99?ni8'i«»8 

Ma sflltwdii^Jalb 10 1 «9V : d"n-ao5fl.®riiB fcxiB {ftninalasft wit 

qiriefl:«aaffc s . •3;tnsiBi;0 ,tA€xf l>eiiwpe^ 8il;f anIflis;frtiA« 

«.ot assfi^ll Jo 1'fn.:^:- "-.Q d'fleX.avjti/p'i ed* sd o^ fcXfijd nsftd evad 

,c>c'^" Vl' «JX®f.r 0.0 ,v >c! r^ eijawfn a H maCaJ ^X^g, .Jbsngiasfc sacqriwq sd^ 

tVXS ^Yt 35;-; tS^iLSld^ ,v. 90 ^aeai^ YXiJ^ YgG ;56S ♦qqA .XXI 

^ji 6«nijs*no« oeX-s iosiiaco sxlT «088 ^3^3 

add- ct 'S's'^e-i ^iIiii5;iT?-o'>n blwow xloidw ^nevo sri3- to x*-to-aq^o 

+ *'.>f-3{;ad Bd oJ^ a;J'i-eq qroBX to ledmrn 

^f , .arid' Q9x)lvo'sq S\]ErjSU .xfo 

, mgbut, to 1X13(8 B*iJ?XX®a ftdt no 

9£io Ti oiltr Tfoil* ^tttBT- .^ r-fni n.r? «1 9ied;f »(ton no i^nu^ oBtun^a 

-difT f>r . ,. lOwa not Jit tXd&xioajssrt ad XXada 

^vX'Js^'^^fl 3 ^*:?if)'"r.o to -^tflaasiBW aasiqxR flA" ;fBd;f BeMroiq 

JTT'jr *9iiooni m3sI.. .>hw fielXcml jnol^lJbnco 10 xin&tn»9 a 

Y^ 5sllqatl ©d* tsaii noXnlqc nrf* to »n:« s'A " .d*Xwi9riJ 


in this case Is consistent with th^ express warranties stated in 
the contract* A buyer may rely on both kinds of warranties, 
Lldgerwood Mfg« Co. v, Robinson dt Son Cont^g C!o «f 183 111, App. 431, 
439-441; Lathrop-Paulson Co , v. Perfcson, 229 111, App, 400; 
American Spiral Pipe forks v. Universal Oil Prod, Co . > 220 111, 
App, 383; Lyon & Healy, Ino , v. Central States Hotel Go ,, 296 111, 
App» 345; Wool ton ▼, Crist, Inc,, 210 111, App, 6g* 55 Corpus Juris 
at page 750 says: "All jurlsdictione concur in holding that a 
manufacturer warrants the fitness of goods he manufactures for a 
particular purpose of which he is e:q)ressly or impliedly informed 
by the buyer, if the buyer relies upon the manufacturer's skill 
and Judgment in furnishing the goods," 

Plaintiff argues that polymerlne was a new product and its 
use was experimental, and cites Frost v» Van Cleef . 291 111, App, 
363, where it w&s held that as both seller and buyer were entirely 
unfamiliar with the product It could not be said that the buyer was 
relying uponnthe seller's skill and Judgment as to whether the 
mate rial would serve the purpose. 

The evidence in the present case does not support the claim that 
the polymerlne enamel was a new product and had not be n baked in an 
oven prior to the attempt made by the defendant. The process was new 
to the defendant and its officers, but tne witness Smith had had ten 
y-^ars of ej^erienoe with various types of lacquers and efaamelg 
and was familiar with the lacquer known as polymerlne, WllldHm Hover, 
Jr, , testified that polymerlne was merely a trade name for a product 
containing eynthetlo resins; that tnere are many such products 
which are baked in ovena although they do not go by the name of 
polymerlne, but all of them require the same kind of baking as 
polsrmerine - the requirements are no different^ 

Plaintiff says that defendant could have prevented damages by 

tlS^ ,oqA ,1X1 €,&.:. ^.,^. ». inos3. noc I. nosnidci-l ,t »oO ,s1M BoowxsaMJ 

jOOi^ ,■ •■ . f "I SS3 tC Qi'!3t--xa'i tV , 00 nog.X<if3q-»qo'xri;t6j ;II^-es* 

.III OSS; < . v^- ♦f'Ot'^i: XiO Xjaa-T^y-tHi,? .v aaC^xo'fe' 9<:^i'^ Xaiiqe a&oli'^mA 

,1X1 d<32 . » oO Xs.toH aeJ^-J-a Xi3T:r!'fi5Q »v t OnX «'gXjs--H A aozd ;585 ,qqA 

X-sxjL awq^oC 35 »58 .qqA .rXX OXS ».orjI tJ"3X'iO *v co.tXoc.W ;a4^ ,qqA 

)3 cfBildr 8nil>X(5il at 'tuvaco Qacliol&filtvl XIA" JPtss 03V egsq #b 

B 101 B^rTuioe^sjn.^m erf ri^^ — "^.c ssend-il oxiJ a^natiaw •S9iir*asli;aa« 

.bosrao'tc .' r . , r^ ,. ^,., -- . , . ...i.j;^ , Q i sxf xlo irfw lo 9aoqii/q •uaXiioi^'iiaq 

XXi?f? >'•-•; r.-M-f joy iuni.r f^rid^ noqu asiXsn leijwcf &il^ 11 iiQ-%"(i 9£it t^ 

,qq.^ »lii IPS t ):?sXO 4^aV ,v jeo?'g eoJJ'lo £>nA tIaS'nsffilisqxe e«w saw 

".Xsiitfr' ia'^jijd ii r-ig £f;^ocf as ;J'Bri:t J&Xsri a^w *i ©isriw ,C9C 

sw -if^ijyd Giic J^^xfir iXs n bluoo *i ^oudoiq orf* rfliw i&illmalsiu 

^di t&d:t^ d-iisacgiiyt ^J^ XXX:if3 a'isXXsa erf^nnoqjj snlxJ^*^ 

»s3oqni/q exftf aviso blwo* XBX"»a'«B 
jsriJf ffli^Xo Qdi iioqqur '^aso 3Ti*)Beiq sdi til »0flai>iv9 ©riT 

ns nl bsilaef fl-'sef S^oa D>uti bcin ioubaq w@n s sjaw Xsaajxs enliaancXoq ©ffi" 

TH©rs -^ , ' ibnaler) 9d:t •^cf 9£>dffi ;tqm«;t;t« 9di ot loinq xxsvo 

fi©u had b stiJ-Xw p.1.1 ;?ud tSTCPoi'jlo aJX fena *njabnslsi> ©dd" oi 

^l9in&ah 3oqY^ ajjoiiiiv a3"Xw »onoiif-qx9 fo 8ns«x 

isvoH fiUBJXIiW .©filiwflt^J.^ K-ni' iswD-o^I srfJ ri;tX«r islllm&'i a«ir £a« 

to da=5n Ofid" Aja' ojs d";,n ob Y'^^* d8ifoxi;tXa ensvo ni bBiiad sib iiolriw 

3S gnJEjCscT TCo 6i!L£4 ©BfiB oil? oilMpei fi?9ii* lo XXjs d-wcf ^©^X'I9iHX;Xoq 

♦S-nsnalllf) on ana atfneffls^Xwpei exl* - dxiiisflntXoq 


the exercise of reasonable caree There is no evidence of any lack 
of care on the part of defendant. While it had been engaged in 
the manufacture of floor and table lamps for 25 years, these were 
finished by the aiorlication of a lacquer which was dried by 
subjecting it to air. When the oven installed by plaintiff failed 
to bake the materials properly, plaintiff was notified and the 
whole matter of attempting to improve the process was then under 
the control of plaintiff and his employes. Defendant was diligent 
in hlB a tempts to improve conditions. 

Section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act provides that where there 
is a breach of warranty by the seller the buyer may (l)-a "Accept 
or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for 
damages for the breach of warranty," The money expended by defendant 
for alterations and reconstruction of the oven by the Drying 
System, Ino, , is not disputed. This amount was $810, 5g, 

Section 70 of the Sales act also permits the recovery of 
special dsmagee. After the preliminary t sts, which were unsatis- 
factory, "laintiff insisted that defendant continue to use the oven 
with the first changes made by plaintiff. Defendant's superintendent 
kept a record of the number and kind of lajop parts on which the 
enamel was improperly baked. There is undisputed evidence as to the 
work done on such parts. It required tue removal of the Improper 
finish and it v?as necessary to repollsh and refinlsh them* Le'chinger 
t stifled, giving in detail the number of such iinflnished prjducte 
and the work required to refinlsh themj that 20,225 metal oarts 
were damaged by Improper baking from July 1 to September 15, 1940, 
at a coat to defendant for refinlshing them of !S5,519«07, 

The court disallowed defendant's claim for damages for the 
period between September 15' and October 19 and gave as hie 
reason that defendant was not entitled to damages incurred after 
they had contracted with the Drying System company for the rebuilding 

ni fer5^;<>s^o n?5«f 5«d tl ©XMVi' .Jri^sSru^lsb to ^i&q edJ no «tca© Io 
©'X8W sa^rfi tBi-agt 32 not eqiaal eldjaij liius *sogI1 Io s^inToBli/nAffi eriJ 

enj DOS f)9ill*Gii v^JW lti;tnlAlcf ^X-Cl^QO'^q al..ilisi^si8 erit eiBcT o* 

Sn&'glllb Bmi in^n^te^i ^n^x^J^<^^ BJtri btm ttltat&lq 1;c Ioi3"fioe adit 

♦anoLtlbnco ©voiqarl et atqad^-'fl Btk fli 

d'qsooA" B-(X) Ajsff: le-^ctrd' silJf isllsa sri* ^d Y^iuaiTAw Tto rfose^cf a si 

^ni^iiO flil^t Tja nsvo ail;f Io nolj-owi^tanooei ftnfi BnolcfJStritlA lot 
*sa«0I8§- afivf SoiSijOa sMU ^b&^uqstb ion ai ^ ,onI (iBs^exS 

-aJt^tflanx/ ©isw d'jliivi ^atfg J X*^j8rtJtflilI<yxq erftf *!t9;^'iA «89sa&ifi£> laiosqs 
£19-/0 ancf sau 0*^ 9«r:xSnon ifH«bit9'S^f> Jvirid- 6t>.tRianl ttl^fniaL" ^X'ioio&t 

ejtl.t xloirfw no nJt^q qisjel to f>ni::^ fefws locfttarn ftdt to Snoo9^ s ^qsi 

ifjgoiqp4 ^* to Xjwofire^ 9 »t J&9*i:lnpftt -tl .e^tiBq riotrn no <^noE) <iow 

nesnljcis '>a «e©c[* rf«ifiitai^n« £ifej£X©qsn o:f ■<5iBnP90»n sew S'i Baa rislrtit 

ecfoi5.b iq j^edr-iieWinu daua to T:o«fiium exfif Xi®J©l> ni ^fii-rii tbeXtlts J 

aJiAq Xd*efli dSS,Os iferf^ ia©ri:;+ x£einltei c;f £>©«ijti/pei ;rficw »ri^ &rta 

lO^^f^X ^SX ■x^-'dnie^qsa oi X "^kXwL raoit gnl^isd i^qotqnrl x<^ l>©S«inab ♦rrsw 

,VO*QXd,.el tc ffierij 8«lfi8lGlts^ lot d-flans'tsib e;J- tf^od 3 is 

-t a®5.iiHi3.5 tot arXsXo Q^inMba»t&h foewoIXsai^ :fiyoo siiT 

eiil a« -*v*5i £)na ^X 'a:«»crG^»0 baz ax i^dm^^tq^e «?9i»*stf fcciiaq 

ir-^fljs bsaTwoni a9>^«fflJ3b oJ b9X;ti:tfie :^on esw *ns>ffftt*t6 d^JSriiT nosA^rt 


^jnlbXXi/d's'x 9xi:t tc.t xf^-J-^^ffioo ffle;ta"iC •grilx*s(j^ 9di dilw fee:tosi;J-noo bAd x^^ 


of thft oTen, ThB dftnages for this p riod aiaotintdd to @l9 867»55, 

and defendant by its croee-appeal claims tkls. The theory of the 

court seems to be that during tiile latter period defen<3ant should 

not have attempted to bake any of Its products In the oven but should 

have allowed it to st&nd Idle during this time. While defendant 

might hope that the t^rylng Systwi could put the oven in a 

satisfactory condltlon,yet the outcome wag still uncertain. Pltlntlff 

had refuged to attempt to Improve conditions. The defendant 

imffl<?«le.tely employed ths new eoneern^ Drying System, which Involved 

days of study, planning and designing, and several weeks in 

fabricating and installing the new s^ygtem. The p<=^riod from September 

16 to the middle of October was the vf^ry height of defendant's 

production season in order to get ts product into the stores for tl^ 

Christmas seasson, Xt would seem the part of wisdom to pperate the 

oven with the imperfect adjustments made by plaintiff, Thff 

altffrnative would be to suspend all production and by losing the 

Christmas season trade the dan^ia^s to defendant and tr&oe&ble to 

plaintiff's breach of warranty, would undoubtedly hav^^ be n much 

larger* By eontinuing to operate the oven the ciamages for which 

plaintiff .wa» livable were iesisened. Under these circufflstanees the 

trial court should have included in defendant's Judgment the damages 

suffered during this latter period. 

For the reasons indicated the judgment of the trial court is 

reversed and Judgmi^nt will be entered in this court against 

plaintiff and in favor of the defendant for the full amount of its 

damages, less 1903,60 the unpaid balance of the purchase price, 

or 35,293,04, all costs of this appc-al to be taxed ai^inat the 


' AMwUNT OF $5,2939d4» 

Matchett, P, J,, concurs, 
O'Comor, J., dispents. 


«dS«733«I$ 03 bf>inuom& Boi r q nidi %olt t^qiaMftfr «ff •asro td^ to 

hlu.i^& m«lax6 ititlxta «ifi Saikt Aqod ^djiifl 

a «vctQ6sJt D* #(qpEs;J;fa ©J d*^«flvt had 
.-. «... ^... ■» .,...-.,.. ^.^i^snoo w»ii a# 6«%oX^« i;X»#AlAftaai 
.4,-.=.* r.x..v .«'.r. ?,o,fl ,3|(ilfi8lsefe Ana g0lr:s|al«i; ',^^^e Iq «Xfi^ 

«irU « SJh i 4^ If '^W i *».4» ■ iJi** 

r«'S«l»£tOO «#l> •'^ «^ 




GOi/iPANY, a corporation, ""'"^-.-,^,^ , ' 



On Appeal of WILLIA^ L.EDMOxMDS, 

DiiiWEY, ..--" 

y^ Appellants 


Plaintiff brought suit against the above named defendants 
to recover damages for Injurlee received on a toboggan elide 
operated by Edmonds, Kollath and Dewey, The ca^use was dismissed 
as to defendants Kellogg Huntington and Illinois Brick Company* 
The jury returned a vercict finding the pepalning defendants 
guilty and assessing plaintiff's damages at |12, 500„ These 
defendants appeal from the Judgment* 

Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that defendants 

were negligent in the operation of the toboggan slide by 

permitting a dangerous ditch to traverse the toboggan runway. 

Defendant first says the trial court improperly permitted 
a disclosure to the jurors on their voir dire , that a foreign 

insurance company had insured defendant against risks such as 

were involved* Before examining the prospective jurors the 

attorneys for plaintiff asked permission of the trial court in 

chambers to interrogate prospective Jurors as to their interest, 

if any, in the Underwriters at Lloyds of London,, This was supported 

by an affidavit by plaintiff stating on information and belief 

that this company had a number of employes in Cook county and there 


( t9 5?Xl5?q<;A 



-u ( i>j:.;,..L:-4 ,Y-w a.. ^ YL' jaua »htajjo3 

< . to XssqcrA nO 

. .i. ;^DidHJ!AJ 

i ^Yawaa 



Bbtls rm-^'godi bevleo^n eQi^uial not B9gsmBb i«vooet o* 

bQBBlBslb aiJw ^s0&oi ^r:' .Y.owoa bti& dt&llol ^sfinoiaJbH^ ^cT 6»3'«'X'»qo 

lis? rtags'^'cfo;}' sxid- lo nol*sisqo eyrfJ nl tfnsgilasii srr»ir 
,X^v:n!Jt nsi'g'-^ocSoi arid" 9t3isvBiJ otf^ tioilb awotegnafe a 8nl:tJiBW?»q 

figlOTc ■? i ^.-gif3 li^Z *5ri^>^* no aioitft ©£i;:t od" sixisolosifc « 

ofii sioiwi;, evlJosqeciq arid* gflinlffisx© enotoa ^tsvLcvnl 9t9W 

fli *i«oo Liii'i$ ^i'a lo nolaeirti'^sq 6»3C8« ^llinl&lq fol Bt«>i«o:rj« 

jJaansdni lietdcf ocT 8» siotwt, evl;toeqaQ'«q ' 9d-asoiie;fnl oit at^dmado 

J&e^ioqqtf* ««« al 1T ,,rtoBni>I to n5i{oiJL ;?£ BTsrfltwtsbnU 9tii al ^xa& tl 

t9il«wf baa ncid^iantotni no sniitBd-B ttl^nlsiq T£<f ;Jlva6jt«A na T<f 


were others in Cook county financially interested in this com any» 
A oounter-affldayit filed by the trial attorney for the 
defendants stilted that the insurance company which wrote the 
policies insuring the defendants in this case was R,N, Crawford & Co,, 
which had 88 employes; that the investigators making the 
investigation of this case was the firm of Toplis & Harding, which 
had 65 employes, and that the attorneys employed to defend against 
plaintiff's claim was the fiinn of Ekern & Meyers* The counter- 
affidavit stated that no officer, agent or employe of any of these 
firms was "on the present Jury panel, * and that no other agent, 
investigator or attorney for any of the Underwriters at Lloyds 
had any financial interest in the outcome ®f the litigation, Couhsel 
for plaintiff point out that the counter-affidavit fails to deny the 
possibility that other agents, investigators or other employes 
of the Underwriters at Lloyds might at that very time have been 
sitting on the jury panel. 

The cour' permitted plaintiff's counsel to ask prospective 
Jurors as to whether they had any connection with any company 
that makes a practice ©f defending cases of this kind, or, "Do any 
of you have any con ectlon i^rith the Underwriters, Lloyds of London?" 
The answer of the prospective jurors was in the negative. Counsel 
for defendants argue that these questions were ifiproper, citing 
Kavanaugh v, Parret^ 379 111* 273* The coimter-af f Idavlt by the 
defendant in that case was positive In showing that plaintiff's 
rights could not have been prejudiced in the trial before the 
panel of the Jurors then in court. The affidavit specifically 
named all of the Jurors on the panel and stated that none of them 
was interested in any way whatever in the affairs of the 
insurance company. In aoditlon there was testimony that none of 
the Jurors had any Interest in the company. 

The practice in the Instant case was appr:)ved in gmithers v. 
Jenrique^, 368 111, 588, T^^t case has been followed in a number 


,Tj;rLs fiioo slrfd" al bB&so-j'^ial ■^Iljslon.ixiil xifm/oo 2I00O at 8'xeii;fo eiew 

9£it eiJcxw iloifiw piBqfliOO Boa&*tUBfii exit Sadi b&SiiB 8*n£Jbn9le& 
»,oO ^ MoIw^tO^H^H 8«w 93.80 aJt^i* nl 8(fru8ibn9^»A «fi';f gflliUBfll seloiloq 

/isXdw ,aai.6iaH & slXqoT "io unit Qdi saw ©sao aidcf to aoli&^liB&vnl 

'-nlags 5n©t;'=>Jb ou flOTjoIqEs ait^iwo^fctfi »iii i&di 6/19 ,8«>xoXq«9 3d bMd 

-^s^Hx/oo 3xlT ,8is-^9M & an^ii^ t^ anlt e4i bbv aXalo a'tlii'fllAlq 

inBdS tc xtvi to e-^olqws 10 tfaej^ iisolllo en iAdi beiBtB ^IvafciltB 

titnag-B TiPiiS'o on ;tiJd* Mb "tlenaq ^iJirt Jn^a^^q Sil;t iio" b«w tjviil 

Is>5«>/cO ««ol*^SlJ-iX 9xl;t lo sflioo3"uo add" ni ;*3«is*fii ls,lonanlt x;n« J^tiiri 

fi99(J ©vsjti 9ffil;J •^'?^T JjBrfvt oA ^rfglia 8i&"?oIJ[ *« 8isd2iwi»b«U 9ffJ I0 

♦laooq x^wL »d^ no snittfla 
evi^sqacic iajs o? X^sajjoo b * tlti^nl-oXq 6»^d'iara»jC[ ciuoo erif 

Y«Bqmoo Y^J3 rfS^ltv Rol^osrino9 xtui bAsL xatii ledJMfw o;>" as eiOiwt 

^ t -M Btd^ lo a&8«© i^alhaet^h !♦ »olio&tq a B^ijsa tjuii 

"VnoSnca to af>^oXJ «8'sed'l'xwi9JbflU »ri;f d^I*? noi^tos nof> -^iijij sved uox to 

XSsfiuoO .©vld"S8«n 9n;t ni a^^ sioitrt ^vitfosqsoiq oxljf to 'isiraniB 9dT 

anltio tiaqoiaspX riew anold'asx/p ©Bsii? ^aii;*' augte s^tnafcfiateJb "tot 

8ri* Y<f ;rivfif>±tt«-'i6;Jnuoo sriT *BVs .XXI QS^t ^^011^% ,v dsiiBnjrraJi 

a'ttldrtXaXq tsrfa grilworia ni evlitiaoq ttm asso Jsrid' nl i'naftnataB 

:ot%tf IJSi:*E^ 9ff3- nl fceolJDi/t^tQf n^fd 9T-«5d tfon l)Xi/oo e^ifsii 

TCXXBOltlORqe *Jhj^J8X>illij adT •itiwco ni n8d;t a-xoiwt sid;f to iBtmq 

fflfjrit lo ^non ;fsdd- 59;t«?a hKs, l*ft-Q<^ srf^t no anoint »dt to IXa fcenan 

•rf^- to BiisttB wli ni isvffijjsdur xxm xn& nl 693-8 dTiaitfll saw 

a. ^m^ y;ncinirfe sv* ti«w ©««d;r noi^-i&f jb nl ♦^n-^qrao© eoajmsanl 

^XOBqrae^ Btii :ii *a?>*t6;J-ni xaa btui a*iciisl sitJ 

•'«' ^t'-'Jii^i?^:-^ «i fcST •TtqqjB ««w ©aao Jna^ani sd* nX aai^Toaiq ©dT 

i9dsiwn s nl -bftwoXXot a^^d s^i 9bbo Ja^JT »88<3 .XXI 8d5 ,_sciipl2n9H. 


of subseQumt eases. In 'Nea l ▼, Caffa rell_o, 303 111* App,e74, 
the qto- Rtlons permit tefi %o be put to the r«spectlve jupore weire 
substantially the saMi as thos«^ Xn the laetant case. It i« 
eignifio^nt that in response to tl^se qu^^stlons In the 0*5^eal case 
ft TPnir^san answered that he wae eonrteeted with Lloyde and was 
excused with the consent of both parties. The queetians put to the 
rrepedtlTS jurors in the inetsmt ease might have r s ated in the 
same ^ay^ which emphasises the duty of an attorney to hie client to 
^&ke all reasonable inquiries as to the interest of th© prospective 
Jurors in the outcome of tne litigation, Also might be noted the 

at)inlan cf this court in a case where the facts are vary much the 


same ag/here. ( Halladay ▼. lyaoia Fields Sou .try Club . 206 
ill. A|>p, (abst, ) 622* ) In that case oounsel for plaintiff follewtd 
the procedure appro'red in the ^?mithers case and we there held there 
WAS no reversible error ia this respect, in the H&lXaday case, 
where the plaintiif was injured on a tobogg&n slide, we affirmed a 
Judgment for $20,000, In the inetant cage the amount of tiie 
judgment-ftl2,6 0, is not quftstioned. In aaallen v, hronpon . 263 
111. App, 540, reversal of the Judgment w&e refuged a@ it was 
apparent from the else of the vt^rdiot that the Jury w&p, not 
influenced by the reference of a Juror to the insurance oomr-any. The 
test of all such oases ie whether couns 1 used good faith in his 
requeet to be i>e mltted to interrogate the prospective Jurors as to 
tlw»ir interests in any liability insurance company. Here the 

good faith of plaintiff's ooimsfl is evident and th© procedure 

^ ,, cited 

followed has been approved in many oases/in 56 a* L. E. 1464; 106 

A, L» R, 1330, 

Th« aeoident happened on the evening of Deoemb'^r g9, 1938; 

defens^nts were operating a tobo^jaa slide n-ar north C^ifomia 

avenue in Chicago; the glide eonelstf^d of a tower or platform 

^j at b-~' .%iis »a«t> (tflAsfB/tJt fliti^ oi aTcn-srt «vitft«4|i«4c 

i3£jJ xCoBJ? '^«*t di4# sn«f« MUM « itl #*x)sf<so slui V.' flolalqc 

[^ftjtXfi^ l^i?/si: y^'^9 •»«o i^it «I (•std (.^e^Al ^^^ •1X1 

tsd# M©a 9^<»fi* ?s*' Sm.B m*ii ircgjijttlwe «tf^ Hi bsto^arui otub^Oiytq 9tii 

js &sis^1 I n(i5g^o#oJ a fie l>««v|,ia a^sv tiKTolAXq «f(* d-itrfvi 

j m»!i!^i^t 9^^ ^(<i XA«-39Vcn( «Q^9 .ciq^ *XXI 
<^i;^ ;r9l^f«v 9£is le Mis 9^ «»v%^afttumq« 

9rfT ,f, ■■ qiuboI fjAS ot i<3^©t A "ie cwjivxdin ««lt -ftf J^soiiejjXlni 

slff ;5i ilifii;;^ fojo© t«d^atf» ai •««•« il©6^8 jLU \o *at^ 

-uii-^rr- ' :i f^aswco ti*\^tinlul<i to ri»l«t *••» 

aOX J^S^X . . S'; nJ:\a«wti^ ^flUKP Hi 6*rontq<|« flr»«d »«I ftetroXXot 

,0S8I ♦/! .J -A 

id§««X »cr' '■■■•*■:-■ 3i5X«»vft «iiC* iro &f»i»«»c[afiil #n®Bl08Js wrr 

amr/V &«»«r.9lftC00 «MX* «ll^ JO^OixfO 111 •im«irA 


3d feet above the ground level j a ramp ran from the top of the 

tower to the -round, 254 feet long; on the ground runway, 
approximately 720 feet from the top of the tower, a ditch ran at 

right Angles to the runway; it was 6 or 8 fe; t wide and from 

12 t® 15 inches deep at its deepest portion* 

Plaintiff, then 39 years ©f age, with his daughter and tw® 
of her young girl friends, went to the slide at about 8:30 o'clock 
on the evening of Deoember 29j none of them had ever been there 
before and none knew of the existence ©f the ditch* 

Customers might rent a toboggan sled at $1 an hour, or if 
their own was furnished the cost wag 50 cents an hour. Plaintiff 
owned a toboggan sled and It was used on this ©ccasion. He made 
arrangements with a Mrs* Kollath, the cashier, for the use of the 
slide, paying her 50 cents for one hour. 

The three girls sat in the forward part of the sled and the 
plaintiff at the rear; the ride down was smooth but when the sled 
struck the ditch plaintiff felt a jolt and rolled of f the sled; one 
of the girls sustained minor injuries; plaintiff attempted to rise 
but was unable to do so and remained lying on the ground while 
asflstanoe was sought; he was taken home and the next morning 
removed to a hospital where he remained until February 6. Plaintiff 
sustained a broken back which was immobilized in a heavy cast 
which remained for some considerable time even after he left the 
hospital; at home he was supplied with a hospital bed especially 
designed for treatment of fractures ©f the back; he was unable to 
return to work until after the following Labor Day; heart 
complications developed during his convalescence; he incurred large 
expenses which were proved at the trial, and at the time he was 
still suf ering from pains in his back. There is no claim that 
the verfiict is excessive. 

When plaintiff approached Mrs, Kollath, the cashier at the 

J.S ttat iiOiMf) 3 »ic9«ro3- 9/i:f Ic qod" wif eiot;! toe's Osf xX»*j8iHlx©nqqa 
^aolttoq t&Bqfi&b stl 1f» qas* ssiionl 81 ©^ 21 

fsi«ri*i nsecJ Tt@v9 biid ssfit lo erton {6$ TstfoftosQ ^o gnlnsra ©xf;f no 

^o^lb adit to ©oHPitBixe srfJ lo w»ni ©noji fins '•iiolsd 

^i 10 jTtwori as X-' .t.i; .bTl.? ni::;i^odo;t^ jb Jnen tJrigla BfSino^ai/O 

llid-nlfil^ ,ii;or{ n^ s*n '» tfaoo siiJ- f>«d8lfni/l baw iriro flsd* 

9.&Bffi eH ♦c.-isjsooo Qjtf! 'W saw tl AnJs feala ««asotfo? « Aenwc 

M:} ^o set/ 91 <i?>iri8«o Biii ,j(i;JflIXo3 .b^M « ri*iw stneaidgnBiiiB 

.*swori 9fjo •sot a^Ties 03 ^»ri s**-^"^®*! tSAila 

f)el .;»fiw ?u<:f ri3'Gome 3-sw tmob ©J&Ii snif t'sun ©ri* t& m*niBlc 

»JK> jRftls affS- ^to BsIXoft i&n/r; d"Xc(, s ;fX©t ttl;tjtU:BXq £fo?ifc &iii ioui^e 

sai tqffl!=vt.ta t'iliJnijaXq jael'to'tiaX ncnljEt befil*,#8tfa aXtlg arl* 1© 

elXrh? hnuot^ oil* n© sni^X bnnlmsf^i hrm os ofc oif eXcf^m; asw ttutf 

SniiTCoffi ;)'X3ii difif Ms sffloxf ni;:?l6;f eisw dd ;;txi3yos saw ••iiA#ai»i8A 

!:ti*ni.e.r'^ .B ->,':':r Bt,ftcf©''4 Xi*nu fioniajflst srf 9i»riw l&^lqBod * oi b^romsi 

al SsslXlcfoiaiffl 3«w rfoXrfw ioBd nsiotcf a Jbejila*aua 

etftf tflSfl erf TetftE nevs ©aiX^f 9Xcf.a^f!>feiBno© i^^moa ict benXaffls^ rlolriw 

XXXalo^O' iB^iqscri s d^Xw SsXXwwb »3w sd eatoii Jb iXa^lqaod 

o* aMsau sbw 9d jiDBd oriJ to a siud-ojait to d'fi»ffl*B9i;J' lot ben:glm9b 

*T-serd ;X3G lodfij gnXwoXXct mi isJ'tij XX;ffi« if'scw o;f mistei 

^laX Sft^iirofiX ed tso^«oaj'Xj9Vfloo aid -gal^iub S39qoL*^*& anoii'BoiXciaoo 

3.3W ori ©ijtXit ed* c?jb fin,i ^l&lti sri^- d'B i>»vGiq a^sw ilolriw aaanaqpcs 

itiJd? loiaXo on ai siedT ,3ioBd aid nX axilijq ffloit gnlis tua XXld"? 

fc«Tia«*ox9 aX ifolSisv adS^ 
ad* *a loXdsJBo adi^ «d*BXXo ^ej'xM bari^Aso'Kiqjs tti^nXaXq nadW 

toboggan sj.lde, to obtain a ticket, he was asked by her to 

register on a card giving bis name, address and telephone number? 

he wrote these on a card which Is In the record; It Is yellow 

In color, about 6 Inches long by 4 Inches wide; the upper 2 Inches 

i# detachable and aft^r plaintiff hc^d signed on the lower part this 

upper part wa« detached and given to him and the lower part 

retained by the cashier* On this lower part, iniiaediately above 

the name ©f plaintiff in prominent type are $he words "Return 

This Redeipt; » above this in small, rather obscure type, are words 

purporting, on the part of plaintiff, to release defendants from 

all liability from any and all injuries which may be sustained, 

it being the intention to assume all risk? from the use of the 

equipment or otherwise. 

This portion of the so-called receipt was introduced in 

evidence and defendants argue that this was a release by plaintiff 

of all liability on the part ®f the defendants; that the court 

erroneously instructed the jury that t la release was no bar to 

this suit if they believed there was Induced in plaintiff's mind 

the belief that he was/assiiming any risk or releasing any claim. 

It is argued that it is the law that whoever signs any agreement 

or release is presumed to act with knowle: f^e of what he has signed. 

At defendants* request the court also instructed the Jury that if 

it believed plaintiff "knowingly affixed his signature to the 

Inst' iiment* the verdict as to the defendants must be not guilty* 

It is well settled law that where an alleged release is 

objrained by practices tending to deceive the party asked to sign 

it, it will not be obligatory on him. In G. R« I« Sc P. Ry. Co« 

V* Lewis , 109 111* 120,, 129, it was held that where a plaintiff 

was induced to sign a release "under the belief, created by 

defendant's agents, she was simply signing a receipt for expenses, 

defendant would not be permitted to plead it as a defence to the actio 


c3 Toa' v:cj £>02fa-a B&m aid ^tsAol^ «. ,fil;*Jd'G o;^ t^tbi^^e nap,so*f®* 

j^ecfrown snorfqelsd^ Ijfu^ 3«©if)&s taffi^sjK aixi gftivis Mes « no ns^fBJtgtw 

woXIftv ;6i:oo?»*f r-iicf fii. s;i ctojtriw J&ijbo s no ©sedJ s*o*rw «< 

siii? st&q tmiol s^ii^ so fesn^ia bsA 'filrinisilq *iPt%ji^fcna 9Xcurio;*;f9i> 61 
tl£iq iriwol s»£ld" 5xi:^ ne^^S 6nB fesrios.jeB a ^w ^''wq naqqu 

abtoTM ©IB daqvil r^iwoacf® •X9ri;^©^ ^XXaurB nl slsi^ avoo'^ " jj^qie&sH eJtdl 

0^%% Btfrnhmtsi) 08,seX9'' t uliRtMlc to it&q wi:f no ^^nitiocfrttiq 

^&Bisi.&^3is& ©€f ^JQBJ doXrf?/ isslt^tii-t X-C-8 ^^^ 'Z'^ fficil ^jrfiXicfsiX XX* 

eriiJ lo satr Qxlif motl sii^lt I -a 90i/«8« o:f nol;tfled'ni erf* snlsd 11 

• e8l<rTf»xi;ro no in9.a.qlvp9 
al b&ouboi^nl saw ^ql?>oei ^sXXjSo-oe orirf lo ccI;J'toq sMT 
■ll^tHlaXe Ycf sajisXri 6 a«t^ eiriJ t^:f ©wgtA 8^nJafcxiet«6 fixis Boa-'b£v9 
cf-xtf-' ; )nfi&flet»6 ada- 1© ^*tiiq ©dif no Y^*I-icf&iX IXu to 

bnlm B^VtMnl^lq_ ni bti&ubnl am; -nsdl b»v»ll^d x^^^ ^-^ Hsjb ?lril 

, , : y^ sd ^-Bd,. oXwoflX ri;flw ^-o* od' bsmvBt^tq si ftSB'-iXei: lO 

"ti t&dt xisJl ado fielowi^anl oaXs itsjao 9ri%t S"s«i/pffi *aJiial»nel9l> d'A 

9di Qi 9Tijy;J'snsl» eld fi xltljs ^I^fiiwonai" Itlsl-ffljeXq fesvalXscf a^l 

*t?;JI1m® ifofi o(f *^3«K e*iijBl;flst9& ©d* o^ a-e JolMf^v sdtf "JnefflUTrd-anl 

al saa^Xet f>©38.£XjB aa »«5f>d'» timt w&l j^eXJJeB XXs.* e.^. :JI 

a^lQ od" JbsoiBja t*i«q *qJ evl«o»£> o:f gnlMs^- a90l;f0JEtq xd bf>iilut^o 

«oO «.^H .1 :& .X #H «Q nl .fflld no x'xo:ta«lXdo ©cf #on XXlsr jTl »J1 

tll*ftlsXq £ sisri© ^stit bl^d ^bw ^1 ,esx ^OSX 4XII €0X tSlw^'J ♦t 

X6 £>9tffi9io jlelled oiiJ isJbjCM;*' 9aiS3X«>*t A ogla oJ fepotrlml 8«r 

ftBQwisqxs lol ^^qlQos'^t jt gnlns^s Ylfl(ffil» saw ©ds «8d"n€>^js a ' :ffijabn«lol> 


That would be to have an advantage from Its/wrong, which the law 

will not tolerate," In Pioneer Cooperage Co . v, Romanowicz, 186 

111. 9, the Jury was instructed that where the signature of the 

plaintiff wag secured by being told that it was only for the 

purpose of securing the services of a physician, and plaintiff so 

believed, a release so procured would not be biniing upon the 

plaintiff* See also Savage v, Chioago & Joliet Ry. Co .« 142 111, App, 

342, and many other cases. In the present cage no one called 

plaintiff's attention to the small printed matter on the card which 

purported to release defendants from all liability. He did not 

know ®f such conditions and hence could not have agreed to them. 

The simple request that he register his name, the make-up of the 

card bearing in bold type the word "Receipt*" the delivery to 

plaintiff of the detached portion which contained only the rates 

of charges for using the slide and the retaining by defendants' 

agent of the part containing the purported release of liabllity- 

these, with other circumstances would justify the Jury in concluding 

that plaintiff was intentionally misled and would not be bound by the 


Defendants say that plaintiff was told that the use of a 
toboggan sled with steel runners was forbidden* Plaintiff 
testified that nothing wag said to him about steel runners on 
his sled. Moreover, there wag evidence of other patrons using 
sleds with wooden runners who ran into the ditch at about the 
same time as plaintiff's accident* 

It is also argued by defendants' counsel that there was 
a large sign above and back of the cashier's desk warning 
toboggan riders that they rode at their own risk. Plaintiff 
testified that he did not see such a sign, and there was testimony 
by another witness that she did not see the sign. Although there 
were a number of witnesses for the defendants testifying to the 

waL edi iioiii ^ A'^>t.t ffloi^ «!j|a*ta*v5j8 its Bv&d oi ad fclwow t^T 

S6JC , ,^aivj-CigJ«eo/j .v ^ ol; _e>? ; ^;grt^^qoo,0 , 'x^gccil fll •• ♦ad-ftiefo^ tea IIlw 

9di to *>«*ii>:t.*inBJt8 «i;? S'sfsniw ^£uii baicuti&aX s^w xi«L arf* tS .1X1 

^ST «©|i -^In iiJ felGJl Siiisd x<^ £?9^0O98 saw ttXial&£q 

5ii# noqa -^ELllSmJiQ ed ^c^u l>X«<iw 6Bij/ooiq es »8a9l0Xiat&©v9iX«f 
qqA ►IXI S:M . #oO .^ eH ; r»vi:Xcit, » os^^olriO ,v ay^vaa «aXfi «©e .l^ii-nlaXq 

xioXxiw ftgiSB .<^* «o ♦i»ir*aK J&o;:f«X'iq XXsme »rl* o* aoitn?>^ta a * lli^tniJsXq 

d'ofi 5i/ IlicfJsiX XXb aoitt 9fn&bamji9b ©sfi'^Xn oif As^ioq^jrg 

,msii^ 0^ Jb?*eigij sv^4:i d'cn blij0& eonerf isaa anci^l^oo ilotra 1© woni 

ado le qwo-s:^; < in 'X9i»i^B*i &d iMic *8eirp»i oXqstli fuS 

aazfia-j »rir j9flXj*;taoo ffeidw actttoci btaio&SBb wi? to lll^nXfiXq 

*BJ^x^.afe^®1•sl> xd fkcsMl^&ei etU bei& »f>XX« &d^ ^ali&u not aoyiArio !• 

~^;)"lXi<f-«.; '3itiocrx«q eri^ aninXawnoo i^iBq ©n* 1o ^fm^a 

9£ii -^cf fentu a £)Xmow f>AS J&oXalffl ^XXsnol^-nsS^nX hbv ittinlBlq i&tit 

. ; '&Mcf*iGt a-rja- e'sajfrnj/i XfteS'a dtlv b&is njssgocfo* 

.9* a Jwocfs s&lsi Qi bX»a b4» jgnliid'oc it'.sd;t B^itld-gecf 

:s}f?iniT Bftoi^aq larfd-o lo ©ofiftMr© a«w aisriit ,ievo©*ioM tt&*Xa aid 

doilb «di ctfaX n*i wCir si©nxa/i naJ&ocjw ri;rxw afcoXa 

«*C9Moos a'lllJaXeXq 8A ©ffllJ «HBa 

8J6W ctttfi;^ ^^;f X^'Stuwc-©^ '»?rjsj^B©t?».& -^tf fcwf^xft o^X* eX *I 

gnX/iiisw ie©l> 3»ieiila«0 «rS* to it ojawf M# ©votf^ fl^-i* e,-p.'JdX a 

^tX:t.-'X^X<l .rfr'lT rr^-o Tisfifcis ;tfl 9f>oi x»^^ ^-'i* 81«6Xt . Ji«850<fo* 

^notffXJf t-'iS-'^s ^ xiows ei«a ;l»ia *X6 ««l J^siW" Aaitlitt** 

??T'?rf^ ri75trofi*'Xif; *a^is. oiitf i«e ^oii J&X^ eria #Aa^ at ©cJiw lad^efts t^ 

jtilx'mB'fi a*imfeBol«& ^i-i:^ Ttot aeaasflJlw lo latfflttra « eTtaw 


pr senoe of such a sign, It was for the jury to weigh the variant 
testimony and to determine whether there was suoh a sign and of a 
character to bind the plaintiff. 

The Jury could reasonably find that the presence of the ditch 
on the runway over which persons using the slide would go, was negli- 
gence. The very fact :^hat plaintiff w«» severely injured when his 
sled ran into it was in itself evidence of negligence. The facts 
are in many respects like those in Halladay v» Olympia Fields 
Country Club. 295 111. App. 522, where we held that a toboggan slifle 
must be smooth, and the presence of a bump (or in the present case a 
ditch) was negligence. See also Weifenbach v. White City Const. Co.; 
201 111, App, 521, and Fishbaine v, \fhite Star Line . 224 i.;ioh. 173. 
In this latter case the plaintiff was injured while riding on a 
toboggan slide. It was held the questions presented were for the 
Jury to determine and it was error to direct a verdict. There are 
numerous other oases where persons have been injured while riding 
on amusement devices and toboggan slides which hold that the law 
imposes upon the operators a duty to maintain them in a reasonably 
safe condition for the purpose for which they were Intended, 

The evidence fully Justified the conclusion of the jury, 
and as there were no reversible errors upon the trial the 
Judgment is affirmed, 


Matchettj P, J,, and 0' Connor j J,, concur. 

;in&i-s.&r erfj dsisv? ou -^lul edtt icl asw *1 ^n^is b xioiia lo ©onea-^iq 

xio*l& sd? to sofxt -.;v.v -^■^^ d'jsrid' I>nil ■^IcfBXioajae'i bluoo Xiul sriT 

ilgsfi 3SW ^os l)Ii;ow 9f>lle 9£l:f Snlau enoBi-^q doixiw fievo xewfiLn edi no 

aiil nexlw £»9ti;t«-^ ^f»^9»»8**» ItlinlaLq ^sjit ^oal xiQv eriT ,eon9g 

^.to-'^l 9riT .sonsgilasn lo eoneblre tLsBtl nl aaw *•! o^nl tun fisXe 

a.&XeJ:'^ £xqfflYlQ *v xgi^j^JJ "^ ! ^ ^-^ eaoxfJ- eTTlI ai'osqssi -^fim nl eiB 

tSila fi5SSodo;t b t:3dd- f)X9xl aw eisxiw ,Sa6 .qqA .III esS .cfuID Yi^tnyoD 

B saso jfasaf-rtq sxirT ni "xo) qmucf b to esneesnq siid" fina trid'ooiHa ©cf ;fai«n 

5VI »aoi: -^r.? , enlJ t^^S ad'ixiV' ,v enJt.sdxfe.t'g boB »I2S ,qqA *XII XOS 

;i 00 sfiXM-x elJtiiw l)9T:yt,ni 8.:w I'ild'xilfiXq srfi' saso tart^taX sldi jjl 

siiO" 'lo'i e'xsw bad'HSseiq anoieTesup ©dj" LXsri asw il •eAlXa AJsg^odo^ 

915 Qtsfil **oIM V i3 J^oeilX) oJ noiie bbw ?i f>nj9 ©nianc^l'sf) od" xisjI 

•gntl)li 9lXrfw fisiu^.Gl n^ed" svM anosiaq a^edw aea.eo tsxI^o Bucismua 

wel ■ Mori liolriw a@bllB a»ggo(So^ bns asolveJb JnsffisauniJB no 

rdsnoc^aQi: ^. ni lIt9rfc^ ala-^alBm o^ x^"^ ^ eio;J'-y'^9qo sdd- noqir asaoqai 

,I>9£>ned'ni s-isw '^silcf rioixiw lol saoqiuq exl;t tot aol^lbaoo et&B 

iXtsjl add- ^o nolauXonoo edi bsltltsiul ■^XXi/'i eoaoblre eriT 

exit iBl-x-t exirf- rioqjj aioiio sLditei^vei on siew eiario as l>n£ 

.JDSfflnilts si ttifimsbul 


316I.A. 4w - 

VlCtOiSX MUTUAL i^IfE inr-m.k 


Cij«o» mLivtmmp m% 'Wi^m or im e*:^»f. 

la»ttr«sia<»« pollay far tl.eoo i»$tt<id. Ftbrtt«ry IB, 1S=^@, to l>»r 

»blch In 1®33* 1»»e««» ia»l>lv«nt. fids paXley ana oth^r p@l.lftl*fi 
«©re r®-linisur«fd by defftadiiist. Victory Mutual Llf» Xasui^-nee 
Co%p^ny, » n^->*l.y or^nl&»S e9&p»..f\y, r&»r« Ba*"- « trl**l b«f>3r«« tlui 
saurt irlt^ut a ^UTff a find lag 6a^ Jti6^Mi»a« la <l«f«A4ita«*a 
f*r©i» aaa plfelatlff i»i5»^ftla. 

»^ la 1,»S£ « 9ttlt la »<^uity m^^^ filed In tfcws anlt«a r-tatta 
Mstrlot eo'ttrt, C'lgil««fa» »nA & x^eeiXri^r «£si>*?«, mho ta^k 
p0!$;i«i«»l«^ of Its as#«itt 4Mifi &1I aXulsfi ap&la^t lt« la«lutlng 
tb« «lal«« of palloy feald^rs, Gm Jiaa« 0,103*3, & r#-lii«mr«ufi©e 
«gT«<9a«nt WBR 0nt<^Tm4 latd p'urstmat ta & d»arft«i ^f liliftt «iaurt 
«nt*r«<l May 3^#195S» bwtiWim %hB r«®©lir#r «M tha old eoap»ay, -s-feioh 
iMi«^ by tba ilaltad ^3t«««g e&urt» Tttm Saare^^ r»«lt;«« tbat 
ai}tlQ«» »fe«? Klvfia ta sal p&r%l»«# lael-i41ag pollay telaor* sf tba 
olA Insaraaea eospany; t^t tba old oan^ay la laealwnt aad that 
It w»» n«««».»i*«ry for Ite busslnasf to b« ra-lneu td. tea o<Jurt 
fauacS Vuet th<» i^i*opH3>ft«4 la««ix^a@«» agxvaaent* vblels ^at attaehad 
to tba deor-^ffi, *a« a felr »a<i rw-aaoaable ««tti»A for oantlaulng 
tba btt»loa8s; It tmn apjsrov** sad th» ree«lv«r filrisotad ta enter 
lat© tjbe y*-laeur!&a^ a|^r«ft«#at wltJa tte« mit aoai>«ny. Tbat tr^e 

Ojfr^ • = 

r p 








;tSE(T .^:- .,::... 

,^«9f 14301 «flUI»«tf «4{S«X lit lC»iilv 

i-- :^:','£t« lk«91#j »ttJ.i<l »«r<w#<f* #•• 
^d(P ri».'i;r iin^'l*^''^ ••mnuffifti *Xfi 

■laa r.r. m^ n ---^ Si 1%91UU9U6 9tLf 

&na to tfe« ldfiir«no« <5«p«irtw»at of tJie ttAf tor approvnl; tb^t /. 

upon polloy nrnwrfw* l« to b© fl»ifi itsd is to to« tea»«di ^a tiSMi V_/ 

f»lr Ifltrlmslo v^lu* of ttes ©Id «i^iir*a3r «s*«t«, ivll 
p&lloyhol«#r« of th« Vlet^ry Llf© Aa»urtno# 0««|j«ay C©ld oo«p<feiiy) 
vli» do not natlfy tlM a«« ooap^jiy of t]tlf^lr iet«atioa to o&ne*! 
their pQlioi«a siufi t«ls« «. 4iTiae»A «re to b« preused to ~^ant 
thi»ir paliolea o«rri«d ia tteft it«« e@«paajr««» It «»« d«ereed that 
tbe esart r««err« Jurl^dietlaa of tis* «&»«« ftad of ell p»rtl««, 
for tim p^oppiiM* of e&rry lag out %im t^mt, and eondltions &f tim 
43f«?erfl«?-, tiao r9-ift«wrsiae« agrwig-sPBt fiM &ajr #tli#r ii*tt«r aot full/ 
dif-posad of » for & p«riod of oa® 3r#»r. 

Af%»rmtT&, pMrmn&nt to tl5» r^-la«air&?.ae« *.tr««mwnt, li» 
p«>e«lv»r and' th* tmns ooaaimfiy 9alof3l&t«d tlM lif»ii on t£i<» palloi#« 
an<a Fttortt&ry 15, 1 >34, tte r«d«rftl $oart «at«r»d en arder shleJbi 
r»oit««5 th*t im m«k%':*r ««»« ^1 to fe® ii^Ard as tte» report ^f tfee 
r«e®lif«r «if tia* old ©©•ne.giy aad ^paa r*««©lv»r»s ewpiT'lssentsl 
report. It furthnr r«dltos ti^t du# a@tie« «»« Slv*a to &11 
|i«rties« iavluding tbii .)2kaXd<P>r9 of palloi9« «M.eli »«ir4i^ iis f€» -@« 
4ttB« 0, l@33, fh» e^urt tjaen fiadeJ **"ti9at tfee x^mlmir &ad 
tJHe r?*- imeuriag eomp»ay itew toatstlvsly eoapiwttd t'ae lltn aijfelast 
tho rf's^nrait an oontlnuod polioi$e ^t iOf &iid uj!^ adjustw^nt 
tlMtrvia to tla« «x«et itiMsvoit ©f liua &er«lafcfti»r d«t#r»ia«d 
on iftciTldu&l pali«i«c on & premium pmftm$; I^sXm $la^ttXc! bo dof«rr«d 
until 0«e«eb«r 31, 1954, ai» fl^uld tl»9 ^ilistrllnitlon of ^ny profit 
aprsllosblft &8 af ;->#0'mb»r 31, 1S?35 to r«idu«« tiwi Ilea a« 
proYldod la til© oontraot af r^ittettr&no*. * 

Ttoait to sitvo umi9o««@«r7 &®tti&rl&l #xp«a.«9«, tim n^m 
eomp^.nf is pjrmittffd to mwrt tb« aot«^l ftpplieation by ««y >5f 

it^manimal f)di t>S hem 

;*.qaB«9 W9JI «*» ttitOO t-" *■ ^ «Mf« 

i&di bs9T- »?,«^,.. .. ..■^.•=. .'^u «it «* tt^lqptia© JS.»i»Jt£»Q mlMlt 

^..q}- '-iie t--'^' ''^s **^* •^^ ^*^ t»iri»*i»n 
d •«£9ix«»<? l^tAitHml Jit 

er«41t to ftay r^mTf vftlu* (»f unf «on>r« t«d or e^Attntt9<ii pallel^a, 
^ttee <$lff«r«!i«« l>«tw»#ii tfe# t#ftt&tlY« o®aputAtlan of aivldeiii of 
40 p«r «i«nt suid oorr«»pow41ttf ll'»n of SO p^.r mnt, &n<S that 

«h&ll oowp»ut« th« ^efual ®r*4lt t^ »&eh r»-mT99 «»«®*iltl«|f fro» 
tte« distribution of ealdi l%«»fi* tl^%t from tMg ^i^t« «t.apdl. until 
0««««l»«r SI, 1^34 t1» relnnttriJig «a»i^#njr amy sjj>#r&t# tlae lBwiilii««g 

ttiiil.»>r im t«nt*tlv» Ilea af 00 jj€r t^nt fe«r«twfoi»t U8«<^« iMfelclnf 
ttp0«»s«ry ii.<IJWff.t!8®nt« at 'O»o«»b«ar Sl#lt34# #»tB«pt in tjs© e*»« &t 
p&lieX*B t»r®lai8«.te<l. * tlat oaurt petalo#di Jurledlotl-sa "of this 
o-&m«# aad, ©f all psrtl«» Iwsreta in«lu.<linf thu Vlotai^ ^i^atwa.! i<lf« 
i0«tti»ano« Cosi|>«.ny» t&T Vm piAvp&m of enrrylng a'«t tlM> t«r«» of 
tiil« ©r4«ir. * 

Aft''rw»r<!l» «|!»%»a^r ti» 10$4» t«f»a^»t, tli# ntw ijipiiy, 
fl1.«d lt« p«tltl-^ia lit tisw r«d«r®.l 9«iurt» r«*«|tte«tlag la#tni«ti«»ii« of 
tlSBS 9^ur% *r<»«*«UB«p tlm (Slatrltewtidn toy It «»f f^iamlag;« cm ©©r-aujit 
of f^-lamupw^ l5ftttl!i«i« «ns«S on *ee@«uit of tl$,«> *^-if&ly«itic»tt of iitr-ete isn 
mrsfsQ^at of th« «o« af rt-i««itr*fl»©«t *• In «M.®ii It *«#( #v«-rr»<l 
ttot «ln«« tlM» iiatry of tb« «3»©r«« of M&y gS, 193;5, It, tii© a^* 
eo%pa.ny, tiftd 4a#e«rt%l»«id thi-^t na provlgloa «i»r> m^Mi^ In OK,'leul«).tliig 
that timn far «. ©mrpiliia ©f |li:30,OOOwhloii th# iasuraa©® i5«p*irt«»a1i 
of tJs« 3t&te »slt wa« ni»«» •■' s''«,ry f&r tt*^ a«i» e«».aay ta oa«tlnu«f 
In tii« liitttra«o# b«i0lji«e«» flmt It te-i a&iiiii»« s jf^t^ltt*»,tlon Qt 
Bom^ of im m»^.mt» Qt tiim tx^mpsm^i timt mAmr t&« t^-rma --it the 
r?»-li5ft«ir8k.nfi# oontr&et ami tii« <ara.#r ar d«ewMi ^at#r«d f'^bm^iry 15» 
ll>S4, It 5w?T r««jwirt^ to dl8t-tl»at« ms at r^ewalwr 31, li?34, aika. 
l>«rlo^l©«lly tJaarefeftrr, «11 of tist enrreat earnings' of ';}:'«# r*- 
liPiBurtO. iis>uiln#ff«'^ In r-siauctl-ea ^f th# il«a on tia# &"AU««d tmeln«ss; 
"aniS. %1^Q to <11st;-l^t« «lAlXarIy tk» of ^ftld <3ftt9 th« dlfforeae* 
t»«t*f««a tim t«nt«tliw»Xy oo«DUt«d llira of 60f^ *atf thf «i.etual Ilea of 


-lit ta a^iUlif^ :t^ 

ifoiffwOOO iiIst'^WB il tiftt ll»ll ftrfJ 


■0 ««1X i:.a«t»A •^ii* *ft* ^m I/O «»iX fr.*f«i':rm8o ii»Tl**tiB»* •AS mmimt 


B7,09S$ fix#d bjr thi« ocurt;** tii^ t Lt wM SMM Aiiry to la».im & 

eoa«trafl)ti'aii af the r«;— lAsur«u%o« oantraet bjf t>l»s) oourt %n€ th«t 

h9 ftppr. tr«4» it »»• further All«ig«* tmX tJ» f««lv«r ««A all 

eowrt eoaSvru© th» i^-ln««,rs^»«« oantraot and tlstat tir»« jwe^lvsi* b« 
«tt'liorlKi»S to ^Rt^T into ttm fiuppl9«t«iitiOl ooatraet. 

On the g«a# (iigr, th® F«d»nil eourt »nter«« an order «Mobi 
r«dlte« th» auittftr e&s* on to* tei« hv&rd oa d«f«ndeLnt*« T*^rffl<»d 
p<»tltloii aiid th« ftiiffimr of the' r«!i!itlv<»r. thi» oomrt thtun fom%& tasX 
*ltt t&« 4««r«* »nt©r«d M«y i,'8# 193v tlii« «owrt r#»'»t^e4 Juriedletlon 
of till© etettssff and of fell ■f3«rtl«» fe»i»eto for the purpose of earrylag 
QU% tfebi ttrMii i&n& oondlt'';m« of t}»» i!3»0r»« and th« r«>*lngtti%ne«i 
oontr«iot» iu»d for th« furtiiieT purpos« of dieissotiitg of any »fttt^»>r 
not ia tii« aratr «»d d«ei^« fully dl«po««d of, * *• «• fjjBtt *to ea*t|»l« 
thB d,«f«ada«t to oo«ply wit,u tte r^'^fqialr«j»««iti!! of t&« illinal* 
lnaarfea©» Bn^^rtwtat and to b«»oa« ll««>a®«d t© do bMsln**'?®'* in am»T 
Stat«» tii«r» shaulfS b« a '♦frtfl «arpltt« of 1100,(00 %f i^ialii lt» 
«ji«tt« «kdald #9ni«ttd Its IlaMlltleft. "^ 

fla»t tli« or««r of «r«»brttary IS, IM4 fixing; tfe« r^re«ni*ii tf 
ll«a on ©ontlsu«d poll«l«» * « * di4 aot t«ls» Into «,©?>ouat th« 
9r«^(itlaa of &ueh &» l%ma of sarpltta. * Tlut oourt f ouad tbet th» 
mipplesamnthl'* '*««*' s»t "in fAlr ®ad «QMlt«.l>l« a« r"f»rd3? i^^lloyhold- 
#ri aad orr^dltoro « * *, Xh&t da® aatlo* baisi befta «riv«a fey ««11 to 
all polioyi3old#r8 ftod. or«dlta]*»; * th».% tim eontraet of n^*laottr&aa« 
^'eho'al^ b# ooii«t9*vt«d &M aarrlod oat by thm i^-ianurlag ooau^any ao 
h«r<$lnaft«%r p'^Tldtd.* tho a#w ooapaay waip Auth.rlt«d to r^v&lu« 
Its a$«-^«t0 a# p#r eobodalo ar<ta.alM»d to Itii p«!'tit.loia; »n& "th^^t th« 
eontraot of« 'aay provl»Iona tiwreof to tfcio eoatr&ry 

.c.;:n3*« t»/i.J'!irt trtJ tOt 6«i» «l9'*'V^II0« 

k1<:< '-rx&r*^ ffl'Wff'fcft ttifi *t«fciru tM<* Hi Ion 

':^&^ «*♦ &■■& ?a*»«.t*iife5t»^ «*»ii*Tir»ji2 

- c Xuciia •#•!«•« 

«1«K(^ ISMfQilAe* oe ii*iX 

. i- 

, .:. ^flb» «^«l>X<Mlft»iI«^ XlA 

i^-lneurln^ ooapAay «»« )a«r«laai't«r prarldtdi. mnA the r^-insurlnf 

eflwi|f»«iajr aaa th« i^:W««lwr te# and t.h»y ttr* Iktrobf «at;i^.Tlx<Hl ta 

©B© &r »M®fa l« tttet tjjit *a«>t «*ir»ftt taralnga fro* Sufiilaasss-- 
mntmm^ te«iMil« fitbraary IS, 19M, tfeus la tff^et i»klaf «i»» 

wltHottt ialng iat© d«t«U, m*f thSaOs. tb#y *#rp' all pi»©»^-l,3r «<S«ltt*4. 
'Tliwi^ is «a eant«Rtlua bttt t^t tfeay »l^fe« %i3» ^rutte. It ■»«© 

f«tl|>iBl«toi4 «m& «gir^--4 toy tii« purti^n %h.€^% h» i^eo-rds, af tli« ««f«a«« 
»at, tto« S3M9» la«»j»aiie« e^ai^isjsy, p^^r-t^ifilnft tiu felsw 5>«>ll«jr iavi3lt»«t 
ei»o»*»« tJ»t It *l&pe«di. fgr ii«»-p«!y»«Rt of s^r^^mliaiR iue -m August 
l«t l;>54i tkiit m tMt ««t%i» t^ p^Kf-^ irmlm #f t-^^e pulley »*« 

ti^@a toy t^ ©®-«f&tty m® «0^, uMis^it with intisfe^t, a«:>tti»t«4 ta 

wltfe lnt«reii»t from tl» p«^««: mlw» «».f th» polley ltfeir»# « r^-ettltlnip 

«.ppll«4 toy tii« easimay <m tii« pvam^i&» »f »iet*?::-iio4 lasuwin«« for 
tk» f«i0* *«ow»t 3f tm jK>li«y, l®«r^ lii««tot®«lii»fw, niiJSftXy, 
«i»4l«l.00, for 3 y-.r« a*i« $« «&yii fro« tli» 4&l« of lftpi«, «K?.^lrlii« 
0«t©to»p 13, 18;J7,* * * 

*If th« ll«n lfi(8»tot«<lB»as It fi|Ettr»4 t^t 57 l/im, Instsad 
of tl» 80^ ttt#<S by «»<« ©ospaay, ^4.«« tlm otiM?r faote b<?.lng t£» «^.«« 
vltb r«ftf>«ao« ta |pmf^«.» valuft §iul lo^m lndntot«dti«9i!i «« «it4tt9d atoov** 

ri».j» &M« lnf$ ultNultm 


tb»B tm n^t m.Mh v«^lu« of turn p^iltof «t 4«t« ^t i&ps* woulB 

«3Kt«a*i®^ ln«Mr<au«« af 11,468,00 far ^ y*'»p« ».ii*^ 9S dayt, sxplrlair 

tte polley «Hii tla^re/'or* tJi« »»% o«»te iral««» of th« p»iii»f m^uM 
puTtam,m 9x%*!M^4. .iQeui*«tiiee t© ^oir»«b<»r 19, lf'37, j? ^;:';«y« &ft®r <fis«s 
IngUT^* «.l«4, «kin« tlanptfar*^ ti^ policy *«■&«' la fill I far©* luad «ffttet 
At th» tl«« af "&4t*« dftiitli. Oit tl3# otfe#p ttM®, isifi»io«l»nt*« piisl- 
tlaa It timt ^0$ 1« tfem pr-o|5.?»r p«jro«iit«^-g« ta l>» tts®i. lj» ©©aputlng; 


ir«liiii of ta* mli9f wouM purakfe»«/in«wr^.n««- wM«fe wauia ©jtplre 

Dotoi>«r 1..,, 1927, 3S <'ittys befar© wa««»« «««tk, tteftrefarf %im polley 
)»all l«tpii)t»4. mKl %lm pHRif^mmt <a>f im e^itrt tn 4«f«iici:«at*«i favor ftliauld 

GoMaS"?! f-:^r .^li^latiff ©amtieiM fefeat i« «as!<8 of amMiftiitjr 
©*5iitr»ote of InstirsdMiw «tad of p»-iii®ar«a©® steo-iiid. fe? lttef*»r«iiiy eon- 
stni#«S In fifciVijf' ,;if tii» 4ja8^«r«4 i»d &« to pr«?ira?jit a f©rf*ltwr« Rod tt»«t 
wfetm tlfeff laj*fiiss.g« af {!:tt«li eawti^etg It af dautetful «■ fealeif , 
rtfijrwa©*' m&f to® fe!,»4 l« ffeMs nl^^Mlag'Ji af ta® eas*. -^^ tJalii'k tfei« l» 

^;' f4, Llf < » , Ifi^t „ gig J . 860 ill, 6»v'?, 3t9, jkjwi ©i^ttn*?*?-! argut thifit 
»95*lylng tals rwl*^ »f ean^tntj^tton ta tfe.'- f^fttt in %h» o&fte *t b«p, 
i* follawt that 87,1* is tfet pi»op«r js*'re^«ta-i« to ajtjply is 
»«liml»tlnf th# valttf af tl3« pollay i» «5«#!«tl.;ia tiiisit tait »«« felw» 
1M»re«fitag» fisunA ia tlu» 4l«ttr«e«» af tlBta P«d@ral eourt @i!it«?«Nid £^y S5, 
1933, «ii»9 ttafit this fftet «%« fiot i^baAg«4 Hy tJM 9r<i#r9 df F«ii»rtt«ry 
15, or s«|^t«tt!ft«r 1^, 19^, 

' ■,&^'»W'>& 9f »Miem%sU. h<»h»»tx* ^^juttmim 

:; K»«!^»« '*■*-- .„-■ - -■-. ' jJfcdT lis 8cli »sUf tit 

^..5.,.. •■'■-•? «^ ,tA& 5S .teSf ,.,X ta<i4#C 
t^--.*.«'-*?w*f «^^'» 5^3 A#««4X ftJMl 

•^q «^ »i ^.TQ tMtl$ 9««Xlol ti 

* ■•■- ■■ "^'.^ nins*lii •dr fti keat^X •>«*«*»'» <wi 

\>j-.>4--j 4r^4 »«« #«^ ai4i t«Bitf i«« •&$$! 


We have above set forth /fully the pertinent provisions 

of the orders or decree of May 25, 1933> and February 13 and 

September 25, 1934,p and we think, upon a consideration of them, 

it appears that when the decree of 1933 was entered, the value 

of the assets of the old company was more or less uncertain - could 

not be determined definitely and the requirements of the Insurance 

Department were not fully understood. When it afterward developed 

that the Insurance Department of the State required there be a 

surplus of $100^000 so that defendant would not have to go out 

of business, with the result of practically destroying the 

value of all the policies, the matter was taken up February 13, 

1934, with the Federal court* It had retained Jurisdiction for 1 yeai 

by its decree of 1933, and later, in September, 1934, all of the 

parties were before the court, including the policyholders » The 

court construed its decrees and orders and definitely fixed 60% 

as the proper basis to be used in computing the lien indebtedness. 

Although all of the policyholders, including the one in suit, were 

notified of all of the proceedings in the Federal court, so far 

as the record discloses. Wade made no objection to the orders 

entered. In these circumstances we feel that we are bound by what 

the Federal court did, and the matter ought not to be relitigated. 

James Blaokstone Memorial Library Assn . v. Alton R«_„.R«__Co., , 316 

111. App. 70, and cases there cited. 

The Judgment of the Circuit court of Cook county is 



Matchett, P.J., and McSurely, J., concur. 

anolaivoiq ineal:t'zsq srid" x-f -E"^ ^^tol *9a svoda evBri eW 

tiaarii- lo aoX^Bieblaaoo b noqu ,2lnin;r 9w Mb t^^Ql ,32 -sscfms^rqea 

80lev ed^ ^fjaiedris saw 5561 ^0 ss^osfi afiS nsrlw Jarl;^ aiBsqqjB il 

bluoo - nlBd-ieonu aasX lo eiom asw ^naqmoo Mo edt ^o a^saaa sxld- lo 

sonBiuanl edit ^:o ai^nsmsilupsi ©il* bna xSisH^'i^b bealm^Qisb sd ton 

fieqolevsf) biBnis^ts il nsrtW ȣ>ood'art9f>m; xLlut ioa snsw Jnsmd-'iBqsCI 

B 9cr arc add" b&itsjpei s^BiQ edi lo inQOiit&ciQd Bonaivaal sd^ iadt 

itjo OS oi svfiri d'on bluov iasbaslsb d-srid" 02 OOO^OOll !to eulq^ua 

sdd^ gnl^oid-asJb x-TlBoUoBiq lo i^Itfasi odd" riJlw tsasniaud to 

t5I ■\t'iBincf9'5 qjj neiiBt asw ^eiiBa srid" tS®-tolIoq arid" 11b to smIbv 

tB9-^ I nol nold-oJt£>ai:iwt JbeniBd-ei f)Bri d-I •tfii/oo'S add" ridlw j:^5ei 

odd- lo IIb t^G^-C tiecfins^tqaa al ^le^iBl baB ^SSei lo esnosf) aJ± Y^ 

9dT ,8i9£)IoriY0lXoq add" 8nl£)i;Ionl ^d-ii/oo arid siolacf 9i9W eaid^iBq 

^06 f)sxll Y-Csd'inilsS boB aisJb^o f>flB asenoaf) sdl baviienoo d^iiroo 

•aasnbad^dgBni nsll sdd" •gnlitsqmoo nl beau ad o;t alaBd leqoiq add bb 

919W tilas al ano edi -gtilb